The Stanford Program on Regions of Innovation and Entrepreneurship (SPRIE), in collaboration with its more than seventy research affiliates in seven countries, continues to describe and analyze rising high technology regions across Asia.
This two-day research workshop at Stanford University aims to bring together experts to explore the nature of the connections between universities/research institutes and industry in the United States , Taiwan , and Mainland China . Within this national and international context, the workshop will focus on several leading cases, including Stanford University , Tsinghua University in Beijing , and the Industrial Technology Research Institute in Hsinchu Science-based Park. The workshop will facilitate exchange of data and ideas among leading scholars and practitioners from several disciplines, institutions, and countries. Workshop proceedings will be published and distributed by SPRIE as part of its Greater China Networks program.
In recent years, the rise of the Knowledge Economy has underscored the essential role technological innovation has played in economic development. As key institutions in the innovation process, universities and public research institutes have become the center of many theoretical and empirical studies, most of which have focused on the various roles of academia in national innovation systems and their linkages with industry in fulfilling these roles.
Okimoto Conference Room
President Bush has claimed a renewed mandate, and has begun to reshuffle his national security team. Condi Rice will move to State; Steve Hadley will move up at the NSC. Rich Armitage and Jim Kelly, who have borne much of the day-to-day responsibility for U.S. policy in Asia, are leaving along with Colin Powell. What might we expect of the Bush administration in its second term?
Generally speaking, continuity rather than change is likely to be the watchword in foreign policy. Above all, the Middle East and South Asia are likely to remain the principal preoccupations of American concerns. In Iraq, Washington will seek to acquit its commitments - to hold elections, train Iraqi security forces, and accelerate reconstruction projects - with whatever measure of dignity and honor it can muster in the face of excruciatingly difficult choices. With Yassar Arafat's death, American engagement in Israeli-Palestinian issues is destined to increase. And Iran's bid for nuclear weapons will continue to challenge the United States and Europe.
Thus Asia will not have pride of place on the Bush agenda. Yet it will continue to command Washington's attention. Why? Because it is in Asia that the interests of the great powers intersect most directly. Asia is the world's most dynamic economic area, and it is becoming more tightly integrated. Washington cannot afford to neglect South and Southeast Asia, for in these areas Islam presents a relatively moderate face. And North Korea, of course, poses a direct and growing challenge to the administration's nonproliferation policy.
Fortuitously, the United States is better positioned in Asia than in most other regions. Our military presence remains sizable and retains mobility and flexibility. Our economy continues to generate solid demand for Asian exports and is a robust source of direct investment. While criticism of American policy is widespread in the region, it is not expressed with the virulence that is seen in Europe and the Middle East. Above all, Washington has cultivated the Asian great powers assiduously, and has managed to improve relations with Tokyo, Beijing, Moscow, and New Delhi - a substantial accomplishment. It remains to be seen whether it can work in concert with others to ameliorate the sources of discord on the Korean Peninsula and over the Taiwan Straits.
The United States, to be sure, confronts some daunting challenges in Asia. If the U.S.-Japan alliance is in excellent condition, defense cooperation with Seoul remains troubled by the sharp divergence in U.S. and Korean perspectives on North Korean aims and strategy. Nor have we found a solid basis for pursuing with Pyeongyang's neighbors a coordinated approach to the six-nation talks. Regional economic cooperation is taking shape along pan-Asian rather than trans-Pacific lines. Developments in the Middle East threaten to "Arabize Islam" in Southeast Asia. And the "Johnny One Note" quality of American diplomacy - i.e. its preoccupation with international terrorism - often plays poorly against Beijing's more broadly based effort to provide regional leadership.
Nor is America unconstrained in its policy efforts in the region. Our military forces are stretched thin globally, impelling some downsizing of deployments in Asia. Huge fiscal deficits loom, and with growing bills falling due in both Iraq and Afghanistan, resources available for policy initiatives elsewhere are likely to be tight. The president has succeeded in pushing negotiations with North Korea into a multilateral framework, yet Washington is being pressed by its negotiating partners to adopt a more conciliatory posture. The democratization of Asian nations, while welcome, does not automatically facilitate U.S. diplomatic objectives. Recent elections in South Korea and Taiwan were decisively shaped by a new generation of voters. Governments in Seoul and Taipei are increasingly accountable, yet viewed from the United States, they are not extraordinarily sensitive to Washington's views, let alone deferential to its lead.
