North Korea successfully launched a long-range rocket Wednesday, with the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) confirming Pyongyang had "deployed an object that appeared to achieve orbit." The defiant rocket launch has prompted worldwide consternation: Japan has called for an urgent meeting of the U.N. Security Council; the Obama administration called the launch a "highly provocative act that threatens regional security" and violates U.N. resolutions; and South Korea has raised its security threat level. 

Pyongyang insists it has a right to pursue a peaceful space program and that the rocket was armed with a communications satellite to help in that endeavor. But the U.S. and its allies worry the technology could lead to an intercontinental ballistic missile capable of carrying a nuclear warhead.  

We turn to three experts on North Korea for their views on the launch: David Straub, associate director of the Korean Studies Program at the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center; Thomas Fingar, an international intelligence expert and the Oksenberg-Rohlen distinguished fellow at FSI; and Nick Hansen, a CISAC affiliate and expert in foreign weapons and imagery intelligence who writes for Jane’s Defense and 38North.org, a website for the U.S.-Korea Institute at SAIS.

 

Why is the global community surprised North Korea has successfully launched a rocket and apparently put a satellite into orbit? 

Straub: It shouldn't come as a surprise that North Korea has finally succeeded with its fifth test of a long-range rocket, which it's been trying to do since 1998. North Korea has pursued the development of nuclear weapons and missiles with great determination and intensity over many decades, because its leaders regard these as a panacea for problems actually originating in their own failed economic and political systems. 

Fearful that domestic reform would result in their overthrow, they continue to oppress and isolate their people while using military threats to intimidate other countries. Their aim is to remain in power and eventually prevail over their rival South Korea by forcing the lifting of international sanctions and being accepted as a nuclear weapons state. It is not irrational but it is very unrealistic. Most members of the international community, including the United States, will never accept this. North Korea is thus going ever deeper down a blind alley. 

The rocket technology is dangerously close to long-range missile technology and the United Nations Security Council has issued several resolutions and forbidden North Korea from conducting any further tests. 

 

Was there any significance to the Dec. 10-29 launch window? 

Straub: The media is full of speculation about why North Korea announced this particular window of dates, such as that it means to send a message to the Obama administration or to influence the upcoming South Korean presidential election on December 19.  My own guess is that it is keyed to the first anniversary Kim Jong Il’s death on December 17. 

But in the end, the most important question is why the North Koreans conducted the launch. It is fundamentally because they have a long-standing missile program to which they have devoted a great deal of resources. If the leadership had devoted those resources to taking care of its citizens, it could have bought enough food on the global market to prevent hunger, instead of calling on the international community for assistance.

 

The North Koreans typically pick the spring or summer to test their rockets. Why did it launch now amid constraining winter weather? 

Hansen: The timing is purely political. The reasons they prefer to launch in the spring and summer are, of course, better weather conditions and longer days to work on the pad. But the anniversary of the death of Kim Jong Il, the presidential elections in South Korea, beating the south to a satellite launch or putting the DPRK back in the international spotlight – these could all have driven the decision. 

North Korea may be following the same script they used for the (failed) April 12 Unha-3 launch. If they continued at the April pace, the rocket should have been completely stacked on the pad on Dec. 7 in order to be checked out on the 8^th and 9^th and be ready to launch on the 10^th, which was the first day of the launch window. This was a tight schedule with little room for technical problems or weather delays. (The North's Korean Central News Agency announced Dec. 10 that the launch window had been extended to the 29th, thus catching many North Korea observers off guard by the earlier launch.) 

Fingar: The timing is indeed outside the normal window of relatively better weather. Possible factors include commemoration of the anniversary of Kim Jong Il’s death; a ploy to capture the attention of new administrations in Washington, Beijing, Seoul, and Japan; and intent to buttress the North’s claim to having a nuclear deterrent by demonstrating that it can launch at any time of the year. There might also have been a simpler explanation, namely that DPRK engineers thought they had found and fixed the problem that caused the previous tests to fail and persuaded Kim Jong Un that there was no technical reason to delay.

 

What are the larger implications of North Korea’s actions and why do these rocket launches provoke such global condemnation? 

Fingar:  Perhaps the primary reason is that North Korea is widely perceived to be dangerous and more than a little bizarre. In other words, it is an easy target and symbolic embodiment of “worst case” fears about what a defiant and “irrational” country might do with its nuclear and missile capabilities. 

The world also sees that North Korea’s attempt to launch a satellite is interpreted, not unreasonably, as defiance of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1718, which demands that the DPRK not conduct any further nuclear test or launch a ballistic missile. Pyongyang argues that a rocket used for space launches is not a ballistic missile, and therefore is not proscribed by the U.N. resolution. 

