Stanford University

Spin Dictators: The Changing Face of Tyranny in the 21st Century

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Hitler, Stalin, and Mao ruled through violence, fear, and ideology. But in recent decades a new breed of media-savvy strongmen has been redesigning authoritarian rule for a more sophisticated, globally connected world.

In place of overt, mass repression, rulers such as Vladimir Putin, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, and Viktor Orbán control their citizens by distorting information and simulating democratic procedures. Like spin doctors in democracies, they spin the news to engineer support. Uncovering this new brand of authoritarianism, Sergei Guriev and Daniel Treisman explain the rise of such “spin dictators,” describing how they emerge and operate, the new threats they pose, and how democracies should respond.

Spin Dictators
Spin Dictators traces how leaders such as Singapore’s Lee Kuan Yew and Peru’s Alberto Fujimori pioneered less violent, more covert, and more effective methods of monopolizing power. They cultivated an image of competence, concealed censorship, and used democratic institutions to undermine democracy, all while increasing international engagement for financial and reputational benefits. The book reveals why most of today’s authoritarians are spin dictators—and how they differ from the remaining “fear dictators” such as Kim Jong-un and Bashar al-Assad, as well as from masters of high-tech repression like Xi Jinping.

Offering incisive portraits of today’s authoritarian leaders, Spin Dictators explains some of the great political puzzles of our time—from how dictators can survive in an age of growing modernity to the disturbing convergence and mutual sympathy between dictators and populists like Donald Trump.

ABOUT THE SPEAKER

Daniel Treisman
Daniel Treisman is a professor of political science at the University of California, Los Angeles, a research associate of the National Bureau of Economic Research, and a fellow at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences (2021-2). His research focuses on Russian politics and economics as well as comparative political economy, including the analysis of democratization, the politics of authoritarian states, political decentralization, and corruption. A former lead editor of The American Political Science Review, he has been a Guggenheim Fellow and a visiting fellow at the Hoover Institution (Stanford) and the Institute for Human Sciences (Vienna), as well as receiving fellowships from the German Marshall Fund of the US and the Smith Richardson Foundation. His book, The Return: Russia’s Journey from Gorbachev to Medvedev (The Free Press 2011) was one of the Financial Times’ “Best Political Books of 2011”. He is the editor of The New Autocracy: Information, Politics, and Policy in Putin’s Russia (Brookings Institution Press 2018), and co-author of Spin Dictators: The Changing Face of Tyranny in the 21st Century (Princeton University Press 2022).

 

At this time, in-person attendance is limited to Stanford affiliates only. We continue to welcome our greater community to join virtually via Zoom.

Kathryn Stoner

Online, via Zoom

Daniel Treisman UCLA CASBS
Seminars

Challenges to Democracy in the Digital Information Realm

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VIDEO RECORDINGS

Read the full transcript of President Barack Obama's keynote.

PANEL I

10:00-11:30am

THE TRUST PROBLEM: What is the role of the U.S. government in facilitating consensus and reducing polarization at home?

Renée DiResta is the Research Manager at the Stanford Internet Observatory. She investigates the spread of malign narratives across social networks, and assists policymakers in understanding and responding to the problem.
renee diresta

KEYNOTE | PRESIDENT BARACK OBAMA

12:15pm

President Barack Obama

President Barack Obama will deliver a keynote speech about disinformation and challenges to democracy in the digital information realm. The Obama Foundation is co-hosting the event.

PANEL II

2:00-3:30pm

DESIGNING FOR DEMOCRATIC DISCOURSE: What is the role for media and tech companies to ensure quality, access, and participation?

Marietje Schaake is international policy director at Stanford University Cyber Policy Center and international policy fellow at Stanford’s Institute for Human-Centered Artificial Intelligence.
Marietje Schaake

PANEL III

3:45-5:15pm

THE THREAT OF DIGITAL AUTHORITARIANISM: What are the most effective ways to defend open democratic systems in a global digitized world?

