Can indigenous communities ruling through politically autonomous institutions better protect against cartel takeover? In a CDDRL seminar series talk, Beatriz Magaloni, the Graham H. Stuart Professor of International Relations, a Senior Fellow at Stanford’s Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, and Director of CDDRL’s Poverty, Violence, and Governance Lab argued that in Mexico, indigenous communities ruled by traditional governance have proven more resilient against cartel takeovers than comparable municipalities relying on state-backed security provision. 

Existing literature typically frames violence in developing countries as a manifestation of state weakness. But, in many areas of the world, organized criminal groups infiltrate the state, buying off intelligence, protection, and impunity. 

In Mexico, cartels infiltrate local governments by funding political campaigns, killing those who refuse to be bought off. In this context, the selection of leaders through conventional Western multi-party elections is an effective vehicle through which cartels can extend their influence. 

The capture of municipal political bodies is advantageous to cartels as it allows them to diversify their revenue generation. Access to intelligence, resources, and territory makes demanding regular payments and extracting natural resources far easier. It also allows cartels to gain discretionary power in the decision of who the state grants protection to or not. This bleak reality in which the borders between the state, organized crime, rule of law, and impunity are blurred elevates the urgency of investigating to what extent “opting out” of the state represents a viable alternative in the provision of security. 

In Oaxaca and other regions across Mexico, indigenous communities have the right to govern autonomously. In their traditional form of governance, known as “usos y costumbres,” local elections and political parties are banned. Authorities are instead selected through community assemblies, in which decision-making is highly participatory. Based on this traditional governance, a growing number of indigenous communities have established community police groups, which are detached from the state and constituted by local community members with little or no professional police training. 

Importantly, autonomous indigenous municipalities still receive state transfers and cannot be punished for opting out of the party system. In conducting extensive qualitative fieldwork, Magaloni sought to understand whether this traditional governance structure prohibits cartel infiltration and keeps communities safer. 

The team hypothesized that higher levels of cartel presence would increase violence – which they proxied with homicide rates. They expected less cartel presence and less violence in Usos (autonomous indigenous communities) relative to party-controlled municipalities. Lower levels of police corruption and better deterrence against criminal cells were also expected for communities ruled by Usos. 

The initial exploratory analysis showed that following the autonomous governance reform, Usos communities experienced a sharp decrease in violence. When the drug war began in 2006, these communities continued to see low levels of violence, whereas comparable municipalities suffered a sharp increase. 

Magaloni employed a variety of difference in difference analyses to control for possible confounders. Usos communities were compared to similarly sized, similarly indigenous communities. Using a geographic discontinuity design, Usos were also compared to municipalities just 1 km from the border of Oaxaca – those ruled by multi-party elections. The analysis controlled for opium poppy suitability and history of ancestral governance practices. 

The analysis confirmed that the more cartel presence, the more violence a community experienced. Across all models, the team was able to conclude that Usos communities saw significantly less cartel presence, fewer homicides, and less violence. 

Magaloni’s work highlights the state's limitations in creating order in circumstances where criminal groups have compromised it. It also suggests that in the context of these predatory regimes, indigenous political autonomy can serve as a powerful rampart to the corrosive presence of organized crime.

From June 23 to 25, the world watched as Yevgeny Prigozhin, head of the private militia Wagner Group, ordered his fighters to  seize the military headquarters in the Russian city of Rostov-on-Don, demanded the resignation of Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu and Chief of General Staff Valeriy Gerasimov, and advanced his forces toward  Moscow.

The rebellion posed the most significant threat to President Vladimir Putin’s power in his 23-year tenure as Russia’s leader. While the mutiny was abruptly called off following a deal brokered by Belarusian president Aleksandr Lukashenko, the effects continue to reverberate throughout Russia, Eastern Europe, and beyond.

Much is still unknown about the mutiny, Prigozhin’s exile in Belarus, and internal disputes within the Kremlin. But long-time Putin watchers and Russia experts agree that the events of the weekend have significantly weakened Putin’s image as an authoritarian strongman and sole commander of Russia.  

Below, scholars from the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies offer their analysis of how the mutiny may impact Russia, Putin’s power, and the war in Ukraine.

Ongoing Problems for Putin

Kathryn Stoner

Writing in Journal of Democracy, Kathryn Stoner, the Mosbacher DIrector of the Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law, explains how the rebellion is both a symptom and cause of Putin’s instability as a leader:

“Putin’s rule relies on individual loyalties rather than institutionalized, transparent chains of command and responsibility. This allows him to retain unrivaled control over a hierarchy of patron-client relationships and to change policies quickly before any real internal elite opposition can coalesce. But the result of such a system is that it operates at the mercy of shifting loyalties and is therefore inherently fragile. The Prigozhin rebellion, therefore, is a symptom of this latent instability within Putinism.”

