Despite all of the rhetoric, it is clear from the numbers that China's ascendency has not been at the expense of the United States.

-Thomas Fingar

China unquestionably occupies a significant place in the world's U.S.-led economic and political system. Will it continue to participate in the system that it has benefited from and contributed to, adapting its policies and practices in order to do so? Or, will it attempt to overturn the current system at some point in an effort to gain global dominance? Thomas Fingar, the Oksenberg/Rohlen Distinguished Fellow at Stanford University's Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, will address these core questions in a new research project, arguing that the situation is neither so polarized, nor so simplistic. Former chairman of the National Intelligence Council, Fingar takes an empirical approach to his research, examining whether there have been recurring patterns to China's involvement in the global order; what drives, shapes, and constrains Chinese initiatives; and how others have responded to Chinese actions.

Fingar asserts that there have been patterns to China's participation in international economics and politics over the past 30 years, including a pendular quality to the U.S.-China relationship. According to him, relations between the two countries were largely instrumental during the Cold War era when the United States was at odds with the Soviet Union and China was undergoing a period of self strengthening. U.S.-China relations cooled following the Tiananmen Square incident, the timing of which coincided roughly with the fall of the Soviet Union. Trust between the two countries deteriorated as China displayed its more authoritarian side, and the United States responded with sanctions that did not significantly impede China's economic growth, but did change the relationship in ways that still shape perceptions of one another.

Economics are now the primary focal point of discussions about U.S.-China relations, with a negative light frequently cast on China. "Despite all of the rhetoric, it is clear from the numbers that China's ascendency has not been at the expense of the United States," states Fingar. Trade with China, in fact, creates jobs in the United States, but trade-related jobs are dispersed and therefore not clearly visible. "They are not concentrated in a place where a factory closed, often for reasons that that have nothing to do with China," says Fingar, "but the pain and the political impact is local. I would predict that when our economy turns around, the pendulum will swing further back in a less-worried, less-critical direction."

While China has a legal system and has adopted many international standards, Fingar asserts that "it is still not a society governed by law," and that it in fact does not always measure up to global or even to its own standards. He cites China's record of undesirable practices and issues, such as currency manipulation, government corruption, and intellectual property violation, which complicate and confuse understanding of its involvement in the global system.

Fingar does not believe that the U.S.-China relationship will ever return to the "honeymoon" era of the Cold War, but he says, "The swings of the pendulum and the perturbations in the relationship are less intense and of shorter duration; that is the pattern." Quoting Anne-Marie Slaughter, director of policy planning at the U.S. Department of State, Fingar suggests that the best vision for the global order is "a world in which there are more partnerships and fewer alliances." He cautions against disregarding important, long-time alliances, such as the U.S.-Korea relationship. He notes, however, the crucial fact that alliances assume that there is an adversary, which can marginalize and threaten regional neighbors, such as China, or put allies in the uncomfortable position of having to choose between siding with a neighbor or a distant ally. "We must find a way so that no one has to choose," says Fingar.

On January 6, Fingar outlined the primary points of his new research project at a public lecture co-sponsored by the Stanford China Program and the Center for East Asian Studies, part of the China in the World series. He will also lead Stanford students through an examination of related key issues and questions in "China on the World Stage" (IPS 246), a course that he is teaching during the current winter quarter.

How do military allies come to find each other more dependable on security issues, instead of less comfortable with mutual reliance? How do rival nations manage to build confidence and shared expectations for a collaborative future, rather than fall into a spiral of suspicions over each other's strategic intentions? Leif-Eric Easley, the 2010-11 Northeast Asian History Fellow at the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (Shorenstein APARC), addresses these key questions in his recently completed dissertation, Perceived National Identity Differences and Strategic Trust: Explaining Post Cold-War Security Relations Among China, Japan, South Korea, and the United States. Examining post-1992 Northeast Asia, and drawing from a broad range of source materials in four languages, Dr. Easley argues that differences in how the policymaking elite in two countries perceive the national identity of one another determines the level of strategic trust between their governments. This ultimately affects patterns of cooperation on national and international security matters.

With a background in both political science and mathematics, and paying close attention to historical issues in East Asia, Dr. Easley earned his Ph.D. in Government from Harvard University in 2010. While at Shorenstein APARC, he is revising his dissertation into a book and will teach a course about nationalism and security relations in Northeast Asia. In a recent interview, Dr. Easley discussed his research and future plans.

What is one of the most interesting and timely case studies that you examined?

Japan and China have had a very difficult time improving the level of strategic trust between them. The reasons for this are numerous. There are, of course, the historical legacies of Japanese colonialism, the Pacific War, and indeed hundreds of years of disagreements between China and Japan.

