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Taiwan/China Seminar Series

Cosponsored with Department for Anthropological Sciences and the Institute for Research in Social Sciences at Stanford University.

Daniel I. Okimoto Conference Room

Laurel Bossen Professor of Anthropology Speaker McGill University
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The Chen administration has attempted to deal with the growing economic and technological links across the Taiwan Straits through confrontation with and coercion against Taiwanese businesses with investments in the People's Republic of China. These attempts have done little to stop the flow of capital and knowledge from Taiwan to China, but this failure is not necessarily bad for Taiwan even as it is a boon for China. This talk will address in which sectors and in what ways the flow of Taiwanese business activities to China have been beneficial or detrimental to each economy. Looking forward, the talk will also attempt to answer how further integration will benefit each side.

Douglas Fuller has spent over ten years researching technological development in East Asia. Most recently, he completed a doctorate at MIT in political economy. The topic of his thesis was technological development in China's IT industry. For this and previous research, he has interviewed IT firms in Malaysia, Japan, Korea, Taiwan, the People's Republic of China and the US. He has published articles in Industry and Innovation and other peer-reviewed journals.

A wine and cheese reception will follow the seminar.

This is the inaugural seminar of the CDDRL Taiwan Democracy Program and it is co-sponsored by the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia Pacific Research Center.

Philippines Conference Room

Doug Fuller SPRIE Postdoctoral Fellow Speaker
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In this Q&A session from the Council on Foreign Relations (reprinted in the New York Times), Shorenstein APARC visiting professor David Kang -- together with other experts on the region -- comments on South Korea's increasing independence from the United States, and other issues related to the "North Korea problem."

What is South Korea's strategic posture in East Asia?

After the Korean War ended in 1953, South Korea and the United States established a political and security alliance that has lasted more than half a century. "For a number of decades, South Korea primarily defined itself as a U.S. ally, with the enemy to the north," says Donald Gregg, president of the Korea Society and a former U.S. ambassador to Korea. However, South Korea is now trying to create a new role for itself in Asia. Seoul is exploring a growing economic relationship with China--which passed the United States in 2003 to become South Korea's largest trading partner--and its policy of engagement and growing cooperation with North Korea is pulling it away from the United States. "All we know for sure is that South Korea's role is no longer junior partner to the U.S.," says David Kang, a visiting professor of Asian studies at Stanford University. "The days when they would just unquestioningly follow the U.S. are over."

Kang and other experts say Seoul is beginning to shift its focus towards increasing regional ties with its Asian neighbors. The U.S.-South Korea relationship, while still strong, is not as exclusive as it has been in the past. "South Korea is still an ally of the United States ... nevertheless, it has been the most active country in promoting East Asian cooperation and integration, and will probably continue to do so," says Charles Armstrong, professor of history and director of the Center for Korean Studies at Columbia University.

What are South Korea's biggest foreign policy challenges?

Dealing with North Korea while preserving its relationship with the United States, maintaining relations with Japan, and addressing potential long-term military or economic threats from China, experts say. But "the major issue for Seoul is overwhelmingly North Korea, and everything else gets filtered through that lens," Kang says. South Korea looks to its northern neighbor with the goal of eventual reunification, and therefore seeks economic cooperation and political engagement to smooth relations and slowly move down that path. The United States, on the other hand, is primarily seeking to prevent North Korea from gaining nuclear weapons, and has refused to engage with Pyongyang until that issue is resolved.

Other experts see a disconnect between how South Korea views its role in the region and how other nations see it. South Korean officials talk of playing a "balancing" or mediating role in regional disputes, including tensions between China and Japan and the nuclear standoff between the United States and North Korea. But South Korea's "actual ability to mediate and balance is limited," says Armstrong. And while South Korean President Roh Moo-Hyun has expressed hopes of building Seoul into a logistics and business hub for the region, existing tensions on the peninsula--including international fears that North Korea is amassing a nuclear arsenal--cloud any long-term economic plans. As things stand, South Korea has the world's 11th largest economy, but not a corresponding level of political clout.

How is South Korea dealing with North Korea?

