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Melissa Morgan
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Every year, leaders in politics, industry, and business gather in Germany for the annual Munich Security Conference. Established in 1963 with the goal of building peace through dialogue, the conference is one the world’s premier forums for discussing global security challenges.

At the 2025 conference, the ongoing war in Ukraine, now entering its fourth year, was at the top of the agenda.

FSI Director and former U.S. Ambassador to Russia Michael McFaul was in attendance, while Steven Pifer, a former U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine and FSI affiliated scholar, followed the proceedings closely. As the event came to a close, they reflected on the potential negotiations over the Russia-Ukraine conflict and the changing global security landscape.


Prioritizing Ukraine’s Security Needs


In any proposed resolution to Russia’s invasion, Ambassadors Pifer and McFaul agree that Ukraine’s security needs must be front and center. Writing in The Hill, Pifer outlines the high stakes of the negotiations:

“The less territory Ukraine must give up and the stronger the security guarantees it receives, the greater the prospects the agreement will prove durable — and that U.S. mediation would be seen as a victory for Trump’s diplomacy. He might even win the Nobel Peace Prize he covets.”

Pifer continues:

“On the other hand, a U.S.-brokered settlement that requires Kyiv to cede a great deal of territory with only weak guarantees would leave Ukraine vulnerable to future Russia attack. Few would regard that outcome as a triumph of American diplomacy.”

Ambassador McFaul also views robust security guarantees for Ukraine as a foundational piece of a successful peace deal. In an article for Foreign Affairs, he used a recent history lesson as evidence against conceding too much while offering too little.

“The lessons from U.S. negotiations with the Taliban during Trump’s first term should inform the president-elect’s thinking about dealing with Putin. The Taliban and the Trump administration negotiated a deal that was highly favorable to the militant group but that the Biden administration nevertheless honored. Its terms included a cease-fire, a timeline for the departure of American forces, and the promise of a future political settlement between the Afghan government and the Taliban. The Taliban, however, did not commit to the agreement; instead, they used that peace plan as a way-station on their path to total victory. Appeasement of the Taliban did not create peace. Appeasement of Putin won’t either. Instead of just giving Putin everything he wants—hardly an example of the president-elect’s much-vaunted prowess in dealmaking—Trump should devise a more sophisticated plan, encouraging Ukraine to nominally relinquish some territory to Russia in exchange for the security that would come with joining NATO. Only such a compromise will produce a permanent peace.”

Comments by U.S. officials at the Munich Security Conference and in the days since has left McFaul deeply concerned about Ukraine's influence on the negotiations. Speaking on WBUR’s Here and Now program, he said:

"Zelenskyy is in the fight of his life right now. He is trying to preserve Ukrainian sovereignty, and he's willing to negotiate. But he is very worried he's going to be sold out by the Americans."

Negotiating with Russia


While Ukraine may be feeling sidelined, the groundwork for peace talks with Russia is already being laid in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.

As former diplomats, McFaul and Pifer both have direct experience negotiating with the Russian Federation, and both agree that the Kremlin is an extremely shrewd and difficult negotiating partner that requires careful, strategic handling.

As the U.S. delegation continues to meet with their Russian counterparts, McFaul offered his advice on the basics of successful diplomacy via X.

In a post-Munich article for The National Interest, Pifer expands on that basic diplomatic framework with specific suggestions for the U.S. team:

  • If Washington seeks to play an honest broker, senior American officials should not concede points to the Kremlin at the outset.
     
  • Dismissive treatment of European allies on issues directly affecting their security will hardly increase prospects that they will assist U.S. efforts.
     
  • Trump’s first call on ending the war should have gone to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, not Vladimir Putin, and the second set of calls should have gone to senior European leaders. Eagerness to engage with the Kremlin weakens their hand with their Russian counterparts. 
     
  • Steps to build leverage with Russia by asking Congress to approve new military assistance for Ukraine, working with the G7 to transfer frozen Central Russian Bank assets to a fund for Ukraine, and tightening sanctions on Russia should be taken before engaging directly with Russia.