Even though those were largely papered over in favor of normalizing relations in the 1970s and then building up an economic relationship—China is now Japan's largest trading partner—a lot of that historical baggage was not fully unpacked. The Chinese say there are a lot of things the Japanese have not apologized for. The Japanese say that Beijing tends to use anti-Japanese nationalism for its own domestic purposes. At various points of time in the post-Cold War era—whether it has to do with the way that textbooks are being revised or how the Japanese prime minister periodically pays homage to Japan's war dead at the Yasakuni Shrine—Chinese nationalism has found expression in anti-Japanese protests.

My argument is that such historical antagonisms, among other things, bring to light the perceptions of identity difference between the two sides. The more severe the perceptions of difference, the more of a gap that elites in one country see between their national identity and the national identity of the other side, and the less trust the two sides are going to have. So these historical issues really weigh down on the level of strategic trust between Tokyo and Beijing. This is problematic—not just for dealing with pressing hard security issues like North Korea or trying to advance regional security architectures like the ASEAN Regional Forum—but also because strategic trust is very important for facilitating cooperation and avoiding conflict. Without a decent measure of trust, you do not have much margin for error when some unforeseen things happen, such as the recent incident over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands.

Based on your dissertation, what steps would you recommend for governments to build strategic trust?

A lot of work in both academic and policy circles has pointed to mechanisms like increasing exchanges and trying to cooperate on so-called "easy" issues to establish a pattern of cooperation. Meanwhile, politicians and diplomats tend to be concerned with different forms of political theater to produce positive headlines.

My theory suggests that if trust-building efforts do not actually change the deeply-held perceptions that each side maintains about the other's national identity, then you are not going to see a meaningful and lasting effect on the level of strategic trust. That is not to say that exchanges and trying to rack up points on easy issues is not worth doing or will not ultimately have some positive effect. But the sorts of events and actions that really change perceptions and then can allow for meaningful changes in strategic trust are those that help redefine the relationship or the way that one side looks at the other.

For example, if Japan were to have an entirely different memorial site where its leaders could remember and honor Japan's veterans, separate from a shrine that has a certain view of history associated with it that is very objectionable to its neighbors, this could be something that would help change perceptions. Contrast that to a carefully worded speech by a prime minister. Japan has actually apologized dozens of times and yet the problem is still there. Those apologies, as well-meaning as they may be, have not significantly changed identity perceptions and hence we do not see much improvement in strategic trust between Beijing and Tokyo.

Another example would be dealing with some of the recent maritime disputes. If the China-Japan relationship had more strategic trust, it might be able to encapsulate those issues and not let them derail the relationship. But this is not yet the case. Coming to a greater level of agreement about how to deal with economic zones and how to pursue joint development of underwater gas deposits could really do a lot to improve perceptions on both sides. This would ameliorate Japanese perceptions of an aggressive Chinese identity, and help resolve a hot-button nationalist issue between the two populations. Real improvement in identity perceptions, such that each side thinks better of the other's international role and national characteristics, would allow Japan and China to realize a more stable, trusting relationship.

What is the course that you will offer at Stanford and what approach will you take to teaching?

The course will be about nationalism and security relations in Northeast Asia. I am hoping to engage these issues with some fresh perspective. What I want to do is provide students with background on the different forms of nationalist conflict in Northeast Asia to help them understand where these historical legacies and identity frictions come from. These are really contemporarily relevant issues. I will ask students to write on a very specific topic—a nationalist issue of their choice—and develop not only their own analysis, but also some of their own suggestions. This is a lot to expect, but I anticipate that the students are going to be up to the challenge. The students will probably come from different fields—including political science, history, sociology, and Asian studies. I think that with their diverse backgrounds, they will benefit from the environment here at Shorenstein APARC.

Shorenstein APARC is really special among centers—nationally and even internationally—in the way that it brings together academic rigor, policy relevance, and policy experience. We have top-flight academics, and we also have very distinguished policymakers, who bring a wealth of experience to the table. With more exchange between the academic and the policymaking communities, both sides stand to benefit tremendously. Shorenstein APARC is one of the few places that is doing this, and doing it so well. 

Do you hope to work in academia or government, or serve in both fields?

I plan to pursue an academic career, but at the same time to produce research and publications with policy relevance. Teaching is incredibly important because there is more and more demand among students with interest in Asia, and increasing demand across sectors for people who have expertise in Asian history and political economics. Teaching is an opportunity, not only to help prepare the next generation of experts, but also to improve my research and writing through interaction with students. Likewise, being able to take a sabbatical to serve in an advisory role at the U.S. Department of State, the Pentagon, or National Security Council would be a great opportunity to have real-world impact on the incredibly pressing issues in U.S.-Asia relations. Policy work is also a chance to expand one's own skillset and basis of research. 

Take for example, Thomas Christensen of Princeton University and Victor Cha of Georgetown University. Both are strong academics, who publish in top academic journals and produce academic books. They also served in the State Department and National Security Council respectively. After making positive contributions on the policy side, they returned to their universities with firsthand knowledge of the complex relationship between theory and practice. I hope to one day have an opportunity for public service and then return to academia with experience that is of value to my research and of value to my students.