Authors
Donald K. Emmerson
News Type
Commentary
Date
Paragraphs

This editorial was originally carried by Asia Times on June 13, 2018, and reposted with permission.

Bedecked with skyscrapers, Malaysia’s capital Kuala Lumpur is a high-rise city. In that lofty context, the headquarters of the People’s Justice Party (PKR) are down to earth.

They occupy one in a row of nondescript low-rise buildings unfashionably far from downtown. Even the lettered number of the floor that includes the PKR leader’s office is anomalous: 3A.

As if the “A” stood for Anwar—Anwar Ibrahim, the head of the PKR. As if, years ago, the builder had presciently inserted the “A” floor, predicting correctly that the trials and incarcerations of Malaysia’s most famous political prisoner would end years later, on May 9, 2018, in a historic, peaceful, electoral ouster of Prime Minister Najib Razak and his inter-communal National Front, or Barisan Nasional (BN).

Included in the defeated coalition was its leading member party, the United Malays National Organization (UMNO), which had been returned to power in every general election held in Malaya/Malaysia since 1959.

This writer has known Anwar since the 1980s. In November 2014 at Stanford University, I joined him and my colleagues Larry Diamond and Frank Fukuyama on a panel to discuss Islam and democracy, with specific reference to Malaysia. Anwar was on his way back to Kuala Lumpur.

He and we knew he was almost certain to be detained again on politically motivated charges of sodomy, a crime under Malaysian law. He could have gone into exile. He did not. He went home to face his accusers in the ruling UMNO party.

He was jailed three months later, in February 2015, and was not released until more than three years later still, on May 16, 2018, not coincidentally a week after Malaysians had voted his four-party “Alliance for Hope”, or Pakatan Harapan (PH), coalition into office.

Promptly at the new government’s request, Malaysia’s king issued a pardon amounting to an exoneration that covered not only Anwar’s latest detention, but an earlier political jailing from 1999 to 2004 on the same sodomy charge.

On June 6, 2018 I visited Anwar at his office. He was in fine spirits. Had he chosen not to fly back to Malaysia after speaking at Stanford in 2014, had he opted for exile instead, he would not have been able to stage a martyr’s comeback into his country’s political life. “Out of sight, out of mind” applies to politicians as well as lovers.

Now Anwar is very much in sight, out of jail, and leading the PKR, the main party in the Alliance of Hope that ousted Najib’s National Front including UMNO.

The words “I’M BACK” appear next to his photograph on a poster in the elevator to his office. But the man upon whom Anwar’s immediate political future depends is also back.

The blunt, decisive, nonagenarian Mahathir Mohamad, who led the PH’s winning campaign against the incumbent BN, has reassumed the prime ministership that he held for 22 years from 1981 to 2003.

Prior to the May 2018 election, Mahathir apparently agreed that if the PH won, he would, as prime minister, free Anwar and eventually cede the position to him. Already the world’s oldest head of state, Mahathir will be 93 in July. In August, Anwar will be 71.

The gap of more than two decades between them suggests that time is on Anwar’s side. Or is it? Could history repeat itself? After all, it was Mahathir as prime minister who, in 1998, blocked his then-deputy Anwar’s ascent to the top slot. Mahathir fired him and, in effect, hounded him into prison.

The reason? In 1997-98, while the Asian financial crisis raged, Anwar as finance minister argued for relatively liberal, International Monetary Fund-friendly economic reform and opposed the corruption associated with Mahathir’s rule. Mahathir disagreed. He responded to the crisis along more or less state-nationalist lines, and he resented what he thought was Anwar’s premature ambition to replace him.

There are no visible signs of such acrimony between the two men today. They are indebted to each other. Technically, Anwar owes his freedom to Mahathir. But politically, without Anwar’s iconic status and popularity, the PH might not have won the lower-house majority that enabled Mahathir, as prime minister, to obtain his former rival’s release.

The good news is that Najib’s massively corrupt and incrementally despotic nine-year rule is over. The cautionary news is that Malaysian democracy is not yet fully secured, given the uncertainties and contingencies that could affect its future.