Eileen Donahoe is the Executive Director of the Global Digital Policy Incubator (GDPI) at Stanford University, FSI/Cyber Policy Center. She served as U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Human Rights Council during the Obama administration.
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The student lottery administered by FSI is now closed. Randomly selected students have been notified via email.

Eileen Donahoe
Marietje Schaake
Renee DiResta
Barack Obama
Symposiums

How Credible Nuclear Security Guarantees Backfire

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For spring quarter 2022, CISAC will be hosting hybrid events. Many events will offer limited-capacity in-person attendance for Stanford faculty, staff, fellows, visiting scholars, and students in accordance with Stanford’s health and safety guidelines, and be open to the public online via Zoom. All CISAC events are scheduled using the Pacific Time Zone. 

                                                                                           

About the Event: Existing literature posits that the main challenge for nuclear security guarantees lies in making the promise of protection sufficiently credible. If allies do not believe their guarantor will actually come to their aid, they may seek alternate means of protection, including by investing in nuclear infrastructure. Credible security guarantees, on the other hand, are thought to reassure allies. In contrast to this approach, Dr. Sukin argues that credible nuclear guarantees can backfire. These guarantees can cause clients to fear that their guarantors will drag them into a precipitous nuclear conflict. Fears of nuclear escalation by their guarantor can drive clients to distance themselves from their alliance or seek stronger independent nuclear capabilities. Using survey experiments and case studies of U.S. alliances in East Asia and Europe, this project explores the risks of credible U.S. nuclear security guarantees.


About the Speaker: Dr. Lauren Sukin is currently a MacArthur Nuclear Security Fellow at Stanford University’s Center for International Security and Cooperation. In September 2022, she will join the Department of International Relations at the London School of Economics and Political Science as an Assistant Professor of International Relations. Dr. Sukin holds a Ph.D. (2021) and M.A. (2020) from the Department of Political Science at Stanford University. She also holds A.B.s from the Departments of Political Science and Literary Arts at Brown University (2016). Dr. Sukin’s research examines issues of international security, focusing on the role of nuclear weapons in international politics.

Virtual to Public. Only those with an active Stanford ID with access to William J Perry Conference Room in Encina Hall may attend in person. 

Lauren Sukin
Seminars
Research Seminar Series

Researcher Perceptions of Current and Future AI

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For spring quarter 2022, CISAC will be hosting hybrid events. Many events will offer limited-capacity in-person attendance for Stanford faculty, staff, fellows, visiting scholars, and students in accordance with Stanford’s health and safety guidelines, and be open to the public online via Zoom. All CISAC events are scheduled using the Pacific Time Zone. 

About the Event: Artificial intelligence (AI) has enormous potential for both positive and negative impact, especially as we move from current-day systems towards more capable systems in the future. However, as a society we lack an understanding of how the developers of this technology, AI researchers, perceive the benefits and risks of their work, both in today's systems and impacts in the future. In this talk, Gates will present results from over 70 interviews with AI researchers, asking questions ranging from "What do you think are the largest benefits and risks of AI?" to "If you could change your colleagues’ perception of AI, what attitudes/beliefs would you want them to have?"


About the Speaker: Dr. Vael Gates is a postdoctoral researcher at the Institute for Human-Centered Artificial Intelligence (HAI) and the Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC) at Stanford University. They study perceptions of AI safety, and are currently interviewing technical AI researchers to understand their views about risks from AI. They previously completed their PhD at UC Berkeley, formalizing and testing computational models of social collaboration.

Virtual

Vael Gates
Seminars
Research Seminar Series

Global Perspectives on Crypto-Asset Regulation

image of encina hall at stanford with blue overlay and headshots of Valerie Shen of Third Way and Aman Nair of CIS

Join us on Tuesday, March 15th from 12 PM - 1 PM PT for “Global Perspectives on Crypto-Asset Regulation” featuring Valerie Shen of Third Way, Aman Nair of the Centre for Internet and Society, in conversation with Kelly Born of the Hewlett Foundation. This weekly seminar series is jointly organized by the Cyber Policy Center’s Program on Democracy and the Internet and the Hewlett Foundation’s Cyber Initiative.

