Stanford University’s Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law in partnership with the Canadian Foreign Affairs and International Trade department are hosting a symposium, Addressing the Accountability Gap in Statebuilding: The Case of Afghanistan, on February 25, 2011. The distinguished Ashraf Ghani, former Afghan Minister of Finance and 2009 Presidential Candidate, will be delivering the keynote address. This event will bring together practitioners, experts, and diplomats from Afghanistan and beyond, to share experiences and explore options to improve the contemporary practice of state-building. This conference and keynote address is open to the public.

On February 8, Dr. Dan Chirot, Job and Gertrud Tamaki Professor of International Studies at the University of Washington, was the featured speaker at a special CDDRL seminar held on the unfolding crisis in Cote d'Ivoire. CDDRL hosted this event to bring attention to the instability and violence that has resulted in the aftermath of the November 2010 presidential elections, which left this West African country in  political stalemate and chaos after nearly a decade of civil war. Chirot's work has focused on social change and ethnic violence in Francophone West Africa, where he has spent considerable time researching and living in Cote d'Ivoire. Chirot spoke to a diverse audience, which included members of the Stanford community and a number of Ivorian nationals who brought a great deal of local context and perspective to the seminar discussion. The passion and interest that this topic generated, reminded CDDRL of the importance of providing a platform for global crises of democracy, governance, and development.

Providing a historical analysis of the region, Chirot described Cote d'Ivoire in its early years as the "greatest success story in post-independence Africa." An economic boom resulted from Cote d'Ivoire's competitive advantage in exporting their cash crop, cocoa, to French and other Western markets bringing rising GDP and prosperity levels. Chirot continued to describe the preferential economic relationship Cote d'Ivoire enjoyed with France, who considered this former colony a linchpin in its Africa strategy. Patronage networks began to form under the tutelage of Cote d'Ivoire's first president Felix Houphouet-Boigny and corruption among local elites was endemic. Chirot then described the upset that followed in the 1970's when globally competitive markets led to the deterioration of the trading position Cote d'Ivoire had traditionally held. Economic growth was curtailed and compounded with mounting  demographic pressures and land disputes, which surfaced multi-ethnic tensions in a country where over 60 dialects are spoken.

The 1990s brought a period of successive upheaval and instability to Cote d'Ivoire after the death of President Houphouet-Boigny in 1993, resulting in a coup d'etat, and massive devaluation of the national currency. President Laurent Gbagbo head of the Ivorian Popular Front, was swept into office in 1999 as the country descended into a civil war that splintered it into  three sections that loosely followed ethnic and regional identity. With rebel groups governing the north and west of the country, and President Gbagbo residing in the southern commercial and political hubs, chaos and violence ensued as thousands were killed, displaced, and made victims to this disaster.

Chirot described the 2010 election as representing the promise of hope but only delivering more chaos and uncertainty to a country that was once the most stable in West Africa. He explained that opposition leader, Alassane Ouattara Alassane who hails from the north, was the internationally recognized victor in elections that were monitored by the Independent Electoral Commission. Gbagbo has refused to accept the results as Ouattara was overwhelmingly favored in the north and generally does not enjoy support from the southern power center of the country. Neither side is willing to make any concessions to the other and this deadlock and political stalemate has exacerbated the instability that has left Cote d'Ivoire in a state of crisis.

During the discussion period, there was some debate concerning the election results, the role of outside actors (namely the French), and the legitimacy of the reporting mechanisms. Amidst the controversy of the election results, Chirot made the claim that there is "an absence of leadership necessary to remedy this situation," and that some form of power sharing will be need to be negotiated if a peaceful resolution of the standoff is to be achieved.  Neither candidate has "clean hands" and there are clearly political and economic interests behind each man, who refuses to relinquish control over these patronage networks and influence as the country remains divided. Chirot reminded the audience that it is important to look beyond the perceived victor in this election and focus on how to bring stability and accountability back to Cote d'Ivoire after years of neglect.

