Demographic shifts worldwide have increased the number of older workers, and many economies are facing a critical question: Are their labor markets ready to support older workers?

Researchers have found that, in the United States, the surge of older workers has gone hand–in-hand with an increase in the number of “age-friendly jobs” – roles with working conditions more suitable for aging employees, such as placing fewer physical demands or offering greater scheduling flexibility. Yet it remains unclear whether comparable trends have taken hold in other aging economies.

A new study, published in the Journal of the Economics of Ageing, helps fill in this gap by examining the evolution of age-friendly jobs in South Korea (hereafter Korea), where the number of workers aged 50 and over increased by 165 percent from 2000 to 2023. Korea is now officially considered a "super-aged" society, and the government is doubling down on its efforts to bolster the workforce.

The study, co-authored by Hyeongsuk Kim and Chulhee Lee, both of Seoul National University, and Stanford health economist Karen Eggleston, the director of APARC’s Asia Health Policy Program, examines Korea’s workforce and economy to determine whether the nation significantly expanded its 50+ workforce by creating job opportunities favorable for older workers or if some other mechanism is at play. 

The co-authors examined the job characteristics experienced by older Koreans relative to their younger counterparts and U.S. older workers. Second, they analyzed data collected in 2020 about Korean workers, evaluating their jobs based on various parameters in the Age-Friendliness Index (AFI), a tool that measures the degree to which jobs are more suitable for older workers. The researchers considered AFI factors such as the requirement for heavy physical activity, the pace of the job, and the possibility of telecommuting. They also examined how the number of age-friendly jobs changed from 2000 to 2020.

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The study finds that, while age-friendly jobs have increased in Korea, the number grew more slowly than in the United States, indicating that the U.S. market responded more quickly to changes in workforce demographics. Furthermore, the study indicates that older Koreans were not the main beneficiaries of age-friendly jobs. Instead, women and college-educated workers benefited more from these jobs, while non-college-educated men have seen fewer gains. “These results highlight the uneven adaptation of Korea’s labor market to demographic change and suggest that social norms and labor market frictions shape age-friendly job creation and who benefits from those jobs,” the researchers write.

The study also unveils that, in Korea, the working conditions of employees aged 50–61 differ significantly from those aged 62 or older. Despite the nation's high employment rates for those aged 65 and older, the researchers discovered that a third of working Koreans over the age of 62 held jobs requiring heavy physical activity and earned lower wages. Additionally, only a little over one-fifth of them had jobs that allowed for “mostly sitting.”

Labor Market Frictions

The study’s authors propose several explanations for why Korea’s economy, despite a significant increase in older workers, has not adapted as quickly as the United States in placing these workers in age-friendly occupations. One reason is Korea's comparatively low level of pension support, which forces workers to fill a disproportionate number of low-skilled, temporary, and day jobs. It may be that many older workers are forced to work, regardless of whether the jobs are friendly to their needs. Another reason may be the rigidities of the labor market, including strong protections against employees being laid off. Such protections are beneficial for workers, but they restrict companies' ability to restructure their workforce. Moreover, the role of chaebol, or large corporations, may also be significant. Although chaebol are producing and selling more, they have also increased automation and resorted to outsourcing instead of hiring additional workers.

Older workers in Korea are also facing competition from women for age-friendly jobs. The researchers noted significant gender-related changes in the country's education and employment levels. In 2009, the percentage of women enrolling in college surpassed that of men, and the percentage of women in the workforce increased by 2.5% from 2000 to 2023. Korean women are likely to have an even stronger preference for the flexibility of age-friendly jobs than American women because of gendered responsibilities for household production.

The study’s results, researchers said, reinforce key findings from previous studies: "that 'age-friendly' jobs appeal to many kinds of workers, not just older adults; and that labor market frictions shape who benefits from age-friendly jobs."

As governments grapple with rising life expectancies and shrinking traditional working-age populations, ensuring that older adults can continue working safely and with dignity is key to sustaining economic growth and social stability. According to the study, South Korea has made impressive strides in keeping older people in the workforce, but the next challenge is ensuring work itself evolves to meet their needs.

Mounting hidden local government debt is one of China’s pressing challenges. Held by local government financing vehicles (LGFVs) and estimated between US$8-10 trillion, this off-the-books debt originates from a long-running tug-of-war over tax revenue between China’s central government and the localities. In the years before COVID-19, LGFVs controlled their debt by drawing on steady non-tax revenues. In summer 2020, however, approximately six months after the pandemic broke out in Wuhan, the hidden debt held by LGFVs began rising dramatically. Today, many of them are nearing default, and local governments are increasingly going broke.

​​Why did hidden LGFV debt rise so much during COVID?

A recent study, published in The China Journal, sheds light on this question. The study’s co-authors – including Jean Oi, the William Haas Professor of Chinese Politics, a senior fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, and director of the China Program at APARC – use quantitative data to show how China’s central government’s regulatory crackdowns on income tied to the real estate sector during the pandemic disrupted the revenue sources LGFVs and their local governments relied on to service their debts. These policy changes “interacted with the zero-COVID policy to create a perfect storm, pushing hidden local government debt to new highs,” they write. 

Their study draws on a wide array of quantitative data, tracking information on factors ranging from COVID shocks (including confirmed cases and deaths) to, among others, government medical responses, special treasury bonds and their allocation, local debt, land purchases, and business activities. Using these sources, the co-authors built a province-level dataset covering all 31 of China’s provincial units from 2018 to 2022, allowing comparative analyses before and after China’s COVID shocks. They organized the data into three categories: (1) the impact of COVID on small and medium enterprises; (2) government fiscal responses and COVID expenditures during the pandemic; and (3) local government finances and debts.

