Note: This piece originally appeared at Lawfare.

Many analysts, practitioners, and scholars are skeptical of the efficacy of drone strikes for counterterrorism, suggesting that they provide short-term gains at best and are counterproductive at worst. However, despite how widespread these views are, reliable evidence on the consequences of drone strikes remains limited. My research on drone warfare and U.S. counterterrorism—some of which was recently published in International Security—addresses this issue by examining the U.S. drone war in Pakistan from 2004 to 2014. Contrary to the skeptics, I find that drone strikes in Pakistan were effective in degrading the targeted armed groups. And, troublingly, they succeeded in doing so even though they harmed civilians.

Three Key Findings

I have conducted research in Pakistan and the United States over the last few years, gathering new qualitative data on the politics of the war and its effects on the two main targets, al-Qaeda and the Pakistan Taliban. I have also evaluated detailed quantitative data on drone strikes and violence by al-Qaeda and the Pakistan Taliban. This research offers three important findings.

First, the U.S. drone war was damaging for the organizational trajectories of al-Qaeda and the Pakistan Taliban. I found that after the United States surged its surveillance and targeting capabilities in 2008, both groups suffered increasing setbacks; they lost bases, their operational capabilities were reduced, their ranks were checked by growing numbers of desertions, and the organizations fractured politically. These effects appear to have persisted until 2014. In a related paper, my University of Michigan colleague Dylan Moore and I show that during the drone program in the Waziristan region, violence by the two groups fell substantially.

Second, the U.S. drone war disrupted al-Qaeda and the Pakistan Taliban not just by killing their leaders and specialized rank-and-file members, but also by heightening the perceived risk of being targeted. Across a variety of empirical materials, including some collected through fieldwork, I found that both groups were direly constrained by the fear—a constant sense of anticipation—of drone strikes, which crippled routine movement and communication. In addition, leaders and rank-and-file jihadis regularly viewed each other with the suspicion of being spies for the drone program, which contributed to their organizational fragmentation.

Third, the notion of increased recruitment for al-Qaeda and the Pakistan Taliban due to civilian harm in drone strikes is questionable. In the local battlefield, I did not find evidence of any tangible increase in recruitment. Interviews with some surviving mid-level members of al-Qaeda and the Pakistan Taliban negated the impression that the groups benefited from a stream of angry recruits. Instead, a recurring theme was that they experienced desertions and manpower shortages because of the stress of operating under drones. To the extent that new recruits were available, both groups struggled to integrate them in their organizations because of the fear that they might be spies for the drone program.

Beyond Pakistan?

The U.S. drone war in Pakistan is a crucial case of U.S. counterterrorism policy, but it is one of many other campaigns. The U.S. government is waging such campaigns in Yemen and Somalia, and considering an expansion in the Sahara. In my work, I identify two factors which are important for the dynamics evident in Pakistan to hold generally.

First, the United States must have extensive knowledge of the civilian population where the armed group is based. The counterterrorism force needs such knowledge to generate intelligence leads on their targets, who are often hiding within the civilian population. This comes from detailed population data sharing by local partners, large-scale communication interception, and pattern-of-life analysis of target regions from sophisticated drones.

Second, the United States must be able to exploit available intelligence leads in a timely manner. As members of targeted armed groups consistently try to escape detection, most intelligence has a limited shelf life. The capability to act quickly depends on the bureaucratic capacity to process intelligence, decentralized decision-making for targeting, and rapid-strike capabilities like armed drones.

In Pakistan, the United States met these criteria with an abundance of technology and high-quality local partner cooperation. Starting in 2008, the United States mobilized a large fleet of drones and surveillance technologies to develop granular knowledge of the civilian population in the targeted regions. Despite deep political rifts on the conflict in Afghanistan, the Central Intelligence Agency obtained extensive covert support from Pakistani intelligence against al-Qaeda and the Pakistan Taliban, which enabled it to regularly locate targets. With ample targeting authority and armed drones operating from nearby bases, U.S. forces were able to exploit available leads.