The central premise underlying Bussell's discussion this week is the reality that public service provision is often flawed in the developing world. Reforming public services entails significant efforts to increase the quality of public service, and there have been two important recent trends in this space: privatization and public-private partnerships and increased use of information and communication technologies (ICTs). The one-stop services model (which has been adopted globally in various forms, from Singapore's eCitizen Centre to Germany's Buergerbuero or "Citizen's Bureau"), exemplifies current trends.

In her research, which focuses primarily on the case of India, Bussell asks the following questions: why do or don't governments reform public service delivery? And when governments decide to implement reforms, why do they or don't they employ ICTs in these reforms?

The Indian strategy to public service reform has been to create stand-alone, one-stop citizen service centers. These centers are computerized and frequently have private-sector participation. Aside from these typical characteristics, there is significant state-level variation on several points, including timing of policy adoption, quantity and type of services, degree of automation, and ownership and management models.

Bussell discusses a variety of hypotheses that offer insight into the potential factors influencing the character of Indian reforms. First, she notes that politicians faced mixed electoral incentives for and against reforms. After all, there is evidence that eServices can improve service characteristics and reduce corruption. On the other hand, reforms may also reduce politicians' opportunities to amass funds to run for re-election. After all, bureaucratic discretion and opaque processes enable the siphoning of funds and bribe taking in service delivery. Politicians use "transfer authority" over bureaucrats to access bribes. More transparent services, due the implementation of reforms, threaten this access to bribes. At the same time, reform may also offer new opportunity for rents. Private partnerships to run centers entail new contracting processes. Larger-scale bribes may be available from ownership and management negotiation.

Based on these mixed direct and indirect incentives, Bussell predicts that reform will require expected net benefits to ruling politicians. States with higher petty corruption should implement policy reforms later. Meanwhile, states with higher grand corruption might lead to more partnerships with private sector.

So what factors actually explain variation in when different Indian states adopted reform? According to Bussell's research, the level of corruption was the most statistically significant variable affecting the timing of reform adoption. However, whether or not there was a coalition government in power was also significant. This means that an increase of 1 point out of 10 in the state's corruption level led to a 63% decrease in the chance of a reform being adopted in a given year. The quantity of services covered varied widely in the sample of states from less than 10 to more than 40 services. On average, moving from a state with below average corruption to a state with above average corruption causes a drop of 14 in the number of services covered.

In addition to examining the variation in reform adoption across Indian states, Bussell also looks at the consequences of reform. Despite reforms in the state of Karnataka, to give one example, demand for services continues to outstrip supply. Visitors to Nemmadi (privately-run computerized centers) were able to access services faster, while paying less money, making less visits, spending less time waiting at each visit, and seeing a reduction (on average) in the number of days before receiving the service. Despite quantitative improvements in average efficiency, however, perceived efficiency actually declined. Now, there is a 7-day minimum for service delivery and a 21-day maximum. Although average has declined as a consequence of these new requirements, it is now impossible to bribe officials in order to achieve service delivery in one day.

According to Bussell, these results bring up some interesting policy implications. First, it is important to consider the institutional incentives underlying the established model in order to ensure that reforms are effective. The incentives faced by both top politicians and street level officials must be taken into account. Second, it may be best to design policies that establish a strong, if narrow, initial model. After all, growing citizen demand affects electoral benefits and the calculations of politicians. Third, more research must be done regarding the various factors that influence policy outcomes. According to cases in South Africa and Brazil, there is some evidence that differences in electoral competition can affect policy outcomes. In South Africa, for instance, less electoral competition has led to less incentive to reform. More research will help to clarify the factors of importance in public service reform implementation.

Drawing upon his experience with India's Right to Information movement, Vivek focused his discussion on how information and communication technology (ICT) tools could be designed and applied to strengthen people's movements to combat corruption. Of course, Vivek conceded, ICT cannot combat all kinds of corruption. These tools can be very effective, however, in combating types of corruption for which there is a paper trail attesting to something that never happened (such as the construction of a road or the provision of grain subsides or other goods).

In the past, it has been possible for members of people's movements working to combat corruption to request lists of all government programs going on in a village to monitor who received what benefits. After summing up this information over a long period and comparing notes with the villagers themselves, activists have then been able to expose inaccuracies in government records through public hearings.