Through a policy of active engagement. In 1998, Former President Kim Dae-Jung introduced the "Sunshine Policy" aimed at improving ties with North Korea while assuring Pyongyang that Seoul is not trying to absorb it. Since then, "the degree of economic interaction between south and north has substantially increased," Armstrong says. Kim and North Korean President Kim Jung-Il met at a historic summit in 2000, and increasing progress has been made on a range of issues, from economic--increased rail links and joint projects like the Gaesung industrial complex--to social and symbolic, including cross-border family visits and Korean athletes marching together under a single flag at the Olympics. Trade between the two countries reached $697 million in 2004, and South Korea is now Pyongyang's second-largest trading partner after China.

South Korea sees engagement with North Korea as yielding far more benefits than confrontation. "South Korea is reorienting itself toward reconciliation and eventual reunification of the peninsula," Gregg says. South Korean officials say reunification would reduce the burden on each side of maintaining huge armies, help improve living standards, draw international investment, create employment, and help avert the worst possibility: open war on the Korean peninsula.

What is South Korea's relationship with China?

South Korea is developing increasingly warm relations with its giant western neighbor. "There is a real fascination with China in South Korea, and the flow of investment, exports, students, tourists, and businessmen going to China from South Korea has exploded in the last several years," Armstrong says. Bilateral trade between Seoul and Beijing reached $90 billion in 2004, a 42 percent increase from 2003. The two countries also agree politically on issues ranging from opposition to Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi's visits to the Yasukuni war shrine, to accord on how to deal with North Korea's nuclear ambitions. China is also choosing the path of engagement with North Korea, and helping Pyongyang find a "Chinese way" to develop: that is, increasing economic openness without sacrificing political control. "On the whole, [South Korea and China] see pretty much eye to eye on the major geopolitical issues," Kang says.

Beijing, like Seoul, is investing in North Korea, which has ample natural resources--including coal, iron, and gold--and a low-cost labor force. In 2003, Chinese investment in North Korea was $1.1 million; in 2004, it ballooned to $50 million; and in 2005, it was expected to reach $85-90 million. The volume of trade between China and North Korea reached $1.5 billion in 2005, making Beijing Pyongyang's largest foreign trading partner. North Korean leader Kim Jung-Il, who rarely travels, emphasized Beijing's importance to his country by visiting China in January.

South Korea is positioning itself to be closer to an ascendant China, but trying to do it without jeopardizing existing ties with the United States. South Korea's biggest worry, experts say, is being pulled into a conflict between the United States and China over Taiwan.

What's the relationship like between South Korea and Japan?

"Very bad at the moment in terms of public diplomacy and popular opinion," Columbia University's Armstrong says. South Korean wariness of Japan dates back at least to 1910, when imperial Japan invaded Korea and ruled it as a colony for thirty-five years. During the occupation, Japanese efforts to suppress Korean language and culture earned Korean enmity. During World War II, the Japanese practice of using "comfort women"--women from occupied countries, mostly Korea, who were forced to serve as prostitutes for the Japanese army--increased the anti-Japanese feeling.

South Koreans, and others across the region, are also infuriated by Koizumi's annual visit to the Yasukuni shrine. The site honors more than two million Japanese war dead, but includes the remains of more than a dozen convicted war criminals. South Korea also has disputes with Japan over territory. Both countries claim a group of islands--and the fishing and mineral rights around them--in the Sea of Japan that the Koreans call Dokdo and the Japanese call Takeshima. And many critics in South Korea and across Asia accuse Japan of whitewashing its wartime atrocities in its grade-school textbooks.

But much of the South Korean conflict with Japan may be for domestic political consumption, some experts say. "Under the surface, I would say the degree of interaction [between Seoul and Tokyo] remains high and, in the economic realm, is rather good," Armstrong says.

How is South Korea dealing with the United States?

While experts say most South Koreans still consider the U.S.-Korean alliance the backbone of their security relationship, time has passed and attitudes are shifting. A new generation of South Koreans, assertive and nationalistic, are less mindful of the Korean War--and less grateful for American intervention in the conflict that left nearly three million Koreans dead or wounded--and more resistant to what they see as a U.S. attempt to impose its values and Washington's singular focus on terrorism. The United States has opposed South Korean engagement efforts with North Korea, and has also moved to increase its ties with Japan. The Bush administration's foreign policy, including the war on terror, its punitive stance toward North Korean nuclear weapons, and particularly the invasion of Iraq, is highly unpopular in South Korea, according to opinion surveys there.