     

Assessing America on the Global Stage


Both Pifer and McFaul share concerns about how negotiations for the end to the war might impact the standing of the United States as a global leader.

Reacting to Vice President’s J.D. Vance’s keynote address at the Munich Security Conference, McFaul was unconvinced that the administration has accurately assessed the threats to America’s national security.

“For someone to come to Europe and say the biggest threat is censorship and a lack of democracy is just analytically incorrect. The data does not support that hypothesis. The greatest threat to Europe is Russia.” 

Ambassador Pifer echoed similar concerns about the United States’ national security priorities. In a discussion with Ian Masters on the Background Briefing podcast, he said:

“Over the past ten years, Putin has made Russia a major adversary to the United States. And it’s not just about the war in Ukraine; they’re moving across the board to try and challenge American interests. They want to weaken and diminish American influence and power.”

If left unchecked, Pifer warns that a sloppy performance negotiating in Ukraine could have far-reaching consequences for American national security.

“Vladimir Putin wants to have a U.S.-Russia negotiation to divide up spheres of influence in Europe. It would be a horrible mistake for the United States to fall into that trap.”

Taking a broad view of current trends in international security and the ripples flowing from the Munich conference, McFaul cautions against an over-reliance on coercive power, or the ability to influence nations to act vis-à-vis the threat of pain or disruption.

Coercive power, McFaul explains on Substack, tends to produce zero-sum outcomes—the powerful get more, and the weak get less.

In contrast, says McFaul, cooperative power typically produces win-win outcomes.

“Like market transactions in which the buyer and seller both benefit from the exchange, everyone is better off from international cooperation, both the weak and the strong.”

Looking to the coming weeks and months of potential negotiations and what it may signal about American leadership more broadly, McFaul urges policymakers to revisit the long-term, tried and tested benefits of cooperation, outreach, and allyship.

“It’s not too late to rethink this singular focus on coercive foreign policy tactics. The United States is not a monarchy or a country run by gangsters. Hopefully, our democratic institutions and norms will allow the American people to engage in a substantive discussion on the wisdom of only relying on coercive power for our security and prosperity.”

To stay up-to-date on the latest research, commentary, and analysis from our scholars, be sure to follow FSI on BlueskyThreadsX, and Instagram, and subscribe to our newsletters.

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[Left to right]: Dawn Garcia, Director of the John S. Knight Fellowships; Roman Anin, Journalist and co-founder of iStories Media; Michael McFaul, director of the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford University
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Russia Experts Decode Trump-Putin Dynamics

At an event hosted by the John S. Knight Journalism Fellowships at Stanford, Michael McFaul and journalist Roman Anin discussed U.S.-Russia relations under Putin and Trump and the role of journalism in combatting anti-democratic ideology.
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Steven Pifer and Michael McFaul address a room full of students during Stanford University's 2024 Democracy Day.
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Former U.S. Ambassadors Call for Increased Western Assistance to Ukraine

As part of Stanford's 2024 Democracy Day, Michael McFaul and Steven Pifer spoke to students about the war in Ukraine and what the future might bring should Russia be allowed to prevail in its illegal aggression.
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Vladamir Putin at a Victory Day military parade in the Red Square, Moscow
Commentary

Would Putin Attack a NATO Member?

The probability that Putin would challenge a NATO member militarily is not high, but his history of miscalculations and overinflated ambition should remind the alliance not to underestimate the risks.
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Michael McFaul and Steven Pifer share analysis of where international security seems to be headed, and what it might mean for the U.S., Ukraine, and their partners.

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Clémence Tricaud seminar
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We assemble a comprehensive database of historical electoral results for the US House, Senate and presidential contests, from the 19th century until today. We analyze long run trends in election vote margins and party seat margins. Seat margins declined in the recent period, so the margins of control of the House, Senate, and Electoral College by either party have become smaller. However, this was not accompanied by a decline in the margins of victory at the constituency level. We interpret these facts in the context of a simple model of electoral competition where seat margins and vote margins depend on the availability of information about voter preferences, as well as the ability of political candidates to tailor their platforms locally. We argue that the gradual increase in politicians' information about voter preferences, as well as the growing nationalization of politics can explain the long-run decrease in seat margins and the concurrent stability in vote margins.

