Asia-Pacific

Terrorism policies most effective when reasonable, balanced

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Fri, 01/20/2017 - 12:00

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Why is terrorism such a vexing problem for policy makers to solve?

The details – and not sloganeering – are important in grappling with the terrorist threat against the U.S. and West, a Stanford scholar suggests. One reason is that the study of terrorism is often confused and contentious, and the study of counterterrorism can be even more frustrating, says Martha Crenshaw, a Stanford terrorism expert and senior fellow at the Center for International Security and Cooperation.

“The conceptual and empirical requirements of defining, classifying, explaining, and responding to terrorist attacks are more complex than is usually acknowledged by politicians and academics, which complicates the task of crafting effective counterterrorism policy,” wrote Crenshaw in a new book, Countering Terrorism, with her co-author Gary LaFree, a criminal justice professor at the University of Maryland.

The researchers examined about 157,000 terrorist attacks that have occurred around the world since 1970. These are catalogued in the Global Terrorism Database at the University of Maryland. Crenshaw founded the Mapping Militant Organizations project at Stanford to identify militant organizations globally and trace how they arise, their root causes and their connections. Understanding the nature of terrorism, the diverse groups and ever-changing aspect of how they adapt is a key theme in her research.

Crenshaw said the stakes in fighting terrorism today are especially high since the consequences of missteps and miscalculations can be catastrophic. While research in what is now known as terrorism studies has made significant strides, more progress is needed on the analytical and academic fronts.

“Terrorist attacks are rare, yet they encourage immediate and far-reaching responses that are not easily rolled back. Most attempts actually fail or are foiled, so that examining only successful terrorist attacks gives an incomplete picture,” the scholars wrote.

Obstacles and hindrances

After 9/11, the U.S. reshaped its policies and institutions to deal with terrorism. Fifteen years later, Crenshaw and LaFree analyzed the lessons learned from 9/11 and how governments responded. Both authors are participating in a Jan. 25 panel discussion at Stanford on the subject of their book. Crenshaw and Lafree suggest three key principles emerge from their research. Countries like the U.S. should prepare for change, disruption, and surprise from terrorist groups.

Second, countries should resist the temptation to magnify the image of the destructive power of terrorism as well as the vulnerability of its targets. Finally, the U.S. needs to accept limits to its ability to totally manage and control the jihadist threat. As Crenshaw and LaFree noted, “Even superpowers cannot completely control their environments. Terrorist threats are constantly evolving, never static.”

A realistic understanding of the actual extent of terrorist capacity to harm national security interests is the best approach, she said. “Governments, especially the American government, should avoid both overreacting and promising or threatening overreaction, which means entertaining modest expectations about what can be accomplished in an extremely complex and uncertain threat environment that requires constant adaptation and adjustment,” they wrote.

Counterterrorism policy should be reasonable, practical, and balanced – in a word, sensible, Crenshaw said.

“There is no perfect solution,” she and LaFree said.

The top priority of the U.S. government is to prevent attacks on American soil, she said. While this is a clear goal, no one in political leadership can guarantee the public absolute security. “If the goal is set as the complete absence of terrorist attacks, then policymakers become so anxious that a terrorist will slip through the preventive security net that they risk panic or overreaction. Fear of being blamed in the aftermath of an attack starts to take precedence over all other considerations,” they wrote.

Policy paradoxes

Crenshaw and Lafree’s research revealed some policy paradoxes. One involved counterterrorism: policymakers tend to set overly ambitious policies to eradicate terrorism completely, rather than risk being called “reactive” rather than “proactive.” But Crenshaw said such goals lack clarity and realism, and can lead to unwise and unattainable objectives. For example, in the wake of 9/11, the U.S. government believed that overthrowing authoritarian regimes in countries like Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Libya and Yemen in favor of “democratic change” would serve as the antidote to terrorism.

However, the change did not take place, and the U.S. has since had to intervene militarily to restore or establish security and stability for weak and embattled allies facing terrorism. One aim for American policy should be greater precision about the strategic goals of military action abroad and that connection to security at home, said Crenshaw and LaFree.

“If the contradictions behind the paradox cannot be resolved, policymakers must find a middle ground between the tactical and strategic,” they wrote.

Another problem is measuring progress against terrorism, Crenshaw and LaFree said. Significant skepticism exists about what the metrics mean in regard to drone strikes, bombs dropped, targets struck, arrests made and cases prosecuted, convictions secured, territory seized or regained, plots foiled, websites taken down, Facebook postings and Twitter accounts deleted, and so on.

