He broke the news to the world that North Korea had built a modern uranium enrichment plant. He’s helped the Russians secure their vast stockpile of ex-Soviet fissile materials. And Stanford students routinely rank him as one of their favorite professors. 

Siegfried Hecker, one of he world’s top nuclear scientists and co-teacher of the popular course, “Technology and National Security,” has completed his five-year tenure as co-director of the Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC).

Though Hecker is stepping down from the leadership role, he’s not walking away.

“He’s not going anywhere,” emphasized his successor, Stanford microbiologist and biosecurity specialist, David Relman, as he opened a seminar in Hecker’s honor on Feb. 25. The panel discussion, “Three Hard Cases: Iran, North Korea and Pakistan” featured Scott Sagan, Malfrid Braut-Hegghammer, Abbas Milani, Robert Carlin and Feroz Khan.

“He’ll be back this summer with his infectious energy and unswerving dedication for which he is so well known,” Relman said.

Hecker, 69, is taking a sabbatical in New Mexico – where he was director of the Los Alamos National Laboratory for more than a decade before coming to Stanford – and then at the Vienna Center for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, run by the Monterey Institute of International Studies. He’ll continue work on his book about his historic efforts to foster collaboration between U.S.-Russian nuclear labs and do some travel to meet his nonproliferation counterparts in other parts of the world.

“CISAC is part of my heart and soul now,” Hecker told a reception in his honor after the seminar. “Los Alamos was in my blood and bones. Today, Stanford is part of that too.”

Hecker will return to CISAC this summer to resume his writing and research projects as a senior fellow at CISAC and its umbrella, the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (FSI). He’ll head back to the classroom as well.

“What I found out is that teaching is so much harder than just giving a lecture, because you really have to pay attention to what the students have actually absorbed,” Hecker said. “You need to be able to communicate with each and every one of them.”

Among the many national honors that Hecker has received over the years, the one he treasures most is the 2010 Eugene L. Grant Award for Excellence in Undergraduate Teaching, an honor voted on by the students.

Lauren Cipriano, a Ph.D. candidate in Mechanical Science and Engineering, has been Hecker’s teaching assistant for four years. She noted his class co-taught with former Secretary of Defense William J. Perry – also a senior FSI fellow and CISAC faculty member – is routinely attended by hundreds of students and rated among the best.

“He shares his own stories of how developing personal relationships with Russian nuclear scientists in the wake of the Cold War helped overcome diplomatic challenges, and how he continues those efforts today in Russia and North Korea to make the world a safer place,” she said in her reception toast. “Sig also has a scary ability to predict the future. Several times our policy paper assignments have nearly come true.”

One of those dramatic examples unfolded in 2010. While the students were writing a paper about how they would respond to the discovery that North Korea had established a uranium enrichment facility, Sig was traveling to Pyongyang.

“Our students were some of the first to hear the stunning news of the uranium enrichment facilities the North Koreans revealed to him on his trip,” she said. “The students couldn’t have been more excited to feel like insiders in the national security policy arena.”

Hecker said he is particularly proud of the bright young scientists who have come through as CISAC fellows during his tenure.

“I think we’ve been able to build a really strong science component to support CISAC’s mission of building a safer world,” Hecker said. “We’ve been able to attract a lot of very good young scientists and then send them on to good careers from here.”

He said that working with these pre- and postdoctoral fellows and visiting faculty and scholars from the life sciences and political sciences “has helped me to better understand how important it is to bring the technical and social sciences together when looking at problems of international security.”

Hecker, who moved to the United States with his family from Austria when he was a boy, received his Ph.D. in metallurgy from Case Western Reserve University and began his professional career as a senior research metallurgist with the General Motors Research Laboratories in 1970. He joined the Los Alamos National Laboratory in 1973, became its director in 1986 and served for more than a decade.

Hecker came to CISAC in 2005 as a visiting professor, having been recruited by Sagan, who was then the social science co-director of CISAC.

“Sig first became involved with CISAC when he was still at Los Alamos, through participating in our Track II nuclear diplomacy efforts with John Lewis in North Korea and with me in a Five Nations project meeting in Thailand,” recalled Sagan. The Five Nations Project on Asian Regional Security and Economic Development focused on new challenges to nuclear nonproliferation by the U.S., China, Russia, India and Pakistan.