South Koreans are also increasingly demanding more control over their country's military and political affairs. In 2004, the United States returned several military bases to Korean control, and agreed to withdraw 12,500 of the 37,500 U.S. troops currently stationed in Korea by 2008. U.S. officials, including Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, had been pushing for South Korea to take more of a role in the defense of the Korean peninsula, to free up U.S. forces for deployment elsewhere. But, all differences aside, Seoul is still eager to cooperate with the United States. South Korea, with some 3,000 troops in Iraq, is the third-largest member of the U.S.-led coalition there, behind the United States and Britain.

What is the recent history of the region?

Poised between China and Japan, fought over by the United States and Russia, the Korean peninsula long has played a central role in Asia's geopolitical affairs. After World War II, Japanese colonial rule gave way to U.S. and Soviet trusteeship over the southern and northern halves of Korea, respectively. The peninsula was divided at the 38th Parallel. In 1948, the southern Republic of Korea and the northern Democratic People's Republic of Korea, under Kim Il-Sung, were established.

In 1950, North Korean forces invaded South Korea, starting a conflict that brought in China on the North Korean side and a U.S.-led UN coalition on the South Korean side. While an armistice was agreed to in 1953, a formal peace treaty was never signed. In 1954, the United States agreed to help South Korea defend itself against external aggression in a mutual defense treaty. U.S. troops have been stationed in Korea since then. In addition to this important security relationship, shared interests in the last fifty years have included fighting communism and, since the 1980s, establishing a strong democracy and fostering economic development. However, in recent years strain has emerged on a range of issues, none more important than how to handle Pyongyang.

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Professor Park will address the changes that have occurred in the Chinese labor market over the past quarter century, focusing on the extent to which labor market reforms have successfully created a well-functioning market for labor with a high degree of labor mobility. Like other rapidly growing developing countries, China has experienced rapid structural change featuring a steady flow of labor from agriculture to industry, and from rural areas to urban areas. As a transition economy, China has shifted gradually from planned allocation of labor in state-sector jobs to a more open labor market. Although the large magnitudes of these changes are impressive, reform of the labor market has been halting, uneven, and difficult, with much additional reform still required. Prof. Park will look at several dimensions of the Chinese labor market: labor allocation, wage setting, regional differences, and ownership sectors. He will conclude by discussing the key policy challenges that lie ahead.

Albert Park is Associate Professor of Economics and Faculty Associate of the Center for Chinese Studies at the University of Michigan. He is also a research affiliate at the Population Studies Center and chairs the faculty steering committee for Michigan's China Data Center. Dr. Park has been a visiting professor and researcher at Harvard University and Peking University, as well as other research institutions in China and Taiwan, and has served as a consultant for the World Bank on several projects analyzing economic development issues in China, including the Bank's current China Poverty Assessment project. Dr. Park earned a Ph.D. in applied economics from the Food Research Institute and Department of Economics at Stanford University in 1996. His research interests include economic development, economic transition, labor, applied microeconomics, and the Chinese economy. He is involved in numerous collaborative research activities in China, including several large survey projects to study labor market developments in urban areas, and rural education, health, and labor outcomes. He has published over thirty journal articles and chapters in edited volumes, and is the coeditor of a forthcoming volume titled Education and Reform in China. At Michigan, he teaches a graduate course on the microeconomics of development and an undergraduate course on the Chinese economy.

This series is co-sponsored with the Center for East Asian Studies at Stanford University.

Philippines Conference Room

Albert Park Associate Professor of Economics Speaker University of Michigan
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Based on recent work in Guangzhou, Xiamen, Taipei, and Hong Kong, this talk will address the relationship of NGO's to political transformation. It will focus in particular on three problems: the relation between state and society under various Chinese regimes, the relation between official and unoffical organizations, and problems of scaling up civil society organizations.