“Are these measures of success against terrorism or measures of the extent of the government’s efforts? These metrics calculate what government has done, not necessarily the effect of its actions on adversaries’ calculations and capabilities,” the researchers said, adding that government measures may be taken before a specific adversary exists.

Finally, the real agents behind terrorism are extremely difficult to identify, Crenshaw and LaFree said, because there is no standard “terrorist organization,” and groups evolve, mutate and adapt. Meanwhile, governments and researchers often struggle to establish responsibility for specific attacks.

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MEDIA CONTACTS

Martha Crenshaw, Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies: (650) 723-0126, crenshaw@stanford.edu

Clifton B. Parker, Center for International Security and Cooperation: (650) 725-6488, cbparker@stanford.edu

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Corporate Governance Reform in Japan

Wednesday, February 1, 2017 | 12:00 PM -Wednesday, February 1, 2017 | 1:30 PM

Since Abenomics launched corporate governance reforms as the third arrow of its policies mix, a series of reform measures were introduced such as the Stewardship Code, Corporate Governance Code, and the organization of JPX 400 by the Tokyo Stock Exchange. In this presentation, I firstly summarize recent changes of governance arrangements in Japanese firms, focusing on the trend of listing and de-listing, ownership changes, rapid deleveraging, the rise and fall of activism, gradual increase of independent directors, and modest use of high-powered incentives. I characterize these changes as a hybridization of corporate governance. Then, I suggest an agenda for how to fine tune hybrid structures: the reestablishment of mega-banks and client firms, the role of block shareholders, a new long-term commitment scheme post cross shareholding, the choice of management or monitoring boards, and the use of pay for performance associated with long-term employment.

Hideaki Mi

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yajima is Director, Waseda Institute for Advanced Study(WIAS), Professor of Japanese Economy, Ph.D. in Commerce, Graduate School of Commerce, Waseda University. He teaches about the Japanese economy and corporate governance in Japan. He finished his Ph.D coursework at the University of Tokyo in economics, got a position as Research Associate at the University of Tokyo Institute of Social Sciences, and then moved to Waseda University. He stayed at Reischauer Institute of Japanese Studies, Harvard University, as a visiting scholar from 1992-94 and 2004-05. He was asked to consult by several institutions such as the World Bank, Hawaii University, Hebrew University, and Korean Development Institute. He was also appointed at numerous positions: Faculty Fellow, Research Institute of Economy, Trade & Industry, a Special Research Fellow of Policy Research Institute (Ministry of Finance), Research Fellow of EHESS (Paris), and an Adjunct Professor of Chung-Ang University (Seoul). He has written several books and numerous papers including: The Ownership of Japanese Corporations in the 20th Century, Review of Financial Studies, 2014, Benchmarking Business Unit Governance in Turbulent Times: The Case of Japanese Firms, Benchmarking: An International Journal, 2012, The Global Financial Crisis and the Evolution of Corporate Governance in Japan, laviedesidees.fr, 2009, Corporate Governance in Japan, Oxford University Press, 2007 (co-edited), Changes and Continuity in Japan, Routledge Curzon Press, 2002 (co-edited), Policies for Competitiveness, Oxford University Press, 1999 (co-edited).

Corporate Governance Reform in Japan

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Hideaki Miyajima Director, Waseda Institute for Advanced Study and Professor, Waseda University

Seminars

Human Barriers to International Trade

Tuesday, January 31, 2017 | 12:00 PM -Tuesday, January 31, 2017 | 1:30 PM

This paper investigates the impact of human barriers on international trade using data on common ancestry. Using data on 172 countries covering the near universe of international trade, our analysis documents that country pairs with a large ancestral distance are less likely to trade with each other (extensive margin) and, if they do trade, they trade fewer goods (intensive margin). The results are robust to including a vast array of micro-geographic and political control variables. We explore the role of several proximate determinants that lead to this negative relationship, including differences in values, preferences, technology, as well as migration patterns. Our findings offer a partial explanation to the distance puzzle, the observation that estimates of geographic distance have remained persistently high despite substantial decreases in transportation costs in recent years.

Lukas Schmid is an Assistant Professor at the University of Lucerne -- where he teaches empirical methods. His research interests include political economy, labor economics, and international economics. On-going projects explore the interaction between institutions and political and economic behavior, the impact of language and common ancestry on economic outcomes as well as the long-term consequences of education. His articles have been published in American Journal of Political Science, Review of Economics and Statistics, Economic Journal, and elsewhere.

