The talk will highlight the economic and social development of India and Pakistan and how this has been affected by the high level of military expenditures. It will trace the likely consequences of the emergence of a nuclear race on the two economies arising both from the short-run impact of economic sanctions and the costs in the long-run of increased sophistication of military technology. Before becoming the managing director of the SPDC in Pakistan, Dr. Hafiz Pasha was Advisor to the Prime Minister on Finance and Economic Affairs and Deputy Chairman of the Planning Commission, with status of federal minister. Earlier, he was Vice Chancellor of the University of Karachi, Dean and Director of the Institute of Business Administration, Karachi, and Professor and Director of the Applied Economics Research Centre, University of Karachi. Dr. Pasha's publications cover the fields of public finance, urban and regional economics and economics of social sectors. He has been involved with high-level policy making in Pakistan and has taken on numerous research assignments for international bilateral and multilateral agencies.

Like a double-edged sword, the recent conflict in East Timor challenged Indonesia and the international community alike. For Indonesia, the crisis and its resolution offered a chance for military reform, yet threatened national unity. For international donors, the chance to defend human rights and implement self-determination carried a risk of provoking nationalist resentment against foreign intervention for democratic change.This talk will focus on the international community and its donor countries and agencies. How did they react to the conflict in East Timor? What were their strategies? How did their actions affect Indonesia -- not only its East Timor policies but also the course of its own democratic transition? Looking back on them now, do the crisis and its outcome lessons for the feasibility of foreign intervention to achieve domestic political reform? If so, what are they? If not, why not? And what do the answers to these questions imply for the democratic prospect in developing countries more generally?

In 1975Ð76 the fall of Saigon was followed by national reunification and the establishment of the Socialist Republic. Access to the Mekong Delta was widely expected to facilitate rapid neo-Stalinist industrialization and the appearance of a powerful military threat to capitalist SEA. But this did not happen. By 1981 partial reforms had permitted all state enterprises to operate in markets and some degree of agricultural decollectivisation. In the second half of the 1980s there was a clear de-Stalinization of everyday life. And by 1989Ð90 a recognizable market economy had emerged. Since then the Vietnamese Communist Party has, with some success, negotiated a major opening-up of the country to foreign contacts. Vietnam has joined ASEAN, and has seen the emergence of land, labor, and capital markets, and the confused processes by which classes form. Fundamental economic and political change has therefore occurred. Growth has been rather fast and the use of state violence minimal. Politically, for the still-Leninist VCP, the shift from Plan to Market has been a great success. What is the political economy basis for this? Despite emergent capitalist classes and a market economy, the political economy of "post-transition" Vietnam is heavily marked by its recent history, and remains very different from other ASEAN members. Notwithstanding revolutionary change, dualities common to both the traditional and modern political economies have offered great potential for political restructuring. In this sense "development doctrines" are perhaps less exotic and more indigenous than elsewhere in SEA. This facilitates relatively harmonious political adaptation and is the key to understanding change. For example, wide rural land access, with a collective tinge in the most densely populated areas, has a strong and pervasive effect upon the macro political economy. "Voice and exit" are enhanced. Thus we see rather high levels of migration, and risk bearing be farmers. Rural GDP has grown fast through the 1990s. Also, real wages in urban areas tend to be higher and the labor regime less brittle. What are the political implications of such a land regime? At the end of the day, one reason for the lack of extensive state violence against the population seems to be that the party/state has sufficient sources of support and power for tense economic issues in the rural areas to be fought out without property rights needing violence to enforce them. These issues are fought out locally (within cooperatives and communes) and in macro contexts (access to world markets). But in the rural areas the state does not, apparently, need to support particular economic interests for its survival. One reason for this is that the "land issue" has been addressed through the adaptation of socialist models, so that large-scale land property is not (yet?) a major issue. Dominant groups in the rural areas do not depend upon land access for their incomes. Adam Fforde is a development economist. He holds an Oxford MA (Engineering Science and Economics), a London MSc (Economics) and a Cambridge PhD (Economics). He studied Vietnamese in Hanoi during 1978/79 and was a visiting scholar at the National Economics University (Hanoi) in 1985Ð86. He lived in Vietnam from 1987 to 1992 while working as an advisor to the Swedish aid program, and in Australia from 1992 to 1999, where he was a visiting fellow at the ANU and Chairman of Aduki Pty Ltd (Consultants). He is now senior fellow at the SEA Studies Programme, National University of Singapore. He has published on topics including the economic development of north Vietnam prior to 1975, agricultural cooperatives, and the transition from plan to market. He is currently working on class formation and the emergence of factor markets in the 1990s, industrial reform since the early 1960s, and Vietnamese development doctrine.

Resulting in part from the end of the Cold War, the study of international security has been infused with innovative approaches to international history and organizational theory. The MacArthur Consortium workshop brings together participants primarily from three scholarly communities: political scientists and sociologists who have studied organizational issues in security-related problems; historians, particularly those interested in international, diplomatic, and military history; and organizational theorists concerned with institutional origins, evolution, and learning. Our goal is to review recent innovative scholarship in these fields and to develop an inter- and multidisciplinary research agenda that will be of interest to scholars in all three communities. The workshop encourages political scientists to take the historical dimension of their work more seriously, enrich the study of international history by exploring problems that might be studied using insights from organizational theory, and encourage organizational theorists to think about and investigate international security problems. Anthropologists and others interested in international organizations or organizations that can have an impact on the outbreak of deadly conflict or its resolution are also very welcome. The workshop draws on recently completed work or work in progress. Discussion focuses on the problems being investigated, the arguments being made, the broader class of problems being addressed, new questions being raised, and research issues among various disciplines.

John Wilson Lewis, William Haas Professor Emeritus of Chinese Politics at Stanford University, is one the founders of the field of contemporary China studies. After receiving a doctorate from UCLA, he taught at Cornell University before coming to Stanford in 1968. He founded and directed Stanford's Center for East Asian Studies, as well as the Center for International Security and Arms Control, and the Northeast Asia-United States Forum on International Policy (now Shorenstein APARC). He currently directs the Project on Peace and Cooperation in the Asian-Pacific Region. Professor Lewis has written widely about China, Asia, and security matters. Many of his works have long been required reading for students of Chinese politics, especially his still often cited Leadership in Communist China. His edited volumes include: The City in Communist China, Party Leadership and Revolutionary Power in China, Peasant Rebellion and Communist Revolution in Asia, and Next Steps in the Creation of an Accidental Nuclear War Prevention Center. His history of the Chinese nuclear weapons program, China Builds the Bomb, written with Xue Litai, is published both in English (by Stanford University Press), and, in Chinese, by the Atomic Energy Press in Beijing. He has also co-authored Uncertain Partners: Stalin, Mao, and the Korean War and China's Strategic Seapower: The Politics of Force Modernization in the Nuclear Age. In addition to his work at Stanford, John Lewis has served on the Committee on International Security and Arms Control of the National Academy of Sciences, the Joint Committee on Contemporary China of the Social Science Research Council, and the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations. He has been a consultant to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Los Alamos National Laboratory, and the Department of Defense, and is currently a consultant to Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory and the Office of Technology Assessment, U.S. Congress. He has made numerous visits to the People's Republic of China (PRC), Japan, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, and the Soviet Union/Russian Federation.