ABOUT THE SPEAKER

Clemence Tricaud is an Assistant Professor of Economics at the UCLA Anderson School of Management. She is also a research affiliate of the NBER and CEPR. She received her Ph.D in Economics from Ecole Polytechnique and CREST in 2020. Her research lies at the intersection of political economy and public economics. Her work combines quasi-experimental designs with administrative data to better understand the determinants and consequences of citizen and policymaker behaviors. The first part of her research studies the factors affecting voters' and candidates' behavior during elections and the consequences of their choices on electoral outcomes. The second part of her work explores how the identity of policymakers and the level of governance affect the design of local public policies and the provision of public goods.

Virtual to Public. Only those with an active Stanford ID with access to Room E008 in Encina Hall may attend in person.

Hesham Sallam
Hesham Sallam

Virtual to Public. If prompted for a password, use: 123456
Only those with an active Stanford ID with access to Room E008 in Encina Hall may attend in person.

Clémence Tricaud Assistant Professor, UCLA Anderson
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Khushmita Dhabhai
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News
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At a CDDRL weekly seminar, American University Political Scientist Keith Darden examined how the Russian-Ukrainian war is reshaping European institutions. The talk was part of the REDS seminar series, organized in partnership with The Europe Center and the Hoover Institution. While some expected that heightened military threats would drive greater European Union (EU) unity and integration, Darden argued that the war is instead reinforcing national institutions and re-nationalizing Europe.

First, the war has shifted power dynamics within the EU, strengthening newer member states, particularly those from post-enlargement waves in Eastern Europe. Unlike older Western European members, these states do not share the post-WWII commitment to anti-nationalism that has underpinned European integration. Countries such as Poland and Hungary have adopted nationalist policies that challenge the EU’s foundational ideals, treating European regulations as discretionary rather than binding. This shift has weakened the EU’s ability to act as a unified political entity.

Second, while the war has spurred European military rearmament, this has occurred along national rather than EU-wide lines. Defense spending has surged across the continent, yet procurement remains fragmented, with countries prioritizing domestic industries and bilateral agreements over collective EU initiatives. Military aid to Ukraine, rather than being coordinated by European institutions, has largely been managed through U.S.-led bilateral mechanisms. This reflects the EU’s limited role in security policy. Historically, existential threats have led to fiscal centralization—the concentration of taxation and spending powers at a higher level of government to fund collective defense. However, the EU is restricted by its treaties from directly allocating budgeted funds for military expenditures, limiting its ability to centralize security coordination or build stronger institutional frameworks in response to the war.

Third, the war has heightened national identity politics across Europe, further undermining European integration. Instead of fostering a shared European identity, the conflict has reinforced national distinctions. In Ukraine, the war has fueled policies emphasizing language, media control, and historical narratives rooted in nationalism. Within the EU, it has led to unilateral trade restrictions, violations of Schengen rules, and disputes over migration policies. These trends have strengthened sovereignty-based decision-making at the national level rather than pushing Europe toward deeper federalism.

Darden situated these findings within broader theories of state-building. Drawing from bellicist theories, he explained that war has historically driven state-building by centralizing fiscal capacity and consolidating power. However, unlike past cases where war led to greater political integration, the EU remains structurally constrained by its reliance on voluntary market-based cooperation rather than centralized security imperatives. Kelemen and McNamara (2022) argue that the EU’s fragmented institutional development results from the absence of war-induced fiscal consolidation. Even with the return of war to Europe, integration has not accelerated; instead, security responses have remained decentralized, with national governments taking the lead.