Lukas Schmid Assistant Professor speaker University of Lucerne

Lectures

Opportunity for marine fisheries reform in China

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China’s 13th Five-Year Plan, launched in March 2016, provides a sound policy platform for the protection of marine ecosystems and the restoration of capture fisheries within China’s exclusive economic zone. What distinguishes China among many other countries striving for marine fisheries reform is its size—accounting for almost one-fifth of global catch volume—and the unique cultural context of its economic and resource management. In this paper, we trace the history of Chinese government priorities, policies, and outcomes related to marine fisheries since the 1978 Economic Reform, and examine how the current leadership’s agenda for “ecological civilization” could successfully transform marine resource management in the coming years. We show how China, like many other countries, has experienced a decline in the average trophic level of its capture fisheries during the past few decades, and how its policy design, implementation, and enforcement have influenced the status of its wild fish stocks. To reverse the trend in declining fish stocks, the government is introducing a series of new programs for sustainable fisheries and aquaculture, with greater traceability and accountability in marine resource management and area controls on coastal development. As impressive as these new plans are on paper, we conclude that serious institutional reforms will be needed to achieve a true paradigm shift in marine fisheries management in China. In particular, we recommend new institutions for science-based fisheries management, secure fishing access, policy consistency across provinces, educational programs for fisheries managers, and increasing public access to scientific data.

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Publication Type

Journal Articles

Publication Date

January 17, 2017

Journal Publisher

PNAS

Authors

Ling Cao

Rosamond L. Naylor

External URL

http://www.pnas.org/content/114/3/435.full

Duterte and Other Threats to Liberal Democracy in the Philippines

Tuesday, February 14, 2017 | 12:00 PM -Tuesday, February 14, 2017 | 1:30 PM

Since assuming the presidency of the Philippines in June 2016 Rodrigo Duterte has been the focus of considerable international attention because of his brusque personality and two dramatically new policies: 1) a take-no-prisoners war on illegal drugs that has resulted in the deaths of over 6,000 alleged drug pushers and users; and 2) an abrupt distancing of relations with the United States coupled with an enthusiastic embrace of China. But considerably less attention is being paid to the Duterte government’s other policies or to the underlying political dynamics that will determine the efficacy of his government and, perhaps, the future of liberal democracy in the Philippines. The speaker will situate the Duterte government in the context of Philippine’s democratic experience, identify the political dynamics that are likely to determine its future, and assess the multiple threats to liberal democracy in the Philippines.

David Timberman is a political analyst and development practitioner with 30 years of experience analyzing and addressing political, governance and conflict-related challenges, principally in Southeast and South Asia. As a Visiting Scholar at Stanford/APARC he is working on a book on the contemporary Philippine political economy. During 2015-2016 he was a Visiting Professor of Political Science at De La Salle University in Manila. He has lived and worked in the Philippines, Indonesia and Singapore, including experiencing first-hand the democratic transitions in the Philippines (1986-1988) and Indonesia (1998-2001). He has written extensively on political and governance issues in the Philippines and has edited or co-edited multi-author volumes on the Philippines, Cambodia, and economic policy reform in Southeast Asia.

David G. Timberman 2016-2017 Lee Kong Chian NUS-Stanford Fellow on Contemporary Southeast Asia

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CISAC encourages U.S.-China dialogue

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Fri, 01/13/2017 - 12:00

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Improving the U.S.-China relationship is a focus at the Center for International Security and Cooperation.

CISAC continued this tradition in co-sponsoring the 8th Sino-U.S. Security Relations and Cooperation Conference in Beijing from Dec. 14-15, 2016. The conference was hosted and co-sponsored by the Foreign Ministry's China Institute of International Studies (CIIS).

Ambassador Su Ge, president of CIIS, attended the conference and delivered an opening remark. FSI’s Thomas Fingar and Teng Jianqun from CIIS chaired the conference.

Fingar said, “Although held at a time of uncertainty about the future of U.S.-China relations, the conference included constructive exchanges on strategic stability, obstacles to cooperation in space, and other sensitive topics.”

He added, “The exchanges were frank and constructive because they built on the foundation of understanding and trust developed through years-long exchanges between CISAC and CIIS. In the next phase, small teams of American and Chinese experts will develop joint blueprints to enhance understanding of issues critical for nuclear stability and space cooperation.”

CISAC co-founder John W. Lewis has been active for many years encouraging and supporting better ties between the U.S. and China. He is an expert on Chinese politics, U.S.-China relations, China's nuclear weapons program, U.S. policy toward Korea and health security issues in northeast Asia.