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The Pre-COVID Era: The Grand Bargain That Failed

China’s local debt problem traces back to the 1994 fiscal reforms, which recentralized tax revenues in Beijing and left local governments with chronic budget shortfalls. To bridge the gap, the central government struck a “grand bargain”: while claiming a larger share of tax income, localities could generate new non-tax revenues through special-purpose vehicles, namely, local government financing vehicles. These LGFVs were set up as state-owned enterprises to incur and hold debt off-the-books, yet not illegally, on behalf of local governments.

The workaround fueled rapid development for years but laid the groundwork for today’s mounting hidden debt crisis.

“The success of LGFVs hinged largely on revenue generated through land finance,” explain Oi and her co-authors. “Local governments provided LGFVs with cheap land as collateral for bank loans and bonds. Further revenue was generated from preparing and selling land to real estate developers.”

Thus, LGFVs powered over a decade of rapid growth in China, driving infrastructure booms and urbanization that made the real estate sector a cornerstone of the economy. The model appeared mutually beneficial: the central government gained more tax revenue as the economy grew, while local governments used land sales and debt to fund development. But this growth depended on a continuous flow of non-tax income, making the system increasingly fragile.

After the 2008 global financial crisis, Beijing launched a sustained push to rein in local government hidden debt, focusing heavily on LGFVs. By 2017, officials labeled the risk a “gray rhino.” Yet this drive for fiscal discipline ground to a halt with the onset of COVID.

A Perfect Storm of Policy and Pandemic

The pandemic’s impact was swift and severe. Small and medium-sized businesses, especially in the hardest-hit regions like Hubei Province, saw their incomes collapse by up to 90%. In response, Beijing provided a massive fiscal support package to localities, including one trillion yuan in special COVID bonds to offset the costs from the initial onslaught of the pandemic. Crucial for LGFVs, these bonds cushioned the impact of the pandemic on land sales.

By summer 2020, however, as China was still locked away from the rest of the world and COVID was under control, Beijing resumed its policy agenda to enforce fiscal discipline and curb local government debt. The central government’s most consequential measure was the “three red lines” policy, which dealt a major blow to China’s real estate sector by sharply restricting developers’ ability to borrow once debt thresholds were crossed. The policy, expanded from 12 pilot firms in 2020 to cover the entire sector by 2021, disrupted the “borrow-to-grow” model and triggered a liquidity crisis. Evergrande, China’s second-biggest property developer, was among the first groups affected.

As borrowing dried up, firms struggled to repay debt, halted construction, and stopped buying land, slashing local government revenues. Land sales plummeted across provinces, with national revenue growth from land transfers plunging into negative territory by 2022. The crisis deepened when unfinished housing projects led to mortgage boycotts by frustrated home buyers, prompting more state intervention.

For local governments, the shift came at a steep cost. They were ordered to step in, using LGFVs to purchase land and inject cash into public budgets. As a result, even wealthier provinces like Shanghai and Guangdong saw sharp increases in LGFV debt.

“The call for LGFVs to buy land to create revenue for local governments made matters worse, turning land from a key source of revenue into a source of new debt and forcing LGFVs further to increase borrowing, all of which caused soaring increases in LGFV debt, without any alternative revenue source to service or pay that debt,” explain Oi and her co-authors.

A Fiscal Reform Imperative

The study shows how China’s shifts in central government policies during the pandemic – especially the three red lines and the directive for LGFVs to buy up unwanted land — exacerbated long-standing vulnerabilities in local public finance. What had been a delicate balancing act quickly became unsustainable.

“At the root of China’s continuing crisis of LGFVs' debt is China’s flawed fiscal system,” the co-authors emphasize. Before the pandemic, the system masked deficits by relying on LGFVs to generate off-the-books revenues, primarily through land sales fueled by a booming real estate market. This arrangement allowed Beijing to capture the bulk of tax revenue while localities chased growth. But when COVID struck and the property sector collapsed, the facade crumbled.

The fallout exposed how deeply local governments had come to depend on land finance – an unstable, non-institutionalized revenue stream. With the real estate sector once accounting for over 20 percent of GDP, its collapse left localities and their financing vehicles adrift. “In the context of a crisis such as COVID, the weakness of the fiscal system and LGFVs was exposed as policy instability added to the volatility of the economic situation,” Oi and her co-authors note.

The local government debt problem might not trigger a financial crisis in China, “but LGFVs and their local governments remain in dire straits,” they write. More worrying, the economy has not rebounded in the post-COVID years as hoped, and “as long as the real estate sector remains depressed, land finance will not be able to make local government budgets whole as it once did. The grand bargain can’t work.”

Rather than assume the debt, Beijing is extending lifelines: urging banks to offer LGFVs 25-year loans with temporary interest relief, approving debt swaps into longer maturity municipal bonds, and allowing new issuances of special-purpose bonds. But these are stopgaps, not solutions.

Hidden debt will keep resurfacing unless China overhauls the fiscal system born out of the 1994 reforms, Oi and her co-authors conclude. Institutionalized, dependable, alternative revenue streams for local governments are needed, or the crisis will persist. “It may be time for Chinese leadership to stop kicking the can down the road and undertake institutional reforms of the fiscal system. This may be painful, but there is no other sustainable solution.”

The talk culminated in a preview of Maggiori’s new research using large language models (LLMs) to analyze earnings calls and analyst reports at scale. His team leveraged AI to detect when companies reacted to government pressure—offering real-time visibility into geoeconomic tensions. Maggiori goes on to explain how tools like these allow us to capture threats that never appear in policy, in fact, “some of the most powerful threats never occur because the target complies.”

Maggiori’s talk emphasizes the need for economists and policymakers to develop and use better tools to measure power, model interdependence, and design policy that balances trade gains with national security; Because this is not just theory, these dynamics are shaping the world we live in today.

Watch the Full Talk Here