On Feb. 12, White House National Security Adviser Robert O’Brien announced that the U.S. government has “evidence that Huawei has the capability secretly to access sensitive and personal information in systems it maintains and sells around the world.” This represents the latest attempt by the Trump administration to support an argument that allied governments—and the businesses they oversee—should purge certain telecommunications networks of Huawei equipment. The position reflects the preferred approach in the United States, which is to issue outright bans against select companies (including Huawei) that meet an as-yet-unknown threshold of risk to national security.

Read the rest at Lawfare Blog

In Summer 2020, three of the top students of the Fall 2019 Stanford e-Japan distance-learning course will be honored at an event at Stanford University. The three Stanford e-Japan Day honorees—Ayano Hirose (Okayama Sozan High School), Chisaki Sano (Gunma Kokusai Academy), and Natsumi Shindo (Keio Girls Senior High School)—will be recognized by Stanford e-Japan Instructor Meiko Kotani for their coursework and exceptional research essays that focused respectively on “Three Basic Ways to Promote Cross-Cultural Understanding in Japanese Education,” “U.S.–Japan Relations: Economic Interdependence Seen in 7-Eleven Operations,” and “The U.S.–Japan Security Alliance: Its Preservation and the Responsibilities of Both Countries.”

Yuta Myojo (Rikkyo Ikebukuro High School) received an Honorable Mention for his coursework and research paper on “How Could Japanese Society Achieve Increased Biculturalism: From the Aspects of Education Reform and Self-Awareness.”

In the Fall 2019 session of Stanford e-Japan, students from the following schools successfully completed the course: Aiko Gakuen (Ehime), Gunma Kokusai Academy (Gunma), Hiroshima High School (Hiroshima), Hiroshima Prefectural Hiroshima Junior/Senior High School (Hiroshima), Hitachi First Senior High School (Ibaraki), Ichikawa Junior and Senior High School (Chiba), Keio Girls Senior High School (Tokyo), Keio Senior High School (Kanagawa), Mita International High School (Tokyo), Nishiyamato Gakuen High School (Nara), Okayama Prefecture Asahi Senior High School (Okayama), Okayama Sozan High School (Okayama), Rikkyo Ikebukuro High School (Tokyo), Ritsumeikan Uji High School (Kyoto), Sendai Shirayuri Gakuen (Miyagi), Senior High School at Otsuka, University of Tsukuba (Tokyo), Senior High School at Kyoto University (Kyoto), Shibuya Kyouiku Gakuen Shibuya Senior High School (Tokyo), Shibuya Makuhari Senior High School (Chiba), Shirayuri Gakuen Senior High School (Tokyo), Takada High School (Mie), Takatsuki Senior High School (Osaka), Tokyo City University Senior High School (Tokyo), Waseda University Senior High School (Tokyo), Yokohama Science Frontier High School (Kanagawa), and Zushi Kaisei High School (Kanagawa).

For more information about the Stanford e-Japan Program, please visit stanfordejapan.org.

To stay informed of news about Stanford e-Japan and SPICE’s other programs, join our email list and follow us on Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram.

SPICE offers separate online courses for U.S. high school students. For more information, please see the Reischauer Scholars Program (online course about Japan), Sejong Scholars Program (online course about Korea), and China Scholars Program (online course about China).

Related articles:

• Spring 2020 Session of Stanford e-Japan Online Course Begins
• Winners Announced for the Spring 2019 Stanford e-Japan Award
• SPICE’s Stanford e-Japan Instructor Waka Takahashi Brown Honored with the Elgin Heinz Outstanding Teacher Award
• Stanford e-Japan: My Window to the Wider World

The Stanford Center at Peking University (SCPKU), the Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law (CDDRL), and the APARC China Program jointly hosted a workshop on China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in early March. The workshop, held on March 2 and 3, welcomed researchers from around the world with expertise in the Initiative. Unfortunately, because of the rapidly developing health emergency related to the coronavirus, participants from not only China, but also Japan, were prevented from attending. As described by Professor Jean Oi, founding director of SCPKU and the China Program, and Professor Francis Fukuyama, director of CDDRL and the Ford Dorsey Master's in International Policy, who co-chaired the workshop, the meeting aimed to provide a global perspective on the BRI, consolidate knowledge on this opaque topic, and determine the best method and resources for future research.  

