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The Trump administration's immigration crackdown may be leading to an unintended consequence: a drop-off in benefits enrollment among legal Hispanic immigrants, according to new research by Stanford Health Policy's Marcella Alsan.

This CBS News story about her work notes that an immigration program called Secure Communities, which was rolled out during the Obama administration, is linked to a lower take-up of benefits such as food stamps and health care enrollment.

In a new paper published by the National Bureau of Economic Research, Alsan and Crystal Yang of Harvard Law School found Hispanic households were particularly hard-hit, even those with legal immigration status.

"We find evidence that our results may be driven by deportation fear rather than lack of benefit information or stigma," the researchers wrote.  "Though not at personal risk of deportation, Hispanic citizens may fear their participation could expose non-citizens in their network to immigration authorities. We find significant declines in SNAP and ACA enrollment, particularly among mixed-citizenship status households and in areas where deportation fear is highest."

Read the CBS News story.

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"What is different today is the speed and extraterritorial reach of disinformation. Over-restriction on content undermines our democratic values, but understanding the mechanisms of manipulation opens up the solutions." Our Eileen Donahoe, Executive Director of CDDRL's Global Digital Policy Incubator, said in the podcast "Digital Media: Combatting Threats in the Era of Fake News." Listen here.

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Vincent Tanutama is a research data analyst at the Center on Food Security and the Environment, where he supports the work of Marshall Burke on climate’s impact on economic outcomes such as workers' labor productivity and subnational economic output. Vincent's interest in the environment sprouts from investigating the distribution of rent among bureaucrats in their management of forest and oil palm resources in Indonesia, his country of origin. He has worked at the Indonesian Ministry for Economic Development Planning (Bappenas), The Abdul Latif Jameel Poverty Action Lab (JPAL Southeast Asia), Oxford Policy Management (OPM), and the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (UNESCAP).  He holds a B.A. in Ethics, Politics and Economics from Yale University.

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​I am a Junior Fellow at the Harvard Society of Fellows. Starting in 2023, I will be an Assistant Professor at Harvard Business School's Business, Government and the International Economy (BGIE) unit.

My research examines political extremism, destigmatization, and radicalization, focusing on the role of popularity cues in online media. My related research examines a broad range of threats to democratic governance, including authoritarian encroachment, ethnic prejudice in public goods allocation, and misinformation. 

​My dissertation won APSA's Ernst B. Haas Award for the best dissertation on European Politics. I am currently working on my book project, Engineering Extremism, with generous funding from the William F. Milton Fund at Harvard.

My published work has appeared in the American Political Science Review,  Governance,  International Studies QuarterlyPublic Administration Review, and the Virginia Journal of International Law, along with an edited volume in Democratization (Oxford University Press). My research has been featured in KQED/NPRThe Washington Post, and VICE News.

I received my Ph.D. in Political Science at the University of California, Berkeley in 2020. I was a Predoctoral Research Fellow at the Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law at Stanford University and the Stanford Program on Democracy and the Internet. I hold a B.A. (Magna Cum Laude; Phi Beta Kappa) from Cornell University and an M.A. (with Distinction) from the University of California, Berkeley.

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The rising level of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere means that crops are becoming less nutritious, and that change could lead to higher rates of malnutrition that predispose people to various diseases.

That conclusion comes from an analysis published Tuesday in the journal PLOS Medicine, which also examined how the risk could be alleviated. In the end, cutting emissions, and not public health initiatives, may be the best response, according to the paper's authors.

Research has already shown that crops like wheat and rice produce lower levels of essential nutrients when exposed to higher levels of carbon dioxide, thanks to experiments that artificially increased CO2 concentrations in agricultural fields. While plants grew bigger, they also had lower concentrations of minerals like iron and zinc.

Read the entire story at NPR

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There is a wealth of data that could help hospitals cut costs while still providing high-quality service for patients, if physicians were willing to join forces with administrators to truly understand how much their services cost, according to a new article by Stanford researchers.