Taiwan/China Seminar Series

Philippines Conference Room

Robert Weller Professor of Anthropology Speaker Boston University
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The latest volume in this popular series focuses on the best ways to evaluate and improve the quality of new democratic regimes. The essays in part one elaborate and refine several themes of democratic quality: the rule of law, accountability, freedom, equality, and responsiveness. The second part features six comparative cases, each of which applies these thematic elements to two neighboring countries: Brazil and Chile, South Africa and Ghana, Italy and Spain, Romania and Poland, India and Bangladesh, and Taiwan and Korea.

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Johns Hopkins University Press
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Larry Diamond
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Daniel C. Sneider
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The arrogance of the Bush administration would be barely tolerable if it were not paired with a stunning incompetence, on display from Kabul to Katrina. That deadly combination has weakened American strength in the world, argues Pantech fellow and San Jose Mercury News foreign affairs columnist Daniel Sneider.

Despite its attempt to soften criticism of the war, there is no evidence the Bush administration is capable of self-correction.

That came home to me the other day while listening to a senior administration official deliver an off-the-record tour d'horizon of American foreign policy. He is among the best minds in this administration, counted among the ranks of the realists, rather than the neoconservatives.

The United States stands alone as the most powerful nation in the world, the official began. In no previous moment of human history has a single state enjoyed such a dominant position.

When it comes to managing its relations with other would-be powers -- Europe, China, Japan and India -- the United States has done "extraordinarily well,'' he said.

The tensions generated by the war in Iraq have eased, the senior foreign policy official confidently asserted. The Europeans are content to gaze intently inward, he observed, while America strides the globe.

Japan is embracing the United States in a very close relationship that shows no sign of unraveling. Meanwhile the Bush administration has forged a growing partnership with India.

When it comes to China, the administration has chosen the path of accommodation and integration rather than containment of the rising power. He expressed confidence that American power and the prospect of democracy in China will secure the peace.

The only remaining challenge for the United States is to combat the threat of a radical Islamist movement that seeks to acquire weapons of mass destruction. For that, there is the promotion of democracy and American values around the world. After all, the official said with not even a nod to humility, "the U.S. is the most successful country that has ever existed.''

A year or two ago, the American people embraced this vision of a confident colossus, a Gulliver among the Lilliputians. That was before they watched the giant tied down in its attempt to export those American values by force of arms in Iraq.

The arrogance of this administration would be barely tolerable if it were not paired with a stunning incompetence, on display from Kabul to Katrina. That deadly combination has weakened American strength in the world. It has emboldened far more serious challengers in Iran and North Korea, who see the United States as too bogged down in Iraq to credibly threaten them with the use of force.

The war rated barely a mention in the sweeping view offered by the senior administration official, except indirectly. He offered a realist defense of the administration's democracy crusade.

World War II was fought with democratic goals, the official pointed out. And the Cold War -- the model for the current struggle against Islamic extremism -- was not just about balancing the power of the Soviet Union. The wars in Korea and Vietnam were really about determining which system those countries chose, he argued.

Those are curious examples to cite as a defense of the decision to go to war in Iraq. The United States shored up authoritarian regimes in Korea and Vietnam to counter the communist threat. Vietnam was a strategic mistake that took decades to overcome. And democracy came to Korea more than 35 years later, after a long period of economic development.

President Bush cited the democratic transformation of Korea -- along with Taiwan and Japan -- in a recent speech during his trip to Asia. But these are examples of the "conventional story in which you become rich and then you become democrats,'' as the senior official put it so well.

The administration proposes however to skip this long, but necessary, path to democratic capitalism when it comes to the Middle East. The policies of security and stability have failed there and a quicker route to democratic change is called for. But there is no historical evidence to suggest that this is any more than another manifestation of a blind belief in American power.

Democratic values have always been essential to American foreign policy. In practice, however, American administrations have often made painful choices between stability and the promotion of democracy. We saw that too often during the Cold War -- in Budapest in 1956, Prague in 1968 or Tibet in 1959.

The administration might do well to recall the words of candidate Bush, uttered Oct. 11, 2000.

"It really depends on how our nation conducts itself in foreign policy. If we're an arrogant nation they'll resent us,'' Bush said. "But if we are a humble nation, they'll respect us.''