The workshop began with presentations from several of the invited guests. Dr. Atif Ansar from the University of Oxford’s Saïd Business School kicked off the first day by describing not only the tremendous opportunity that the BRI presents to developing economies, but also the serious pitfalls that often accompany colossal infrastructure projects. Pointing out the poor returns on investment of mega infrastructure projects, Ansar examined the frequest cost and schedule overruns, random disasters, and environmental degradation that outweigh the minimal benefits that they generally yield. China’s own track record from domestic infrastructure projects does little to mitigate fear of these risks, Ansar claimed. In response, he urged professional management of BRI investments, institutional reforms, and intensified deployment of technology in BRI projects. Dr. Ansar was followed by Dr. Xue Gong of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. Dr. Gong’s analysis centered on the extent to which China’s geopolitical motivations influenced its outward foreign direct investments (OFDI). Although her research was still in the early stages, her empirical analysis of China’s OFDI inflows into fifty BRI recipient countries from 2007-2018 nevertheless revealed that geopolitical factors often outweigh economic factors when it comes to China’s OFDI destinations.

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Professor Curtis J. Milhaupt and Scholar-in-Residence Jeffrey Ball, both at Stanford Law School, followed with individual presentations on the role of State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) in the BRI and the emissions impact of the BRI on climate change, respectively. Professor Milhaupt  characterized Chinese SOEs as both geopolitical and commercial actors, simultaneously charged with implementing Party policies and attaining corporate profits. Chinese SOEs are major undertakers of significant overseas BRI projects, acting not only as builders but also as investors, partners, and operators. This situation, Milhaupt asserted, carries significant risks for SOEs because these megaprojects often provide dismal returns, have high default rates, and can trigger political backlash in their localities. Milhaupt highlighted the importance of gathering firm-level data on businesses actually engaged in BRI projects to better infer geostrategic, financial, or other motivations. Jeffrey Ball turned the discussion to carbon emissions from BRI projects and presented preliminary findings from his four-country case studies. He concluded that, on aggregate, the emissions impact of the BRI is still “more brown than green.” Twenty-eight percent of global carbon emissions may be accounted for by BRI projects, Ball asserted, underscoring the importance of the BRI to the future of global climate change.

The day concluded with presentations by  Michael Bennon, Managing Director at the Stanford Global Projects Center, and Professor David M. Lampton, Oksenberg-Rohlen Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies. Bennon first presented findings from two empirical case studies of BRI projects and then went on to describe how the BRI is now practically the “only game in town” for infrastructure funding for developing countries. Lengthy environmental review processes at Western multilateral banks have turned the World Bank, for example, from a lending bank into a “knowledge bank,” he argued. He also highlighted that, in general, economic returns on BRI projects for China are very poor, even though recipient countries may accrue macroeconomic benefits from these projects. Finally, Professor Lampton turned the discussion back to Southeast Asia, where China is currently undertaking massive cross-border high-speed rail projects through eight ASEAN countries. He described how each host country had varying capacity to negotiate against its giant neighbor, and how the sequential implementation of these cross-border rail projects also had varying impacts on the negotiating positions of these host countries. BRI played out differently in each country, in other words, eliciting different reactions, push-backs and negotiated terms.

The second day of the workshop was dedicated to working toward a collaborative approach to future BRI research. The group discussed the key gaps in the existing research, including how to know what China’s true intentions are, how to measure those intentions, who the main players and their interests in both China and the host countries are, and even what the BRI is, exactly. Some cautioned that high-profile projects may not be representative of the whole. Participants brainstormed about existing and future sources of data, and stressed the importance of diversifying studies and seeking empirical evidence.

The coronavirus has upended long planned events at the Stanford Center at Peking University (SCPKU) this winter, including a workshop on China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) that had been planned for March 2-3. Fortunately, the organizers, Professor Jean Oi, founding director of SCPKU and director of the APARC China Program, and Professor Francis Fukuyama, director of the Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law (CDDRL) and the Ford Dorsey Master's in International Policy, reacted quickly and successfully changed the venue to the main Stanford University campus. Most of the original participants were able to accommodate the change of venue, but because COVID-19 was still surging in China at the time, the invited experts from not only China, but also Japan, were unable to attend.    