“I first broached the possibility of his coming to Stanford as a visiting professor when he and I were in the back seat of a taxi in Bangkok after giving a joint lecture at the Royal Thai Military Academy,” in July 2004, Sagan said. “He has been a stellar leader and now that he is stepping down from administrative responsibilities, he will have even more time to be involved in CISAC’s nuclear nonproliferation activities around the globe."

CISAC co-director, Tino Cuéllar, called himself a “charter member of the national federation of the Sig Hecker fan club.”

“In his eventful, five-year tenure, Sig has been an extraordinary leader,” Cuéllar said. “He’s been a visionary about its future, an endlessly enthusiastic supporter of its varied missions and a role model of excellence combined with the collegiality that CISAC prizes so dearly.

Just hours ahead of North Korea’s most recent nuclear test, an event which pushed the country once again into headlines around the world, a panel gathered at Stanford to discuss the challenges journalists face “uncovering” facts about North Korea.

The discussion, organized by the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center, was held on Feb. 11 at Stanford in conjunction with the 2012 Shorenstein Journalism Award.

Barbara Demick, Beijing bureau chief of the Los Angeles Times and recipient of the 2012 Shorenstein Journalism Award, said it was the lack of access to North Korea that inspired her to first want to cover the country.

“I felt like if I could not go to North Korea, I should be able to get into the mindset of the people,” Demick said. “I think this has been true for my entire career as a foreign correspondent—you are trying to really understand how people tick.”

Susan Chira, assistant managing editor for news at the New York Times, emphasized that reporters have a responsibility to piece together credible news from the fragments of often unreliable or biased information about North Korea.

“I always feel as an editor that your responsibility is to write in the caveats as clearly as possible so readers understand that you are dealing—to a much greater degree than with other articles we publish—with highly fragmented information,” Chira said.

Adam Johnson, an associate professor of English at Stanford and the author of the novel The Orphan Master’s Son, suggested that literary fiction can help bring to life the incomplete and untold stories of North Korea.

“For fiction, the things you can’t use in journalism—legend, rumor, story, whisper, and suggestions—these are all equally valid in my realm,” Johnson said. “Those can all be used to conjure a portrait.”

Katharina Zellweger, a former development worker who lived in Pyongyang for five years and who is the current Pantech Fellow at Stanford, spoke of the need to provide more balanced coverage of North Korea, especially of its regular citizens.

“Nobody has the full picture,” Zellweger said, “But I hope there will be more efforts to give the North Korean people the attention they deserve.”

A full-length video of the panel is available on the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center website.

Established in 2002, the Shorenstein Journalism Award recognizes the work of veteran American and Western journalists whose work has generated a greater awareness of the complexities of Asia. It also honors Asian journalists and media organizations engaged in helping build stronger U.S.-Asia ties by presenting a clear picture of key issues facing Asia’s society and politics.

North Korea conducted an underground nuclear test on Tuesday, prompting President Barack Obama to call the detonation of a miniature nuclear device a “highly provocative act” that threatens U.S. security and international peace. It is the third nuclear test by Pyongyang since 2006 and is escalating concern that the isolated Stalinist state is now closer to building a bomb small enough to be fitted on a missile capable of striking the United States and its allies. The test was conducted hours before Obama’s annual State of the Union speech.

North Korea’s official Korean Central News Agency said the test was conducted, “in a safe and perfect way … with the use of a smaller and light A-bomb, unlike the previous ones, yet with great explosive power.” The statement said the nuclear device did not impose “any negative impact” on the environment.

North Korea said the atomic test was merely its “first response” to what it called U.S. threats and said there would be unspecified “second and third measures of greater intensity” if the United States remains hostile to the North. Washington had led the call for more U.N. sanctions against Pyongyang after the North launched its first rocket and put a satellite into obit in December. While the North said the launch was for its civilian space program, the Obama administration believes it was part of a covert program to develop ballistic missiles that can carry nuclear warheads.

We ask two Stanford experts on North Korea to weigh in: David Straub, the associate director of the Korean Studies Program at the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC), and Nick Hansen, an affiliate of the Center for International Security and Cooperation who is an expert in foreign weapons systems.   