In Yemen, however, the United States has struggled to develop knowledge of the civilian population and act on available intelligence. My interviews with U.S. officials and a leaked government document suggest that, until 2013, U.S. forces did not sustain aerial surveillance of targeted regions, the Yemeni state’s capacity in support of operations remained poor, and the targeting rules were stringent.

Implications for U.S. Counterterrorism Policy

The U.S. government’s preference for drone strikes is motivated by the desire to prevent attacks against the American homeland. My research suggests that the drone program has the potential to inflict enough damage on the targeted armed groups to upset their ability to plot and organize attacks in the United States.

The United States also deploys drone strikes to manage jihadi threats to allied regimes. In such cases, the political value of strikes depends, in part, on the capability of the local partner. An effective drone deployment can go a long way in providing a necessary condition for restoring order. But the local partner must ultimately step up to consolidate state control.

For example, President Obama’s drone policy degraded al-Qaeda and the Pakistan Taliban, securing the American homeland and substantially reducing the threat to the nuclear-armed Pakistani state. The Obama administration’s policy was sufficient because the Pakistani state was relatively capable and could build on the gains made by U.S. counterterrorism strikes. Indeed, Pakistan’s ground operations, although contentiously timed, consolidated those gains.

In contrast, in today’s Afghanistan, the U.S. government cannot rely on instruments of counterterrorism alone. U.S. officials realize that just degrading the Afghan Taliban and the Islamic State is unlikely to stabilize the country. The Afghan government remains so weak that it will struggle to consolidate territorial control even after substantial degradation of its armed foes.

Finally, a key limitation of counterterrorism strikes is that they cannot alleviate the ideological appeal of jihadi actors like al-Qaeda and the Islamic State. Strikes cannot substitute for efforts at countering online jihadi propaganda and de-radicalization. Thus, they should not be seen as a silver bullet that can defeat armed groups operating from safe havens and weak states.

Civilian Protection and Drone Strikes

Civilian harm in U.S. counterterrorism remains a vital challenge. While moral objections to civilian casualties are a powerful reason to reconsider drone operations, my research suggests that strategic concerns, like a surge in local violence or increased recruitment of targeted organizations, are not. In Pakistan, for example, drone strikes harmed civilians while also undermining al-Qaeda and Pakistan Taliban. Similarly, the U.S.-led counter-ISIL campaign in Iraq and Syria was very difficult for the civilian population, and yet also inflicted losses on the Islamic State.

If civilian casualties do not affect the strategic outcomes of counterterrorism campaigns, then the U.S. government must be convinced to protect civilians for purely moral reasons. How responsive might the U.S. government be to such appeals? It is unclear. The Obama administration was not transparent about the use of drone strikes. Under President Trump, the lack of transparency has worsened. Concerned policymakers and human rights activists must continue to push the U.S. government to be more transparent and to protect civilians caught up in counterterrorism campaigns.

A group of 8 Stanford graduate and undergraduate students entered the gates of SCPKU on September 21st. They are participating in the inaugural fall quarter of China Studies in Beijing, an overseas, pilot program being offered by the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies in partnership with Peking University. Jay Gonzalez, a Stanford junior, already described his experience as “life-changing” – “exactly what I dreamed of and more.”

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(From left to right): Lucas Hornsby (sophomore), Jenny Zhao (SCPKU’s Beijing program coordinator), Isaac Kipust (junior), Cathy Dao (sophomore), Minhchau Dinh (second year, Master’s in International Policy), Jenn Hu (sophomore), and Jay Gonzalez (junior) walking towards SCPKU for China Studies in Beijing orientation

Leading faculty from different Stanford departments and two Peking University faculty are offering intensive courses on contemporary Chinese society, politics, international relations and economic development. And each of the students brought their energy, curiosity and long-standing interest in China to the fall program. With an array of exposure to China – from one whose Chinese begins and ends with “ni hao (hello)” to another who calls China his adoptive home -- their interests vary from a passionate interest in the Belt Road Initiative; China-Africa relations; geopolitics; technology and Chinese entrepreneurs; Chinese domestic politics; and, literally, “anything China.” Many recognize China’s central role in the world and the critical importance of acquiring a nuanced understanding of this global power.