Stoner, who has written previously about the conditions that lead to regime changes in autocracies, offered her insights in The Atlantic on how Putin might try to recoup from the embarrassment caused by the rebellion:  

“What does all of this tell us about what might now be going on in Russia and how Putin might pursue the war in Ukraine going forward? While to us Putin may look weak and ineffective, he will undoubtedly use his control over the Russian media to pin the rebellion on Ukraine, NATO, and Russia’s other enemies. He may even take credit for avoiding mass casualties in a civil war by making a deal with Prigozhin. Spinning the story as best he can, Putin himself will survive, although his carefully crafted myth of competence will be damaged. Over time, this might erode elite confidence, although it is unlikely to result in an open coup attempt anytime soon.”

Stoner believes that there is “much still to learn about all that has transpired,” but that one thing is certain: Putin’s ill-considered war in Ukraine has weakened his grip on Russia.

“Although this is not the end of the war or of Putin,” she says, “the Wagner rebellion might yet prove the beginning of the end of both.”

The Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law at Stanford University is proud to join Freedom House and a coalition of nearly 500 experts, organizations, dignitaries, and heads of state calling on the international community to strengthen its support for Iranian pro-democracy protesters.

A joint statement on the Freedom House website reads as follows:

Iranians have taken to the streets in rebellion.  The vanguard are young women, but they have been joined by men and people of all ages.  With breathtaking courage and unarmed, they have kept coming, even as the regime has shot, hanged, tortured, blinded, raped, beaten, and arrested many thousands. 

The spark was mandatory hijab, but the target of the uprising is the whole theocratic system.  Their slogan is Woman, Life, Freedom.  The goal they chant is “Azadi, Azadi, A-za-di,” meaning “Freedom, Freedom, Freedom.” 

Their victory would mean deliverance from a regime that denies free elections, free speech, due process of law, and personal autonomy in matters as simple as the choice of clothing. 

Victory would mean even more than that.  The end of the Islamic Republic’s system of misogyny would constitute a global landmark in the long march toward a world in which women are treated equally. 

The triumph of freedom in Iran could renew the global tide of democratization that was so strong in the latter twentieth century but has ebbed in the face of authoritarian counterattack. 

The Azadi movement addresses no demands to the regime, which it regards as fundamentally illegitimate and beyond reform.  The protestors chant “down with” it.  They want theocracy and dictatorship replaced by freedom and democracy.  They proclaim a “revolution.” 

They deserve unstinting support from freedom-loving people around the world: 

• Governments, civic associations, and individuals should speak loudly and often in support of the protestors and in condemnation of the regime’s repressive actions.  Legislators and others should “adopt” individual arrestees, especially those facing execution, and spotlight their plight. 
• Governments should take diplomatic, economic, and symbolic measures to punish the regime and bolster the protestors. All officials involved in the repressions, from Supreme Leader Khamenei down to local Basij commanders, should be sanctioned. The Revolutionary Guard (IRGC) should be added to terrorism lists. 
• High level officials of democratic governments should receive leaders of the opposition, in publicly-announced meetings. 
• Accurate, reliable, fact-based reporting via international radio, television, and social media reaching Iran should be enhanced, as should assistance to private Iranian exile broadcasting. 
• Technical assistance, including equipment, should be given to help the demonstrators counteract censorship and surveillance and to communicate despite the regime’s disruption of Internet service and blocking of websites. 
•  Labor unions, governments, and others in the international community should express solidarity with Iranian workers, should share the experiences of other labor struggles for worker rights and democracy, and should also seek ways to provide practical assistance, such as VPNs, other means of communication, and contributions to strike funds if safe and effective channels can be found.

We pledge to do all in our power to support the Iranian struggle for Azadi and call upon all people of good will everywhere to join us.

Additional signatories as of publishing this article include CDDRL faculty (Kathryn Stoner, Abbas Milani, Michael McFaul, Francis Fukuyama, and Larry Diamond), visitors (Sheri Berman), and practitioner program alumni (Laura Alonso, Nino Evgenidze, Nino Zambakhidze, Agon Maliqi, Andrea Ngombet, Oleksandra Medviichuk, and Saeid Golkar), among the hundreds of others.

We encourage you to read the full statement and sign the petition for yourself.