"The Kofi Annan Commission on Elections and Democracy in the Digital Age found the rise of social media has caused irrevocable harm to global electoral integrity and democratic institutions—and the effects may get even worse," Paris Martineau writes in Wired. CDDRL's Deputy Director Stephen J. Stedman served as the Secretary-General of the Commission. Read here.

Speaking on Monday about Donald Trump’s impeachment trial, Ukraine’s foreign minister said “please don’t drag us into your [America’s] internal political processes.”  Unfortunately, Republicans appear intent on doing precisely that, as they repeat the false Russian claim that the Ukrainian government interfered in the 2016 US election.

Republicans see this as part of their effort to defend President Trump. In doing so, they put at risk America’s long-standing support for its Ukrainian partner.

The US government and large bipartisan majorities in Congress have backed Ukraine since the early 1990s, when it regained independence following the Soviet Union’s collapse. By the end of the decade, Congressionally-approved assistance for Ukraine had reached USD 300-400 million per year.

When Ukrainians took to the streets in the 2004 Orange Revolution and the 2013-2014 Revolution of Dignity, their striving for democracy won interest and support from both sides of the aisle on Capitol Hill.

Such Congressional support offered Kyiv grounds for comfort when Trump became president in 2017. Candidate Trump had suggested he might recognize the illegal 2014 annexation of Crimea by Russia. He also questioned the sanctions imposed on Moscow for its seizure of Crimea and subsequent aggression in eastern Ukraine.

Despite Trump’s apparent skepticism about Ukraine and his reluctance to criticize Vladimir Putin (or Russian actions), Congress continued to back Ukraine. It regularly voted by wide margins to approve funding for reform and military assistance for Kyiv while pressing the administration to bolster sanctions on Russia.

Things took a turn last September with the revelation of Trump’s effort to extort Ukraine’s president into investigating his possible 2020 political opponent by withholding an Oval Office visit and military assistance. The president’s alleged abuse of power led to his impeachment by the House of Representatives in December.

I tried to assure my Ukrainian interlocutors that, whatever President Trump did, they had an ace in the hole: the bipartisan support their country enjoyed from both Democrats and Republicans in Congress. This was support that, if necessary, would produce veto-proof votes to aid Ukraine. Today, I am not so sure.

It has long been clear that Trump buys Moscow’s disinformation line that Ukraine, not Russia, interfered in the 2016 US election. It is true that individual Ukrainian officials criticized candidate Trump, just as officials from many European countries did. But it was Russian intelligence agencies, with Putin’s approval, that hacked the Democratic National Committee’s e-mails and gave them to Wikileaks. It is Russia’s Internet Research Agency that used social media to sow division among Americans.

However, in November and December as they sought to defend Trump against impeachment, Republicans began to make the Russian argument that Ukraine had interfered. There were many examples of this from Republicans who will sit in judgment as the Senate conducts the impeachment trial. Senator John Kennedy (R-LA) commented, “I think both Russia and Ukraine meddled in the 2016 election.” Meanwhile, Senator Richard Burr (R-NC) argued, “There’s no difference in the way Russians put their finger early on, on the scale and how Ukrainian officials did it,” and Senator Ted Cruz (R-TX) stated bluntly, “Ukraine blatantly interfered in our election.”

We can expect more such charges in the coming days. Republicans have put themselves on a slippery slope as regards support for Ukraine.

Will Republicans who assert that the Ukrainian government interfered in the US election vote in the future to approve assistance for Ukraine? And, if they can separate their espousal of the Kremlin’s talking point from their votes on assistance, how do they defend to constituents and others less sympathetic to Ukraine a vote to assist the country that they say interfered in the 2016 US election?

This is dangerous ground that could undermine US support for a country whose success is in America’s national interest.

Steven Pifer, a William Perry research fellow at Stanford’s Center for International Security and Cooperation, is a former US ambassador to Ukraine.

Read the Rest at The Atlantic Council

Following the death of Qassem Soleimani, the commander of Iran’s Quds Force, five international affairs experts from the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (FSI) gathered to discuss Soleimani’s prominence in Iran, the potential consequences of Soleimani’s death on the surrounding Gulf states and U.S.-Iran relations, and the rising presence of Russia and China in the region.

Several hundred people packed Encina Hall for the panel discussion, “The Strike on Soleimani: Implications for Iran, the Middle East & the World,” which was moderated by FSI Director Michael McFaul.

Soleimani was a unique figure in Iranian society, said panelist Abbas Milani, who is the Hamid and Christina Moghadam Director of Iranian Studies at Stanford. Soleimani had perhaps a closer relationship with Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khomeini than anyone, and his assassination was a major event that transformed the country for several days.

“Iranian television and radio were constantly talking about him, and they described him as a pious soldier, and a national hero,” Milani said. “For the first time in maybe 15 years, Iran played an iconic secular song, which to most Iranians is the equivalent of ‘La Marsailles.’ Hundreds of thousands of people turned out [for Soleimani’s funeral] — it was a huge demonstration of support.” 