(Clockwise, from left to right): Isaac Kipust, Jay Gonzalez, Prof. Andrew Walder, Lucas Hornsby, Prof. Thomas Fingar, Josh Cheng (Executive Director, SCPKU), Jenny Zhao, Prof. Jean Oi, Jenn Hu, Cathy Dao, and Minchau Dinh

(Clockwise, from left to right): Isaac Kipust, Jay Gonzalez, Prof. Andrew Walder, Lucas Hornsby, Prof. Thomas Fingar, Josh Cheng (Executive Director, SCPKU), Jenny Zhao, Prof. Jean Oi, Jenn Hu, Cathy Dao, and Minchau Dinh

Each of the Stanford faculty teaching in the overseas program has dedicated his or her professional life to engaging with and understanding China. These students have unparalleled access to foremost China experts like Prof. Thomas Fingar, Shorenstein APARC Fellow and former chairman of the National Intelligence Council who has devoted himself to U.S.-China relations since the “ping-pong diplomacy” days in the early 1970’s. Prof. Jean Oi, the founding Lee Shau Kee Director of SCPKU and the William Haas Professor in Chinese Politics in the department of political science; and Prof. Andrew Walder, Denise O’Leary & Kent Thiry Professor in the Department of Sociology, were among the first group of U.S. scholars to conduct fieldwork in China after Deng Xiaoping’s Open Door policy was announced in 1978. Prof. Scott Rozell, Senior Fellow at FSI and Co-director of the Rural Education Action Program is the recipient of numerous awards and recognitions, including in 2008 of the Friendship Award, the highest award given to a non-Chinese by China’s Premier.

(Clockwise, from left to right): Prof. Thomas Fingar, Isaac Kipust, Prof. Scott Rozelle, Prof. Andrew Walder, Jennifer Choo (Associate Director, Stanford China Program), Lucas Hornsby, Drew Hasson (second year, Master’s in International Policy), Jenn Hu, and Prof. Jean Oi on the Yalu River looking over at North Korea.

(Clockwise, from left to right): Prof. Thomas Fingar, Isaac Kipust, Prof. Scott Rozelle, Prof. Andrew Walder, Jennifer Choo (Associate Director, Stanford China Program), Lucas Hornsby, Drew Hasson (second year, Master’s in International Policy), Jenn Hu, and Prof. Jean Oi on the Yalu River looking over at North Korea

The program is simultaneously exposing students to China’s contemporary politics, society and economy in the classrooms and pairing them with lived experiences -- through real-life conversations with PKU professors and PKU classmates; ordinary citizens of Beijing; and through visits to diverse parts of China. To date, the group has traveled to historic Chengde (承德); a mining equipment factory in Jinzhou city (锦州); the China-North Korean border in Dandong (丹东); and the strategic port city of Dalian (大连). Each of these areas embed layers of history and reveal artifacts from different eras: the Manchus who ruled the Han Chinese during the Qing Dynasty (Chengde); the SOE restructuring in the 1990’s that devastated China’s Northeastern “rust belt” (Jinzhou); massive human casualty suffered by the Chinese during the Korean War (Dandong); and the Sino-Russo-Japanese tug-of-war that marked Dalian’s fate throughout the 19^th and 20^th century. Through these experiences, students are gaining insights into how the world might look to their counterparts in China and elsewhere.

Below are pictures and reflections from students’ own experiences at Jinshanling (金山岭) Great Wall, Chengde as well as in China’s Northeast (东北) region.