The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) has been pushing physicians and providers toward population-based payment, which requires that providers reduce their internal costs below payment levels.

In this effort, the beleaguered health-care payer for the elderly has been undertaking innovative payment models, such as accountable care organizations (ACOs) and bundled payment that require providers to better coordinate care and reduce reimbursements and unnecessary or redundant patient procedures.

“However, it has proven challenging for the models, which focus on costs from the payer perspective, to achieve the desired effect of reduced Medicare spending,” writes Merle Ederhof, PhD, in this Health Affairs Blog. The researcher who focuses on issues at the intersection of health-care and accounting is with Stanford’s Clinical Excellence Research Center.

Her co-authors, Alexander L. Chin, MD, MBA and Jeffrey K. Jopling, MD, MSHS, are also at the center, which is dedicated to discovering, testing and evaluating cost-saving innovations in clinical care.

Changing old patterns at hospitals and among physicians

“Highly detailed cost data generated by internal cost accounting systems already exist in a large, and growing, number of health-care organizations,” says Ederhof. 

As Ederhof wrote in this New England Journal of paper last year, the data collected by the Healthcare Information and Management Systems Society shows that more than 1,300 U.S. hospitals have adopted sophisticated internal cost accounting systems.

The authors argue that the cost data produced by these accounting systems can be used in hospitals internally to lower their costs of providing services to all their patients, both within and outside the Medicare system. But physicians must get on board.

“The high adoption rate of these cost-measurement systems is not surprising, considering that the systems are designed around the existing data infrastructure that providers must have in place for billing purposes,” the authors write. “However, while provider administrators have used such cost accounting systems for some time, we are only now beginning to see them being used by interdisciplinary teams involving physicians to restructure clinical processes.”

Some large health-care systems have already started using these accounting systems alongside teams of physicians.

Partners HealthCare in Boston has started to use this approach to analyze costs for a set of services, for example, in a recent project a team of spine surgeons reviewed and discussed unblinded comparisons at the episode and cost-category levels. 

“Analysis of the costs in the individual categories revealed variation in clinical processes across surgeons, which was very illuminating to the team,” the authors wrote.

Leaders at NYU Langone Health have also started to use the cost data in the organization’s “Value-Based Management” initiative. A key feature of the initiative, the authors write, is a dashboard that is accessible to all physicians. For each specific diagnosis-related group (DRG), the dashboard shows cost averages for each physician performing the procedure, at the procedure level and at the level of individual cost categories, such as the ICU, laboratory, operating room and therapies.

“Physicians have been highly engaged and interested in the dashboard since it allows them to compare their costs to their peers and external benchmarks, and to learn how they can restructure clinical processes to lower their costs,” the authors write.

This Value Based Management initiative at NYU, which incorporates cost savings targets, development-level incentives and quality components, has apparently resulted in substantial cost savings for the organization.

Stanford Health Care has also joined the movement to promote value-based care, recently launching its Cost Savings Reinvestment Program

Compare, for example, the average cost for a hip replacement surgery among five surgeons who perform the surgery in the same hospital. Then take the “positive outlier,” or the surgeon with the lowest cost for the surgery.

“Once positive outliers are identified, detailed analysis that combines physicians’ clinical expertise and administrators’ insight can uncover ways in which clinical processes can be restructured to deliver high-quality care at lower total episode cost,” the authors wrote.

Then the interdisciplinary team of physicians and administrators must try to understand why that surgeon’s costs are lower and what he or she does differently. Did she order physical therapy sooner after the hip-replacement surgery? Did he use a different anesthesia approach that resulted in a shorter recovery for the patient? 

But you still have to get those four, more expensive surgeons to adopt the less-expensive treatments. And that can go to the heart of a physician’s identity.

“Even just a few years ago concern for the cost of providing health-care services still heavily clashed with physicians’ professional identity,” Ederhof said in an interview. 

The authors believe there is no turning back.