With these considerations in mind, one should expect President Bush and his foreign policy team to continue cultivating close ties with the Asian powers. Whether Washington can effectively utilize those relationships to roll back North Korea's nuclear program and avert crises in the Taiwan Straits will depend heavily on its relationships with the governments in Seoul and Taipei. And at the moment South Korea appears determined to expand economic ties with the North virtually without reference to Pyeongyang's nuclear activities. Taipei remains preoccupied with efforts to assert its own identity while counting on American protection.
In the end, of course, foreign policy rarely sees carefully laid plans bear fruit. Someone once asked a new British prime minister, Harold MacMillan, what would drive foreign policy in his government. He answered without hesitation, "Events, dear boy, events." I expect the same may be true for Mr. Bush.
With his second inauguration looming, President Bush has his hands full in the Middle East and with ambitious plans for domestic reform during his second term. In this context, Beijing's recently announced plans for anti-secession legislation is particularly unwelcome.
The content of the anticipated legislation remains uncertain, and its motivation and timing are puzzling. According to letters sent by the Chinese Embassy in Washington to key members of Congress, it is intended to "give full expression to the strong resolve of the Chinese people of never allowing the 'Taiwan independence' forces to cut off Taiwan from the rest of China under any name or by any means." Or as a pro-Beijing daily in Hong Kong put it, "It will leave 'Taiwan independence' forces with no room for ambiguity to exploit."
This suggests that the legislation's main aim will be further to deter President Chen Shui-bian's salami-slicing separatist tactics. An additional motivation may be to further energize U.S. efforts to restrain Chen in order to head off a future crisis. And, to be sure, the new legislative initiative may be attributable to internal political forces.
But why now, within weeks of President Chen's setback in the Dec. 11 legislative elections? One can only guess.
Perhaps Beijing chalked up the Democratic Progressive Party's difficulties in the elections to their own martial rhetoric, and decided to pile on new forms of political pressure. Perhaps it has concluded that despite the election results, Chen will still move aggressively on his stated intention to revise Taiwan's constitution -- thus moving a step closer to independence -- before the conclusion of his term in 2008. Perhaps it deduced from the pointed warnings directed at Chen by senior U.S. officials during the recent Taiwanese elections that Washington will now tolerate blunter threats to reinforce the People's Republic of China's "red lines."
Whatever the suppositions behind Beijing's plan for anti-secessionist legislation, they probably underestimate the substantial risks involved. Such legislation will doubtless alienate many Taiwanese voters, perhaps contributing inadvertently to the evolution of a growing sense of Taiwan's separate political identity, and producing wider legislative support in Taipei for major arms purchases from the United States.
It could also set off an action/reaction cycle with Taiwan that would undermine any possibility of reviving a serious cross-Straits dialogue. While Beijing's planned legislation may be its "response" to Chen's frequent references to constitutional referenda, it is as likely to encourage such referenda as obstruct them. It will upset many Americans, and it will galvanize the Taiwan lobby in America to stir up unhelpful resolutions in Congress when it reconvenes.
The greatest risk, perhaps, is that this could exacerbate the dangerous remilitarization of the Taiwan issue that has emerged since 1995, marked by explicit People's Liberation Army deployments and training aimed at Taiwan contingencies on the one hand, and escalating U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, combined with closer cooperation between the United States and Taiwan's defense establishment, on the other.
To a disturbing degree, this process seems driven less by policy considerations than by the parochial interests of the PLA for enhanced equipment and budgets, and by the attractiveness of the lucrative Taiwan arms market for U.S. military suppliers. Not surprisingly, this evolution is convincing pessimists on each side that confrontation is simply a question of time, despite the disaster it would represent for all parties.
Stabilizing this situation will demand the Bush administration's attention, despite other urgent preoccupations. Stability in the Straits, moreover, is an achievable goal if good sense prevails on all sides. Realistic leaders in Beijing recognize that there is no short-term solution.
With Taiwan in full control of its domestic circumstances, no country whose support is necessary for its independence to be meaningful views such independence as worth the cost of conflict with Beijing. The growing economic interdependence between China and Taiwan also raises the ante of any such conflict for them both.