Jinshangling (金山岭) Great Wall

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Jenn Hu and Minchau Dinh (holding up the Stanford banner) at the Great Wall

Chengde City (承德市)

The city of Chengde in Hebei Province, located 155 miles northeast of Beijing, was an imperial summer resort during the Qing Dynasty. Emperor Kang Xi (1662-1723) discovered this rare scenic spot during a hunting trip and turned it into a “Mountain Resort.”

As one student noted, these field trips “supplement academic discussions with . . . diverse representations of China – from historical kingdom to innovation contender (Cathy Dao, Stanford sophomore).”

Prof. Jean Oi and Isaac Kipust engaged in discussion at the imperial summer resort of Chengde

Prof. Jean Oi and Isaac Kipust engaged in discussion at the imperial summer resort of Chengde

China’s Northeast region (东北)

Jinzhou City (锦州市), Liaoning Province

Jinzhou Mining Machinery (Group) Co., Ltd

Faculty and students enter the factory at Jinzhou Mining Machinery (Group) Co., Ltd. with the company’s senior managers

Faculty and students enter the factory at Jinzhou Mining Machinery (Group) Co., Ltd. with the company’s senior managers

Stanford students and faculty toured a mining equipment factory in Jinzhou city in Northeast China. Massive worker lay-offs and closures of state-owned enterprises devastated this “rust belt” region throughout the 1990’s and early 2000’s. The company’s senior management sat with students and faculty and described its current reincarnation as a private shareholding company. They also opened up about their difficulties in attracting talent; local tax rates and land use fees; and their inability to enforce contracts and redress payment defaults.

As Jenn Hu (Stanford sophomore) remarked, “One thing I found particularly fascinating [was that]. . . it was not unusual for [the company’s] clients to bail on contractual obligations . . . . [T]he company allowed their client to pay them back in the form of raw materials, essentially engaging in barter trade . . . The fact that an increasing number of clients are unable to pay back, a trend party leaders have dubbed the ‘new normal,’ is also indicative of China’s slowing growth.”

Jay Gonzalez and Jenny Zhao pose in front of a giant painting of “model workers” at Jinzhou Mining Machinery (Group) Co., Ltd.

Jay Gonzalez and Jenny Zhao pose in front of a giant painting of “model workers” at Jinzhou Mining Machinery (Group) Co., Ltd

Dandong City (丹东市)

War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea Railroad Museum (铁路抗美援朝博物馆)

Group photo in front of the old railroad tracks in Dandong, Liaoning province, that helped transport Chinese troops into North Korea during the Korean War

Group photo in front of the old railroad tracks in Dandong, Liaoning province, that helped transport Chinese troops into North Korea during the Korean War

Jenn Hu reading the captions at the “War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea” Railroad Museum

Jenn Hu reading the captions at the “War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea” Railroad Museum

Dandong’s small “railroad museum” displayed images, quotes and photos from the Korean War – better known as “War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea” in China. Nearly 3 million People’s Liberation Army troops overwhelmed the U.S. troops and allies in 1950; and China tragically lost anywhere from 149,000 to 400,000 soldiers in the war.

Students heard the Chinese perspective on the war, which focused on U.S. aggression and China’s rightful defense. The museum’s guided tour, in fact, ended with an anti-American sing-along that praised China’s bravery and denounced U.S. imperialism. As one student commented on her blog, “[f]rom the ends of the room, [the museum’s visitors’] voices rose in unison, and swelled into a chorus of song -- 抗美援朝鲜，打败美帝野心狼! (‘Resist America, help Korea, defeat the American imperialists with their wolf-like ambitions!’) (Cathy Dao, Stanford sophomore),” giving substance to the reality that history is, indeed, political.

Prof. Scott Rozelle, Senior Fellow at FSI and faculty member for China Studies in Beijing, engaged in a heated debate with the local guide from Dandong who argued that North Korea’s decision to start the Korean War was to defend its motherland against U.S. military aggression.