About The Seminar: 

Since the launch of Bitcoin, the world’s first cryptocurrency, just over 10 years ago, the cryptocurrency market has grown to over $2.4 trillion, tripling in value in the last year alone. In addition to its many purported benefits, cryptocurrency poses challenges to the environment, privacy, financial stability, and more. Cryptocurrencies have played an increasing role in the rise of cybercrimes, including ransomware and money laundering. In light of this the Biden Administration, European Union, Indian government, and countries around the world are actively exploring regulatory options to address these and other concerns. On March 15 join Aman Nair of India’s Centre for Internet and Society and Valerie Shen of Third Way, in conversation with Kelly Born of the Hewlett Foundation, to discuss the use cases and limitations of crypto-assets, compare relevant regulatory regimes from around the world, discuss the debate over the proper legal and regulatory framework for crypto-enabled crime, and explore how to govern crypto-assets while supporting widespread financial stability.

Speakers:

Valerie Shen
Valerie Shen directs Third Way's National Security Program and Cyber Enforcement Initiative, a nonpartisan dedicated to strengthening governments’ abilities to identify, stop, and bring malicious cyber actors to justice. Third Way’s National Security program focuses on cutting edge policy ideas and to keep our country safe  against foreign adversaries in the ever-changing and developing cyber ecosystem.  Valerie served as the Chief National Security Counsel to the House Oversight and Reform Committee for Chairman Elijah E. Cummings. She oversaw all national security and homeland security matters from cyber operations and federal law enforcement, to counterterrorism, defense, and counterintelligence. Valerie was also an investigative counsel for the Select Committee on Benghazi and the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee. Valerie was also a post-doctoral fellow at Georgetown University’s Center for National Security focusing on China’s social media and influence operations. Valerie earned her J.D. from Georgetown University Law Center and her bachelor's degree in Politics from Pomona College.

Aman Nair
Aman Nair is a policy researcher at the Centre for Internet and Society, India (CIS). He leads the financial technologies research agenda at CIS and has been focusing on research on crypto-assets and blockchain technology. He also works on issues of data governance and access to justice. 

Cheryll Alipio

Shorenstein APARC
Stanford University
Encina Hall E301
Stanford, CA 94305-6055

(650) 497-2678
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Cheryll Alipio joined APARC in 2022 and serves as Associate Director for Program and Policy. Previously, she was the Program Director for Government Services and Engagement at the University of Maryland, College Park's Institute for Governmental Service and Research as well as Assistant Research Professor of Anthropology.

An economic and medical anthropologist, she has held teaching and research positions at York University in Canada, the University of Queensland in Australia, and the Asia Research Institute of the National University of Singapore. Her previous experience also includes roles with the Luce Scholars Program at The Asia Foundation and the Washington State Parks Foundation, among others.

Cheryll has extensive experience performing and administering qualitative, mixed methods, applied, and community-based research on contemporary Southeast Asia, Inter-Asia engagements, and Asia-U.S. relations. In addition, she has international and interdisciplinary research expertise and public service experience with nonprofits and NGOs.

She holds a Ph.D. and M.A. in Anthropology from the University of Washington and a B.A. in Anthropology and Psychology from the University of California, Davis. She is co-editor of Money and Moralities in Contemporary Asia (Amsterdam University Press, 2019), The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science's special issue on "Transitioning to Adulthood in Asia" (2013), Children's Geographies' special section on "Asian Children and Transnational Migration" (2015), and the Journal of Modern Slavery's special issue on "New Research on Modern Slavery, Forced Labor, and Human Trafficking" (2022). In addition, she has authored several articles and book chapters on migration and development, transnationalism and diaspora, labor and governance, care work and health, and children and youth.