During this most recent Beijing conference, scholars and security experts from both the U.S. and China held in-depth discussions on topics including cybersecurity, outer space cooperation, maritime dispute management, missile defense, grey zone cooperation, and China-U.S. nuclear issues.

The American attendees included scholars from CISAC (Fingar, Brad Roberts, and Joseph Torigian); Brad Roberts, director, Center for Global Security Research, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory; Major General Roger W. Burg, former commander, 20th Air Force; Vice Admiral Michael Connor (retired), U.S. Navy; Lieutenant General Susan J. Helms (retired), U.S. Air Force general and former NASA astronaut; Lieutenant General James M. Kowalski (retired), U.S. Air Force general; Steven M. Benner,chief, Strategy and Campaign Division, U.S. Strategic Command, among others.

The Chinese experts came from a variety of institutions – CIIS, China Academy of Engineering Physics, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Rocket Force, Rocket Force College, China Defense Science and Technology Information Center, PLA Navy Academy of Military Science, PLA South Command, Chinese Academy of Social Science, Renmin University of China, National Defense University, Tsinghua University, etc.

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Eight Threats to Freedom of Expression in India

Wednesday, April 5, 2017 | 4:30 PM -Wednesday, April 5, 2017 | 6:00 PM

Due to venue capacity limits, we are no longer accepting RSVPs for this event.

India prides itself on being the "world's largest democracy". In some respects it is certifiably democratic; as in the regular conduct of free and fair elections. But in other respects there are deficits. One such area is freedom of expression. While Indian writers, artists and film-makers are certainly freer than their counterparts in totalitarian countries such as China, they are less free when compared to their colleagues in democracies such as Sweden or the United States. This lecture identifies eight distinct threats to freedom of expression in India, the most important of which are the presence of archaic colonial laws and the rise of identity politics.

Guha is a historian and biographer based in Bangalore. He has taught at the universities of Yale and Stanford, held the Arné Naess Chair at the University of Oslo, and been the Indo-American Community Visiting Professor at the University of California at Berkeley. In the academic year 2011-2012 he served as the Philippe Roman Professor of History and International Affairs at the London School of Economics.

Guha’s books include a pioneering environmental history, The Unquiet Woods (University of California Press, 1989), and an award-winning social history of cricket, A Corner of a Foreign Field (Picador, 2002). India after Gandhi (Macmillan/Ecco Press, 2007) was chosen as a book of the year by the Economist, the Washington Post, the Wall Street Journal, the San Francisco Chronicle, Time Out, and Outlook, and as a book of the decade in the Times of India, the Times of London, and The Hindu. His most recent book is Gandhi Before India (Knopf, 2014), which was chosen as a notable book of the year by the New York Times.

Apart from his books, Guha also writes a syndicated column, that appears in six languages in newspapers with a combined readership of some twenty mllion. Guha’s books and essays have been translated into more than twenty languages. The New York Times has referred to him as ‘perhaps the best among India’s non fiction writers’; Time Magazine has called him ‘Indian democracy’s pre-eminent chronicler’.

Ramachandra Guha’s awards include the Leopold-Hidy Prize of the American Society of Environmental History, the Daily Telegraph/Cricket Society prize, the Malcolm Adideshiah Award for excellence in social science research, the Ramnath Goenka Prize for excellence in journalism, the Sahitya Akademi Award, and the R. K. Narayan Prize. In 2009, he was awarded the Padma Bhushan, the Republic of India’s third highest civilian honour. In 2008, and again in 2013, Prospect Magazine nominated Guha as one of the world’s most influential intellectuals. In 2014, he was awarded an honorary doctorate in the humanities by Yale University. In 2015, he was awarded the Fukuoka Prize for contributions to Asian studies.

About the colloquia:

In 2014, Indian voters gave Narendra Modi and the BJP a mandate to accelerate India’s economic reforms and revitalize its foreign relations, in particular with the United States and with partners in East Asia. But the pace and depth of reforms and economic transformation have not met the high expectations, despite strong GDP performance. Economic growth remains uneven, job creation sluggish, and massive infrastructural and administrative problems continue to trouble many sectors of the economy. After twenty-five years of economic reforms, India’s potential as a new global industrial hub has still not been realized and its vast resources of labor and talent remain underdeveloped.