Prof. Scott Rozelle, Senior Fellow at FSI and faculty member for China Studies in Beijing, engaged in a heated debate with the local guide from Dandong who argued that North Korea’s decision to start the Korean War was to defend its motherland against U.S. military aggression

Sino-North Korean Friendship Bridge that links Shinuiju, North Korea, to Dandong, China.

Sino-North Korean Friendship Bridge that links Shinuiju, North Korea, to Dandong, China

Dalian (大连)

Lastly, students traveled to Dalian, the “pearl of the East” founded by the Russians in 1898 and built in the style of European cities at the turn-of-the-century. The site of intense battles during the Russo-Japanese War of 1904, the city now boasts a Sino-Soviet Friendship Monument built in 1996.

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Group photo in front of the Sino-Soviet Friendship Monument in Dalian city

Whether it be “[t]he sheer size of a small city like Jinzhou”(pop: 3.1 million) or the “‘little’ city” of Dalian (pop: 6.2 million), these cities drove home for students the sheer scale of a country like China – its significance, complexity, and import.

Students have written blog pieces posted on FSI’s Medium site in which one student also described a fascinating solo backpacking trip to Tibetan communities in western Sichuan and, another, the quotidian challenges of everyday life in Beijing. Regardless of their subject matter, however, their words echo the program’s success in enabling students to perceive the world through vastly differing lenses – lenses that often show a place and people that are deeply warm and welcoming and, at other times, reflect a world that proves decentering and unclear. Yet, the complementary experiences in the classroom and outside the curriculum are enabling students to develop an imagination that can encompass the “other” and nurture a humility that can feed a lifetime of questions. As Cathy Dao commented upon visiting the “War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea” Railroad Museum, “I realized that such hostility is a function of history. How each country portrays conflicts [such as the Korean War] strongly influences the perceptions that its people have. [But] [s]hould we learn how one another views history, we can see the humanity in what would otherwise be an abstract and incompatible ‘other.’”

(Counter clockwise): Julie Gu (second year, Masters in International Policy), Pan Xue (Beijing program assistant), Jenny Zhao, and Lucas Hornsby taking a group selfie in Dalian city

(Counter clockwise): Julie Gu (second year, Masters in International Policy), Pan Xue (Beijing program assistant), Jenny Zhao, and Lucas Hornsby taking a group selfie in Dalian city

For information regarding similar opportunities, please visit FSI Student Programs or email Patrick Laboon, FSI’s Academic Program Manager, at plaboon@stanford.edu for all updates regarding the many international student opportunities offered through FSI.

The two-day forum, part of a project of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, led by the Freeman Spogli Institute’s Karl Eikenberry and Stephen Krasner, gathered experts to examine trends in civil wars and solutions moving forward.   

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The Council on Foreign Relations presently tracks six countries in a state of civil war, including three (South Sudan, Afghanistan, and Yemen) where the situation is currently worsening. Furthermore, three states (Central African Republic, Myanmar, and Nigeria) are experiencing sectarian violence with the potential to become larger conflicts. With two months still remaining in 2018, the combined fatalities in Afghanistan, Syria, and Yemen alone is fast approaching 100,000 for the year.

It was against this backdrop that Shorenstein APARC’s U.S.-Asia Security Initiative (USASI), the American Academy of Arts and Sciences (AAAS), and the School for International Studies at Peking University recently co-hosted the security workshop “Civil Wars, Intrastate Violence, and International Responses.” Held in Beijing, on October 22-23, the workshop brought together thirty-five U.S. and international experts to gain a wider perspective on intrastate violence and consider the possibilities for, and limits of, intervention. The workshop is the latest activity of the AAAS project on Civil Wars, Violence, and International Responses, chaired by Ambassador Karl Eikenberry, director of USASI, and by Stephen Krasner, senior fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (FSI) and professor of international relations.