“In my view, the shift in recent years is attributable to the fact that physicians are starting to realize that the rising costs of the U.S. health-care system are no longer sustainable and that things will have to change — with or without their collaboration,” Ederhof said.

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"In what may be looked back upon as the most important election in the United States in 2018, the voters of Maine rejected political cynicism on Tuesday and preserved ranked-choice voting (RCV) for its future elections. To appreciate the historic significance of this vote for greater democratic choice, it’s important to understand what Mainers were up against—a two-party duopoly in which “all the levers of power” (in the words of one grassroots activist) were overtly or covertly working to block political reform," writes Larry Diamond in American Interest. Read here

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Donald K. Emmerson
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The 2018 IISS Shangri-La Dialogue was held in Singapore, June 1-3. Shorenstein APARC's Donald Emmerson was in attendance; some of his observations from the the 17th Asia Security Summit are provided below.

NOTE: This post is forthcoming from YaleGlobal.

 

The 2018 Shangri-La Dialogue on 1-3 June in Singapore might as well have been renamed the “Indo-Pacific Dialogue.” In the plenaries and the panels, in the Q&As, corridors, and coffee breaks, not even the imminent Trump-Kim summit hosted by Singapore could compete with the “Indo-Pacific” among the attendees. Although the toponym itself is old, its sudden popularity is new, reflecting new geopolitical aspirations for the region. 
 
What explains the latest revival and rise of the “Indo-Pacific” in the international relations of Asia? What does the term now mean, and why does it matter?  In March, China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi dismissed the “Indo-Pacific” as “an attention-grabbing idea” that would “dissipate like ocean foam.”  Is he right?  And is the “Indo-Pacific” purely maritime, or does it have legs on land as well?  Is the strategy Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s way of labeling his shift from “looking east” to “acting east” – and perhaps his hope of looking and acting westward past Pakistan toward Africa as well?  Does the term frame a potential rival to China’s 21st Century Maritime Silk Road?  Is it an American rebranding of former President Barack Obama’s “pivot” or “rebalance” toward Asia?  In the “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” that Washington favors, what do the adjectives imply?  Is the “Indo-Pacific” a phoenix – a Quadrilateral 2.0 meant to reunite Australia, India, Japan and the US in leading roles?  Could the strategy someday morph into a five-sided “win-win” arrangement with “Chinese characteristics”? 
 
Understandably, the officials who spoke at Shangri-La preferred not delve into such controversial and speculative questions. Satisfactory answers to some of them are not possible, let alone plausible, at least not yet. But the dialogue, a summit on Asian security, did stimulate thought and discourse about just what the “Indo-Pacific” means, for whose purposes, and to what effect.
 
It is easy to load the “Indo-Pacific” with geopolitical intent. Having accepted the invitation to keynote the dialogue on 1 June, Modi became the first Indian prime minister to speak at Shangri-La since the event’s inception in 2002.  Many at the gathering read the prefix “Indo-“ as a geopolitical invitation to India to partner more explicitly with states in an “Asia-Pacific” region from which it had been relatively absent, and thereby to counterbalance China within an even larger frame. 
 
Perhaps aiming to mend relations with China after the Wuhan summit, held in April, Modi unloaded the loaded term. “The Indo-Pacific,” he said, “is a natural region. …  India does not see [it] as a strategy or as a club of limited members.  Nor as a grouping that seeks to dominate.  And by no means do we consider it as directed against any country. A geographical definition, as such, cannot be.”  Modi flattened the Indo-Pacific to a mere page in an atlas – the two dimensions of a map – while widening it to include not only all of the countries located inside “this geography” but “also others beyond who have a stake in it.”  Modi thus drained the toponym of controversially distinctive meaning. India’s rival China could hardly object to being included in a vast “natural” zone innocent of economic or political purpose or design. 
 