Associate Director for Program and Policy
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Invasions Are Not Contagious

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Oriana Skylar Mastro
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This essay was originally published in Foreign Affairs magazine.

As Russian President Vladimir Putin intensifies his assault on Ukraine, a growing number of U.S. military and foreign policy analysts are voicing concern that China may be emboldened by Russia’s example and try to take Taiwan by force. “If Russia can grab chunks of Ukraine or install a puppet regime and withstand economic sanctions, that could embolden nationalists in China to look to Taiwan and think they could do the same,” Ian Johnson, a China expert at the Council on Foreign Relations, has argued. Representative Michael McCaul, Republican of Texas, made a similar argument in an interview last month, as did retired Army General Jack Keane, who said that Chinese President Xi Jinping sees “weakness in the West and how that can advantage him in terms of his national objectives as well.”

Xi is certainly watching events in Ukraine, but his calculus for whether to use force against Taiwan is shaped primarily by domestic factors, not foreign ones. As I have argued in Foreign Affairs, Chinese leaders are considering “armed reunification” with Taiwan more seriously than at any time in the last 50 years. But Xi will assert Chinese control over the island only if he is confident his military can conduct a successful amphibious invasion and if he believes the timing is right for his own career.

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Shifts in the international environment would be important for Taiwan if they changed Xi’s thinking on either count. But the war in Ukraine has not. Xi’s views about U.S. power and resolve and about the likely international response to an invasion of Taiwan probably remain unchanged. If anything, China’s desire not to invite comparisons with Russia at a time when the world is united against Moscow will lengthen its timeline for taking control of Taiwan, not shorten it.

Too Big to Sanction?

The economic sanctions that the United States, Canada, and many European countries have imposed on Russia give China little reason for pause. To the contrary, these punitive measures simply confirm Beijing’s previous assessments of the possible economic repercussions of using force against Taiwan. Chinese leaders expect the economic costs of an invasion to be heavy but acceptable—partly because of how the international community has responded to Chinese provocations in the past and partly because Beijing’s foreign policy is designed to convince countries to stay out of China’s “internal” affairs, such as the status of Taiwan.

That is not to say the economic measures Washington and its allies have imposed on Russia in recent days are insignificant. The United States and European countries have blocked Russia’s access to most of its foreign currency reserves, making it impossible for Moscow to intervene to prop up its collapsing currency. They have frozen the assets of senior Russian officials, including Putin himself. And they have moved to exclude big Russian banks from SWIFT, the global financial messaging system.

China’s ability to retaliate against the West with economic sanctions of its own is much greater than Russia’s.
Oriana Skylar Mastro

But the United States and its allies could do more to punish Russia. They could bar all transactions with Russia, whether trade or financial. They could seize all Russian assets within their jurisdictions. Washington could announce secondary sanctions on anyone using U.S. dollars for any transaction with Russia. Most important, the United States could use these and other measures to prevent Russia from exporting oil and gas. Letting Russia continue to export oil and gas would be like letting China sell consumer electronics even after it had taken Taiwan by force.

If the United States and its allies have been cautious in their response to Russia, they are likely to be even more restrained when responding to China — and Beijing knows it. China’s ability to retaliate against the West with economic sanctions of its own is much greater than Russia’s. Singapore, which announced trade and banking restrictions against Moscow, trades about $2.5 billion worth of goods with Russia each year — but $57 billion worth of goods with China. China’s leaders likely do not fear U.S.-led economic sanctions in the event of a Taiwan takeover because they probably think that China’s own productive capacity, resources, and friendly partners will allow them to survive on their own, especially since China will soon be the world’s largest economy. They are probably right. China could absorb the types of sanctions being imposed on Russia. And given China’s ability to inflict pain on Western countries, any measures levied against Beijing would likely be softer than those imposed on Moscow.