During the 2017 winter and spring quarters Shorenstein APARC and the Center for South Asia will host a series of lectures and discussions that explore what makes India democratic and dynamic, and the obstacles that prevent the country from realizing its enormous potential.

Also, in 2017, the next Global Entrepreneur Summit will be in India, sequel to the 2016 Stanford-hosted Summit. This colloquium will help prepare for that event by reaching out to scholars, students, interested stakeholders, business leaders and others in the Bay Area.

This colloquia is co-sponsored with the Stanford Center for South Asia

Seminars

How India Works: Caste, Community and the Indian Economy

Thursday, March 2, 2017 | 12:00 PM -Thursday, March 2, 2017 | 1:30 PM

Since its independence, India’s statesmen, policymakers and social scientists all firmly believed that the entrenched hierarchical caste order and the deep divisions between religious communities would become less salient, and perhaps wither away, as the country developed a modern economy and a new division of labor based on skill and merit rather than a ‘traditional’ inherited status. Today, after seven decades of democracy and steady economic growth, it is clear that both caste and religious community are as important as ever. Rather than disappearing, these cultural identities and social networks have evolved along with the economy. A closer look at how the Indian economy is organized reveals that caste and community fundamentally shape how labor is organized, how markets function, how urban development happens, and how industry is owned and organized. Two case studies, one of skilled labor in South India and another of the structure of industrial growth in a city in central India, will illustrate how India actually works.

Thomas Blom Hansen, Director, Center for South Asia; Reliance-Dhirubhai Ambani Professor in South Asian Studies; Professor in Anthropology, Stanford University

As the Director of Stanford’s Center for South Asian Studies, Hansen is charged with building a substantial new program. He has many and broad interests spanning South Asia and Southern Africa, several cities and multiple theoretical and disciplinary interests from political theory and continental philosophy to psychoanalysis, comparative religion and contemporary urbanism..

Aruna Ranganathan, Assistant Professor of Organizational Behavior, Stanford University

Aruna Ranganathan studies questions of work and employment in the context of economic development. By applying novel methods that combine field-experimental and quantitative research designs with ethnography and interviews, Aruna's research investigates how low-income occupations in developing countries are governed, organized, seek meaning through their work and navigate the market. Through her research, Aruna strives to advance our theoretical understanding of work, while informing the design of labor-market institutions and policy for the developing world. In previous projects based in India, Aruna has studied the boom of IT and business process outsourcing, the professionalization of plumbing, price-setting behavior among handcraft artisans and the transition of women into formal employment in garment factories.

About the colloquia:

This colloquia is co-sponsored with the Stanford Center for South Asia

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Hecker: The U.S. must talk to North Korea

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Thu, 01/12/2017 - 12:00

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Siegfried Hecker wrote the following op-ed for the Jan. 12 edition of The New York Times:

Since my first visit to North Korea’s Yongbyon nuclear complex in 2004, I have witnessed the country’s nuclear weapons program grow from a handful of primitive bombs to a formidable nuclear arsenal that represents one of America’s greatest security threats. After decades of broken policies toward Pyongyang, talking to the North Koreans is the best option for the Trump administration at this late date to limit the growing threat.

North Korea broke out to build the bomb because President George W. Bush was determined to kill President Bill Clinton’s 1994 “Agreed Framework,” a bilateral agreement with the North to freeze and eventually dismantle the North’s nuclear program. Hard-liners in the Bush administration viewed it as appeasement. Mr. Bush labeled the North, along with Iran and Iraq, part of an “axis of evil” in January 2002.

At the first bilateral meeting with Kim Jong-il’s regime in Pyongyang in October 2002, Bush administration officials accused North Korea of violating the Clinton pact by clandestinely pursuing the uranium path to the bomb. Washington had already detected this effort in the late 1990s, but it was deemed an insufficient threat not worthy of jeopardizing the gains made by the plutonium freeze.

For the Bush administration, the clandestine uranium effort was all it needed to walk away from the Agreed Framework. Yet Mr. Bush’s team proved unprepared for the consequences and stood by as North Korea resumed its plutonium program and built the bomb.

During six visits between 2004 and 2009, I watched the North continue to try to engage Washington, while the Bush administration preferred the six-party talks led by China, believing that the North would have greater difficulty cheating in the context of multilateral diplomacy. In a 2004 visit, I was even allowed to hold a piece of plutonium — in a sealed glass jar — to convince me and Washington that North Korea had the bomb.

In September 2005, China orchestrated a six-party joint statement calling for a nuclear-weapon-free Korean Peninsula. When the Bush administration concurrently slapped financial sanctions on Pyongyang, the North Koreans walked out of the six-party talks and responded with their first nuclear test in October 2006.

