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Alan Isenberg
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Earlier this month, the so-called EU Three--Britain, France and Germany-- achieved an important victory for global security, convincing Iran to suspend its uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing activities pending further negotiation on its nuclear question. Though Iran claims that it does not desire a nuclear bomb, the West has long been skeptical of the oil-rich state's contention that it seeks a nuclear fuel cycle for energy purposes alone. Europe and the United States (and of course Israel) will sleep better knowing that Tehran is not pursuing enrichment activities, whatever their alleged purpose.

But the EU3 agreement, which fails to discuss consequences for Iran if it breaks the deal, is vulnerable to being undermined not only by Iran but also by the United States; both have already raised eyebrows in the wake of the accord. Iran raced to produce uranium hexafluoride, a gas that can be enriched into bomb fuel, before it began to observe the temporary suspension on Monday. And both President George W. Bush and outgoing Secretary of State Colin Powell have publicly aired their suspicions that Iran will continue its drive for nuclear weapons under cover of the deal.

At the moment, administration hawks are pressing to confront the mullahs at the United Nations Security Council, where economic sanctions could be considered; calls for using force and for regime change are likely to follow.

Military action is inadvisable at this point, because of a dearth of solid intelligence and the secretive, geographically diffuse nature of Iran's nuclear sites. If the issue reaches the Security Council with the United States and Europe continuing along divergent paths, the inevitable deadlock will deal a severe and lasting blow to international security. Therefore, the agreement must be fortified to keep the Iranians honest, the Europeans effectively engaged and the U.S. hawks bridled.

This can be achieved through a U.S.-European accord laying out trigger mechanisms for specified consequences if Iran violates certain benchmarks. For example, if Iran fails to allow inspectors the access accorded by the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty's additional protocol--which Iran is provisionally observing pending ratification--or resumes enrichment and centrifuge-building activities, it could face severe economic sanctions, censure by the Security Council (necessitating cooperation from Russia and China), or in the event of hostility, a forceful response.

We don't know yet whether Tehran will play by the rules. The regime has mastered the art of behaving badly and then seeking rewards for getting back into line. To date, the Europeans have played into its hands, offering carrots for compliance without wielding sticks to punish violations.

Therefore, the Bush administration's apparent comfort with a military option can serve as an important deterrent against Iranian cheating, arming the EU3 agreement with teeth that it would not otherwise have. Iran desires economic incentives but does not yet desperately need them; without a credible threat of U.S.-backed sanctions imposed by the international community, the mullahs can simply decide one day that the restrictions have ceased to be worth their while, and break any deal as though it were merely a business contract.

For the United States, accepting the EU3's carrot-based approach (provided the benchmarks are added) will show the world that it still supports negotiated diplomacy and multilateralism, even in cases where military threats loom. Participating in this framework will also send a message to Iran that the United States is not ruling out renewed relations. This would resonate with the largely pro-American Iranian populace, who despise their regime and are seeking inroads to break free of it.

But if the United States instead presents itself as a unilateralist maverick, it will hinder its own interests; the only thing Iranians disdain more than the mullahs is outside meddling with their deeply nationalistic desire for self-determination. The more overtly hostile the United States acts toward Iran, the more the mullahs are able to spin America's posture to alienate Iranians against the "Great Satan."

The way to keep the Iranian regime in check while speeding its demise is to insure the nuclear agreement through benchmarks and triggers, and then give the mullahs exactly what they ask for in terms of increased access to international institutions like the World Trade Organization.

Such carrots can also be Trojan Horses, allowing the forces of democratic reform within Iran to blossom by enabling pro-democracy elements to make global connections. The U.S. and Europe should saddle up those horses together.

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Nuclear weapons states must move to disarm, and nations must join in multilateral approaches to prevent further nuclear proliferation, said Mohamed ElBaradei, head of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), at CISAC's Drell Lecture on Nov. 4.

Nuclear weapons states must move to disarm, and nations must join in multilateral approaches to prevent further nuclear proliferation, said Mohamed ElBaradei, head of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), at CISAC's Drell Lecture on Nov. 4.

"If we are ever to build a global security culture based on human solidarity and shared human values -- a collective security framework that will serve the interests of all countries equally, and make reliance on nuclear weapons obsolete -- the time is now," ElBaradei said. Drawing lessons from Iraq and other recent experiences with IAEA nuclear weapons inspections, ElBaradei called upon politicians, scientists and society to join in international collective actions toward nuclear disarmament.

ElBaradei's lecture was covered by Reuters, the Stanford Daily: U.N. expert cites nuclear danger, the San Jose Mercury News and other news media.