Taiwan Is Not Ukraine

The Western military response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine will have an even smaller impact than sanctions on China’s thinking about Taiwan. True, neither the United States nor NATO has deployed troops to fight on Ukraine’s behalf. And U.S. military assistance to Ukraine has been modest: late last month, President Joe Biden instructed the State Department to release up to an additional $350 million worth of weapons from U.S. stocks to Ukraine.

But Russia would have to invade a NATO ally without provoking a U.S. military response for Chinese leaders to seriously question Washington’s commitment to defending Taiwan. Biden has made clear from the beginning of the crisis that his administration will never send troops to Ukraine—a stark contrast with his rhetoric on Taiwan. Just last week, Biden stated unequivocally that the United States would defend Taiwan in the event of a Chinese attack. As a show of support, he also sent to the island a delegation of former U.S. officials led by Mike Mullen, a former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Chinese planners largely assume the United States would intervene militarily on behalf of Taiwan.
Oriana Skylar Mastro

In any case, Chinese planners largely assume the United States would intervene militarily on behalf of Taiwan. What some of them question is whether the United States could amass enough forces fast enough to blunt a Chinese assault on the island. Ironically, if the United States had launched a military operation in response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Chinese leaders would have had further reason to question Washington’s ability to thwart a Chinese assault on Taiwan. The United States does not have the resources to fight the Russians in Europe and prepare adequately for a great-power war in Asia.  

Of course, these facts have not prevented China from trying to manipulate the narrative to undermine Taiwan’s resolve. Chinese state media has been flush with stories about how the United States did not come to Ukraine’s aid and therefore won’t come to Taiwan’s either. Like much of what appears on Chinese state media, however, these stories reflect what Chinese leaders want the world to believe—not what they believe themselves.

Not the Right Time

Chinese leaders are without a doubt considering an attack on Taiwan, but now is not the right time. China’s military is still honing the capabilities it would need to take and hold the island. And Xi is unlikely to take a dangerous gamble on Taiwan before the next Party Congress in late 2022, when he is widely expected to secure a third term as general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party. Xi is also working hard to lessen China’s technological dependence on the West, thus minimizing the impact on any further decoupling after a possible war. For all these reasons, an assault on Taiwan before 2025 is unlikely.

If anything, the crisis in Ukraine creates an additional incentive for China to wait. Beijing does not want the world to equate the two scenarios. From China’s perspective, Ukraine is an independent country engaged in a border dispute with Russia. Taiwan, by contrast, “has always been an inalienable part of China’s territory,” as China’s ambassador to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, Deng Xijun, put it late last month. In other words, linking the two issues would undermine China’s claim to the island.

China also understands that moving against Taiwan now would solidify fears in the West of an axis of autocrats. The United States may not have the resolve to fight a protracted war to defend Taiwan. But suddenly faced with a need to defend freedom and democracy against an authoritarian alliance, Washington could muster a greater military response and convince its allies to do the same. Partly for this reason, China has desperately tried to maintain some semblance of neutrality during the Ukrainian crisis.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has certainly changed aspects of the international order. It has rallied European countries against Russia, prompted Germany to increase defense spending, and even convinced historically neutral countries such as Finland, Sweden, and Switzerland to take a stance against Moscow. From China’s perspective, however, nothing Russia or its adversaries have done meaningfully alters the calculus on Taiwan. 

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Oriana Skylar Mastro

Center Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies

Deterrence and Defense Across the Taiwan Strait

Learn more about Oriana Skylar Mastro's research project analyzing the political and strategic dynamics underpinning deterrence in the region.
Explore research project page

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Commentary

Ukraine Is a Distraction from Taiwan

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North Korea Is Becoming an Asset for China

Pyongyang’s Missiles Could Fracture America’s Alliances
North Korea Is Becoming an Asset for China
Chinese military propaganda depicting the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1958.
News