Darden concluded that the war is reinforcing the dominance of the nation-state rather than strengthening the EU as a collective entity. Despite increased military spending, European defense remains disjointed, and the war’s institutional impact is shaped by national identities, security alternatives, and EU governance constraints. Far from unifying Europe, the war may ultimately weaken the post-WWII European project.

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Alice Siu presented her research during a CDDRL seminar on January 30, 2025.
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Can Deliberation Revitalize Democracy?

Alice Siu, Associate Director of CDDRL’s Deliberative Democracy Lab, demonstrates the wide-ranging effects of deliberation on democracy.
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Ali Çarkoğlu
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Polarization, Cleavages, and Democratic Backsliding: Electoral Dynamics in Turkey (1990-2023)

Using data from the World Values Survey and Turkish Election Studies, CDDRL Visiting Scholar Ali Çarkoğlu explores the rise of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) and the enduring influence of cultural divides on Turkey’s political landscape.
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Yoshiko Herrera presented her research in a REDS Seminar co-hosted by CDDRL and TEC on January 16, 2025.
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Identities and War: Lessons from Russia’s War on Ukraine

Political Science scholar Yoshiko Herrera examines how identity shapes the causes, conduct, and consequences of war, especially in the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
Identities and War: Lessons from Russia’s War on Ukraine
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American University Political Scientist Keith Darden examines how the Russian-Ukrainian war is reshaping European institutions.

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Soraya Johnson
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In a recent REDS Seminar, co-sponsored by CDDRL and The Europe Center, University of Wisconsin-Madison Professor of Political Science Yoshiko Herrera examined the role of identity in shaping the causes, conduct, and impact of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

Based on the groups they align themselves with, Herrera explained, individuals hold collective memories and similar interpretations of a shared past. These memories and interpretations are often central to our understanding of wars. In the Russian context, the narrative of humiliation by the West in the 1990s and the urge to show strength against NATO expansion fueled Russia’s violent drive to assert its national identity.

During conflict, identity is central to an individual’s assessment of who is an ally or enemy. According to the social identity theory, humans cooperate more within their ingroups than outgroups, or those they perceive as different. Importantly, it can be difficult to determine which identity markers prevail the most. Although identity is often viewed through the limited lens of ethnicity, factors like nationality, religion, or gender can anchor group cohesion. In Ukraine, for example, a concept of national identity has unified people across other markers, such as ethnicity. The fundamental denial of Ukraine’s national identity has been central to Putin’s devastating invasion of the country.

Group alignment, moreover, continues to affect political attitudes throughout a war, affecting, for instance, how invested the masses are in victory. The perception of a conflict as an assault on identity tends to deepen the public’s personal investment in that conflict, as evidenced by Ukraine’s high military mobilization since the onset of the war.

Identity is not only a driver of conflict; it also is a dependent variable, or a domain that is shaped by the experience of war. In Ukraine, a cohesive national identity has strengthened in reaction to Russia’s devastating aggression. Language, a crucial dimension of identity, demonstrates this pattern; as of 2023, 82% of Ukrainians identify Ukrainian as their “native tongue,” compared to only 57% in 2012. There has been a rapid evolution in how Ukrainians view themselves, extending beyond what even the most ardent nationalists could have hoped for a decade ago.

It is not just policy considerations and pragmatism that propel the decisions of political leaders; abstract and ever-evolving concepts of identity are motivating forces behind conflicts. Herrera’s research recognizes identity as a key factor influencing war, with the power to uniquely mobilize the masses. In the face of conflict, identities can change and strengthen; Russia’s construed narratives of national identity fuel its war conduct, while in Ukraine, there has been a corresponding maturing of a unified national identity. The role of identity in all aspects of conflict must not be underplayed, as it is manipulated by and motivates political leaders, especially in times of war.