At Stanford, SCPKU, CDDRL, and the APARC China Program effectively joined forces to host the workshop on BRI. Jean Oi and Francis Fukyama stressed that their goal in organizing the workshop was to gain a global perspective on the BRI, consolidate existing knowledge on this opaque topic, and determine the best methods and resources for future research. While some were missing, the workshop, nonetheless, included an array of perspectives from around the world, outside of China.

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The workshop began with presentations from several of the invited guests. Dr. Atif Ansar from the University of Oxford’s Saïd Business School kicked off the first day by describing not only the tremendous opportunity that the BRI presents to developing economies, but also the serious pitfalls that often accompany colossal infrastructure projects. Pointing out the poor returns on investment of mega infrastructure projects, Ansar examined the frequest cost and schedule overruns, random disasters, and environmental degradation that outweigh the minimal benefits that they generally yield. China’s own track record from domestic infrastructure projects does little to mitigate fear of these risks, Ansar claimed. In response, he urged professional management of BRI investments, institutional reforms, and intensified deployment of technology in BRI projects. Dr. Ansar was followed by Dr. Xue Gong of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. Dr. Gong’s analysis centered on the extent to which China’s geopolitical motivations influenced its outward foreign direct investments (OFDI). Although her research was still in the early stages, her empirical analysis of China’s OFDI inflows into fifty BRI recipient countries from 2007-2018 nevertheless revealed that geopolitical factors often outweigh economic factors when it comes to China’s OFDI destinations.

Participants then heard presentations from Amit Bhandari of Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations and Professor Cheng-Chwee Kuik of the National University of Malaysia. Mr. Bhandari’s talk focused on Chinese investments in India’s six neighboring countries, which tend to center more on energy rather than connectivity projects. He first found that the investments are generally not economical for the host countries because they come with high costs and high interest rates. Secondly, he argued that these projects often lacked a clear economic rationale, appearing instead to embed a geopolitical logic not always friendly to India. Professor Kuik, by contrast, provided a counterexample in his analysis of BRI projects in Southeast Asia. He described how, in Southeast Asia, host countries’ reception of the BRI has varied substantially; and how various stakeholders, including states, sub-states and other entities, have used their leverage to shape outcomes more or less favorable to themselves. Kuik’s analysis injected complexity into the often black-and-white characterizations of the BRI. He highlighted the multidimensional dynamics that play out among local and state-level players in pursuit of their goals, and in the process of BRI implementation.

Professor Curtis J. Milhaupt and Scholar-in-Residence Jeffrey Ball, both at Stanford Law School, followed with individual presentations on the role of State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) in the BRI and the emissions impact of the BRI on climate change, respectively. Professor Milhaupt  characterized Chinese SOEs as both geopolitical and commercial actors, simultaneously charged with implementing Party policies and attaining corporate profits. Chinese SOEs are major undertakers of significant overseas BRI projects, acting not only as builders but also as investors, partners, and operators. This situation, Milhaupt asserted, carries significant risks for SOEs because these megaprojects often provide dismal returns, have high default rates, and can trigger political backlash in their localities. Milhaupt highlighted the importance of gathering firm-level data on businesses actually engaged in BRI projects to better infer geostrategic, financial, or other motivations. Jeffrey Ball turned the discussion to carbon emissions from BRI projects and presented preliminary findings from his four-country case studies. He concluded that, on aggregate, the emissions impact of the BRI is still “more brown than green.” Twenty-eight percent of global carbon emissions may be accounted for by BRI projects, Ball asserted, underscoring the importance of the BRI to the future of global climate change.