As for my having met Anwar on floor 3A, the “A” does not of course stand for Anwar. The elevator rises directly from 3A to 5 for a different reason. In spoken Mandarin, “four” sounds like the word for “death.” Only the tones differ. Whoever built the building, knowing that superstitious Chinese occupants would shun a numerically fatal fourth floor, called it “3A” instead.

Will the ruse fool the devil? Will renascent Malaysian democracy survive? Bandwagoning is already underway, as venal officials and executives who benefited from Najib’s kleptocratic ways seek political safety by ingratiating themselves with the new government, potentially weakening its ability to clean house.

Nor were reformers necessarily encouraged when Mahathir chose his long-time ally Daim Zainuddin to head a Council of Eminent Persons to advise the new government. Daim both preceded and succeeded Anwar as minister of finance during Mahathir’s long and controversial earlier reign as prime minister.

Also concerning in this context was the June 8, 2018 decision by the Council’s head of media and communications to resign from the position because it prevented him from speaking freely. A veteran journalist, he had been criticized for reporting in his blog that the Najib administration had allocated public funds for the royal family’s expenses in 2017-18 far in excess of the amount allowed by law.

Anwar himself felt obliged to warn against disrespecting the country’s basically symbolic and constitutional monarchy—an arrangement whereby the national kingship in effect rotates every five years among the ceremonial rulers of Malaysia’s nine states.

In Anwar’s plausible if debatable view, the country’s newborn and vulnerable administration can ill-afford to criticize royals whose symbolic support it may well need in the years ahead.

The newly ruling “Alliance of Hope” for democracy in Malaysia, as it transitions from opposing to governing, will need to navigate skillfully the problematic space between reformist candor and pragmatic restraint.

That dilemma instantiates, on a far-from-whimsical scale, Anwar’s need to protect the democratic freedom of Malaysians to be outspoken in principle, while he works on a floor whose number is unspoken in practice.

Donald K. Emmerson heads the Southeast Asia Program at Stanford University where he is also affiliated with the Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law.

 

Hero Image
gettyimages 168069973
All News button
1
Paragraphs

Climate-induced shocks in grain production are a major contributor to global market volatility, which creates uncertainty for cereal farmers and agribusiness and reduces food access for poor consumers when production falls and prices spike. Our study, by combining empirical models of maize production with future warming scenarios, shows that in a warmer climate, maize yields will decrease and become more variable. Because just a few countries dominate global maize production and trade, simultaneous production shocks in these countries can have tremendous impacts on global markets. We show that such synchronous shocks are rare now but will become much more likely if the climate continues to warm. Our results underscore the need for continued investments in breeding for heat tolerance.

All Publications button
1
Publication Type
Journal Articles
Publication Date
Journal Publisher
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
Authors
Rosamond L. Naylor
Authors
Donald K. Emmerson
News Type
Commentary
Date
Paragraphs

The 2018 IISS Shangri-La Dialogue was held in Singapore, June 1-3. Shorenstein APARC's Donald Emmerson was in attendance; some of his observations from the the 17th Asia Security Summit are provided below.

NOTE: This post is forthcoming from YaleGlobal.

 

The 2018 Shangri-La Dialogue on 1-3 June in Singapore might as well have been renamed the “Indo-Pacific Dialogue.” In the plenaries and the panels, in the Q&As, corridors, and coffee breaks, not even the imminent Trump-Kim summit hosted by Singapore could compete with the “Indo-Pacific” among the attendees. Although the toponym itself is old, its sudden popularity is new, reflecting new geopolitical aspirations for the region. 
 
What explains the latest revival and rise of the “Indo-Pacific” in the international relations of Asia? What does the term now mean, and why does it matter?  In March, China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi dismissed the “Indo-Pacific” as “an attention-grabbing idea” that would “dissipate like ocean foam.”  Is he right?  And is the “Indo-Pacific” purely maritime, or does it have legs on land as well?  Is the strategy Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s way of labeling his shift from “looking east” to “acting east” – and perhaps his hope of looking and acting westward past Pakistan toward Africa as well?  Does the term frame a potential rival to China’s 21st Century Maritime Silk Road?  Is it an American rebranding of former President Barack Obama’s “pivot” or “rebalance” toward Asia?  In the “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” that Washington favors, what do the adjectives imply?  Is the “Indo-Pacific” a phoenix – a Quadrilateral 2.0 meant to reunite Australia, India, Japan and the US in leading roles?  Could the strategy someday morph into a five-sided “win-win” arrangement with “Chinese characteristics”? 
 