To be viable, a stabilization arrangement cannot negate the "one China" principle, but it should leave open the parameters of an eventual settlement. Its goal should be an end to explicit PRC threats to use force against Taiwan and of overt preparations for military contingencies in the Strait, supplemented by reduced missile deployments opposite Taiwan; reduced U.S. military sales to Taipei consistent with the lowered threat level; more international "space" for Taiwan in exchange for an indefinite halt to actions aimed at enhancing Taiwan's international position; augmented links across the Taiwan Strait; and cross-strait talks aimed at addressing immediate problems and encouraging the growth of greater mutual confidence.
At a moment when we are entering a new year, let us hope that progress toward stabilization can be achieved.
This two-day research workshop at Stanford University aims to bring together experts to explore the nature of the connections between universities/research institutes and industry in the United States , Taiwan , and Mainland China . Within this national and international context, the workshop will focus on several leading cases, including Stanford University , Tsinghua University in Beijing , and the Industrial Technology Research Institute in Hsinchu Science-based Park. The workshop will facilitate exchange of data and ideas among leading scholars and practitioners from several disciplines, institutions, and countries. Workshop proceedings will be published and distributed by SPRIE as part of its Greater China Networks program.
In recent years, the rise of the Knowledge Economy has underscored the essential role technological innovation has played in economic development. As key institutions in the innovation process, universities and public research institutes have become the center of many theoretical and empirical studies, most of which have focused on the various roles of academia in national innovation systems and their linkages with industry in fulfilling these roles.
To date, most studies have been based on the experience of industrialized countries such as U.S. and Japan . Few scholars have examined these issues in newly industrialized or developing economies, such as Taiwan and Mainland China . Linkages between universities and commerce vary greatly among countries, among universities within countries, among academic fields within universities, and among industries. American universities have a long history of involvement with commerce and many Chinese ones have been actively engaged with it since economic liberalizing began 25 years ago. In Taiwan , universities have played a less direct role by comparison with its research institutes.
The nature of the linkages varies greatly. How? Why? With what impact? In broad terms, American universities (including often their faculty members) make money from licensing ideas created in them but, with few exceptions, these universities do not directly own companies. The practice is very different in Mainland China . Its leading universities, including Tsinghua, own and operate many companies. (Its Academy of Sciences has also been a major source of high tech companies.) In Taiwan , the pattern has been mainly for research institutes to spin out companies.
That these institutions can make large economic contributions to society is not in doubt, nor that linkages with commerce can be financially rewarding to them. The focus of this workshop is in the policies and methods they use for generating ideas that have potential commercial and technological value, and how these policies and methods balance commercial-related activities with the teaching and research missions of universities. More detailed analysis and greater understanding of the policies, institutions, and practices on university-research institute-industry relations in the U.S. , Taiwan , and Mainland China is.
As the trend of globalization of science and technology continues, academic communities (including public research institutes and universities) in Greater China will increasingly become important partners in a global innovation system. Therefore, the academia-market interface in these economies not only can shed new light on the ongoing debate, but also because the evolution of such relationships will impact the global innovation system. In addition, university-research institute-industry linkages in Taiwan and Mainland China offer unique cases to study the evolving institutional relationships between academia and industry, such as the roles of ITRI or Chinese universities have played in the growth of high-tech industries in Taiwan and Mainland China . A careful examination of these cases and a comparison of them with leading cases in the U.S. , such as Stanford University , will offer insights into the driving factors and implications of the interactions of these institutions in the process of technological development.
Some of the questions addressed in the workshop:
About Mr. Chu
Yun-han Chu is Distinguished Research Fellow of the Institute of Political Science at Academia Sinica and Professor of Political Science at National Taiwan University. He serves concurrently as the president of Chiang Ching-kuo Foundation for International Scholarly Exchange. Professor Chu received his Ph. D. in political science from the University of Minnesota and joined the faculty of National Taiwan University in 1987. He was a visiting associate professor at Columbia University in 1990-1991. Professor Chu specializes in politics of Greater China, East Asian political economy and democratization.