“Some of the major discussion topics included the appropriate political and economic development models to apply to fragile states recovering from internal conflict, justifications for intervention, and the likely impact of great power competition on the future treatment of civil wars." - Karl Eikenberry

Workshop participants included academics and professionals with expertise in political science, global health, diplomacy, refugee field work, United Nations, and the military. Countries represented at the table included the United States, Ethiopia, France, and China. Throughout the two-day session, they examined three crucial questions: What is the scope of intrastate conflicts and civil wars, and to what extent is it attributable to domestic or international factors? What types of threats to global security emanate from state civil wars? What policy options are available to regional powers and the international community to deal with such threats?

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USASI Director Karl Eikenberry addresses one of the sessions

China’s Emerging Role in Addressing Intrastate Violence

The workshop’s timing and location was prescient. Over the past two decades, China’s global exposure–through trade, investment, and financing–has increased dramatically. Coupled with a growing number of its citizens living abroad, China’s equity in other states has reached the point where it has a direct interest in those experiencing or are at risk of political instability and internal violence. Indeed, through its ambitious Belt and Road Initiative, China has the opportunity to help stabilize fragile states by stimulating economic development.

“The workshop revealed, at least for me, that China is backing away from its absolute defense of sovereignty and non-intervention,” said Stephen Krasner. “As Chinese interests have expanded around the world, and as both its investments and the number of its citizens living abroad have increased, the Chinese have become more concerned with political conditions in weakly governed countries.”

With China’s growing policy and academic interests in addressing civil wars and intrastate violence, as well as its higher international profile in places like United Nations peacekeeping operations, the Beijing event provided an excellent opportunity for Chinese experts to exchange views with their international colleagues.

Paul H. Wise, MD, MPH; Senior Fellow at Stanford Health Policy

Where We are Today, Where We Go Tomorrow

The Beijing workshop was arranged into four sessions, with themes focusing on trends in intrastate violence, the threats it poses to international security, the limits of intervention, and advice to policymakers.

Each panel included presentations of prepared papers, moderator comments, and an open discussion by all participants. A fifth and final session provided an opportunity to summarize the preceding discussions. The workshop then closed out with an open conversation, where participants offered insight and policy recommendations developed over the preceding two days of dialogue.

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The "Civil Wars, Intrastate Violence, and International Responses” workshop marks the second phase of the AAAS project by the same name that launched in 2015. The first phase of the project culminated in the publication of 28 essays across two volumes of the AAAS quarterly journal Dædalus. The ongoing second phase consists of a series of roundtables and workshops in which project participants engage with academics and with government and international organization officials to build a larger conceptual understanding of the threats posed by the collapse of state authority associated with civil wars, and to contribute to current policymaking. Project activities have included meetings with the United Nations leadership and staff; academic activities in the United States; sessions with the U.S. executive and legislative branches; and a visit to Nigeria.

Throughout the workshop, Chatham House Rule of non-attribution applied to all dialogue. A workshop report will be published by the co-hosts in early 2019.

The U.S.-Asia Security Initiative is part of Stanford University’s Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC). Led by former U.S. Ambassador and Lieutenant General (Retired) Karl Eikenberry, USASI seeks to further research, education, and policy relevant dialogues at Stanford University on contemporary Asia-Pacific security issues.

March 1, 2019 update: the workshop report is now available online. Download the report >> 

Participants in the “Civil Wars, Intrastate Violence, and International Responses” workshop

A matrix with m rows and n columns looks like a rectangle filled with tiny boxes: m times n boxes, to be exact. But after visiting the Stanford Center at Peking University (SCPKU) for three months, my mental matrix of the world looked more like a weird trapezoid. New acquaintances added rows and their unique perspectives added columns. My brain drew lines from geography to economics to politics, but the lines were on crumpled paper. Ah and don't forget history. So multiply the rectangle by time t and out comes a 3D trapezoid.