Not so, countered US Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis. Unlike Modi, he explicitly linked ideology to geography by repeatedly invoking a “free and open Indo-Pacific.” Nor did these qualifiers apply only to external relations – a state’s freedom from foreign interference and its freedoms of navigation and overflight under international law. For Mattis, “free and open” implied internal democracy as well – a state’s accountability to an uncensored society. In Singapore during his question and answer period, Mattis acknowledged the “free and open press” that had thronged to cover the dialogue.   
 
In corridor conversations, understandings of the “Indo-Pacific” ranged widely, from an inoffensively natural region on the one hand, to a pointedly ideological one on the other. Will the real Indo-Pacific please stand up?  
 
The rise of the “Indo-Pacific” in American policy discourse amounts to a rejection, a resumption, and a desire.  Because Donald Trump cannot abide whatever his predecessor did or said, Barack Obama’s “rebalance” to the “Asia-Pacific” could not survive. The “Indo-Pacific” conveniently shrinks Obama’s “Asia” to a hyphen while inflating the stage on which a celebrity president can play. Yet Mattis also, without saying so, reaffirmed the result of Obama’s “pivot” to Asia by assuring his audience that “America is in the Indo-Pacific to stay. This is our priority theater.” Alongside that rejection-cum-resumption, the prefix “Indo-” embodies the hope that India as a major power can help rebalance America’s friends against what Mattis called China’s “intimidation and coercion,” notably in the South China Sea. 
 
In Honolulu, en route to the dialogue, Mattis had added the prefix to the US Pacific Command – now the Indo-Pacific Command. But continuity again matched change in that the renamed INDOPACOM’s area of responsibility was not extended west of India to Africa. As for Modi, while recommitting his country to “a democratic and rules-based international order,” both he and Mattis ignored the Quad – the off-and-on-again effort to convene the United States, India, Japan and Australia as prospective guardians and agents of the Indo-Pacific idea.
 
The first effort to create the Quad died at the hands of Beijing and Canberra.  Quietly in May 2007, on the sidelines of an ASEAN meeting in Manila, the four governments met at a sub-cabinet level, followed that September by an expanded Malabar naval exercise in the Indian Ocean among the four along with Singapore. Early in 2008, however, then-Prime Minister Kevin Rudd, bowing to pressure from Beijing, withdrew Australia from Quad 1.0 and it collapsed. 
 
It took the subsequent upbuilding and arming of land features in the South China Sea by China to re-embolden the quartet. Beijing’s maritime militancy, Trump’s disdain for Obama-style “strategic patience,” the worsening of Japan’s relations with China, and alarm in Australia over signs of Beijing’s “sharp power” operations there all came together to motivate a low-key, low-level meeting of a could-be Quad 2.0 on the margins of another ASEAN gathering in Manila in November 2017.  
 
The question now is whether the quartet will reconvene in Singapore during the upcoming November ASEAN summitry and if it does, whether the level of representation will be nudged upward to cabinet status. Trump’s addiction to bilateralism, mano a mano, may be tested in this four-way context. Or his one-on-one real-estate developer’s proclivity could cripple the Quad from the start. 
 
More grandiose is the idea that the “Indo-Pacific” could shed its cautionary quote marks and become a rubric for building infrastructure on a scale rivaling China’s own Belt and Road Initiative to lay down railroads, roads and ports from Kunming potentially to Kenya. That surely is, so to speak, a bridge too far.  
 
In short, the temptation to read multilateral diplomatic content into a map of the “Indo-Pacific” drawn in Washington should be resisted. Having objected to any reference to “the rules-based international order” in the June G7 communiqué that he refused to sign, Trump is unlikely to fit the “Indo-Pacific” into any such frame. Nor is it likely to think that he would wish to augment a resuscitated Quad by adding China. Not to mention that Beijing might fail to see the humor in belonging to a five-sided “Pentagon” whose name is a metonym for the American Department of Defense. 
 

Donald K. Emmerson heads the Southeast Asia Program at Stanford University where he is also affiliated with the Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law.

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The following article first appeared on The Diplomat.