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Alberto Díaz-Cayeros presents his research in a CDDRL seminar.
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Colonialism, Epidemics, and Resilience: Rethinking Demographic Collapse in Tepetlaoztoc

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Alex Mierke-Zatwarnicki
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Understanding Identity Politics: Strategies for Party Formation and Growth

CDDRL Postdoctoral Fellow Alex Mierke-Zatwarnicki explores how identity politics — strategies of political mobilization based on group identity — shape the development of new political parties, particularly those trying to establish themselves in a competitive environment.
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Bryn Rosenfeld
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The Transformative Power of Anger Under Authoritarian Repression

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Political Science scholar Yoshiko Herrera examines how identity shapes the causes, conduct, and consequences of war, especially in the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

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Michael Albertus seminar
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For millennia, land has been a symbol of wealth and privilege. But the true power of land ownership is even greater than we might think. Who owns the land determines whether a society will be equal or unequal, whether it will develop or decline, and whether it will safeguard or sacrifice its environment. Modern history has been defined by land reallocation on a massive scale. From the 1500s on, European colonial powers and new nation-states shifted indigenous lands into the hands of settlers. The 1900s brought new waves of land appropriation, from Soviet and Maoist collectivization to initiatives turning large estates over to family farmers. The shuffle continues today as governments vie for power and prosperity by choosing who should get land. Drawing on a career’s worth of original research and on-the-ground fieldwork, Land Power shows that choices about who owns the land have locked in poverty, sexism, racism, and climate crisis—and that what we do with the land today can change our collective fate.

ABOUT THE SPEAKER

Michael Albertus is a Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago and the author of five books. His research examines democracy and dictatorship, inequality and redistribution, property rights, and civil conflict. His newest book, Land Power: Who Has It, Who Doesn't, and How That Determines the Fate of Societies, was published by Basic Books in January 2025. In addition to his books, Albertus is also the author of nearly 30 peer-reviewed journal articles, including at flagship journals like the American Journal of Political Science, Journal of Politics, and World Politics. The defining features of Albertus' work are his engagement with big questions and puzzles and the ability to join big data and cutting-edge research methods with original, deep on-the-ground fieldwork everywhere from government offices to archives and farm fields. He has conducted fieldwork throughout the Americas, southern Europe, South Africa, and elsewhere. His books and articles have won numerous awards and shifted conventional understandings of democracy, authoritarianism, and the consequences of how humans occupy and relate to the land.
 

Virtual to Public. Only those with an active Stanford ID with access to the Philippines Conference Room in Encina Hall may attend in person.

Hesham Sallam
Hesham Sallam

Virtual to Public. Only those with an active Stanford ID with access to the Philippines Conference Room in Encina Hall may attend in person.

Michael Albertus Professor of Political Science Professor of Political Science, University of Chicago University of Chicago
Seminars
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Andreas Wiedemann talk
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Social housing has regained public attention amidst rising rent prices. In this paper, we examine how the partisan composition of city councils affects housing policies and permits for social housing. We construct a novel panel of all municipal housing construction permits in Denmark between 1981 and 2021 and combine it with information on local election outcomes. Using a close-elections regression discontinuity design, we find that social housing permits increase when Social Democrats win control of the city council. This effect was particularly strong until the early 1990s but has disappeared since. We then draw on data from administrative registries and electoral precincts to demonstrate that electoral realignment can explain this dynamic. We show that social housing residents have become economically marginalized and turned to far-right populist parties while social democratic voters have become more educated and likely to be homeowners. This maps onto the electoral losses the Social Democrats experienced in precincts with high shares of social housing. Our findings suggest that partisan considerations and electoral rewards help explain changes in social housing policies.

This event is co-sponsored by the Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law and The Europe Center.

Speakers

Andreas Wiedemann

Andreas Wiedemann

Assistant Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University

Andreas Wiedemann is an Assistant Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University. He studies economic inequality, redistributive politics, and political behavior in rich democracies.

His book, Indebted Societies: Credit and Welfare in Rich Democracies (Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics), examines the political causes behind the rise of credit as a private alternative to the welfare state and the political consequences for economic insecurity and social solidarity. Indebted Societies won the William H. Riker Book Award and the Best Book on Class and Inequality Award, both from the American Political Science Association.