He currently serves on the editorial board of Journal of Democracy, International Studies Quarterly, Pacific Affairs, China Review, Journal of Contemporary China, and Journal of East Asian Studies. He is the author, co-author, editor or co-editor of eleven books. Among his recent English publications are Crafting Democracy in Taiwan (Institute for National Policy Research, 1992), Consolidating Third-Wave Democracies (Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997), China Under Jiang Zemin (Lynne Reinner, 2000), and The New Chinese Leadership: Challenges and Opportunities after the 16th Party Congress (Cambridge University Press 2004). His works also appeared in some leading journals including World Politics, International Organization, China Quarterly, Journal of Democracy, Pacific Affairs, Asian Survey, and many others.
Oksenberg Conference Room
CDDRL
Stanford University
Encina Hall, C147
616 Jane Stanford Way
Stanford, CA 94305-6055
Larry Diamond is the William L. Clayton Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution, the Mosbacher Senior Fellow in Global Democracy at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (FSI), and a Bass University Fellow in Undergraduate Education at Stanford University. He is also professor by courtesy of Political Science and Sociology at Stanford, where he lectures and teaches courses on democracy (including an online course on EdX). At the Hoover Institution, he co-leads the Project on Taiwan in the Indo-Pacific Region and participates in the Project on the U.S., China, and the World. At FSI, he is among the core faculty of the Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law, which he directed for six and a half years. He leads FSI’s Israel Studies Program and is a member of the Program on Arab Reform and Development. He also co-leads the Global Digital Policy Incubator, based at FSI’s Cyber Policy Center. He served for 32 years as founding co-editor of the Journal of Democracy.
Diamond’s research focuses on global trends affecting freedom and democracy and on U.S. and international policies to defend and advance democracy. His book, Ill Winds: Saving Democracy from Russian Rage, Chinese Ambition, and American Complacency, analyzes the challenges confronting liberal democracy in the United States and around the world at this potential “hinge in history,” and offers an agenda for strengthening and defending democracy at home and abroad. A paperback edition with a new preface was released by Penguin in April 2020. His other books include: In Search of Democracy (2016), The Spirit of Democracy (2008), Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation (1999), Promoting Democracy in the 1990s (1995), and Class, Ethnicity, and Democracy in Nigeria (1989). He has edited or coedited more than fifty books, including China’s Influence and American Interests (2019, with Orville Schell), Silicon Triangle: The United States, China, Taiwan the Global Semiconductor Security (2023, with James O. Ellis Jr. and Orville Schell), and The Troubling State of India’s Democracy (2024, with Sumit Ganguly and Dinsha Mistree).
During 2002–03, Diamond served as a consultant to the US Agency for International Development (USAID) and was a contributing author of its report, Foreign Aid in the National Interest. He has advised and lectured to universities and think tanks around the world, and to the World Bank, the United Nations, the State Department, and other organizations dealing with governance and development. During the first three months of 2004, Diamond served as a senior adviser on governance to the Coalition Provisional Authority in Baghdad. His 2005 book, Squandered Victory: The American Occupation and the Bungled Effort to Bring Democracy to Iraq, was one of the first books to critically analyze America's postwar engagement in Iraq.
Among Diamond’s other edited books are Democracy in Decline?; Democratization and Authoritarianism in the Arab World; Will China Democratize?; and Liberation Technology: Social Media and the Struggle for Democracy, all edited with Marc F. Plattner; and Politics and Culture in Contemporary Iran, with Abbas Milani. With Juan J. Linz and Seymour Martin Lipset, he edited the series, Democracy in Developing Countries, which helped to shape a new generation of comparative study of democratic development.
Download full-resolution headshot; photo credit: Rod Searcey.
The Stanford Project on Regions of Innovation and Entrepreneurship (SPRIE) is a multidisciplinary research program of the Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC) at Stanford University which focuses on innovation and entrepreneurship in leading high technology regions in the United States and Asia. SPRIE has an active community of scholars at Stanford as well as research affiliates in the United States, China, Taiwan, Japan, Korea, Singapore, and India.
New Fellowships
As part of a new initiative on Greater China, SPRIE will select two outstanding post-docs or young scholars as the inaugural SPRIE Fellows at Stanford for the academic year 2005-2006 for research and writing on Greater China and its role in the global knowledge economy. The primary focus of the program is the intersection of innovation and entrepreneurship and underlying contemporary political, economic, technological, and/or business factors in Greater China (including Taiwan, Mainland China, Singapore). Topics of particular interest include, but are not limited to, university-industry linkages, globalization of R&D, venture capital industry development, networks and flows of managerial and technical leaders, and leading high technology clusters in Greater China. Industries of ongoing research at SPRIE include semiconductors, wireless, and software.
