Stanford University

Finding a Better Fable: After 10 Years of Sunshine Policy

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"Sunshine" policy, named after one of Aesop's fables, has been the catch phrase of South Korea's appeasement policy toward North Korea to stimulate and restructure the already collapsed North Korean economy and eventually to convert North Korea to a more conciliatory and cooperative state.

After 10 years of shining the sunlight on North Korea, however, evidences that those self-imposed goals have been achieved are rather scarce. This suggests that, from the beginning, the basic premises of Sunshine policy must have been fatally incongruous with the reality: North Korea should not have been portrayed as an innocent traveler leisurely walking down the street. Or, perhaps, the policy toward North Korea should have pursued more serious goals than just stripping a man of his coat.

In this talk, Dr. Park proposes an alternative to the "Sunshine vs North Wind", and discusses the policy implications of his proposal.

For the past 14 years, Dr. Jongkyu Park has worked on various macroeconomic policy issues of Korean economy including economic forecasts, monetary policy, inflation, budget deficit, exchange rate, savings rate, population aging, real estate bubble, and Japan's economic slowdown and revival. He received B.A. in Economics from Seoul National University in Korea, M.S. in Statistics from University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, and Ph.D. in Economics from Princeton University.

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Jongkyu Park

Shorenstein APARC
Stanford University
Encina Hall, Room E301
Stanford, CA 94305-6055

(650) 723-2408
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For the past 14 years, Jongkyu Park has worked on various macroeconomic policy issues of Korean economy including economic forecasts, monetary policy, inflation, budget deficit, exchange rate, savings rate, population aging, realestate bubble, Japan's economic slowdown and revival, etc. He received B.A. in Economics from Seoul National University in Korea, M.S. in Statistics from University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill and Ph. D. in Economics from Princeton University.

Jongkyu Park Visiting Scholar Speaker Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center
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Korean Studies Colloquium Series
Korea Program

The Politics of North Korea in Japan

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This talk will examine the evolution of Japanese attitudes and policy toward the Korean peninsula.

The legacy of Japan's occupation; divisions in Japan's Korean community and the spillover into Japanese domestic politics; the impact of the abduction issue and the North Korean nuclear and missile programs on Japanese attitudes toward Pyongyang will be looked at. The current state of relations, with a focus on the divisions between Tokyo and Washington on how to proceed, will also be discussed.

Ambassador Deming joined the School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins Universtiy in September 2005, after a 38 year career in the Foreign Service. His last overseas post was as Ambassador to Tunisia from 2000 to 2003. Prior to that, he served as Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (June 1998 to August 2000). He was Senior Advisor to the Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs from December 1997. From October 1997 to December 1997, he was the East Asian and Pacific Affairs Bureau’s Senior Advisor to the United Nations General Assembly in New York.

Ambassador Deming has spent much of his career dealing with Japanese affairs, having served in Japan as Charge d’Affaires, ad interim, from December 1996 to September 1997, and as Deputy Chief of Mission from October 1993 to December 1996. From September 1991 to August 1993, Amb. Deming was Director of the Office of Japanese Affairs in Washington. He served as Minister Counselor for Political Affairs at the American Embassy in Tokyo from August 1987 to July 1991. From 1985 to 1986, Amb. Deming was detailed to the National War College at Fort McNair in Washington, DC.

He received his M.A. in East Asian Studies from Stanford University and B.A. from Rollins College.

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Ambassador Rust Deming Adjunct Professor, Japan Studies, SAIS, Johns Hopkins University Speaker
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Korean Studies Colloquium Series
Korea Program

Multilateralism in Northeast Asia: Combining Values with Security

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In the midst of leadership changes and rethinking of the Six-Party Talks, the time is ripe for reassessing how multilateralism can be advanced in Northeast Asia. The earlier stress on economic integration as the engine of regionalism has lost credibility, although the forces of interdependence continue to grow. The tendency to treat security in isolation also may be receding, as the Six-Party Talks and Sino-U.S. relations both reveal the multi-sided nature of building trust. At the same time, the pessimism associated with overemphasis on the history issue between Japan and its neighbors has receded in the face of renewed Sino-Japanese and South Korean-Japanese diplomacy. Yet, finding common ground in strategic thinking about the future of multilateralism demands a new approach that takes into account lessons from recent years.

As the building blocks of a new approach, this presentation will focus on four themes: 1) re-examination of ways to accelerate regionalism, with attention to leadership, energy cooperation, and the role of Russia; 2) development of a more comprehensive outlook on values, with attention to shared modernity, gradualism, and the role of Japan; 3) discussion of the next phase in managing North Korea, attentive to Sino-U.S. accord and the role of South Korea; and 4) evaluation of U.S. priorities and how a new president may view Northeast Asia within an overall agenda.   The objective of this talk will be to stimulate thinking on a region at a crossroads in order to capitalize on recent currents of change.

