Reuben W. Hills Conference Room
Michael Sulmeyer is currently a pre-doctoral fellow at CISAC and a JD candidate at Stanford Law School, where he co-chairs the Stanford National Security Law Society and is a member of the Afghanistan Legal Education Project. He is also completing a DPhil in Politics at Oxford University about the termination of major weapons systems. As a Marshall Scholar, he received his Masters in War Studies with Distinction from King's College, London in 2005. From 2003-2004, Sulmeyer served as Special Assistant to the Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy at the U.S. Department of Defense. Before that, he worked as a Research Assistant at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington D.C.
Reuben W. Hills Conference Room
Henry S. Rowen was a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution, a professor of public policy and management emeritus at Stanford University's Graduate School of Business, and a senior fellow emeritus of the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (Shorenstein APARC). Rowen was an expert on international security, economic development, and high tech industries in the United States and Asia. His most current research focused on the rise of Asia in high technologies.
In 2004 and 2005, Rowen served on the Presidential Commission on the Intelligence of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction. From 2001 to 2004, he served on the Secretary of Defense Policy Advisory Board. Rowen was assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs in the U.S. Department of Defense from 1989 to 1991. He was also chairman of the National Intelligence Council from 1981 to 1983. Rowen served as president of the RAND Corporation from 1967 to 1972, and was assistant director of the U.S. Bureau of the Budget from 1965 to 1966.
Rowen most recently co-edited Greater China's Quest for Innovation (Shorenstein APARC, 2008). He also co-edited Making IT: The Rise of Asia in High Tech (Stanford University Press, 2006) and The Silicon Valley Edge: A Habitat for Innovation and Entrepreneurship (2000). Rowen's other books include Prospects for Peace in South Asia (edited with Rafiq Dossani) and Behind East Asian Growth: The Political and Social Foundations of Prosperity (1998). Among his articles are "The Short March: China's Road to Democracy," in National Interest (1996); "Inchon in the Desert: My Rejected Plan," in National Interest (1995); and "The Tide underneath the 'Third Wave,'" in Journal of Democracy (1995).
Born in Boston in 1925, Rowen earned a bachelors degree in industrial management from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in 1949 and a masters in economics from Oxford University in 1955.
The fourth session of the Korea-U.S. West Coast Strategic Forum, held at Stanford University on June 18, 2010, convened former senior South Korean and American West Coast-based policymakers, scholars, and regional and functional experts to discuss North Korea, the U.S.-ROK alliance, and regional dynamics in Northeast Asia. Stanford University’s Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center organized the Forum in association with its Korean partner, The Sejong Institute, of Seongnam, Korea. The Forum operates as a closed workshop under Chatham House Rule of confidentiality, allowing participants to engage in frank and in-depth exchanges on important and sensitive current issues. Meeting in the aftermath of the March 26 sinking of the South Korean naval ship Cheonan, Forum participants focused on developments in North Korea, how the U.S.-ROK alliance should respond to North Korean challenges, and the role of China vis-à-vis the Korean Peninsula and the Northeast Asia region.
In the past fifty years, two factors have led to global population aging: a decline in fertility to levels close to—or even below—replacement and a decline in mortality that has increased world average life expectancy by nearly 67 percent. As the population skews toward fewer young people and more elderly who live longer postretirement lives, demographic changes—labor force participation, savings, economic growth, living arrangements, marriage markets, and social policy—are transforming society in fundamental, irreversible ways.
Nowhere are these effects of aging and demographic change more acute—nor their long-term effects more potentially significant—than in the Asia-Pacific region. How will these developments impact the economies and social protection systems of Japan, South Korea, China, and, by extension, the United States?
To assess this question, Aging Asia showcases cutting-edge, policy-relevant research. The first section focuses on demographic trends and their economic implications; the second section approaches select topics from a global comparative perspective, including social insurance financing, medical costs, and long-term care.
Desk, examination, or review copies can be requested through Stanford University Press.
The Economic and Social Implications of Rapid Demographic Change in China, Japan, and South Korea
Prevailing opinion assigns the Tibetan Plateau a crucial role in shaping Asian climate, primarily by heating of the atmosphere over Tibet during spring and summer. Accordingly, the growth of the plateau in geologic time should have written a signature on Asian paleoclimate. Recent work on Asian climate, however, challenges some of these views. The high Tibetan Plateau may affect the South Asian monsoon less by heating the overlying atmosphere than by simply acting as an obstacle to southward flow of cool, dry air. The East Asian "monsoon" seems to share little in common with most monsoons, and its dynamics may be affected most by Tibet's lying in the path of the subtropical jet stream. Although the growing plateau surely altered Asian climate during Cenozoic time, the emerging view of its role in present-day climate opens new challenges for interpreting observations of both paleoclimate and modern climate.