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With nuclear weapons, there is no effective defense. As a result, unless or until universal disarmament can be achieved, arming to prevent war can only mean nuclear deterrence. The US and the Soviet Union overdid deterrence by a large factor in my estimation, but the general view is that it seemed to work in that particular situation. The key assumption of nuclear deterrence is that the prospect of a single weapon dropped on a single city makes any war of conquest unattractive. Equally important is that the inevitable devastation was obvious to all ahead of time, so that the usual demagogic arguments for war failed and for the most part were not made.

No one pretends that what I have just said about nuclear deterrence is the whole story. For one thing, there are many traps and dangers in the actual practice of nuclear deterrence. What is to be done, for instance, about challenges that don't directly involve the risk of nuclear war but might do so down the line? There were plenty of such challenges during the Cold War, in Korea, in Berlin, in Cuba, and in Israel.

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The nuclear programs of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), Iran, and Pakistan provide the most visible manifestations of three broad and interrelated challenges to the nuclear nonproliferation regime. The first is so-called latent proliferation, in which a country adheres to, or at least for some time maintains a façade of adhering to, its formal obligations under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) while nevertheless developing the capabilities needed for a nuclear weapons program. That country can then either withdraw from the NPT and build actual weapons on short notice, or simply stay within the NPT while maintaining the latent capability for the rapid realization of nuclear weapons as a hedge against future threats. This was the path followed by the DPRK with its plutonium program and one that is likely being followed by Iran and more subtly by others. The second broad challenge is first-tier nuclear proliferation, in which technology or material sold or stolen from private companies or state nuclear programs assists nonnuclear weapons states in developing illegal nuclear weapons programs and delivery systems. The third challenge--the focus of this article--is second-tier nuclear proliferation, in which states in the developing world with varying technical capabilities trade among themselves to bolster one another's nuclear and strategic weapons efforts.

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This article grew out of a week-long study in August 2002 to assist ongoing efforts inside and outside the government to remedy some vulnerabilities of the international shipping system on which US and a great deal of world prosperity depend. The study's objective was to identify the most important research initiatives and the major policy issues that need to be addressed in order to improve security of imports using shipping containers, particularly against the importation of nuclear materials and weapons, while maintaining an open trading system. To be effective, a system to detect nuclear weapons or special nuclear material before they reach U.S. ports must be international in scope and reach. It must also be economically acceptable both in terms of total cost and with respect to how these costs are allocated; degrade gracefully when subjected to attack; produce actionable intelligence in a timely manner; treat false alarms realistically; be adaptable to a variety of local physical and political conditions; be auditable, secure yet accessible to the needed foreign and domestic security agencies, and have clear lines of oversight and responsibility. Finally, the system should be flexible enough to allow for regular updates as users and operators gain experience and system performance is reviewed. This study identified a sample technical approach that is feasible technically and operationally and involves components already in the early deployment stage. The approach involves container certification; monitoring at ports of embarkation, debarkation, and continuously during shipment and storage; and continuous data fusion. Specific recommendations regarding system characteristics made by the study include rigorous testing during deployment and in the field, international coordination of standards and protocols, careful analysis of the system for compatibility with pertinent governmental policies and business and labor agreements, and early provision for forward-looking research and development.

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Tonya Putnam
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Mohamed ElBaradei, director-general of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), will deliver the annual Drell Lecture, presented by the Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC), 4 p.m. Thurs., Nov. 4, 2004, in Stanford University's Kresge Auditorium. His lecture, "Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Arms Control: The Road Ahead," is free and open to the public.

As head of the IAEA, ElBaradei oversees international inspections enforcing provisions of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and related arms control agreements. Prior to the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in spring 2003, ElBaradei and Hans Blix, former chief of U.N. Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC), the IAEA group charged with carrying out U.N. Security Council-mandated inspections in Iraq, reported progress with the inspections. As IAEA inspectors evacuated from Iraq on March 19, 2003, ElBaradei continued to urge completion of the U.N. Security Council inspection process.

More recently, IAEA reprimands of Iran have made headlines, with the agency's board of governors scheduled to revisit Iran's compliance with NPT provisions shortly after ElBaradei's visit to Stanford. On Sept. 13, 2004, the IAEA issued a deadline of Nov. 25 for Iran to report fully on its nuclear program. For more than a year, the U.S. has advocated referral of Iran's case to the U.N. Security Council, after inspections revealed evidence of covert Iranian nuclear research.