How do we mentally travel through odd shapes with any sense and efficiency? China Studies in Beijing classes at the SCPKU sharpened our tools for the endeavor. On day one, Thomas Fingar emphasized that the goal of a foreign policy class is not to remember a list of facts, but to build a personal matrix of relations and to learn tricks for traversing the matrix. Jean Oi demonstrated how people's ideals can constrain the goals of business and political leaders. Scott Rozelle showed how economic developments in China changed real lives. Clarity reduces the dimensions we care about. Sometimes we need to melt and reshape the whole matrix. Other times we just need to prune a few rows and columns. We have the algorithms, technologies, "intelligences." Our tools, both natural and artificial, can be useful for navigating political spheres and leading to action.

But tools are not all we have. Other people's matrices sometimes slam into our own. Warping it, filling it. At Peking University (PKU), I met students with different stories and missions. One student transfers industrial expertise from China to Southeast Asia. Another connects Stanford and PKU students to openly discuss US-China relations. I also collaborated with PKU researchers. The scientists are fast learners and deeply curious. The clinicians are hard working and harder feeling. They all faithfully give their time and spirit. Despite the different bases of our matrices, language in particular, we could cooperate and together build a fuller model of the world.

What was the visiting graduate student's place in all of this? As a psychologist, I study humans and their brains. The brain itself is a messy matrix. Figuratively, a life history of data to curate; literally, cells that code spacetime. Maybe the psychology and geometry of every other brain is not so foreign from each of our own. Our science can keep digging deeper and tilling truer in search of common ground. We can build an empirical basis for humans to flourish together.

Sometimes, after long times, a complex matrix can instead be depicted as a fractal. Like flakes of snow. Each one is unique, starting with the same properties of H₂O but morphing through many phases. Maybe with study and reflection we will look back at both China studies and brain studies and, rather than see a messy matrix, find a fractal. Hopefully such a model can also be useful to guide our way forward.

About the author Josiah Leong: Awarded a SCPKU Predoctoral fellowship for research from August to November 2018. He is a doctoral candidate in psychology and his research is about how brain creates emotions and makes decisions. During his visit, he started a neuroimaging study with the Peking psychology department and taught neuroimaging data analyses to addiction researchers at the Peking Sixth Hospital. He also engaged with researchers in anthropology, history, and political science, and he audited courses from the China Studies in Beijing overseas program. These experiences clarified his vision for how psychological science can guide the policies that govern everyday life. He has seen how scientific collaboration builds communities across borders, and he remains optimistic that the practice of science can lead people to question their assumptions and reshape their matrices, so to speak.

5,100 miles separate Tokyo from Stanford. But for Hiroyuki Fukano, the distance was measured in more than miles. It was also a journey of time and memory–of 30 years, to be precise.

As a visiting fellow in the 1988-89 cohort of APARC’s Corporate Affiliate Program (now called Global Affiliates Program), Fukano joined Center alumni and friends from the last four decades for reunions in Beijing and Tokyo. In all, more than 100 former affiliates and visiting fellows gathered to reconnect with peers, meet new ones, and reflect on their times at Stanford.

"These gatherings are a reminder, both to our faculty and alumni, of the power of the APARC experience to change lives,” shared Director Gi-Wook Shin, who delivered welcoming remarks at both events. “We have with us alumni and affiliates from the private and public sectors, as well as from academia. They are doing amazing work in their specific fields; work influenced, in part, by their time at Stanford.”

“Clearly, the APARC experience stretches beyond barriers, both geographical and temporal.”

The gatherings also underscored the influence of the APARC experience on strengthening connections across Asia at large. For example, one Korean affiliate flew in for the Tokyo event, while a Japanese alum, now working in China, joined his Stanford peers at the Beijing gathering.

“It’s an especially unique bond that the affiliates share,” noted Global Affiliates Program Manager Denise Masumoto. “Regardless of the industry or field from which they come, their fellowship year at APARC is a unifying experience for them; it’s something each of them carries forward into everything they do.”

Fukano, who delivered remarks at the Tokyo event, echoed this sentiment. As he reflected on the thirty years that had passed since his time at Stanford, he shared that, even to this day, his year at APARC still held great significance for him.