Understandably, the officials who spoke at Shangri-La preferred not delve into such controversial and speculative questions. Satisfactory answers to some of them are not possible, let alone plausible, at least not yet. But the dialogue, a summit on Asian security, did stimulate thought and discourse about just what the “Indo-Pacific” means, for whose purposes, and to what effect.
 
It is easy to load the “Indo-Pacific” with geopolitical intent. Having accepted the invitation to keynote the dialogue on 1 June, Modi became the first Indian prime minister to speak at Shangri-La since the event’s inception in 2002.  Many at the gathering read the prefix “Indo-“ as a geopolitical invitation to India to partner more explicitly with states in an “Asia-Pacific” region from which it had been relatively absent, and thereby to counterbalance China within an even larger frame. 
 
Perhaps aiming to mend relations with China after the Wuhan summit, held in April, Modi unloaded the loaded term. “The Indo-Pacific,” he said, “is a natural region. …  India does not see [it] as a strategy or as a club of limited members.  Nor as a grouping that seeks to dominate.  And by no means do we consider it as directed against any country. A geographical definition, as such, cannot be.”  Modi flattened the Indo-Pacific to a mere page in an atlas – the two dimensions of a map – while widening it to include not only all of the countries located inside “this geography” but “also others beyond who have a stake in it.”  Modi thus drained the toponym of controversially distinctive meaning. India’s rival China could hardly object to being included in a vast “natural” zone innocent of economic or political purpose or design. 
 
Not so, countered US Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis. Unlike Modi, he explicitly linked ideology to geography by repeatedly invoking a “free and open Indo-Pacific.” Nor did these qualifiers apply only to external relations – a state’s freedom from foreign interference and its freedoms of navigation and overflight under international law. For Mattis, “free and open” implied internal democracy as well – a state’s accountability to an uncensored society. In Singapore during his question and answer period, Mattis acknowledged the “free and open press” that had thronged to cover the dialogue.   
 
In corridor conversations, understandings of the “Indo-Pacific” ranged widely, from an inoffensively natural region on the one hand, to a pointedly ideological one on the other. Will the real Indo-Pacific please stand up?  
 
The rise of the “Indo-Pacific” in American policy discourse amounts to a rejection, a resumption, and a desire.  Because Donald Trump cannot abide whatever his predecessor did or said, Barack Obama’s “rebalance” to the “Asia-Pacific” could not survive. The “Indo-Pacific” conveniently shrinks Obama’s “Asia” to a hyphen while inflating the stage on which a celebrity president can play. Yet Mattis also, without saying so, reaffirmed the result of Obama’s “pivot” to Asia by assuring his audience that “America is in the Indo-Pacific to stay. This is our priority theater.” Alongside that rejection-cum-resumption, the prefix “Indo-” embodies the hope that India as a major power can help rebalance America’s friends against what Mattis called China’s “intimidation and coercion,” notably in the South China Sea. 
 
In Honolulu, en route to the dialogue, Mattis had added the prefix to the US Pacific Command – now the Indo-Pacific Command. But continuity again matched change in that the renamed INDOPACOM’s area of responsibility was not extended west of India to Africa. As for Modi, while recommitting his country to “a democratic and rules-based international order,” both he and Mattis ignored the Quad – the off-and-on-again effort to convene the United States, India, Japan and Australia as prospective guardians and agents of the Indo-Pacific idea.
 
The first effort to create the Quad died at the hands of Beijing and Canberra.  Quietly in May 2007, on the sidelines of an ASEAN meeting in Manila, the four governments met at a sub-cabinet level, followed that September by an expanded Malabar naval exercise in the Indian Ocean among the four along with Singapore. Early in 2008, however, then-Prime Minister Kevin Rudd, bowing to pressure from Beijing, withdrew Australia from Quad 1.0 and it collapsed. 
 
It took the subsequent upbuilding and arming of land features in the South China Sea by China to re-embolden the quartet. Beijing’s maritime militancy, Trump’s disdain for Obama-style “strategic patience,” the worsening of Japan’s relations with China, and alarm in Australia over signs of Beijing’s “sharp power” operations there all came together to motivate a low-key, low-level meeting of a could-be Quad 2.0 on the margins of another ASEAN gathering in Manila in November 2017.  
 