The day concluded with presentations by  Michael Bennon, Managing Director at the Stanford Global Projects Center, and Professor David M. Lampton, Oksenberg-Rohlen Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies. Bennon first presented findings from two empirical case studies of BRI projects and then went on to describe how the BRI is now practically the “only game in town” for infrastructure funding for developing countries. Lengthy environmental review processes at Western multilateral banks have turned the World Bank, for example, from a lending bank into a “knowledge bank,” he argued. He also highlighted that, in general, economic returns on BRI projects for China are very poor, even though recipient countries may accrue macroeconomic benefits from these projects. Finally, Professor Lampton turned the discussion back to Southeast Asia, where China is currently undertaking massive cross-border high-speed rail projects through eight ASEAN countries. He described how each host country had varying capacity to negotiate against its giant neighbor, and how the sequential implementation of these cross-border rail projects also had varying impacts on the negotiating positions of these host countries. BRI played out differently in each country, in other words, eliciting different reactions, push-backs and negotiated terms.

The second day of the workshop was dedicated to working toward a collaborative approach to future BRI research. The group discussed the key gaps in the existing research, including how to know what China’s true intentions are, how to measure those intentions, who the main players and their interests in both China and the host countries are, and even what the BRI is, exactly. Some cautioned that high-profile projects may not be representative of the whole. Participants brainstormed about existing and future sources of data, and stressed the importance of diversifying studies and seeking empirical evidence.

Image

Following the 1989 Loma Prieta earthquake, I recall being astounded that the iconic arches and pillars of Stanford University—though damaged—didn’t collapse or fall during the powerful earthquake. Wooden supports were inserted below the arches and remained for years while retrofitting took place. Since then, the arches and pillars have symbolized for me the stability and the security of the foundation of Stanford University. During yet another unstable time in 2020, this symbolism has once again taken on critical significance here and abroad.

In 1989, the World Wide Web was yet to be born, so obviously SPICE did not offer online classes to students in the United States, let alone to students abroad. SPICE’s first online course, the Reischauer Scholars Program, was launched in 2004. RSP Instructor Naomi Funahashi introduces topics related to Japan and U.S.–Japan relations to high school students in the United States. In 2015, SPICE launched Stanford e-Japan, an online course on U.S. society and culture and U.S.–Japan relations that Waka Takahashi Brown and Meiko Kotani offer to high school students in Japan. Since then, several other regional classes have been launched, including Stanford e-Kawasaki in 2019.

Stanford e-Kawasaki is an online course for high school students in Kawasaki City that is jointly offered by Kawasaki City and SPICE. Stanford e-Kawasaki Instructor Maiko Tamagawa Bacha provides students with an introduction to diversity and entrepreneurship in the United States and equips students with substantive knowledge about U.S. culture and society that may have a significant impact on their future choice of study and career.

The inaugural Stanford e-Kawasaki course began in October 2019 and culminated this month with presentations of final research projects by students from Tachibana High School and Kawasaki High School, the two participating schools in the inaugural course. Leading scholars from Stanford University and Silicon Valley entrepreneurs—including Dr. Stephen Murphy-Shigematsu from Stanford and Silicon Valley entrepreneurs Sukemasa Kabayama, CEO and Co-Founder of Uplift, and Rika Nakazawa, VP Strategy and Business Development at Atheer—led online class discussions and not only encouraged students to critically think about diversity and entrepreneurship in the United States but also in Japan. These discussions helped students to conceptualize topics for their final research projects.

The research projects were varied and included a comparative analysis of college admissions in the United States and Japan, an examination of psychological issues affecting youth in the United States and Japan, and a discussion about whether a Silicon Valley-type ecosystem can be created in Japan. The students’ presentations were not only content rich and creative but also effectively engaged the audience, which included Vice Principal Akihiro Igarashi of Tachibana High School, Miyuki Kitamura of Kawasaki City, SPICE Instructors Carey Moncaster, Rylan Sekiguchi, and Kasumi Yamashita, Bacha, teachers from both high schools, and me. Bacha reflected, “Though my students were not able to make their presentations physically in front of audiences [as originally planned] due to the current COVID-19 pandemic, I was grateful to have had the chance to virtually observe all of the presentations from Colorado along with my colleagues in California, Hawai‘i, and Washington. I was especially impressed with my students’ demonstrated growth in their English-speaking abilities and confidence. Especially gratifying was to witness students asking each other questions.”

Vice Principal Igarashi noted, “I am deeply grateful for the opportunity given to the Tachibana High School students to join online class discussions led by leading scholars in the United States… As I watched them passionately delivering their final research presentations that they worked hard on, I could tell that they gained unique experiences which they cannot experience in regular school classes. By comparing Japan and the United States in their research projects, I am sure that they discovered new things about their own country, Japan… I believe from the bottom of my heart that the online classes and assignments given by this course will empower the youth of the future.”