Wiedemann’s other work has been published in the American Journal of Political Science, the British Journal of Political Science, Comparative Political Studies, and the Journal of Politics, among others.

He is currently working on the affordability crisis in housing markets and a new book project about spatial inequalities and democratic politics across rich democracies.

Soledad Artiz Prillaman

Soledad Artiz Prillaman

Assistant Professor of Political Science
Moderator

Soledad Artiz Prillaman is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at Stanford University. Her research lies at the intersections of comparative political economy, development, and gender, with a focus in South Asia. Specifically, her research addresses questions such as: What are the political consequences of development and development policies, particularly for women’s political behavior? How are minorities, specifically women, democratically represented and where do inequalities in political engagement persist and how are voter demands translated into policy and governance? In answering these questions, she utilizes mixed methods, including field experiments, surveys, and in-depth qualitative fieldwork. She received her Ph.D. in Government from Harvard University in 2017 and a B.A. in Political Science and Economics from Texas A&M University in 2011.

Alex Mierke-Zatwarnicki

Alex Mierke-Zatwarnicki

CDDRL Postdoctoral Fellow, 2024-25
Discussant

Alex Mierke-Zatwarnicki is a postdoctoral fellow at the Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law (CDDRL) at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (FSI) at Stanford University. She holds a Ph.D. in Government from Harvard University and was previously a Max Weber Fellow at the European University Institute.

Alex’s work focuses on political parties and group identity in Western Europe, in macro-historical perspective. A core theme of her research is understanding how different patterns of political and social organization combine to shape the ‘arena’ of electoral politics and the opportunity space for new competitors.

In her ongoing book project, Alex studies the different ways in which outsider parties articulate group identities and invoke narratives of social conflict in order to gain a foothold in electoral competition. Empirically, the project employs a mixed-methods approach — including qualitative case studies and quantitative text analysis — to compare processes of party-building and entry across five distinct ‘episodes’ of party formation in Western Europe: early twentieth-century socialists, interwar fascists, green and ethno-regionalist parties in the post-war period, and the contemporary far right.

Soledad Artiz Prillaman
Alex Mierke-Zatwarnicki
Alex Mierke-Zantwarnicki


In-person: Reuben Hills Conference Room (Encina Hall, Second Floor, East Wing, 616 Jane Stanford Way, Stanford)

Online: Via Zoom

Andreas B. Wiedemann
Lectures
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Wolfgang Mueller
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What visions of neutrality did the Kremlin promote in the Cold War and how has the Russian perception of neutrality changed today?

While Russian aggression against Ukraine has prompted Finland and Sweden to abandon their neutral status and to join NATO, some smaller European states continue to uphold their neutral status. Paying special attention to the Austrian case, the talk will analyze various national traditions of neutral policies in the Cold War and their connection to the Soviet theory of neutrality. It will argue that the ups and downs that linked Soviet relations with neutrals to East-West tension have been replaced by different patterns of Russian behavior.

This event is co-sponsored by Department of German Studies, Department of History, CREEES Center for Russian, East European and Eurasian Studies, Freeman-Spogli Institute for International Studies, Stanford Global Studies


Wolfgang Mueller is Professor of Russian History at the University of Vienna and a member of the Austrian Academy of Sciences. He has been a visiting fellow at the Universities of Nice and Bern, at Stanford University, and at the Russian Academy of Sciences. His books include Die sowjetische Besatzung in Österreich 1945–1955 (2005); A Good Example of Peaceful Coexistence? The Soviet Union, Austria, and Neutrality, 1955–1991 (2011); The Revolutions of 1989 (ed. with A. Suppan and M. Gehler 2014); and A Cold War over Austria (with G. Stourzh 2018).

Anna Grzymała-Busse
Anna Grzymała-Busse
Wolfgang Mueller, University of Vienna
Seminars
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Thomas Olechowski
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Thomas Olechowski, The Europe Center's Distinguished Visiting Austrian Chair, discusses the Austrian-born legal scholar Hans Kelsen, who emigrated to the USA in 1940.