The question now is whether the quartet will reconvene in Singapore during the upcoming November ASEAN summitry and if it does, whether the level of representation will be nudged upward to cabinet status. Trump’s addiction to bilateralism, mano a mano, may be tested in this four-way context. Or his one-on-one real-estate developer’s proclivity could cripple the Quad from the start. 
 
More grandiose is the idea that the “Indo-Pacific” could shed its cautionary quote marks and become a rubric for building infrastructure on a scale rivaling China’s own Belt and Road Initiative to lay down railroads, roads and ports from Kunming potentially to Kenya. That surely is, so to speak, a bridge too far.  
 
In short, the temptation to read multilateral diplomatic content into a map of the “Indo-Pacific” drawn in Washington should be resisted. Having objected to any reference to “the rules-based international order” in the June G7 communiqué that he refused to sign, Trump is unlikely to fit the “Indo-Pacific” into any such frame. Nor is it likely to think that he would wish to augment a resuscitated Quad by adding China. Not to mention that Beijing might fail to see the humor in belonging to a five-sided “Pentagon” whose name is a metonym for the American Department of Defense. 
 

Donald K. Emmerson heads the Southeast Asia Program at Stanford University where he is also affiliated with the Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law.

Hero Image
mattis iiss 2018 U.S. Embassy in Singapore
All News button
1
-
The Western, or liberal, international order which emerged after World War II reflects the culmination of a centuries-long process of European, and later American, economic and political development.  But how can we understand global trade and economic ties before the "Rise of the West" -- and what does the decline of the Western international order mean for global economic relations?  A decline in the economic and political hegemony of Western powers has provided an opening for the revival of trade ties between China and the Middle East, the world's economic hegemons before Europe's rise.  The creation of a new economic zone which touches half of the world's population speaks to the growing relevance of "South-South" economic ties.
 
Lisa Blaydes is Associate Professor of Political Science at Stanford University and Director of the Abbasi Program in Islamic Studies. She is the author of Elections and Distributive Politics in Mubarak’s Egypt (Cambridge University Press, 2011) andState of Repression: Iraq under Saddam Hussein (Princeton University Press, 2018).  Her articles have appeared in theAmerican Political Science Review, Governance, International Studies Quarterly, International Organization, Journal of Theoretical Politics, Middle East Journal, Studies in Comparative International Development and World Politics. During the 2008-9 and 2009-2010 academic years, Professor Blaydes was an Academy Scholar at the Harvard Academy for International and Area Studies. During the 2015-16 academic year, she was a Fellow at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences. She holds degrees in Political Science (PhD) from the University of California, Los Angeles and International Relations (BA, MA) from Johns Hopkins University. 
 
To register, please visit: https://yoopay.cn/event/26611553
 

Stanford Center at Peking University
The Lee Jung Sen Building
Langrun Yuan
Peking University
No.5 Yiheyuan Road
Haidian District
Beijing, P.R.China 100871

Lisa Blaydes Associate Professor, Department of Political Science Stanford University
News Type
News
Date
Paragraphs

 

Group Photo 1

On May 24, Shorenstein APARC hosted the final three research presentations by this year’s Corporate Affiliate Visiting Fellows. What had been months in preparation was at last over; any indications of nervousness or anxiety now gave way to jubilant smiles and celebratory thumbs-ups for cameras. The journey that began for many nearly a year ago had come to a successful end.

Established in 1982, the Corporate Affiliates Program introduces personnel of Asian organizations that have become APARC corporate affiliates to American life and institutions. Over the span of a year, Corporate Affiliate Visiting Fellows have the opportunity to immerse in daily interaction with specialists, students, and scholars from Stanford and abroad. In turn, the practical experience and international perspectives that Visiting Fellows bring with them enrich and inform intellectual exchange at both Shorenstein APARC and Stanford at large. 

The 2017-2018 Visiting Fellows came to APARC from 14 different organizations including government agencies, state-owned enterprises, and private sector industry corporations from four countries: China, India, Japan, and Korea.