Before assuming the IAEA's top job on Dec. 1, 1997, ElBaradei held a number of high-level policy positions, including that of IAEA legal adviser. A diplomat and scholar, ElBaradei works closely with international organizations, particularly in the fields of peace, security and law.

CISAC's Drell Lecture traditionally addresses a critical national or international security issue that has important scientific or technical dimensions. The lecture is named for Sidney Drell, CISAC's founding science co-director. Albert and Cicely Wheelon generously endowed the lectureship.

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Report of the South Asia and the Nuclear Future workshop hosted on June 4 and 5, 2004, by the Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC) at Stanford University, to address question of nuclear weapons and stability in South Asia. The workshop, which brought together approximately 75 scholars, military officers, civilian policy-makers, scientists, and journalists, was co-sponsored by CISAC and the U.S. Army War College.

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In an address at the recent CISAC-sponsored Conference on South Asia and the Nuclear Future, held June 4-5 at Stanford, New York Times reporter David Sanger discussed the nuclear trading network of Abdul Qadeer Khan, which exported nuclear weapons and weapons components to some of the world's aspiring nuclear powers. Sanger's talk, "U.S. Responses to the A.Q. Khan Network," was based on a series of articles previously published in the Times, which resulted from his in-depth research and reporting in collaboration with other Times reporters.

In his talk, Sanger discussed how the Khan network began and how it worked; how it has made clear the limitations of the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty; how it has raised serious questions about the quality of intelligence about nuclear proliferation; and how it has forced a fundamental rethinking of the nuclear danger posed to the world.

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The Conference on South Asia and the Nuclear Future was co-sponsored by CISAC and the U.S. Army War College. It highlighted some of the top academic and policy-relevant scholarship on the prospects for peace and proliferation in India and Pakistan. The conference was also intended to encourage deeper interaction between policy makers, advisers and scholars working on regional and global security issues.

The five panels at the conference focused on understanding current and future developments in the nuclear programs, plans, and problems in India and Pakistan and how such developments might interact with broader global trends in nuclear nonproliferation regime. Papers were presented by leading international scholars and critiqued by scholars and policy makers. Selected papers will be revised for publication by a major university press, in a volume to be edited by Scott Sagan and Sumit Ganguly of Indiana University.

Bechtel Conference Center

Mitchell B. Reiss Director of Policy Planning Keynote Speaker U.S. Department of State
Rakesh Sood Deputy Chief of Mission Keynote Speaker India's Embassy to the United States
David Sanger reporter Panelist New York Times
Christopher F. Chyba Panelist

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Stanford University
Encina Hall, E202
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The Caroline S.G. Munro Professor of Political Science
The Bass University Fellow in Undergraduate Education  
Senior Fellow, Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies
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Scott D. Sagan is Co-Director and Senior Fellow at the Center for International Security and Cooperation, the Caroline S.G. Munro Professor of Political Science, and the Bass University Fellow in Undergraduate Education at Stanford University. He also serves as Co-Chair of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences’ Committee on International Security Studies. Before joining the Stanford faculty, Sagan was a lecturer in the Department of Government at Harvard University and served as special assistant to the director of the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the Pentagon.

Sagan is the author of Moving Targets: Nuclear Strategy and National Security (Princeton University Press, 1989); The Limits of Safety: Organizations, Accidents, and Nuclear Weapons (Princeton University Press, 1993); and, with co-author Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: An Enduring Debate (W.W. Norton, 2012). He is the co-editor of Insider Threats (Cornell University Press, 2017) with Matthew Bunn; and co-editor of The Fragile Balance of Terror (Cornell University Press, 2022) with Vipin Narang. Sagan was also the guest editor of a two-volume special issue of DaedalusEthics, Technology, and War (Fall 2016) and The Changing Rules of War (Winter 2017).

Recent publications include “Creeds and Contestation: How US Nuclear and Legal Doctrine Influence Each Other,” with Janina Dill, in a special issue of Security Studies (December 2025); “Kettles of Hawks: Public Opinion on the Nuclear Taboo and Noncombatant Immunity in the United States, United Kingdom, France, and Israel”, with Janina Dill and Benjamin A. Valentino in Security Studies (February 2022); “The Rule of Law and the Role of Strategy in U.S. Nuclear Doctrine” with Allen S. Weiner in International Security (Spring 2021); “Does the Noncombatant Immunity Norm Have Stopping Power?” with Benjamin A. Valentino in International Security (Fall 2020); and “Just War and Unjust Soldiers: American Public Opinion on the Moral Equality of Combatants” and “On Reciprocity, Revenge, and Replication: A Rejoinder to Walzer, McMahan, and Keohane” with Benjamin A. Valentino in Ethics & International Affairs (Winter 2019).