SPRIE Fellows at Stanford will be expected to be in residence for at least three academic quarters, beginning the Fall quarter of 2005. Fellows take part in Center activities, including research forums, seminars, and workshops throughout the academic year, and are required to present their research findings in SPRIE seminars. They will also participate as members of SPRIE's team in its public and invitation-only seminars and workshops with academic, business, and government leaders. Fellows will also participate in the publication programs of SPRIE and APARC. The Fellowship carries a stipend of $40,000.
How To Apply
Applicants should submit
Address all applications to:
Stanford Project on Regions of Innovation and Entrepreneurship,
Asia-Pacific Research Center,
Encina Hall -East 301,
Stanford University,
Stanford, California
USA 94305-6055
Questions? Please contact Rowena Rosario, Administrative Associate
Deadline for receipt of all materials: January 14, 2005
Applicants will be notified of fellowship decisions in March 2005
Focus on Innovation and Entrepreneurship in Greater China
SPRIE is a multidisciplinary research program at Stanford University which focuses on innovation and entrepreneurship in leading high technology regions in the United States and Asia. SPRIE has an active community of scholars at Stanford as well as research affiliates in the United States, Mainland China, Taiwan, Japan, Korea, Singapore, and India. During 2005, SPRIE is expanding a new initiative on the rise of leading high technology regions in Greater China and their impact on the global knowledge economy. Specific research topics include university-industry linkages for commercialization of technology, globalization of R&D, venture capital industry development and its impact on new venture formation, and networks and flows of managerial and technical leaders. In addition, industries of ongoing research at SPRIE include semiconductors, wireless, and software.
New SPRIE Research Fellows: Research Assistantships with Support for International Field Research
As part of this new initiative on innovation and entrepreneurship in Greater China, SPRIE will select outstanding Stanford students as the inaugural SPRIE Research Scholars. SPRIE Research Scholars will work with SPRIE faculty and senior researchers at Stanford for two (or more) academic quarters in 2005 to gather and analyze data, conduct interviews in Silicon Valley, contribute to publications, and advance progress on the overall project agenda. During summer 2005, they will conduct SPRIE field research through interviews or surveys with business and government leaders in Beijing, Shanghai, or Hsinchu. As part of SPRIE's international research team, they will have the opportunity to interact closely with project leaders and visiting scholars at Stanford as well as partners in Asia, such as the Ministry of Science and Technology, Tsinghua University, or Zhongguancun Science Park in Mainland China or the Industrial Technology Research Institute (ITRI) in Taiwan. They will also participate in SPRIE's public and invitation-only seminars and workshops with academic, business, and government leaders. The financial award will include RA support at 15-20 hours/week (or equivalent) plus summer stipend to cover travel, living expenses, and research.
How To Apply (limited to current Stanford graduate students and exceptional seniors and juniors)
Successful candidates will have demonstrated a track record of superior analytical ability, strong oral and written communication skills (including full fluency in English and Chinese), knowledge of high technology and entrepreneurship, high motivation, and willingness to be part of a dynamic international research team.
Applicants should submit
1) A brief statement (not to exceed one single-spaced page) which describes the candidate's interests and skills,
2) a curriculum vitae, and
3) contact information for 2 references, preferably recent professors, advisors, or employers
Send applications to
SPRIE
Encina Hall East 301
Stanford University
Stanford, CA 94305-6055
Questions? Please contact Wena Rosario, Administrative Associate.
Deadline for receipt of all materials: December 31, 2005
Applicants will be notified of decisions in January 2005.
"Taiwan's Democratization, American Democracy Diplomacy and China's
Democratic Future"
Sheng-Chung "Jeffrey" Hsiao, Shorenstein APARC Visiting Fellow from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Taiwan
and
"A Rhetorical Analysis of U. S. Foreign Policy Towards Taiwan"
Pingshen "Benson" Wang, Shorenstein APARC Visiting Fellow from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Taiwan
Okimoto Conference Room