Q. Why conduct the test now?

Straub: Since the two previous North Korean nuclear tests took place on American holidays and the North Korean themselves have announced that their moves are "targeted" at the United States, many observers have concluded that the this test was especially timed to coincide with President Obama's State of the Union address. It is also possible that, as others have speculated, the North Koreans also took into account that Feb. 16 is the birthday of North Korean leader Kim Jong Un's father, Kim Jong Il, the man who is said to have instructed North Koreans to proceed with the nuclear weapons and missile programs. Others have speculated that the North Korean leadership wanted to test the device before the Feb. 25 transition in South Korea from the current president Lee Myung-bak, to the president-elect, Park Geun-hye. The timing could be intended to punish Lee, whom the North Koreans say they despise, while, the argument goes, making it a little easier for Park to reach out to the North before her inauguration.

Q. What message is North Korea’s young and relatively new president, Kim Jong Un, trying to send to the world with this test?

Hansen: Kim seems to be saying: I’m going to do what I say I’m going to do – and nobody is going to dissuade me. The North said they were going to launch a satellite, and by God they did. They said they were going to touch off a nuclear test after that, and by God they did. Now we have to wait and see what’s next.

Straub:  The North Koreans themselves are saying that the test is a response to the military threat posed to it by the United States and to U.S.-led UN sanctions imposed on North Korea after its rocket test in December. The North Koreans have complex motivations for pursuing nuclear weapons. Many North Koreans may actually believe that having nuclear weapons will defend them against the United States. But the fact of the matter is that the United States and South Korea have never attacked North Korea over the decades, while the North Koreans have repeatedly attacked South Korean and American targets, most recently killing 50 South Koreans in 2010. North Korea's top leaders see nuclear weapons and missiles as a panacea. Fearful of opening up to the outside world because of the lies they have told their people, Pyongyang wants to believe that it will eventually maneuver the United States and the international community as a whole into accepting its possession of nuclear weapons and forcing the removal of sanctions against it. That won't happen, but even if it did, it would not resolve Pyongyang's basic problems, which stem from the totalitarian nature and history of its regime.

Q. What concerns you most in the wake of this test?

Hansen:  The thing I’m worried about now is that they also said they’re going to launch more satellites and long-range missiles. They displayed one in the military parade of 2010, an intermediate-range missile that can probably go 2,000 miles. When you think about that, 2,000 miles, or maybe a little bit longer, it puts just about every U.S. base in Asia under its threat, including Guam, Okinawa, Taiwan and everything in Japan. It’s a threat if they could put a warhead on it. The KN-08 is a bigger, three-stage rocket and is more of a threat, with the potential of hitting at least Alaska, Hawaii and maybe the U.S. West Coast. But remember, the North has tested neither.

Q. The test was in defiance of Pyongyang’s chief ally, Beijing, which had urged Kim not to risk confrontation and said the North would “pay a heavy price” if it proceeded with a test. How will China respond?

Straub: China is key in dealing with the North. China provides North Korea with most of its external support, including vital food and energy supplies. Chinese leaders are certainly not happy with their North Korean counterparts, as China would prefer peace and stability in the region, so it can focus on its own economic development. But Chinese leaders are fearful that putting a great deal of pressure on North Korea might result in chaos, with unpredictable and possibly very dangerous repercussions for China and the region. Thus, before North Korean nuclear and rocket tests, typically the Chinese press Pyongyang not to proceed. But immediately after a test, the Chinese begin to urge "all parties" to exercise restraint. In the United Nations, where China has a veto on the Security Council, it reluctantly agrees to the minimum condemnations of and sanctions against North Korea. After the dust settles, however, China doesn't seriously implement the sanctions. In fact, since North Korea conducted its first nuclear test in 2006, Chinese trade with North Korea has dramatically increased as a result of a PRC government decision to support North Korea. China may agree to a stronger resolution this time, but ultimately this pattern will almost certainly repeat itself.

Q. The North Koreans have said the test poses no risks to the environment or its people. Is this accurate?

Hansen: It takes a while for the particles that are released from the test to get released from the cracks in the rock and get into the atmosphere. My guess is that because of this very hard rock, they probably don’t have much of a radiation release problem. It probably will just seep through naturally and should not be of any danger. Engineers seem to have done a good job from a security and safety standpoint; the way the tunnels make right-handle turns and then there are the blast doors and piles of dirt to soak up any release.

North Korea Timeline