In 2022, Sagan was awarded Thérèse Delpech Memorial Award from the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace at their International Nuclear Policy Conference. In 2017, he received the International Studies Association’s Susan Strange Award which recognizes the scholar whose “singular intellect, assertiveness, and insight most challenge conventional wisdom and intellectual and organizational complacency" in the international studies community. Sagan was also the recipient of the National Academy of Sciences William and Katherine Estes Award in 2015, for his work addressing the risks of nuclear weapons and the causes of nuclear proliferation. The award, which is granted triennially, recognizes “research in any field of cognitive or behavioral science that advances understanding of issues relating to the risk of nuclear war.” In 2013, Sagan received the International Studies Association's International Security Studies Section Distinguished Scholar Award. He has also won four teaching awards: Stanford’s 1998-99 Dean’s Award for Distinguished Teaching; Stanford's 1996 Hoagland Prize for Undergraduate Teaching; the International Studies Association’s 2008 Innovative Teaching Award; and the Monterey Institute for International Studies’ Nonproliferation Education Award in 2009.     

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Lynn Eden is a Senior Research Scholar Emeritus. She was a Senior Research Scholar at Stanford University's Center for International Security and Cooperation until January 2016, as well as was Associate Director for Research. Eden received her Ph.D. in sociology from the University of Michigan, held several pre- and post-doctoral fellowships, and taught in the history department at Carnegie Mellon before coming to Stanford.

In the area of international security, Eden has focused on U.S. foreign and military policy, arms control, the social construction of science and technology, and organizational issues regarding nuclear policy and homeland security. She co-edited, with Steven E. Miller, Nuclear Arguments: Understanding the Strategic Nuclear Arms and Arms Control Debates (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1989). She was an editor of The Oxford Companion to American Military History (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), which takes a social and cultural perspective on war and peace in U.S. history. That volume was chosen as a Main Selection of the History Book Club.

Eden's book Whole World on Fire: Organizations, Knowledge, and Nuclear Weapons Devastation (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004; New Delhi: Manas Publications, 2004) explores how and why the U.S. government--from World War II to the present--has greatly underestimated the damage caused by nuclear weapons by failing to predict damage from firestorms. It shows how well-funded and highly professional organizations, by focusing on what they do well and systematically excluding what they don't, may build a poor representation of the world--a self-reinforcing fallacy that can have serious consequences, from the sinking of the Titanic to not predicting the vulnerability of the World Trade Center to burning jet fuel. Whole World on Fire won the American Sociological Association's 2004 Robert K. Merton Award for best book in science, knowledge, and technology.

Eden has also written on life in small-town America. Her first book, Crisis in Watertown (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1972), was her college senior thesis; it was a finalist for a National Book Award in 1973. Her second book, Witness in Philadelphia, with Florence Mars (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1977), about the murders of civil rights workers Schwerner, Chaney, and Goodman in the summer of 1964, was a Book of the Month Club Alternate Selection.

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FSI Senior Fellow Emeritus and Director-Emeritus, Shorenstein APARC
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Henry S. Rowen was a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution, a professor of public policy and management emeritus at Stanford University's Graduate School of Business, and a senior fellow emeritus of the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (Shorenstein APARC). Rowen was an expert on international security, economic development, and high tech industries in the United States and Asia. His most current research focused on the rise of Asia in high technologies.

In 2004 and 2005, Rowen served on the Presidential Commission on the Intelligence of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction. From 2001 to 2004, he served on the Secretary of Defense Policy Advisory Board. Rowen was assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs in the U.S. Department of Defense from 1989 to 1991. He was also chairman of the National Intelligence Council from 1981 to 1983. Rowen served as president of the RAND Corporation from 1967 to 1972, and was assistant director of the U.S. Bureau of the Budget from 1965 to 1966.

Rowen most recently co-edited Greater China's Quest for Innovation (Shorenstein APARC, 2008). He also co-edited Making IT: The Rise of Asia in High Tech (Stanford University Press, 2006) and The Silicon Valley Edge: A Habitat for Innovation and Entrepreneurship (2000). Rowen's other books include Prospects for Peace in South Asia (edited with Rafiq Dossani) and Behind East Asian Growth: The Political and Social Foundations of Prosperity (1998). Among his articles are "The Short March: China's Road to Democracy," in National Interest (1996); "Inchon in the Desert: My Rejected Plan," in National Interest (1995); and "The Tide underneath the 'Third Wave,'" in Journal of Democracy (1995).