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This article examines Korea's politics of identity in the form of Asianism in the modern period, especially since Korea's incorporation into the modern world system in the late nineteenth century. Asianism, and regionalism generally, has become a salient policy strategy for the current South Korean government. However, Asianism has been a primary ideological current in modern Korea whose most recent incarnation should be understood in the larger historical context. This study traces the development of Asianism in four different periods: precolonial, colonial, Cold War, and postCold War. Initially emerging as a bulwark against Western encroachment, the Asianism narrative became irrelevant upon Japanese annexation of Korea in 1910 and only survived as a discourse about a glorified cultural past during colonial rule. Upon liberation, Asianism rescinded as the Japancentered regional order was replaced by a new Cold War alignment, capitalist (Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan) versus communist (China and North Korea). Although discussion about Asianism and a new East Asian regional order have recently resurfaced, the historical legacy of colonialism, war, and national division has added much complexity to the debate. Explicating how the Asianism narrative emerged and evolved through these various historical contexts sheds light on the complexities and difficulties inherent in the current attempt to forge an Asian regional order. By looking at Asianism from a historical perspective, we can also better appreciate the continuity and discontinuity in Korea's politics of identity. While it is still uncertain what the foundation of a new Asianism will be, it is equally obvious that regional interactions will continue to be an important part of the global world order. This study concludes with policy implications of how a historically sensitive understanding of the development of an Asian regional identity can further interaction and integration of East Asian nations.

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Inter-Asia Cultural Studies
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Gi-Wook Shin
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David Kang
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David Kang comments on the state of China-Taiwan relations in the New York Times.

What is the state of China-Taiwan relations?

President George Bush fanned the flames of the longstanding conflict between China and Taiwan during his November 16 speech in Kyoto, at the start of a week-long state visit to Asia. In urging China to expand openness and allow its people more freedoms, the president used Taiwan as a model, saying Taiwan had brought prosperity to its people by embracing freedom and creating a democratic Chinese society. China rejected Bush's comments. "Taiwan is an inseparable part ofChina, and China does not brook any interference in its internal affairs," Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing told reporters at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in South Korea. Bush meets Chinese President Hu Jintao and other Asian leaders at the summit November 19.

What is the history of the conflict?

Taiwan, an island of 23 million off China's southern coast, was occupied by Japan for fifty years, from 1895 to 1945. In 1949, after Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist Party lost its power struggle with the Communist Party in China, Chiang and his followers fled to Taiwan. Their Kuomintang (KMT) government-in-exile in Taipei defined itself as the alternative to Communist rule and hoped one day to return to power in Beijing. The KMT governed Taiwan from 1949 to 2000; its often harsh rule included discriminatory laws against ethnic Taiwanese and nearly forty years of martial law, which was finally lifted in 1987. The KMT has historically seen Taiwan as a part of "one China" that would eventually be reunited under Nationalist rule.

Taiwan's current ruling party, the predominantly ethnic Taiwanese Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) was founded in 1986 to counter the KMT, and only became legal in 1989 after a longtime ban on opposition parties was dropped. Taiwanese President Chen Shui-Bian is a member of the DPP, which envisions Taiwan as an independent nation, separate from China. In 2000, Chen was the first DPP candidate to be elected president. Taiwanese sovereignty is the first and most prominent issue on the party's platform. This position has put the DPP severely at odds with China's leadership, which views Taiwan as a renegade province that will one day be reunited with Communist China--by force, if necessary.

What is the U.S. position?

The United States officially recognizes only one China -- including Taiwan -- and urges a peaceful resolution to the Taiwan question. However, Washington is also bound by the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act to aid in Taiwan 's defense, including selling the island the weapons it needs to defend itself against China. Experts say the United States is walking a fine line between China 's growing influence and the historical U.S. relationship with Taiwan. "Bush had to stand up for freedom and democracy and all the other values he constantly talks about, without picking a fight with China that nobody really wants," says David Kang, an Asia expert and visiting professor at Stanford University's Shorenstein APARC. Bush stressed in his speech that "there should be no unilateral attempts to change the status quo by either side."