Gil Rozman attended Princeton's Critical Languages Program, returning to Carleton College as an independent major in Chinese and Russian studies. He received his PhD in sociology at Princeton with a field on Chinese, Japanese, and Russian societies and a plan to concentrate on historical comparisons first and on the domestic roots of international relations later. His books have appeared in clusters, including: four on comparative pre-modern urban development and stages of modernization; three on debates in the Soviet Union, China, and Japan over bilateral relations and changes in socialism; two on regionalism; and four on strategic thinking in Northeast Asia. Although he is still learning about Korea, many recent writings have looked at Korea within a regional context.

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Gil Rozman Professor of Sociology Speaker Princeton University
Seminars

Sneider: Cautionary lessons for U.S.-Korea relationship

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Daniel C. Sneider
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%people1%, associate director for research at Shorenstein APARC, gives a few cautionary lessons on U.S.-Korea relations.
Earlier this month I visited Seoul as a member of “New Beginnings,” a study group of former American policymakers and experts on Korea, co-organized by the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center at Stanford, and The Korea Society. We formed this group last year, anticipating that the upcoming Korean elections and the American presidential elections afterwards would offer an opportunity to embark upon a “new beginning” in our alliance.

After several days of meetings in Seoul, most importantly with President-elect Lee Myeong-bak and his senior advisors, we came away convinced that our hopes for a “new beginning” were more than justified. As President Lee takes office, it is clear that his administration is deeply committed to restoring the alliance to its previous place as the foundation of Korean foreign and security policy. Equally important, the new government is focused on the need to boost economic growth based on the free flow of trade and investment, and sees the conclusion of the Free Trade Agreement with the United States as central to that goal.

For those of us who have long argued that a vibrant Korea is vital to America’s interests, these were welcome words. It is no secret that there was a perception in the United States that President Roh Moo-hyun, backed by a significant portion of the Korean people, no longer saw the alliance as a strategic imperative for Korea. Unfortunately, many Americans, particularly in Congress, had begun to share this view of the alliance, fueled by a mistaken belief that Koreans were “anti-American.”

This view of President Roh and of Korea was unfair and even distorted. President Roh deserves credit, particularly in the last two years, for taking important steps to improve alliance relations, not least his promotion of the negotiation of the FTA. He made unpopular decisions, such as the dispatch of troops to Iraq, in order to preserve a cooperative atmosphere. And as we saw demonstrated in the election, public opinion in Korea regarding the United States has shifted dramatically since the emotional days of 2002.

The Lee administration can anticipate a warm greeting in Washington, as is already clear in the preparations for his visit next month. The new President has sounded all the right notes – seeking closer cooperation on North Korea policy, restoring positive ties with Japan, America’s other vital ally in Northeast Asia, and building a broader strategic partnership with the U.S. beyond the Korean peninsula.

Amidst the renewed embrace of the alliance, it is worth however keeping a few cautionary lessons from the past in mind:

1. Not everything will be Smooth Sailing

Despite the welcome official rhetoric, it is no secret that the relationship between the United States and the Republic of Korea has never been entirely smooth. From its earliest days, born out of Korea’s liberation and the trials of the Korean War, the alliance has been marked by both close cooperation and by clashes over key policy goals. While bound together by strategic necessity, the national interests of Korea and the United States have not always been identical.

There is nothing unusual about such differences among allies. Look for example at the tensions that plagued U.S.-European relations over the disastrous decision to invade Iraq. Even with the best of intentions, there will be moments of conflict between Seoul and Washington. What is important is how governments manage those differences to protect the underlying relationship. Both Koreans and Americans need to remember the virtues of quiet diplomacy, trying to avoid negotiating their differences through the media.

2. All politics is local

Alliance relations can no longer be managed solely by diplomats or by friends meeting behind closed doors. Those ties are crucial but both Korea and the United States are democracies in which the issues that are at the core of the relationship – from trade to the alignment of military forces – are matters of public discussion. Domestic politics shapes policy decisions but both Koreans and Americans sometimes forget the pressures operating on the other side.

This is particularly important in an election year. The Korean National Assembly election in April is already having an impact, delaying ratification of the FTA. The U.S. election will mean FTA ratification by the U.S. Congress this year may be impossible. Presidential candidates are taking positions that they may adjust after gaining power. On another level, the new government in Seoul needs to remember that the Bush administration is a lame duck affair and begin to prepare for a new government in Washington.