Hans Kelsen (1881-1973), Austria's ‘Founding Constitutional Father’, is still regarded as one of the world's most important legal scholars of the 20th century. His works have been translated into more than 30 languages. Kelsen was one of the most outspoken defenders of democracy and was therefore one of the first professors in Germany to lose his chair in 1933.

In 1940, Kelsen emigrated to the USA and taught first at Harvard and then at Berkeley, where he remained until the end of his life. However, it was here of all places that his teachings on legal theory met with rejection - in stark contrast to Latin America, where they still find enthusiastic supporters today.


Thomas Olechowski holds a chair for Austrian and European Legal History at the University of Vienna, and is managing director of the "Hans Kelsen-Institute", a foundation of the Austrian federal government. In 2020, he wrote a comprehensive biography on Hans Kelsen. In 2025, Olechowski holds the Distinguished Visiting Austrian Chair at The Europe Center at Stanford University.

Anna Grzymała-Busse
Anna Grzymała-Busse
Thomas Olechowski, University of Vienna
Seminars
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Jan P. Vogler
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When do imperialism and authoritarianism have long-term political effects? Jan Vogler presents a theoretical framework to answer this question.

The suppression of local self-government is a common feature of imperial rule and centralized authoritarianism. Extant scholarship considers such interventions to be potentially legacy-producing. But under which circumstances do these denials of political autonomy lead to sustained changes in political behavior? We develop a novel framework that elucidates when suppression of local self-rule will or will not produce political legacies. Two factors are crucial: the duration of an intervention and the scope of repression. Enduring interventions characterized by encompassing repression are the most likely to generate persistent changes. Contrariwise, transient episodes characterized by limited repressiveness are unlikely to produce legacies. 

Given our theory's broad character, we conduct empirical analyses in two markedly different settings: Poland, which was split between three major empires, and Brazil, where a military regime installed appointed mayors in certain cities. Our results demonstrate that the suppression of local self-government has varying potential to create legacies.


Jan Vogler is an Associate Professor of Political Science at Aarhus University. He previously held a position as an Assistant Professor of Quantitative Social Science at the University of Konstanz. His research covers a wide range of topics, including the organization of public bureaucracies, various forms of political and economic competition (in domestic and international settings), historical legacies, structures and perceptions of the EU, and the determinants of democracy and authoritarianism.

Anna Grzymała-Busse
Anna Grzymała-Busse
Jan P. Vogler, Aarhus University
Seminars
Date Label
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charlotte cavaille
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Despite its early experiment with manhood suffrage, France was among the last countries in Europe to extend voting rights to women. This talk offers a new parsimonious explanation of French exceptionalism, one that highlights how World War I and its massive death toll contributed to women’s exclusion from politics.

Despite its early experiment with universal manhood suffrage, France was among the last countries in Europe to extend voting rights to women. Existing accounts of this French exceptionalism point to the key role of a group of legislators, the Radicals, who blocked suffrage extension because they believed women would vote for pro-Church parties, undermining Radicals’ vote share and reversing the political victories against the Catholic Church. This account emphasizes legislators’ expected loss under new institutional rules, assuming a pro-Church bias among women. 

In contrast, we emphasize legislators’ expected loss absent a change to the institutional status quo. Doing so highlights the connection between support for women’s suffrage and support for proportional representation, especially among legislators facing electoral loss under existing electoral rules. Not only does our argument better explain legislators’ voting patterns in both the upper and lower chambers, it also highlights how World War I and its massive death toll contributed to women’s exclusion from politics.


Charlotte Cavaille is an assistant professor of public policy at the University of Michigan Gerald R. Ford School of Public Policy. Charlotte’s research examines the dynamics of attitudes towards redistributive social policies at a time of rising inequality, fiscal stress, and high levels of immigration. Building on that work, Charlotte also studies the relationship between immigration, the welfare state, and the rise of populism in Western Europe.

Anna Grzymała-Busse
Anna Grzymała-Busse
Charlotte Cavaille, University of Michigan
Seminars
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