Reassessing China’s Capabilities and Goals for Strategic Competition

On the World Class podcast, Oriana Skylar Mastro argues that in order to set effective policy toward China, the United States needs to better understand how and why China is projecting power.
Reassessing China’s Capabilities and Goals for Strategic Competition
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Protesters display placards in front of the Representative Office of the Moscow-Taipei Coordination Commission to protest against Russia’s military invasion of Ukraine on February 25, 2022 in Taipei, Taiwan.
Protesters display placards in front of the Representative Office of the Moscow-Taipei Coordination Commission to protest against Russia’s military invasion of Ukraine on February 25, 2022 in Taipei, Taiwan.
Lam Yik Fei/ Getty Images
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Russia’s War in Ukraine Doesn’t Presage a Chinese Assault on Taiwan

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Ash Narayan

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Ashray Narayan is an M.A. candidate in International Policy at Stanford’s Freeman Spogli Institute whose work bridges technology policy, media, and democracy. He previously managed programs at Stanford’s Center for International Security and Cooperation with Professor Andrew Grotto, led marketing and launch strategy for the Sequoia‑backed startup Rox, and held senior creative roles at Buck Mason and Bode. Earlier experiences include the U.S. Department of State’s Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs and research at UC Berkeley. Ashray earned a B.A. in Economics from USC. 

Master's in International Policy Class of 2027
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South Korea’s Democracy in Crisis

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3D mockup cover of APARC's volume 'South Korea's Democracy in Crisis'

Like in many other states worldwide, democracy is in trouble in South Korea, entering a state of regression in the past decade, barely thirty years after its emergence in 1987. The society that recently had ordinary citizens leading “candlelight protests” demanding the impeachment of Park Geun-hye in 2016-17 has become polarized amid an upsurge of populism, driven by persistent structural inequalities, globalization, and the rise of the information society. 

The symptoms of democratic decline are increasingly hard to miss: political opponents are demonized, democratic norms are eroded, and the independence of the courts is whittled away. Perhaps most disturbing is that this all takes place under a government dominated by former pro-democracy activists.

The contributors to this volume trace the sources of illiberalism in today’s Korea; examine how political polarization is plaguing its party system; discuss how civil society and the courts have become politicized; look at the roles of inequality, education, and social media in the country’s democratic decline; and consider how illiberalism has affected Korea’s foreign policy. 

Table of Contents

Introduction
Korea’s Democratic Decay: Worrisome Trends and Pressing Challenges
Gi-Wook Shin and Ho-Ki Kim

1. Why Is Korean Democracy Majoritarian but Not Liberal?
Byongjin Ahn

2. Uses and Misuses of Nationalism in the Democratic Politics of Korea
Aram Hur

3. The Weakness of Party Politics and Rise of Populism in Korea
Kwanhu Lee

4. The Politicization of Civil Society: No Longer Watchdogs of Power, Former Democratic Activists Are Becoming New Authoritarian Leaders 
Myoung-Ho Park

5. The Politicization of the Judiciary in Korea: Challenges in Maintaining the Balance of Power
Seongwook Heo

6. Two Divergences in Korea’s Economy and Democracy: Regional and Generational Disparities
Jun-Ho Jeong and Il-Young Lee

7. Democracy and the Educational System in Korea 
Seongsoo Choi

8. Social Media and the Salience of Polarization in Korea
Yong Suk Lee

9. Illiberalism in Korean Foreign Policy
Victor Cha

10. The Democratic Recession: A Global and Comparative Perspective
Larry Diamond

Epilogue
Korea’s 2022 Presidential Election: Populism in the Post-Truth Era
Ho-Ki Kim and Gi-Wook Shin

Media Coverage

To celebrate the publication of South Korea's Democracy in Crisis, APARC held a book launch seminar in Seoul on June 14, 2022. The event received extensive coverage in Korean media, including the following:

Desk, examination, or review copies can be requested through Stanford University Press.