3. Expect the Unexpected, particularly with North Korea

The limited progress on the nuclear negotiations with North Korea has temporarily brought closer coordination between Korea and the US. But it would be foolish to assume that this trend will necessarily continue. The negotiations are already facing a slowdown as negotiators grapple with much tougher problems. If they break down, both Seoul and Washington, along with their other partners in the 6-party talks, will face some hard questions about how to respond. Any attempt to pressure Pyongyang is likely to bring an escalatory response, not least to test the new government in Seoul.

It is possible that Seoul and Washington will once again be somewhat out of synch. Ironically, the Bush administration – and whatever follows it -- may favor greater concessions than the new administration in Seoul would prefer to make.

These differences are manageable. The key is real policy coordination between the US and Korea – and the inclusion of Japan in a revived trilateral coordination mechanism. If both sides keep that commitment, we will indeed have made a “new beginning” in our alliance.

Daniel Sneider is the Associate Director for Research at Stanford University’s Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center. A former foreign correspondent, Sneider covered Korea for the Christian Science Monitor.
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New course on North Korea profiled in Stanford Magazine

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The March/April 2008 issue of Stanford Magazine profiles a new course on North Korea taught by Robert Carlin, a Shorenstein APARC Pantech Fellow. The course, , "Media in North Korea: A Window to Plans, Perceptions and Decisions," is one of only a handful about the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) that are being taught nationwide. Although Western observers typically characterize the DPRK as an informational black hole, Carlin encourages students to look beyond the caricatures of "Dear Leader" Kim Jong-Il's elevator shoes, poufed hair, and khaki jumpsuits. "It's not a joke," Carlin says. "It's a real place."
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March 2008 Dispatch - A Short Honeymoon for South Korea's New President

Authors
Nae Young Lee
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South Korea’s new President, Lee Myung-bak, was inaugurated on February 25, 2008. President Lee, a conservative former businessman and popular mayor of Seoul, was elected with a wide margin in last year’s December election. During his inaugural address at the plaza of the National Assembly, President Lee declared that Korea is now on the path to becoming an advanced nation. Advancement means reaching the rank of the world’s top countries, both in terms of economic strength and cultural standards. To achieve this task, he called on Korea to move beyond the “age of ideology,” and to enter the “age of pragmatism.” He also pledged to pursue economic revival, to strengthen the alliance with the United States, and to end a protracted stand-off over North Korea’s nuclear weapons.

Since Lee’s landslide victory ended ten years of rule by Korea’s progressive government, he was widely expected to maintain his momentum and to enjoy a long honeymoon, at least during his first year in office. But the reality was quite different, and Lee’s term got off to a rough start. In fact, there are some signs that his honeymoon may soon be over. His approval ratings were in the 70 percent range in the wake of his election, but had fallen to the 50 percent range by the time of his inauguration.

Public sentiment toward President Lee slumped to lukewarm levels mainly because he and his staff mismanaged the two-month transition period between election and inauguration. Hasty announcement of unpopular policies by a transition committee and, more significantly, poor and reckless choices in his cabinet lineup angered the Korean public. The almost daily allegations of wrongdoings by many nominees for minister-level positions raised the serious doubts about the moral standard of a Lee government. Furthermore, his cabinet and top advisers—which consist of people mainly from Seoul and Lee’s native Gyeongsang Province—provoked a sense of alienation among Koreans from other regions of the country.

President Lee’s shaky popularity will be tested in earnest in the upcoming parliamentary elections, which are scheduled for April 5. Until recently, it was predicted that Lee’s ruling Grand National Party would easily take over the majority in parliament, mainly because the April election will be held during the new president’s presumed honeymoon period. As the Korean public has become increasingly disenchanted with the Lee administration, however, the April election will be a tough battle for the ruling party candidates. In fact, the United Democratic Party, the main opposition party that was demoralized and divided by internal rivalry after December’s humiliating defeat, has shown renewed vigor and has taken the offensive against the Lee government. Without a resounding victory in the parliamentary election, President Lee’s governing leadership will be substantially undermined—if not in jeopardy—and he will be plagued further with factional rivalry within the ruling party.

The economy is the most crucial issue facing the Lee presidency. The Korean economy has lost its vitality in recent years, with a GDP growth rate that has stagnated at less than 5 percent since 2003. Though President Lee has pledged to revitalize the economy as his government’s most critical task, current economic circumstances are not favorable for the new president. The Korean economy, heavily reliant upon foreign trade, has been further slowed by the sluggish cycle of the world economy. The new finance minister, Kang Man-soo, has forecast that the Korean economy will again grow less than 5 percent this year, falling short of the 7 percent that Lee pledged during his campaign. Without a visibly improved economic outlook and new job creation, it is highly likely that high public expectation for an economic recovery under President Lee will instead become a major disappointment.

