First paragraph of the book chapter:

How quickly could individual governments, starting from different levels of nuclear-related expertise and technology, develop a nuclear weapon if they chose to do so? This question—which I will call the “nuclear latency” question—is both exceedingly important and poorly understood. It is important because an accurate understanding of both underlying state capabilities and the time needed to utilize such capabilities is necessary to analyze a wide set of nuclear policy issues: for example, dealing with the Iran nuclear crisis (how quickly could Tehran make a weapon from its stockpile of low–enriched uranium?); understanding the relationship between the spread of civilian nuclear power and the spread of nuclear weapons capability (will new civilian programs make breakout to military programs easier and more likely?); evaluating potential NPT reforms (what would be the effects of lengthening the ninety-day notice in the Article X withdrawal clause?); or assessing the stability of a world without nuclear weapons (could disarmed states rearm in five days, five weeks, five months, or five years?). Despite widespread discussion of these policy issues, however, a set of mirror-image analytic failures has limited our ability to make clear predictions about nuclear latency and proliferation: Political scientists working on these subjects have often failed to examine basic technical factors regarding the nuclear fuel cycle that strongly influence how quickly states can get the bomb; the more technical literature about nuclear latency has similarly often failed to examine the political factors that strongly influence the ability of a government to develop nuclear weapons.

We examined military-related sexual trauma among deployed Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom veterans. Of 125 729 veterans who received Veterans Health Administration primary care or mental health services, 15.1% of the women and 0.7% of the men reported military sexual trauma when screened. Military sexual trauma was associated with increased odds of a mental disorder diagnosis, including posttraumatic stress disorder, other anxiety disorders, depression, and substance use disorders. Sexual trauma is an important postdeployment mental health issue in this population.

Nuclear deterrence has been a central element of American security policy since the Cold War began. The deterrence concept is straight-forward: persuade a potential adversary that the risks and costs of his proposed action far outweigh any gains that he might hope to achieve. To make deterrence credible, the United States built up powerful strategic, theater and tactical nuclear forces that could threaten any potential aggressor with the catastrophic risks and costs of a nuclear retaliatory strike against his homeland.

During the Cold War, the primary focus of this deterrent was the Soviet Union. The Soviets built their own nuclear force targeting the United States, producing a situation of mutual deterrence, often referred to as “mutual assured destruction” or MAD. Many argue that MAD worked and kept the United States and Soviet Union from an all-out war—despite the intense political, economic and ideological competition between the two—as the horrific prospect of nuclear conflict gave both strong incentives to avoid conflict. Others note that it was too often a close thing: crises, such as those over Cuba and Berlin, brought the two countries perilously close to nuclear war.

As the United States developed a post-war alliance system, the question of extended deterrence—the ability of U.S. military forces, particularly nuclear forces, to deter attack on U.S. allies and thereby reassure them—received greater attention. Extending deterrence in a credible way proved a more complicated proposition than deterring direct attack. It was entirely credible to threaten the Soviet Union with the use of nuclear weapons in response to a Soviet attack on the United States. But how could the United States make credible the threat to use nuclear weapons against the Soviet homeland in response to a Soviet attack on U.S. allies in Europe? Or, as it was often put, how could an American president credibly persuade his Soviet counterpart that he was prepared to risk Chicago for Hamburg?

Since September 11, 2001, 26 jihadist plots and attacks have targeted the American homeland, but because the details of the plots and attacks as well as the profiles of their perpetrators vary greatly, scholars, government officials, and other authorities still disagree about the seriousness of threat posed by jihadist terrorism to the United States. This study provides a clearer understanding of the nature of jihadist terrorism in the U.S. by examining all 26 plots and attacks in detail. It concludes that jihadist terrorism is generally a minimally threatening, homegrown phenomenon, but some plots and attacks still emerge that do pose a serious threat to U.S. national security.

Of the 26 plots and attacks since 9/11, seven can be considered "serious," and the emergence of these plots and attacks can best be explained by examining those using explosive devices separately from those using firearms. Regarding the first category, Western jihadists' contacts with veteran jihadist organizations (such as al-Qaeda) and access to training camps explain the ability of some to construct serious bombing plots. As for the second category, the radicalization of individuals with criminal or military experience accounts for the preparation (and even execution) of serious shooting plots. As a result, the critical point at which a would-be bomber becomes a serious threat is his initial contact with a jihadist group, whereas the critical point for a would-be shooter is his radicalization. Understanding this distinction will allow security services to have a clearer and more nuanced picture of the jihadist threat to the U.S.