While listening to the presentations, I was struck by how well the students engaged the audience. In my final comments, I commended their use of several effective presentation techniques, such as the following.

• Emphasis on interdisciplinarity in their research
• Incorporation of multiple perspectives
• Voice projection
• Use of images, including photos, drawings, statistics, and graphs
• Signposting
• Embedding questions for the audience in the presentation, e.g., Can we create a Silicon Valley in Japan?
• Providing historical context
• Definition of complex terms

In addition, for the first time since SPICE launched online courses, I felt a deep sense of satisfaction from knowing that we could bring some stability and security to the lives of students who could no longer physically go to school. The students gushed with enthusiasm despite their nervousness.

Mizuho Toyama, a Teacher of the English Department at Kawasaki High School noted, “We were so excited about our students’ online presentations this morning. What they did was tremendous and the experience they went through—I am sure—has become their priceless treasure… They learned not only English as a foreign language but also, more importantly, stepping out of their ‘comfort zone’ to seek advanced levels of learning. Raising cultural awareness with peers and also sharing thoughts without racial biases is an excellent source of learning. I am thankful for this program for encouraging students to be more openminded.”

Erica Oh, an American Assistant Language Teacher of English at Kawasaki High School, also commented on Bacha’s course. “Again, thank you and your staff, especially Maiko Tamagawa Bacha, for the awesome opportunity you have given our students to learn more and think outside their cultural box. It was an absolute delight for me to be able to witness their growth. I hope Stanford and Kawasaki stay in partnership and that this program continues.” For one of the online classrooms that focused on diversity, Bacha invited former Japan Exchange and Teaching (JET) Program Assistant Language Teachers—John Branderhorst, Jeffrey Fleischman, Ryan Moore, and Cerell Rivera—to share their perspectives. “Bringing Americans and Japanese together—albeit virtually—at a time like this is invaluable,” commented Bacha.  

Students who successfully completed the course will earn a Certificate of Completion from SPICE/Stanford University on March 26, 2020 during a virtual closing ceremony. Mayor Norihiko Fukuda will make opening comments. In addition to SPICE staff, others who will be in attendance are Hisashi Katsurayama from the Kawasaki Board of Education and Katsuyoshi Abe, Yoshitaka Tsuchihama, and Miyuki Kitamura of Kawasaki City, all of whom have been unwavering in their support of Stanford e-Kawasaki.

When SPICE launched its online courses, I never imagined that the SPICE instructors would be reaching many students whose school lives were disrupted by a pandemic. I feel indebted to FSI Director Dr. Michael McFaul and FSI Deputy Director Dr. Kathryn Stoner for their support during this unstable time and enabling SPICE to help add some stability and security to students’ lives.

To stay informed of SPICE-related news, join our email list and follow us on Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram.

Related article:

• Stanford e-Kawasaki: The Vision of Mayor Norihiko Fukuda

Taiwan is only 81 miles off the coast of mainland China and was expected to be hard hit by the coronavirus, due to its proximity and the number of flights between the island nation and its massive neighbor to the west.

Yet it has so far managed to prevent the coronavirus from heavily impacting its 23 million citizens, despite hundreds of thousands of them working and residing in China.

According to the Johns Hopkins Coronavirus COVID-19 Global Cases map, as of Tuesday there were only 42 cases and one death in Taiwan, far behind China, with more than 80,000 cases and more than 2,900 deaths. The country also lags far behind its other Asian neighbors and ranks 17^th in the world for the number of global cases. As of this writing, South Korea was second, with 5,186 cases; followed by Iran with 2,336 and Italy with 2,036 people infected with the virus.

The United States currently stands at 107 known cases and six deaths.

The viral outbreak in China occurred just before the Lunar New Year, during which time millions of Chinese and Taiwanese were expected to travel for the holidays.

So what steps did Taiwan take to protect its people? And could those steps be replicated here at home?

Stanford Health Policy’s Jason Wang, MD, PhD, an associate professor of pediatrics at Stanford Medicine who also has a PhD in policy analysis, credits his native Taiwan with using new technology and a robust pandemic prevention plan put into place at the 2003 SARS outbreak.