Dealing with unpredictable North Korea is another daunting task for the new government. President Lee has declared his skepticism of the engagement policy pursued by the two liberal governments that preceded him, and accordingly has announced a new North Korea policy initiative: the “Denuclearization Opening 3000 Initiative.” Through this initiative, President Lee showed his commitment to assist North Korea opening its economy, once it gives up its nuclear programs completely. According to President Lee’s vision and as a result of this economic opening, North Korea will be able to upgrade its per capita income to $3000 over the next ten years. The Denuclearization Opening 3000 Initiative clearly shows that President Lee seeks to revamp South Korea’s approach to North Korea, shifting from a policy of unilateral appeasement to a strategy of reciprocity. North Korea has not yet revealed its response to the new policy. But many experts remain unconvinced that the new initiative will succeed in abolishing North Korea’s nuclear weapons program and its nuclear ambitions.

Since its transition to democracy in 1987, one of the key features of Korean politics has been its recurring cycle of high expectation and subsequent disappointment. Every president has begun his term with high approval ratings and ended with lame duck status, due to various scandals and declining popularity. At this point, it is too early to determine whether the Lee presidency prove the exception to this cycle. Perhaps the administration’s rough start will serve as a wake-up call for President Lee and his staff, who must now realize that the Korean public is demanding and tough to satisfy. Korean voters, who overwhelmingly supported President Lee in the December election, are now eager to scrutinize his policies and performance, and have their enthusiasm justified.

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Uncivil War: North Korea Policy Factionalism in the U.S. and South Korea

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Differences of perspective between the United States and its South Korean ally on North Korea policy have often been on public display in recent years. The roots of such disagreement, however, extend far beyond the personalities and philosophies of individual American and Korean presidents or even differing national interests.

Fundamentally, extreme factionalism within both the United States and South Korea has made it next to impossible for each to develop a coherent North Korea policy and implement it consistently, much less maximize allied cooperation. The situation has become so political—so uncivil—that like-minded factions in the two countries increasingly are working together to counter policy opponents in their home countries.

The presentation will recount the history of this phenomenon, analyze its implications, and offer suggestions as to how it might be overcome.

David Straub is a 2007-2008 Pantech Fellow at The Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center of Stanford University. A former U.S. State Department Korean affairs director and senior official at the U.S. embassy in Seoul, he has taught U.S.-Korean relations at leading U.S. and South Korean universities and is a frequent commentator on U.S. policy toward Northeast Asia.

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David Straub

No longer in residence.

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Associate Director of the Korea Program
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David Straub was named associate director of the Korea Program at the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (Shorenstein APARC) on July 1, 2008. Prior to that he was a 2007–08 Pantech Fellow at the Center. Straub is the author of the book, Anti-Americanism in Democratizing South Korea, published in 2015.

An educator and commentator on current Northeast Asian affairs, Straub retired in 2006 from his role as a U.S. Department of State senior foreign service officer after a 30-year career focused on Northeast Asian affairs. He worked over 12 years on Korean affairs, first arriving in Seoul in 1979.

Straub served as head of the political section at the U.S. embassy in Seoul from 1999 to 2002 during popular protests against the United States, and he played a key working-level role in the Six-Party Talks on North Korea's nuclear program as the State Department's Korea country desk director from 2002 to 2004. He also served eight years at the U.S. embassy in Japan. His final assignment was as the State Department's Japan country desk director from 2004 to 2006, when he was co-leader of the U.S. delegation to talks with Japan on the realignment of the U.S.-Japan alliance and of U.S. military bases in Japan.

After leaving the Department of State, Straub taught U.S.-Korean relations at the Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies in the fall of 2006 and at the Graduate School of International Studies of Seoul National University in spring 2007. He has published a number of papers on U.S.-Korean relations. His foreign languages are Korean, Japanese, and German.

David Straub Pantech Fellow, Stanford University Speaker
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Korean Studies Colloquium Series
Korea Program

Negotiating with North Korea: 1992-2007

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John W. Lewis and Robert Carlin, longtime North Korea experts, have just published a paper in CISAC's Policy in Context series, titled, Negotiating with North Korea: 1992-2007. The 50-page paper, which includes texts of major documents, analyzes U.S. bilateral and international multilateral diplomatic efforts to negotiate normal relations and an end to North Korea's nuclear weapons program.
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Negotiating with North Korea 1992 2007
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