Soleimani was portrayed by the American media in a much different way, said Colin Kahl, the co-director of the Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC). The description of Soleimani by some U.S. news organizations as a “terrorist mastermind” is accurate to a certain degree, Kahl said, but it doesn’t fully describe his role in Iran.

“His title doesn’t really have an equivalent in the U.S., but you can think of him as a mashup between the director of the CIA, the Secretary of Defense, and the shadow Secretary of State all rolled up into one,” Kahl said. “You can imagine how escalatory it would be in our view if an American secretary of defense was killed on foreign soil by another state.”



The effects of the strike on Soleimani are reverberating throughout the Middle East, said Lisa Blaydes, who is a professor of political science at Stanford and a senior fellow at FSI. Iraqis are very unhappy about Iranian intervention in their country and about U.S. intervention in Iran, she said.

“A national poll conducted in Iraq last year found that most Iraqis want to open up their country more to the international economy — and guess which country they are interested in having intervene to a greater extent?” Blaydes asked. “It’s not Iran, it’s not the U.S. — it’s China.”



Brett McGurk, the Payne Distinguished Lecturer at FSI and CISAC, discussed changes to the United States’ national security strategy, which outlines the major national security concerns of the United States and how the administration plans to deal with them. The strategy that was released in 2017 — when he was still working for the government — was a major shift from what it had been in previous years, he said. 

“It said that we were actually going to reduce our commitments in the Middle East — that we’ve been too invested in the Middle East,” McGurk said. “It said that we were going to shift to a great power competition, which meant we were going to shift our resource focus, our diplomatic focus, and our prioritization to Asia, China, and Russia. A few months later, President Trump pulled out of the Iran nuclear deal and announced an uber-maximalist Iran policy.”



Meanwhile, other countries are beginning to expand their influence in the Middle East, Milani said. He told the audience that the degree of influence that China and Russia have in the region has never been as great as it is today.

“In 200 years, Russia never had a naval base in the Persian Gulf — but they’re about to get one,” Milani said. “Never in history has China, Russia, and Iran had joint naval operations in the Persian Gulf — but they just had one about three weeks ago. I can tell you with absolute certainty that China and Russia have never been as strong in the Persian Gulf as they are now.” 



Related: Listen to Abbas Milani discuss Iran’s response to the strike against Soleimani, Iran's economic and political troubles, and why Soleimani’s death is a big deal on the World Class podcast.

The January 3 assassination by the United States of Qassem Soleimani — the commander of Iran’s Quds Force — transformed Iran, Abbas Milani told Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies Director Michael McFaul on the World Class podcast.

Posters of Soleimani’s face were plastered everywhere, Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khameni announced three official days of mourning, and hundreds of thousands of people took to the streets to grieve Soleimani’s death, Milani explained.

“There is no one in the Iranian domestic structure that was as close to Khameni as Soleimani,” said Milani, who is the Hamid and Christina Moghadam Director of Iranian Studies and founding co-director of the Iran Democracy Project. “The regime had begun a very sophisticated propaganda campaign: they talked about Soleimani as a poet, and as a mystic. When he was taken out, it was a very direct hit to the power structure.”

Milani explained that before Soleimani’s death, tensions were already high in Iran. The country had been experiencing its deadliest political unrest in 40 years after the regime raised gasoline prices by as much as 200 percent in November. Within hours, Iranians took to the streets to protest and call for the removal of President Hassan Rouhani. The regime responded by shutting down the internet for nearly the entire country and by opening fire on unarmed protesters — as of January, more than 1,000 people had been killed, Milani said.

Iran’s Revenge 
Although the regime began to talk about immediate revenge on the U.S. following Soleimani’s assassination, its decision to fire missiles at two Iraq military bases that housed U.S. troops demonstrates that the country was hesitant to escalate things further, according to Milani.

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The missiles did not kill either U.S. or Iraqi troops, and Milani told McFaul that he suspects that Iran had not been looking to produce casualties in the hit. 

“I have no evidence for it, but I would be profoundly surprised if Iraq didn’t tell the U.S. that the missiles were coming,” Milani said. “Then the U.S. moved all of their personnel before Iran had two hits and multiple missiles — but no loss of life. They had done their duty of revenge, and they had done it in a way that would allow President Trump to de-escalate.”  

[Ready to dive deeper? Learn more about long-term Iranian economic, demographic, and environmental trends from the Iran 2040 Project.”]

A Missed Opportunity
Milani told McFaul that he thinks Iran missed an opportunity to create a moment of national unity in the midst of its severe economic and political troubles.

“Every indication is showing that Iran’s economic challenges are going to increase, and once this euphoria has ended, I would be very surprised if we don’t see more demonstrations,” Milani said. “If the regime had any prudence, they could have used this to their benefit. Instead, they’re doubling down on oppression, and these economic difficulties are not going to go away.” 

Related: Watch five FSI experts — including Milani — discuss “The Strike on Soleimani: Implications for Iran, the Middle East & the World” on YouTube.