Although activists can carry out this sort of fact checking without the use of advanced ICTs, the introduction of such ICTs has helped social movements work much more effectively to combat corruption. After all, an individual who goes to a government office to obtain public information will often face significant resistance. Requiring that government offices make information available online makes getting public records much easier. Additionally, cross-comparisons of data created by different government agencies (i.e. comparing ration card data against census information for each village) can be much more easily executed once this data is online.

In some cases, changing procedures can help reduce certain types of corruption. In Kathmandu, for example, public officials began to be required to wear shirts and pants with no pockets to reduce exchange of petty bribes. Creating procedures like these are very useful, Vivek emphasized, but they can also be enhanced through the use of ICTs. In the Indian state of Tamil Nadu, for example, public managers of public works projects began to be required to send text message at 10:30 in the morning, to ensure that officials accurately reported the number of persons employed at the site. Since these messages can be sent to all interested parties, anyone can photograph the site with their cell phone to expose officials' misreporting. This example illustrates how timely verification and dissemination of information can establish whether information is being falsified.

New technologies are also enabling the reporting of new types of information. New kinds of accounting include cross-verification, biometric verification, image-based processes (i.e. video and audio), and geo-specific information (i.e. through RFID, a low cost passive electric tag). Although what you can verify (i.e. teacher presence at the school) is not always the same as the indicator that is truly important (i.e. student learning), the use of these new reporting methods can often raise the cost of cheating.

In closing, Vivek noted that unless people are mobilized, they will not do anything to combat corruption. Once systems are in place however, technology can make any mobilized groups work more effectively. To maximize the ability of activists to extract information from the grassroots level, we need new forms of accounting and dissemination that are user-centered and not divided up by governmental department. Separating implementation agencies from payment agencies will be another positive approach in the attempt to reduce corruption. As entitlement programs grow due to the increased emphasis on a rights-based approach to international development, the need to combat various kinds of corruption is growing, and the application of ICTs offers a big step forward.

 

 

After nearly 30 years on the throne, Egypt's modern-day pharaoh, Hosni Mubarak, will soon follow in the footsteps of Tunisia's dictator, Ben Ali. The only question is not whether he will leave the presidency of Egypt, or even when, but how. In the face of persistent and growing mass protests-and a newfound sense of civic empowerment on the part of Egypt's long demoralized youthful masses-it is difficult to imagine Mubarak surviving in office for more than another week to ten days. The only question is whether he will see the inevitable and do one last service to his country-leave office gracefully-or whether he will have to be pushed out by the military or a deepening climate of chaos on the streets.

Egypt is very far from being "ready" institutionally or civically for democracy, but it is perched at an interesting point that could make a transition to democracy feasible. 

First, the naming of a Vice-President, after the office sat vacant throughout Mubarak's presidency, leaves open the possibility of an orderly transitional succession. Should the savvy former intelligence chief, Omar Suleiman, read his country's mood shrewdly and decide to preside over a free and fair contest for the presidential election six months hence, he could go down as a hero in Egyptian history, negating the central role he played in a now widely reviled regime. Parallels to the now valued transitional role played by Indonesia's Vice President, Habibie, after the fall of Suharto in 1998 come to mind. However, as the public mood shifts toward demand for a thorough house-cleaning, it is possible that nothing less than a broad-based interim government will satisfy popular demands for change.

Second, in contrast to Tunisia, there is an obvious democratic alternative to Mubarak (or Suleiman, or any other regime stalwart): the Nobel-prize-winning former IAEA head, Mohamed ElBaradei.  As a political novice who has lived outside Egypt for most of the last few decades, ElBaradei is far from an ideal founding president of a new democracy (but then, few countries in a situation of regime turmoil, or even after a carefully planned transition, wind up with a leader of the vision and political skill of Nelson Mandela). Yet ElBaradei has a number of assets, including a keen understanding of the international environment, wide international contacts, experience in running a large organization, a personal history that is untainted by association with the repression and corruption of the Mubarak era, and the apparent ability to unite disparate elements of the opposition, religious and secular, behind his candidacy.

Beyond ElBaradei, the emergence of a broad opposition effort (including ElBaradei and former opposition presidential candidate Ayman Nour) to negotiate the terms of a transition and a new national unity government also augur hopefully for the near-term future.