I was in Pyongyang three weeks later and found that although the test was only partly successful, it marked a turning point in the North’s nuclear program. North Korea became a nuclear weapon state and insisted that all future negotiations proceed from that reality. Mr. Bush left office with the North most likely possessing up to five plutonium-fueled nuclear weapons and an expanding uranium program.

North Korea greeted the Obama administration with a long-range rocket launch, followed by a second nuclear test in May 2009 — this one, successful. Unlike the Bush administration, which faced the prospect of the North’s violating the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, the Obama administration faced the North’s steady march to an expanding arsenal.

Mr. Obama was also unwilling to engage directly with Pyongyang, insisting instead that the North denuclearize before starting talks. It appears the Obama administration also viewed the regimes of Kim Jong-il and his son and successor, Kim Jong-un, as repugnant and hoped for their collapse, while also staying in step with two conservative South Korean administrations. Mr. Obama’s preferred path has been to tighten United Nations and United States sanctions and to pressure Beijing to rein in Pyongyang. Neither strategy has stopped the Kim regime from expanding its nuclear program.

Pyongyang upped the ante on its nuclear program with a remarkable revelation during my seventh and last visit in November 2010: the existence of a modern uranium centrifuge facility in Yongbyon. That facility served notice that the North was now capable of pursuing the second path to the bomb. No outsiders are known to have been in Yongbyon since my 2010 visit.

Satellite imagery of the Yongbyon complex combined with official North Korean propaganda photos and three additional successful nuclear tests point to a robust and rapidly expanding nuclear arsenal. My best estimate, admittedly highly uncertain, is that North Korea has sufficient plutonium and highly enriched uranium to build 20 to 25 nuclear weapons.

The North also launched some two dozen missiles in 2016, including partly successful road-mobile and submarine-based missiles that could potentially carry nuclear warheads.

President-elect Donald J. Trump faces a much graver threat from the North than his two predecessors. Pyongyang can most likely already reach all of South Korea, Japan and possibly even some United States targets in the Pacific.

The crisis is here. The nuclear clock keeps ticking. Every six to seven weeks North Korea may be able to add another nuclear weapon to its arsenal. All in the hands of Kim Jong-un, a young leader about whom we know little, and a military about which we know less. Both are potentially prone to overconfidence and miscalculations.

These sensitive nuclear issues require focused discussions in a small, closed setting. This cannot be achieved at a multilateral negotiating table, such as the six-party talks.

Mr. Trump should send a presidential envoy to North Korea. Talking is not a reward or a concession to Pyongyang and should not be construed as signaling acceptance of a nuclear-armed North Korea. Talking is a necessary step to re-establishing critical links of communication to avoid a nuclear catastrophe.

Mr. Trump has little to lose by talking. He can risk the domestic political downside of appearing to appease the North. He would most likely get China’s support, which is crucial because Beijing prefers talking to more sanctions. He would also probably get support for bilateral talks from Seoul, Tokyo and Moscow.

By talking, and especially by listening, the Trump administration may learn more about the North’s security concerns. It would allow Washington to signal the strength of its resolve to protect its allies and express its concerns about human rights abuses, as well as to demonstrate its openness to pragmatic, balanced progress.

Talking will help inform a better negotiating strategy that may eventually convince the young leader that his country and his regime are better off without nuclear weapons.

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Jaclyn Selby

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Former Research Scholar, Japan Program

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Jaclyn Selby was a Research Scholar at the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center's Japan Program through June 2020. She joined Stanford from a postdoctoral fellowship at the Tuck School of Business at Dartmouth, where she was affiliated with the Center for Digital Strategies and the Strategy and Management Faculty Group. Selby's research is at the intersection of strategic management and technology policy for high tech and media industries. Her main areas of focus are the digital platform economy, innovation management, startups, and intellectual property. Her work has been published in Communications & Strategies, Foreign Policy Digest, and Intellibridge Asia.

Selby holds a PhD from the University of Southern California, an MA from Georgetown University, and a BA from Sarah Lawrence College. Prior to pursuing her doctorate, she was a Senior Researcher at Project Argus, a global leader in federally-funded disease and disaster intelligence, where she headed three operations research and tech strategy projects. Her background also includes experience in boutique consulting, as Research & Marketing Director for the Style and Image Network, and in geopolitical consulting (Intellibridge, Courage Services, CastleAsia).

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