This paper aims to demonstrate the relationships between ENSO and rice production of Jiangxi province in order to identify the reason that ENSO might have little effect on Chinese rice production. Using a data set with measures of Jiangxi's climate and rice production, we find the reason that during 1985 and 2004 ENSO's well correlated with rainfall did not promote Chinese rice production. First, the largest effects of ENSO mostly occur in the months when there is no rice in the field. Second, there is almost no temperature effect. Finally, the monthly distribution of rainfall is almost the same in ENSO and neutral years because the largest effects are during months when there is the least rain. In addition, due to the high irrigation share and reliable and effective irrigation facilities of cultivated land, China's rice production is less climate-sensitive.
How do military allies come to find each other more dependable on security issues, instead of less comfortable with mutual reliance? How do rival nations manage to build confidence and shared expectations for a collaborative future, rather than fall into a spiral of suspicions over each other's strategic intentions? Leif-Eric Easley, the 2010-11 Northeast Asian History Fellow at the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (Shorenstein APARC), addresses these key questions in his recently completed dissertation, Perceived National Identity Differences and Strategic Trust: Explaining Post Cold-War Security Relations Among China, Japan, South Korea, and the United States. Examining post-1992 Northeast Asia, and drawing from a broad range of source materials in four languages, Dr. Easley argues that differences in how the policymaking elite in two countries perceive the national identity of one another determines the level of strategic trust between their governments. This ultimately affects patterns of cooperation on national and international security matters.
With a background in both political science and mathematics, and paying close attention to historical issues in East Asia, Dr. Easley earned his Ph.D. in Government from Harvard University in 2010. While at Shorenstein APARC, he is revising his dissertation into a book and will teach a course about nationalism and security relations in Northeast Asia. In a recent interview, Dr. Easley discussed his research and future plans.
What is one of the most interesting and timely case studies that you examined?
Japan and China have had
a very difficult time improving the level of strategic trust between them. The
reasons for this are numerous. There are, of course, the historical legacies of
Japanese colonialism, the Pacific War, and indeed hundreds of years of
disagreements between China and Japan.
Even though those were largely papered over in favor of normalizing relations
in the 1970s and then building up an economic relationship—China is now Japan's
largest trading partner—a lot of that historical baggage was not fully
unpacked. The Chinese say there are a lot of things the Japanese have not
apologized for. The Japanese say that Beijing tends to use anti-Japanese
nationalism for its own domestic purposes. At various points of time in the
post-Cold War era—whether it has to do with the way that textbooks are being
revised or how the Japanese prime minister periodically pays homage to Japan's
war dead at the Yasakuni Shrine—Chinese nationalism has found expression in
anti-Japanese protests.
My argument is that such historical antagonisms, among other things, bring to
light the perceptions of identity difference between the two sides. The more
severe the perceptions of difference, the more of a gap that elites in one
country see between their national identity and the national identity of the
other side, and the less trust the two sides are going to have. So these
historical issues really weigh down on the level of strategic trust between
Tokyo and Beijing. This is problematic—not just for dealing with pressing hard
security issues like North Korea or trying to advance regional security
architectures like the ASEAN Regional Forum—but also because strategic trust is
very important for facilitating cooperation and avoiding conflict. Without a
decent measure of trust, you do not have much margin for error when some
unforeseen things happen, such as the recent incident over the Senkaku/Diaoyu
Islands.
Based on your dissertation, what steps
would you recommend for governments to build strategic trust?
A lot of work in both academic and policy circles has pointed to mechanisms
like increasing exchanges and trying to cooperate on so-called "easy" issues to
establish a pattern of cooperation. Meanwhile, politicians and diplomats tend
to be concerned with different forms of political theater to produce positive
headlines.
My theory suggests that if trust-building efforts do not actually change the
deeply-held perceptions that each side maintains about the other's national
identity, then you are not going to see a meaningful and lasting effect on the
level of strategic trust. That is not to say that exchanges and trying to rack
up points on easy issues is not worth doing or will not ultimately have some
positive effect. But the sorts of events and actions that really change
perceptions and then can allow for meaningful changes in strategic trust are
those that help redefine the relationship or the way that one side looks at the
other.
For example, if Japan were to have an entirely different memorial site where
its leaders could remember and honor Japan's veterans, separate from a shrine
that has a certain view of history associated with it that is very
objectionable to its neighbors, this could be something that would help change
perceptions. Contrast that to a carefully worded speech by a prime minister.