 

Academic Engagement

Group Photo 2The Corporate Affiliates Program is ideal for mid-career professionals looking to expand their knowledge and international experience. Visiting Fellows participate in a structured, yet individualized year of academic exploration. Elements of the program include creating individual research projects, auditing classes, attending exclusive seminars, and visiting local companies and institutions.

Following summer intensives and orientation, Visiting Fellows embark on their nine-month research projects under the guidance of an APARC faculty advisor. Fellows are matched with an advisor based on the research project subject and/or their professional background and region of employment.

“The best thing about this program is that I have one entire year to focus and to manage my own time,” observed a previous Visiting Fellow.

The months of thorough research culminate in a paper and its public presentation. Fellows present their research findings before an audience of APARC faculty and researchers, Stanford community members, and their “fellow Fellows.” Over the course of five days in May, audiences heard presentations on a wide variety of subjects ranging from the impact of U.S. Supreme Court decisions on the AI Industry to regulatory requirements for bio-similar products, and from the role of large industries in Urban Air Transport to the benefits of shifting a government’s focus from economic growth to people’s happiness.

Presentations were well received by APARC faculty, though not before standing up to the rigorous follow-up questions from a highly engaged audience.

 

University Enrichment

For Corporate Affiliates, the year was not exclusively about their research. Fellows found ample opportunities to take advantage of non-academic pursuits, both on-campus and in the greater Bay Area.

Group Photo 3One way to further encourage exploration was a team-based activity designed by the program. Fellows were broken up into groups of five, each tasked with coordinating an excursion to take the rest on. Facilitated trips included a hike to Stanford’s famous radio telescope (“the Dish”), an exploration of the Berkeley neighborhood and its local industries, and a visit to NASA’s Ames Research Center at Moffett Field.

Stanford Jazz OrchestraIn addition to their professional experiences, Fellows also enriched the Center and university community through their personal pursuits. Takahito Inoshita, for example, brought his musical talent to Stanford along with an extensive experience in engineering. While researching how cities could identify policy needs via natural language data, he also performed with the Stanford Jazz Orchestra as lead trombonist at a November performance at Stanford’s Bing Concert Hall.

Next year’s Visiting Fellows are scheduled to begin arriving in mid-June, and include personnel from government, SOEs and private industries, but also the military and non-profit sector as well. For now, however, the Center is still saying goodbye to the 2017-2018 Fellows as they leave to join a distinguished, ever-growing alumni network of government and private sector professionals throughout Asia.

Hero Image
Corporate affiliate 2017 2018 stanford pride
All News button
1
Authors
Amy Zegart
News Type
Q&As
Date
Paragraphs

In a world complicated by terrorism, cyber threats and political instability, the private sector has to prepare for the unexpected. Amy Zegart, CISAC co-director, the Hoover Institution’s Davies Family Senior Fellow, and co-author (along with Condoleezza Rice) of Political Risk: How Businesses And Organizations Can Anticipate Global Insecurity, explains lessons learned in keeping cargo planes moving, hotel guests protected – and possibly coffee customers better served.  

Hero Image
Radio mic
All News button
1
Authors
Siegfried S. Hecker
News Type
News
Date
Paragraphs

STANFORD, Calif. — When President Trump abruptly canceled the summit with North Korea last week, it overshadowed the closing of North Korea’s nuclear test site just a few hours before. Although it is not irreversible, blowing up the site’s tunnels, sealing the entrances and removing test site facilities and equipment was nevertheless a serious step toward denuclearization. What possessed North Korean leader Kim Jong Un to take this step now?

Read the rest in the Washington Post's World Post 

Hero Image
hecker2
All News button
1
-

TITLE:  The China Wide Web:  The information Dilemma and the Domestsication of  Cyberspace

 

Qitong Tom Cao
Major:  Political Science; Computer Science (minor); MS&E (Computational Social Science) (coterm)

 

Abstract:


In order to preempt severe public discontent, an authoritarian government needs its citizens to convey their true political attitudes. But it does not want their attitudes to be communicated among themselves, which may trigger protests or even subversion in case widespread dissatisfaction exists and becomes citizens common knowledge. This information dilemma thus poses a fundamental threat to the stability and governance of all authoritarian regimes. This thesis, however, argues that the Chinese government is resolving the information dilemma through an innovative approach  by domesticating its internet. On this domestic cyberspace, social media companies delete unfavorable content and report user data to the regime, which can be analyzed to reveal citizens true political attitudes. As such, the government manages both to restrict communication of discontent and to gain knowledge of the political inclination of the public. I will demonstrate formally that this domestic cyberspace presents an optimal solution for authoritarian regimes, and that the Chinese government could attract the bulk of their internet users to the domestic cyberspace despite its inability to fully block access to foreign websites. Finally, I will show empirically that domestic social media also helps increase propaganda efficacy, which reduces perceived level of discontent and further consolidates regime stability. Together, this strategy may potentially afford the regime an information advantage enormous enough to secure its stability without fear of overthrow.

 

TITLE:  Whose California?  Power, Property Rights, and the Legacy of the 1851 California Land Act

 

Marin Callaway
Major: International Relations; Spanish (minor)
 

Abstract:

 

In 1848, the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo ended the Mexican-American War and ceded over half of Mexico's territory to the United States. But, the valuable new lands gained by the United States were not empty. With the changing border, the country gained a sizable Mexican and Native American population. The Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo guaranteed the protection of property rights and civil rights of Mexican nationals living on the newly acquired lands. But, in California, the much-delayed California Land Act of 1851 put the burden of proof on Mexican landowners to receive a formal U.S. patent to their land. Landowners, who had received private land grants or ranchos from the Mexican government, underwent lengthy litigation. This thesis evaluates the Land Act's impact on Mexican land ownership, measures the extent to which original grantees were able to retain their lands, and describes the contentious evolution of land and power in California in the nineteenth century. In an effort to add empirical evidence to the historical literature, I find that 58% of patented ranchos remained in the name of the original grantees by the patent date with greater retention in Southern California than Northern California. However, the finding that less than 20% of ranchos in Los Angeles County were owned even in part by original grantees by 1888 reveals that land loss became even more pronounced after patents were issued. The findings of this thesis both support and contradict traditional claims about the fate of Mexican land grant ownership in California throughout the nineteenth century. By determining what the rates of land grant retention were for original grantees throughout California and in individual counties, it is possible to better understand the legacy of the Land Act and how it interacted simultaneously with other social, economic, and political phenomena to ultimately result in significant loss of Mexican land ownership in the state. This thesis treats nineteenth century California as a case study of minority rights in annexed land. It ultimately argues that Mexicans and Mexican-Americans suffered most under a lack of rule of law and uncertainly surrounding property rights and citizenship. The California Land Act of 1851 upheld property rights but was too little too late for a group that was by 1851 the minority in the state.
 

 

Qitong Tom Cao
Marin Callaway
Seminars
Authors
News Type
News
Date
Paragraphs

One of most acclaimed and long-running programs at the Stanford Graduate School of Business that students consider life-changing is “Interpersonal Dynamics”, known to many as “Touchy Feely”. It aims to help increase our ability to forge strong relationships with others, to improve emotional intelligence and leadership through better communications with self and others.

Dr. David Bradford, Stanford Graduate School of Business Eugene O'Kelly II Senior Lecturer Emeritus in Leadership and Co-founder of the Interpersonal Dynamics Program, and Leslie Chin, Interpersonal Dynamics faculty member and Lecturer in Management, is collaborating with Stanford Center at Peking University (SCPKU) Executive Director Josh Cheng and Stanford Graduate School of Business China Director Frank Hawke to bring the condensed version of this program, titled “Essential Interpersonal Dynamics”, to SCPKU, opening the first chapter of Touchy Feely in China.

Stanford MBA alumnus Gu Ji will act as Founding Program Director and will lead the Essential Interpersonal Dynamics program in China. The program is being launched following a 2-year pilot overseen by Leslie Chin in which the program design was adapted to Chinese culture and context. Previous students include founders of listed companies, internet company CEOs, investment executives of large financial companies, noted angel investors, as well as founders of international schools, strategic firm partners, international law firm senior partners and other outstanding individuals.

The first 4-day program will begin on July 19th, 2018. Participants will be awarded a certificate issued jointly by David Bradford and SCPKU. Please click "Read More" to apply this program.

To register, please fill in the form by June 30th:  https://wj.qq.com/s/2134848/fb7d

All News button
1
Subscribe to Asia-Pacific