Straub: North Korea has been developing medium- and long-range missiles for more than two decades, during which time it has repeatedly attacked South Korea and threatened the United States and other countries. It has also been working on its nuclear program and has already tested two nuclear devices. The fear is that North Korea is trying to miniaturize a nuclear device that could be used as a warhead on a long-range missile. 

In January 2011, former Defense Secretary Robert Gates voiced U.S. concern that North Korea was becoming a direct threat to it, and that Pyongyang could successfully develop intercontinental ballistic missile capability within five years.  

In South Korea, the launch is unlikely to have a major impact on the presidential election December 19. Conservative South Koreans regard North Korean behavior as stemming from the nature of its system, while progressives also blame the policies of the United States and conservative South Korean administrations for making North Korea feel insecure. Each side will simply interpret the launch from its longstanding perspective on North Korea.  

In Japan, where concern about North Korea runs deep both because of the nuclear and missile programs and North Korea's abduction of Japanese citizens, the launch will likely further strengthen the front-running conservatives in the Lower House election on December 16.

 

How is the international community responding to the launch? 

Straub: The United States has already signaled that it will seek even stronger international sanctions against North Korea. If China is unwilling to agree in the U.N. Security Council, the United States and its allies will pursue increased sanctions on their own. 

China has again been embarrassed by North Korea, but there is no indication that it will change its basic policy of supporting North Korea for fear it might collapse, creating an unpredictable situation on China's border. Even if China agrees to some increased sanctions against North Korea in the UN Security Council, its record of actually enforcing international sanctions is decidedly mixed. In any event, it has dramatically increased its economic support for and engagement with North Korea since that country's first test of a nuclear device in 20006. 

 

Is there anything more that Washington can do to prevent these provocations by the North aside from pushing the Six Party Talks and threats of greater sanctions? 

Fingar:  Probably not. Some argue that Pyongyang’s goal is to use the provocations to persuade the United States to negotiate directly with North Korea, but its conditions for doing so include U.S. acknowledgment – and acceptance – of the North’s self-proclaimed status as a nuclear weapon state. That is not likely to happen. I think the best course for the United States would be to avoid over-reacting and to focus attention on Pyongyang’s defiance of U.N. Security Council resolutions.

 

There is speculation that a third underground nuclear test will follow the rocket launch if it fails to put a satellite into orbit.

 

Hansen: I believe they will test regardless of the successful launch.  I have been following the nuclear test site at Punggye-ri all November. Details from a Nov. 19 image show that part of the dirt road into the complex from the valley is unusable, as three bridges have been washed out. Instead they have upgraded an old road that runs up the west side of the valley and enters the complex just in front of the new south tunnel. Imagery on Nov. 24 revealed some changes. The new road is still being used and there appears to be more vehicle tracks going to the support area. The most significant development is the probable clearing of snow at the entrance to the south tunnel. It also appears that the mine cart tracks are being reinstalled on the spoil pile to carry dirt out from the tunnel, but I can't be sure of that. 

See our interactive timeline on key events in North Korea here at Storify.com 

Hansen Interview with the Australia Broadcasting Corp. 

Hansen's Q&A with Popular Science with Popular Science on Why Launch Doesn't Spell Doom 

North Korea successfully launched a long-range rocket on December 12, despite a UN ban and a North Korean announcement about possible technical issues. KSP associate director David Straub comments on the motives and larger implications of the launch.

In a recent Dong-A Ilbo op-ed, Gi-Wook Shin says that North Korea is not a priority in current U.S. foreign policy.

Hallmarks during the first year of young North Korean leader Kim Jong Un’s reign range from a much-publicized failed rocket launch to the appearance (and then disappearance) of an attractive, stylish wife by his side. Such events have prompted questions about the new leader’s intentions for the future, including the possibility of reform.

But there is another side to the Democratic Republic of Korea (DPRK) that often goes overlooked: its 20 million ordinary citizens. Only Beautiful, Please, a new book by former British diplomat John Everard, delves into the daily life of North Koreans and examines the challenges of developing successful diplomatic relations with the country.

Everard was Britain’s ambassador to North Korea between 2006 and 2008 and is a former Pantech Fellow of the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center at Stanford’s Freeman Spogli Institute of International Studies. He presented highlights from his book, and offered his insight into current North Korea events during a seminar at Stanford on Oct. 26.

In a recent interview, Everard discussed his book, the prospect of reform in North Korea, and important considerations for engagement with the isolated country.

What is the significance of the book’s title?