Japan has actually apologized dozens of times and yet the problem is still
there. Those apologies, as well-meaning as they may be, have not significantly
changed identity perceptions and hence we do not see much improvement in
strategic trust between Beijing and Tokyo.
Another example would be dealing with some of the recent maritime disputes. If
the China-Japan relationship had more strategic trust, it might be able to
encapsulate those issues and not let them derail the relationship. But this is
not yet the case. Coming to a greater level of agreement about how to deal with
economic zones and how to pursue joint development of underwater gas deposits
could really do a lot to improve perceptions on both sides. This would ameliorate Japanese
perceptions of an aggressive Chinese identity, and help resolve a hot-button
nationalist issue between the two populations. Real improvement in identity
perceptions, such that each side thinks better of the other's international
role and national characteristics, would allow Japan and China to realize a
more stable, trusting relationship.
What is the course that you will offer at Stanford and what approach will you
take to teaching?
The course will be about
nationalism and security relations in Northeast Asia. I am hoping to engage
these issues with some fresh perspective. What I want to do is provide students
with background on the different forms of nationalist conflict in Northeast
Asia to help them understand where these historical legacies and identity
frictions come from. These are really contemporarily relevant issues. I will
ask students to write on a very specific topic—a nationalist issue of their
choice—and develop not only their own analysis, but also some of their own
suggestions. This is a lot to expect, but I anticipate that the students are
going to be up to the challenge. The students will probably come from different
fields—including political science, history, sociology, and Asian studies. I
think that with their diverse backgrounds, they will benefit from the
environment here at Shorenstein APARC.
Shorenstein APARC is really special among centers—nationally and even
internationally—in the way that it brings together academic rigor, policy
relevance, and policy experience. We have top-flight academics, and we also
have very distinguished policymakers, who bring a wealth of experience to the
table. With more exchange between the academic and the policymaking
communities, both sides stand to benefit tremendously. Shorenstein APARC is one
of the few places that is doing this, and doing it so well.
Do you hope to work in academia or
government, or serve in both fields?
I plan to pursue an academic career, but at the same time to produce
research and publications with policy relevance. Teaching is incredibly
important because there is more and more demand among students with interest in
Asia, and increasing demand across sectors for people who have expertise in
Asian history and political economics. Teaching is an opportunity, not only to
help prepare the next generation of experts, but also to improve my research
and writing through interaction with students. Likewise, being able to take a
sabbatical to serve in an advisory role at the U.S. Department of State, the
Pentagon, or National Security Council would be a great opportunity to have
real-world impact on the incredibly pressing issues in U.S.-Asia relations.
Policy work is also a chance to expand one's own skillset and basis of
research.
Take for example, Thomas Christensen of Princeton University and Victor Cha of Georgetown University. Both are strong academics, who publish in top academic journals and produce academic books. They also served in the State Department and National Security Council respectively. After making positive contributions on the policy side, they returned to their universities with firsthand knowledge of the complex relationship between theory and practice. I hope to one day have an opportunity for public service and then return to academia with experience that is of value to my research and of value to my students.
Susan Hyde is an Assistant Professor of Political Science and International Affairs at Yale University, where she is affiliated with the MacMillian Center and the Institute for Social and Policy Studies. She earned her Ph.D. from the University of California, San Diego in 2006, and has held fellowships at the Brookings Institution in Washington, D.C. and Princeton University's Niehaus Center for Globalization and Governance. Her research interests include international influences on domestic politics, elections in developing countries, international norm creation, election manipulation, and the use of natural and field experimental research methods. Her current research explores the effects of international democracy promotion efforts, and her research has been published in World Politics, Comparative Political Studies, Perspectives on Politics, the Journal of Politics. She has recently completed a book entitled The Pseudo-Democrat's Dilemma: Why Election Monitoring Became an International Norm. She has served as an international observer with several organizations for elections in Albania, Indonesia, Nicaragua, Pakistan and Venezuela, and has worked for the Democracy Program at The Carter Center. She teaches courses on international organizations, democracy promotion, the global spread of elections, and the role of non-state actors in world politics.
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Eric Huang is a visiting scholar at CDDRL (Oct. 2010- June 2011) from Taiwan and is currently serving as the Secretary in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of China (Taiwan). Prior to his current assignment in San Francisco, he served as the Unit Chief in the International Security Unit Research and Planning Committee at the Ministry. His previous oversea posts were in Hawaii and Cape Town, South Africa.
Mr. Huang received his B.A. from the Department of Diplomacy at National Cheng Chi University and a M.A. from American University.