“The Taiwan government established the National Health Command Center (NHCC) after SARS and it’s become part of a disaster management center that focuses on large-outbreak responses and acts as the operational command point for direct communications,” said Wang, a pediatrician and the director of the Center for Policy, Outcomes, and Prevention at Stanford. The NHCC also established the Central Epidemic Command Center, which was activated in early January.

“And Taiwan rapidly produced and implemented a list of at least 124 action items in the past five weeks to protect public health,” Wang said. “The policies and actions go beyond border control because they recognized that that wasn’t enough.”

Wang outlines the measures Taiwan took in the last six weeks in an article published Tuesday in the Journal of the American Medical Association.

“Given the continual spread of COVID-19 around the world, understanding the action items that were implemented quickly in Taiwan, and the effectiveness of these actions in preventing a large-scale epidemic, may be instructive for other countries,” Wang and his co-authors wrote.

Within the last five weeks, Wang said, the Taiwan epidemic command center rapidly implemented those 124 action items, including border control from the air and sea, case identification using new data and technology, quarantine of suspicious cases, educating the public while fighting misinformation, negotiating with other countries — and formulating policies for schools and businesses to follow.

Big Data Analytics

The authors note that Taiwan integrated its national health insurance database with its immigration and customs database to begin the creation of big data for analytics. That allowed them case identification by generating real-time alerts during a clinical visit based on travel history and clinical symptoms.

Taipei also used Quick Response (QR) code scanning and online reporting of travel history and health symptoms to classify travelers’ infectious risks based on flight origin and travel history in the last 14 days. People who had not traveled to high-risk areas were sent a health declaration border pass via SMS for faster immigration clearance; those who had traveled to high-risk areas were quarantined at home and tracked through their mobile phones to ensure that they stayed home during the incubation period.

The country also instituted a toll-free hotline for citizens to report suspicious symptoms in themselves or others. As the disease progressed, the government called on major cities to establish their own hotlines so that the main hotline would not become jammed.

Some might say that because Taiwan is such a small country — about 19 times smaller than Texas — it is easier to mobilize during emergencies. Yet Taiwan is particularly challenged by its proximity to China and the fact that 850,000 of its citizens reside on the mainland; another 400,000 work there. Taiwan had 2.71 million visitors from China last year.

So when the WHO was notified on Dec. 31, 2019, of a pneumonia of unknown cause in Wuhan, China, Taiwanese officials began to board planes and assess passengers on direct flights from Wuhan for fever and pneumonia symptoms before passengers could deplane.

As early as Jan. 5, notification was expanded to include any individual who had traveled to Wuhan in the past 14 days and had a fever or symptoms of upper respiratory tract infection at the point of entry. Suspected cases were screened for 26 viruses, including SARS and MERS. Passengers displaying symptoms were quarantined at home and assessed whether medical attention at a hospital was necessary.

What the U.S. Could Learn

One of Wang’s co-authors, Robert H. Brook, M.D., ScD., of the David Geffen School of Medicine at the University of California, Los Angeles, said Washington could learn a great deal from Taiwan’s so-far successful management of the virus.

“In Taiwan, diverse political parties were willing to work together to produce an immediate response to the danger,” said Brook, also of the nonprofit RAND Corporation. “Transparency was critical and frequent communication to the public from a trusted official was paramount to reducing public panic.”

The other co-author of their study is Chun Y. Ng, MBA, MPH, of The New School for Leadership in Health Care, Koo Foundation Sun Yat-Sen Cancer Center, Taipei, Taiwan.

Brook said Taiwan got out ahead of the epidemic by setting up a physical command center to facilitate rapid communications. The command center set the price of masks and used government funds and military personnel to increase mask production. By Jan. 20, the Taiwan CDC announced that it had a stockpile of 44 million surgical masks, 1.9 million N95 masks and 1,100 negative pressure isolation rooms.

“In a country as complex as the United States,” Brook said, “there needs to be a sharing of intelligence on a real-time basis among states and the federal government so that action is not delayed by going through formal channels.”

Please contact Beth Duff-Brown for media requests.