A friend visiting me from the U.K. was pursued by a group of North Koreans who were convinced he had photographed things that did not show the DPRK in the best light. An army officer was eventually summoned, and after examining the pictures he concluded there was nothing offensive in them. As he returned my friend’s camera, he turned to me and said in his best English: “Only beautiful, please.” He meant that he wanted us to only photograph beautiful things in the DPRK.

I took this for the title because it says quite a lot about how the DPRK likes to hide the negative aspects of life there, and to portray itself as a country where only good things take place.

What do you most hope readers will take away from your book?

I hope readers will come away with the understanding that the DPRK is a real country, where real people live. North Korea is different from other countries in many important ways, but its citizens are much more preoccupied with everyday things like marriage, how their kids are getting on at school, and what they are having for supper, than they are about politics and denuclearization. It is a country with over 20 million people, and I hope their lives and happiness are not overlooked as the international community engages with the DPRK to seek long-term solutions to the difficult problems it poses.

What are the most important needs of North Korea’s citizens?

North Koreans are people like the rest of us, and they have the same physical and emotional needs. They need enough to eat, which is a need not always met. They also need to have normal social interactions. Friendships are very important in the DPRK, even if they are somewhat different than friendships in more open societies. North Koreans also have their self-respect and pride. They are a proud people, and as information about the outside world leaks into the DPRK and they learn how poor and backward their country is they feel quite disoriented. They will need to hold onto their self-respect through what is likely to be a very difficult period in the coming years.

There has been significant speculation in recent months about the possibility of reform in North Korea. Have we seen any tangible signs of plans for reform?

There have been indications that Kim Jong Un had been planning some limited economic reforms, including allowing farmers to retain a certain percentage of their produce after giving part of it to the state. But the most recent report suggests that this plan has stalled after the government realized there would be a poor harvest this year. They have decided it is more important to feed the military than it is to implement economic reforms at this point in time.

Another type of reform is the possibility of greater cultural opening. Mickey Mouse appeared in front of the DPRK leadership at a concert a few weeks ago, for example, and there is also the appearance of Ri Sol Ju, Kim Jong Un’s wife. She is a very presentable young woman, and dresses smartly, (and without wearing the traditional Kim badge). But there have been no further appearances of Mickey Mouse, and Ri Sol Ju has not appeared in public for several weeks. I suspect that these reforms, too, have been put on hold.

These are two quite different types of reform that do not depend on each other, and it is not clear if either of them is going to move forward.

In terms of easing diplomatic relations with North Korea, do you think that reform would pave the way or are there other issues to keep in mind?

If reform does indeed take place – I have my doubts – it might not be the kind of reform that would help improve relations with the DPRK. Economic reform does not necessarily translate into a greater readiness for meaningful dialogue with the international community. 

A crucial point is that there are certain aspects of the DPRK regime that are extremely difficult to change. I argue in my book that the DPRK cannot conduct any kind of meaningful economic reform along the lines China did because to do so would erode the regime’s economic power over its citizens. The regime views this power as intrinsic to its survival. It also cannot allow greater openness because that would allow in new ideas to which the regime has no answer. It will be politically very difficult, and even dangerous, for the regime to encourage the greater openness we have seen in other reforming economies.

The DPRK regime is likely to continue broadly along the lines we have seen for many decades now. Although many people were hoping that Kim Jong Un would bring reforms, and perhaps even better relations with the West, as time passes it seems less likely that these hopes can be realized.

What should the international community keep in mind in its relations with North Korea?

The DPRK has made it abundantly clear it has no intention whatsoever of surrendering its nuclear weapons. It has been hardened in its belief by its analysis of what has happened in the Arab world. Negotiations and talks towards persuading the DPRK to surrender its weapons are doomed to failure. They are not going to do so, and any engagement with the DPRK has to take that as a starting point.

There is a tendency in the United States to see North Korea's foreign relations simply in terms of the U.S.-DPRK relationship (or lack of it). The DPRK’s relations with the United States are indeed very important, but you also have to see the world through the DPRK’s eyes. If you are sitting in Pyongyang, your single most important relationship is with the People’s Republic of China.

Beijing has been deeply concerned about the DPRK’s behavior in a number of areas. Earlier this year, for example, we saw the launch of North Korea’s rocket against China’s express wishes, and the seizure of Chinese fishermen by the DPRK navy. The relationship between the DPRK and China has its difficulties, and one of the big determinants in what happens to the DPRK in the immediate future is going to be the position on the DPRK taken by the incoming Chinese government after the Party Congress in November.

About the Images

Even in central Pyongyang almost any cultivable patch of ground is ploughed for crops, like this one just outside the diplomatic quarter. (Credit: John Everard) 

Stalls at Pyongyang spring trade fair -- the dominance of China at these events is clear. (Credit: John Everard)