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October 2021

The North Korean Conundrum

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The North Korean Conundrum
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April 2021

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December 2020

Shifting Gears in Innovation Policy

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Shifting Gears in Innovation Policy
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The Threats of Illiberalism, Populism, and Polarization

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Gi-Wook Shin
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Shorenstein APARC
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Facebook's Faces

Facebook's Faces event flyer on blue and red background with photo of Chinmayi Arun
Join us on Tuesday, March 1 from 12 PM - 1 PM PT for a panel discussion on “Facebook’s Faces” featuring Chinmayi Arun, Resident Fellow at the Yale Law School in conversation with Nate Persily of the Stanford Cyber Policy Center. This weekly seminar series is jointly organized by the Cyber Policy Center’s Program on Democracy and the Internet and the Hewlett Foundation’s Cyber Initiative.

About The Seminar: 

Scholarship about social media platforms discusses their relationship with states and users. It is time to expand this theorization to account for differences among states, the varying influence of different publics and the internal complexity of companies. Viewing Facebook’s relationships this way includes less influential states and publics that are otherwise obscured. It reveals that Facebook engages with states and publics through multiple, parallel regulatory conversations, further complicated by the fact that Facebook itself is not a monolith. Arun argues that Facebook has many faces – different teams working towards different goals, and engaging with different ministries, institutions, scholars and civil society organizations. Content moderation exists within this ecosystem.
 
This account of Facebook’s faces and relationships shows that less influential publics can influence the company through strategic alliances with strong publics or powerful states. It also suggests that Facebook’s carelessness with a seemingly weak state or a group, may affect its relationship with a strong public or state that cares about the outcome.

To be seen as independent and legitimate, the Oversight Board needs to show its willingness to curtail Facebook’s flexibility in its engagement with political leaders where there is a real risk of harm. This essay hopes to show that Facebook’s fear of short-term retaliation from some states should be balanced out by accounting for the long-term reputational gains with powerful publics and powerful states who may appreciate its willingness to set profit-making goals aside in favor of human flourishing.

About the Speakers:

Chinmayi Arun
Chinmayi Arun is a resident fellow of the Information Society Project at Yale Law School, and an affiliate of the Berkman Klein Center of Internet & Society at Harvard University. She has served on the faculties of two of the most highly regarded law schools in India for over a decade, and was the founder Director of the Centre for Communication Governance at National Law University Delhi. She has been a Human Rights Officer with the United Nations and is a member of the United Nations Global Pulse Advisory Group on the Governance of Data and AI, and of UNESCO India’s Media Freedom Advisory Group.

Chinmayi serves on the Global Network Initiative Board, and is an expert affiliated with the Columbia Global Freedom of Expression project. She has been consultant to the Law Commission of India and member of the Indian government’s multi stakeholder advisory group for the India Internet Governance Forum in the past.

Nate Persily
Nathaniel Persily is the James B. McClatchy Professor of Law at Stanford Law School, with appointments in the departments of Political Science, Communication, and FSI.  Prior to joining Stanford, Professor Persily taught at Columbia and the University of Pennsylvania Law School, and as a visiting professor at Harvard, NYU, Princeton, the University of Amsterdam, and the University of Melbourne. Professor Persily’s scholarship and legal practice focus on American election law or what is sometimes called the “law of democracy,” which addresses issues such as voting rights, political parties, campaign finance, redistricting, and election administration. He has served as a special master or court-appointed expert to craft congressional or legislative districting plans for Georgia, Maryland, Connecticut, New York, North Carolina, and Pennsylvania.  He also served as the Senior Research Director for the Presidential Commission on Election Administration. His current work, for which he has been honored as a Guggenheim Fellow, Andrew Carnegie Fellow, and a Fellow at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences, examines the impact of changing technology on political communication, campaigns, and election administration.  He is codirector of the Stanford Cyber Policy Center, Stanford Program on Democracy and the Internet, and the Stanford-MIT Healthy Elections Project, which supported local election officials in taking the necessary steps during the COVID-19 pandemic to provide safe voting options for the 2020 election. He is also a member of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, and a commissioner on the Kofi Annan Commission on Elections and Democracy in the Digital Age.

 

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