Born in Boston in 1925, Rowen earned a bachelors degree in industrial management from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in 1949 and a masters in economics from Oxford University in 1955.

Faculty Co-director Emeritus, SPRIE
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Those advocating nuclear arms control and nonproliferation have few reasons for optimism and many reasons for concern, with obstacles including a lack of public interest in the issue; inadequate security controls at facilities storing nuclear-weapons materials; the threat posed by rogue nations such as Iran and North Korea; and the Bush administration's opposition to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty banning nuclear weapons testing.

These and other challenges were explored at a special CISAC workshop on "Arms Control and Nonproliferation: Past Triumphs, Future Prospects," held June 1 at SIIS. The event honored George Bunn -- a nuclear nonproliferation pioneer and consulting professor at CISAC -- on the occasion of his 79th birthday. The workshop, which drew more than 120 attendees, was moderated by CISAC co-director Christopher F. Chyba and featured presentations by four expert panelists who have worked closely with Bunn. They included his son Matthew, a senior research associate for Harvard University's Project on Managing the Atom.

As the first presenter, Matthew Bunn discussed the problem of inadequate security systems to prevent the theft of weapons-grade nuclear materials. Because there are no worldwide standards for protecting such materials, many nations devote inadequate resources to the task. Bunn showed slides of nuclear materials storage facilities with primitive locks, flimsy seals and broken-down fences. He cited Russia as the largest threat, because it has the world's biggest stock of unguarded nuclear-weapons materials. He urged international standards for safeguarding nuclear materials; renewed discussion with Russia on the issue; and the removal of nuclear material from sites where adequate security is not feasible.

In the second presentation, Thomas Graham -- a senior U.S. diplomat who has negotiated numerous major arms-control agreements -- said the nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty was not meant to forever discriminate between nuclear "haves" and "have-nots." Instead, it was designed so that those without nuclear weapons would benefit by receiving peaceful nuclear technology from weapons-producing nations, and guarantees that they would not be attacked. But when the United States shirks its nonproliferation obligations -- as it has done by rejecting the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and taking steps to develop new nuclear weapons -- the entire regime is threatened, Graham said. He cited Pakistan and North Korea as the biggest nuclear threats, and said the United States must engage in direct negotiations with the latter.

The next presentation, by Daryl Kimball -- executive director of the Arms Control Association -- addressed prospects for the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Though the treaty has been signed by 171 nations including the United States, it has been ratified by only 113 of those nations -- not including the United States -- and must be ratified by 12 more of the 44 designated "nuclear-capable" nations before the treaty can take effect. Kimball discussed the Bush administration's opposition to the treaty, noting that Bush has sought to remove it from the Senate's agenda. Still, Kimball said he's optimistic that the treaty will ultimately be ratified by the United States and will take effect. He cited increasing international pressure on CTBT "holdout states," and a recent U.S. poll showing that public support for the treaty is at its highest level ever, 87 percent.

John Rhinelander, an attorney who helped negotiate the ABM Treaty and SALT I agreements, discussed the prospects for nuclear weapons in space. The weaponization of space is supported by the Bush administration, he noted, and is a real possibility if the United States follows through on its missile defense program. He predicted that President Bush, if re-elected, would continue to pursue weapons development in space, but said Kerry seemed unlikely to do so if elected.

During a question-and-answer session following the presentations, the panelists offered perspectives on why it is so difficult to get the public's and lawmakers' attention on nuclear non-proliferation issues. The panelists agreed that since the breakup of the Soviet Union, most Americans -- including lawmakers -- no longer perceive nuclear weapons as a serious threat, and they have little knowledge about the existing quantity of nuclear weapons. Matthew Bunn said the problem is, "there is no one whose reelection depends on reducing or securing nuclear weapons." He said nuclear non-proliferation could best be promoted by tying it to the issues of terrorism and homeland security. Rhinelander and Grahm advocated holding Congressional hearings on the issue for the first time in 20 years.

Regarding Israel, India and Pakistan, Graham said those nations -- which produce nuclear weapons but have refused to join the NPT regime -- cannot continue to remain outside the regime. He proposed that the three nations be allowed to join in limited form, in exchange for accepting basic limitations such as no first use and no nuclear testing.

Throughout the event, Bunn was praised by the panelists and moderator; Chyba described him as "the personification of the best that CISAC strives to be." Bunn was the first general counsel for the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, helped negotiate the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and later served as U.S. ambassador to the Geneva Disarmament Conference.

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