What is the impetus behind independence for Taiwan?

After the long KMT reign, many Taiwanese are now pushing for self-determination. Independence advocates say Taiwan is a free and democratic nation with multiparty elections and a very successful economy, with a gross national product (GNP) of $328 billion in 2004, of which $174 billion was due to exports including electronics, computer parts, textiles, metals, plastic, and rubber. They say the Taiwan people should have the right to decide for themselves if they want to join China or become an independent nation. Since Chen was elected to his first term in 2000, he has steadily pushed the idea of Taiwanese independence. He provoked Beijing August 3 by supporting the idea of a referendum to ask Taiwanese citizens if the island should declare formal independence from China. China is very hostile to such talk: On August 7, the official China Daily newspaper quoted a Chinese military official saying, "Taiwan choosing independence is tantamount to choosing war."

What has China been doing?

Making both incendiary statements and conciliatory moves. In July, General Zhu Chenghu, the dean of China's National Defense University, warned that China would attack the United States with nuclear weapons if it intervened in a military dispute over Taiwan. Although he later claimed the comments were his own and did not reflect the views of the state, Zhu's words generated international concern. However, China's actions toward some Taiwanese officials have been friendlier. James Soong, head of the Taiwanese opposition party People First, has visited China several times in the last year at the invitation of Beijing. Experts say Beijing is reaching out to opposition leaders in Taiwan in an attempt to sidestep the DPP and build new bases of support on the island. Soong is taking advantage of the opening to play for domestic political support and attempt to show up the DPP, they say. His actions infuriate the ruling party in Taiwan because, despite his unofficial status, Soong is building friendly relations with China in direct contrast to DPP policy.

What are the next steps?

Bush alluded to peace talks in his November 16 speech, but experts say such talks between China and Taiwan are unlikely in the near future. "There are elements moving towards peace talks, and other elements, especially in Taiwan, that are pushing toward independence and want to stick China in the eye," David Kang says. But "it's hard to say what Taiwan wants," he adds, noting the Taiwan electorate is almost evenly split between those who favor independence and those who want to improve relations with Beijing for historical, cultural, and especially economic reasons. David Kang says that, in the last several years, as many as one million Taiwanese have moved to China to do business.

What are Taiwan's security concerns?

China, located just 100 miles away across the Taiwan Strait, has hundreds of ballistic missiles aimed at Taiwan, and is targeting much of its recent militarization campaign specifically at the island, including building amphibious tanks that can be used to storm Taiwan's shores. China's military buildup has put Taiwan at a strategic disadvantage: Taiwan's military spending has dropped 25 percent over the last five years, to only 2.4 percent of gross domestic product (GDP). The United States has been pressuring the island to buy a specially designed $18 billion package of U.S. arms to improve its military capabilities. But some Taiwanese politicians are reluctant to devote resources to military buildup given the presumed U.S. protection, and opposition leaders have blocked the sale over what experts call domestic political squabbling. But, David Kang points out, a military invasion of Taiwan by China is highly improbable. "That's the least likely scenario," he says. "You can have a military dispute that's far short of all-out war."

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Many people in China and the US assume that the new Taiwanese national identity is a political ploy which originated with Taiwan's government. Based on ethnographic research in both Taiwan and China, Melissa Brown argues that Taiwanese identity -- in both its ethnic and national forms -- are based on social experience. Because the people of Taiwan and China have had such different social experiences since 1895, Taiwanese identity as distinct from Chinese identity is real. The reality of Taiwanese identity poses challenges for resolving the debate over Taiwan's future relations with China, particularly in nationalistic responses due to lack of Chinese experience with Taiwanese society.

Melissa J. Brown is Assistant Professor of Anthropological Sciences and Research Affiliate at Asia-Pacific Research Center at Stanford University. She has been researching changing identities in Taiwan and China since 1991. Her books include Negotiating Ethnicities in China and Taiwan (University of California, Institute for East Asian Studies, 1996) and Is Taiwan Chinese? The Impact of Culture, Power, and Migration on Changing Identities (University of California Press, 2004).

Philippines Conference Room

Melissa J. Brown Speaker Stanford University
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