If a reasonably free and fair contest for the presidency could be organized on schedule in September 2011, there is little doubt that the long-ruling NDP would be dealt a crushing defeat.  To ensure that, however, would not only require institutional changes to allow a fully open and free presidential contest, but also to ensure a fresh registration of voters and neutral administration of the electoral process. These changes would need to be implemented fairly quickly to enable a credible and reasonably fair process as soon as September. The first such change will need to be a constitutional amendment to remove the condition that requires a party to have 5 percent of the seats in parliament in order to field a presidential candidate. 

If the September election timetable can be adhered to, the democratic election of a new president of Egypt would be the beginning, not the end, of a democratic transition in Egypt.  The parliament will need to be completely reelected, as the elections of late 2010 were even more farcical and outrageously rigged than previous ones. As a result, the ruling NDP won 81 percent of the seats, and no opposition party won more than a small sliver of seats in an election that at least three-quarters of eligible voters (and probably many more) boycotted. 

A new democratically elected president would thus need to preside over a far-reaching transitional process, which would require the rewriting of the constitution; the reform and renewal of the electoral system, the judiciary, and other government institutions, especially the police; and the training and empowerment of democratic political parties, mass media, and civil society organizations, which have been heavily constrained during the Mubarak era. Egyptians might want to consider the next presidential term as a deliberately transitional and power-sharing government, under a relatively spare interim constitution, while a democratic process of dialogue and deliberation drafted a new permanent constitution. South Africa could serve as a model here; a newly elected democratic parliament could also serve as a Constituent Assembly to draft a new constitution with wide popular participation and consultation.

Forging the rules and institutional arrangements of a transitional period will not be easy. Political stability will require a broadly inclusive process of negotiations that brings all key political stakeholders to the table, and that forges a political pact that ensures the loyalty of the army and security apparatus while gradually renewing its officer ranks and establishing civilian democratic control. No doubt there will be calls for retrospective justice to investigate the many abuses of human rights during the Mubarak era, but the historical experience of other transitions suggest that this task should be addressed with caution and deliberation, in a way that does not drive the surviving elements of the old regime into a posture of resistance and sabotage.

The challenge for the U.S. is to align itself squarely behind Egypt's aspirations for democracy without being so public, clumsy and abrupt in abandoning Mubarak that we provoke an anti-American backlash from among other regional allies. But if we have to choose between rulers and their people, it is time we started choosing the people. We need to quickly develop a strategy and commit new resources to assist Egyptian political parties, non-governmental organizations, civic education groups, and independent media to help them prepare the country for a period of protracted and unprecedented democratic change.

Egypt is entering the end of an era. The exit from power of Hosni Mubarak under pressure of volcanic popular protests will have wide repercussions throughout the Arab world. It will accelerate the momentum of democratic change in the region, and open the possibility of electoral democracy emerging in the Arab world's largest and most influential country. If Mubarak can be induced to exit peacefully and soon, and the way can be paved to a free and credible presidential election in September, the authoritarian exceptionalism of the Arab world may begin drawing to an end.

On January 25, Professor Beth Simmons of Harvard University spoke as part of the Sanela Diana Jenkins Series on international human rights. Simmons, the Director of the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, presented research from her award-winning book Mobilizing for Human Rights: International Law in Domestic Politics (2009).

During her lecture, Simmons explored the reasons why certain countries chose to ratify binding international treaties and others did not. Looking specifically at six "core" treaties, Simmons discussed the various domestic factors and international pressures that would explain the often-unexpected behavior of the nations toward these treaties. Strikingly, Simmons found that one of the best predictors of a country's position on a treaty was the ratification or non-ratification by its neighboring nations. This discovery, she said, suggested that nations could influence non-signatory neighbor countries to sign such treaties.

Simmons then turned to the analysis of why, and to what extent, these treaties matter - a question she is often asked by her students. While insisting that international treaties alone do not "solve all the problems," Simmons emphasized their role in framing human rights issues not only on the international level, but also in domestic politics. According to Simmons, these treaties support the domestic efforts of individuals and organizations across the globe that can now "point to [these] core focal group of documents as evidence [of their rights]."