Director Shin was joined at the events by several Center faculty members. Professor Takeo Hoshi, director of the Japan Program at APARC, updated the Tokyo audience on new research and partnerships being explored by the program.

Professor Jean Oi, director of the China Program at APARC, addressed the Beijing gathering at the Stanford Center at Peking University (SCPKU). Professor Oi spoke about the program’s collaboration this fall with SCPKU on their "On the Road to China" program, which brings Stanford students to SCPKU for three months of coursework and area experiences.

We thank everyone who joined us for these alumni events and look forward to seeing even more friends and partners next time.

Prof. Takeo Hoshi, Lei Guo (2016-17 Visiting Scholar, Peking University), and Masami Miyashita (2011-12 Corporate Affiliate, Ministry of Economy, Trade & Industry, Japan)

Luguang Li (2002-03 Corporate Affiliate, PetroChina) and Professor Gi-Wook Shin

Masami Miyashita (2011-12 Corporate Affiliate, METI, Japan, now based in Hong Kong) and Zhuoyan Wang (2016-17 Corporate Affiliate, PetroChina)

Zhuoyan Wang (2016-17 Corporate Affiliate, PetroChina)

Jung-Yi Lee (2013-14 Visiting Scholar, Hanmaum Peace & Research Foundation)

Xiuxiao Wang (2016-17 Visiting Scholar, Central University of Finance and Economics) and Professor Gi-Wook Shin

Liang (Leon) Fang (2014-15 Corporate Affiliate, China Sunrain Solar Energy Co., Ltd.) and Zhuoyan Wang (2016-17 Corporate Affiliate, PetroChina)

Hong Cheng (2016-17 Visiting Scholar, Wuhan University), Lei Guo (2016-17 Visiting Scholar, Peking University), Professor Takeo Hoshi, and Jianxiong Liu (2016-17 Visiting Scholar, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences)

Professor Jean Oi and Guofeng Sun (2003-04 Corporate Affiliate, Research Institute of People’s Bank of China)

Lei Guo, 2016-17 Visiting Scholar from Peking University, and Professor Andy Walder

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Beijing reception on September 10, 2018

Toshiyuki Watanabe (2017-18 Corporate Affiliate, The Asahi Shimbun) and Takahito Inoshita (2017-18 Corporate Affiliate, Kozo Keikaku Engineering)

Hiroyuki Fukano (1988-89 Corporate Affiliate, ITOCHU Corporation)

Takashi Imoto (1998-99 Corporate Affiliate, Kansai Electric Power Company), Yasuhiro Kanda (2005-06 Corporate Affiliate, Kansai Electric Power Company), and Professor Takeo Hoshi

Aki Takahashi (2015-17 Corporate Affiliate, Nissoken), Kenichi Kamai and Kimie Kawamoto (affiliate representatives from Nissoken)

Ryuichiro Takeshita (2014-15 Corporate Affiliate, Huff Post Japan), Toshiyuki Watanabe (2017-18 Corporate Affiliate, The Asahi Shimbun) and Takahito Inoshita (2017-18 Corporate Affiliate, Kozo Keikaku Engineering)

Yotaro Akamine (2007-08 Corporate Affiliate, Tokyo Electric Power Company)

Professor Gi-Wook Shin and Keiichi Uruga (2013-14 Corporate Affiliate, Ministry of Economy, Trade & Industry, Japan)

Tadashi (Brian) Miyakawa (2000-01 Corporate Affiliate, IBM, Japan)

Yohei Saito (2016-17 Corporate Affiliate, Future Architect Inc.), Col. Daisuke Nakaya (2016-17 Corporate Affiliate, Japan Air Self Defense Force), Akihiko Sado (2016-17 Corporate Affiliate, The Asahi Shimbun), Hiroki Morishige (2016-18 Corporate Affiliate, Shizuoka Prefectural Government) and Aki Takahashi (2015-17 Corporate Affiliate, Nissoken)

Tokyo reception on September 5, 2018