With the historic U.S.-North Korea summit on the immediate horizon, we must recognize that denuclearization will not and cannot be permanent or irreversible as long as there is a desire to reverse it. U.S. President Donald Trump may strike a “grand deal” with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un to denuclearize North Korea, but Kim can — and most likely will — reverse course at his convenience to construct new nuclear weapons. By focusing solely on denuclearization, we risk losing sight of the bigger, more important picture — that is, transforming North Korea into a normal state that no longer sees the need to pursue nuclearization for deterrence, survival, or any other reason.

Much of debate has centered on why Kim suddenly emerged from long-held silence to take the world’s center stage through a series of summits. Was he pressured by toughened sanctions, as Trump credits himself for? Or was it an expression of Kim’s confidence as a leader of a now de facto nuclear power, with more leverage for negotiation? Or has he simply been trying to buy time to avoid war — to get through the unpredictable and ruthless Trump’s tenure as U.S. president? Yet, what really matters now is not so much the question of why Kim came to the table, but rather how we can make the latest détente sustainable without repeating the failures of the past. Will it be different this time?

With the Trump-Kim summit now back on the track after a 24-hour drama of cancellation then resumption, each side seems to have softened its stance by lowering the bar. Next week in Singapore, both leaders will be sorely tempted by clear political and economic interests to paint the meeting as a success. Real challenges, however, will arise as the logistical details of North Korea’s denuclearization are discussed following the summit. The Trump team is unlikely to abandon its goal of the CVID (complete, verifiable, and irreversible denuclearization) of North Korea, while Kim and his men will stand firmly against this all-out approach so as not to follow the footsteps of Libya, Iraq, or Ukraine. North Korea has reportedly demanded a CVIG (complete, verifiable, and irreversible guarantee) of the security of the current regime, but there is a great danger that these deals, if made, will be nothing more than another sheet of paper full of empty words. The deep mistrust between the two countries cannot be overcome overnight, especially considering that both leaders have pretty bad track records of reneging on previous commitments. Neither CVID nor CVIG has much chance of being realized in the current context, from either a technical or a practical perspective.

With all this skepticism, why should we still bother playing this game with North Korea again? It is because we see a window of opportunity to guide North Korea into the international community through processes of diplomatic communication, exchange, and engagement. North Korea’s summit diplomacy has revealed its desire to appear a normal state. Kim vigorously showcased four summit meetings  — twice each with China’s Xi Jinping and South Korea’s Moon Jae-in — and numerous high-level meetings, within two months, all within the parameters of conventional “state-to-state” relationships, departing from past practices. Standing side-by-side with the South Korean president to read out a joint declaration, immediately releasing news of Kim’s summit meetings through its media, presenting Kim’s wife, Ri Sol-ju, as the state’s first lady — all of this would have been unthinkable in his father or grandfather’s generation.

North Korea’s latest efforts at international recognition as a normal state may be insincere and ill-intentioned, but even so, we should continue to allow North Korea and Kim to experience firsthand what it feels like and means to be treated as a normal state and a normal leader according to the ordinary conventions of international diplomacy. Although the goal seems so far away and unreachable, we should strive to normalize North Korea in all respects — its economy, its domestic and international politics, its integration into international institutions, and its adherence to international laws, norms, rights, duties, orders, etc.

CVID can still serve as a short- to mid-term goal, but not as a definitive solution to the long-standing North Korean threat. Whatever is decided at the upcoming summit, a more comprehensive roadmap should be set for enacting desirable transformations in security and economic relations with North Korea, putting the country on a path to become a stable and normal state increasingly integrated into the international community, where it would feel secure without a need for nuclear armament. As Trump says, he is starting a “process” of dealing with North Korea; the upcoming summit should be the beginning of an opportunity to advance this goal. After all, a normal North Korea can achieve CVID, but CVID cannot achieve a normal state.

Gi-Wook Shin is director of the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center at Stanford University, and Joyce Lee is a research professional in the Korea Program at the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center at Stanford University.

 

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