The workshop is premised on the view that we are now entering a new phase in the development of post-Soviet Europe. Clearly, further NATO enlargement and EU expansion are unlikely to take place in the next few years, creating a zone of insecurity and potential instability dividing those countries which succeeded in winning integration into the EU and into NATO in recent years from those countries that have sought membership without any immediate prospects of achieving it.  Moreover, even among countries that have been successful in achieving membership in recent years there remains continuing anxiety about the degree to which their new European partners are prepared to support their economic viability and guarantee their security, particularly in light of increased assertiveness from Moscow.

The central purpose of this workshop series is to analyze the new dynamics emerging within this region, focusing on the external influences exerted by Moscow and Brussels and how they interact with the internal dynamics of the “corridor” countries, and to explore possible scenarios for future stabilization and development.

This workshop will be held November 5 and 6, 2009 at Stanford.  The primary focus will be the “corridor” of countries consisting of the Baltic and Central European members of the EU and NATO, together with Belarus, Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova. Moscow and Brussels will enter as driving outside influences. The participants will include analysts and policymakers from the region itself as well as scholars from the relevant scholarly communities.

 

"I think that, by and large, the managers wouldn't know a good technique if it hit them in the face." The prominent computer scientist Alan Perlis spoke these words at a second NATO-sponsored Software Engineering conference in 1969. He underscored a conflict that would persist in the decade that followed that ill-tempered meeting, as computer professionals organized in the name of "software engineering," many sponsored by the U.S. defense department. Yet software cost overruns are frequent, and glitches occasionally turn deadly, leading many to argue that "software engineering" is not yet worthy of the name.
 
How should we understand the emergence of software engineering: the agendas of its proponents, sources of controversy, and its relationship to diverse defense department interests, including security, reliability, and timeliness, and costs? This chapter-in-progress addresses this question using both qualitative historical materials and social network data. The Defense Department's interest in software research was nurtured by budgetary cuts that followed anti-war protests in the early 1970, making economics a dominant, if controversial theme in "software engineering" research. Debates about the meaning and direction of software engineering often invoked binary divisions, between managers and technical people, industrialists and academics, pragmatists and theoreticians. After describing these debates from the ground up, I use network analysis to provide bird's eye view: to what extent were commonly evoked dualisms reflected in practices of publication, and how did this change as the field became institutionalized? More broadly, can network analysis contribute meaningfully to a historical account employing "thick description," and if so how?

Rebecca Slayton is a lecturer in the Science, Technology and Society Program at Stanford University and a CISAC affiliate. In 2004-2005 she was a CISAC science fellow. Her research examines how technical judgments are generated, taken up, and given significance in international security contexts. She is currently working on a book which uses the history of the U.S. ballistic missile defense program to study the relationships between and among technology, expertise, and the media. Portions of this work have been published in journals such as History and Technology and have been presented at academic conferences. As a postdoctoral fellow in the Science, Technology, and Society Program at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, in 2004 she completed an NSF-funded project entitled Public Science: Discourse about the Strategic Defense Initiative, 1983-1988.

As a physical chemist, she developed ultrafast laser experiments in condensed matter systems and published several articles in physics journals. She also received the AAAS Mass Media Science and Engineering Fellowship in 2000, and has worked as a science journalist for a daily paper and for Physical Review Focus. She earned her doctorate in chemistry from Harvard University in 2002.

Eric Roberts, after receiving his Ph.D. in Applied Mathematics from Harvard University in 1980, taught at Wellesley College from 1980-85, where he chaired the Computer Science Department. From 1985-90, he was a member of the research staff at Digital Equipment Corporation’s Systems Research Center in Palo Alto, California, where he conducted computer science research, focusing on programming tools for multiprocessor architectures. In September 1990, Roberts joined the Stanford faculty, where he is now Professor of Computer Science and the John A. and Cynthia Fry Gunn University Fellow in Undergraduate Education.

From 1990 to 2002, Professor Roberts was Associate Chair and Director of Undergraduate Studies for Computer Science. In that capacity, he was the principal architect of Stanford’s introductory programming sequence, which for many years held the distinction of being the largest course at Stanford. He has also written four computer science textbooks that are used at many colleges and universities throughout the world. His research focuses on computer science education, particularly for underserved communities. From 1998 to 2005, Roberts was Principal Investigator for the Bermuda Project, which developed the computer science curriculum for Bermuda’s public secondary schools.

In recent years, the United States and its European Union partners have often diverged in their policy outlooks towards the wider European periphery—the diverse region stretching from the Balkans and Turkey, to the Westernmost former-Soviet republics and Russia. Whether a temporary hiatus or a more profound strategic divergence, this state of affairs reflects a departure from the mission of extending peace, freedom and prosperity to the European continent that the two sides have pursued in the post-Cold War period.

Fabrizio Tassinari, PhD, is Head of Foreign Policy and EU Studies Unit at the Danish Institute for International Studies in Copenhagen. He is also a non-resident Fellow at the Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS) in Brussels and at the Center for Transatlantic Relations at Johns Hopkins’ SAIS in Washington, DC. He has written extensively on European security and integration. His book, Why Europe Fears Its Neighbors, was published on September 30, 2009.

 

Event Synopsis:

Dr. Tassinari's talk draws upon his recent book, "Why Europe Fears its Neighbors" (Praeger Security International, 2009), which attempts to survey and quantify the many challenges facing Europe with respect to its borders. Tassinari describes Europe's position toward neighbor countries as being influenced by the threat of immigration. He describes a "security-integration nexus" in progress since 1945, involving a gradual economic opening of Europe's borders to promote stability. While the EU today maintains to some degree its enlargement policy toward Turkey and the Western Balkans, other border-region states are classified under a "European neighborhood policy" with no prospects for EU membership. Recent policy discourse has decoupled security concerns from integration. The neighborhood approach, undermines EU policy by keeping neighbor states at too great a distance.

Next Tassinari offers Turkey and Russia as case studies. The debate within Turkey is leaning away from EU membership as the primary path toward modernization. Recent dialogue focuses less on meeting technical standards for EU membership and more on reckoning with issues of religion, identity and history within Turkey. With regards to Russia, in the past decade the country has become more assertive abroad and moved away from cooperation with the EU, preferring not to be grouped with countries like Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia in the EU's approach to foreign policy.

In addressing the transatlantic relationship, Dr. Tassinari reflects that the US and EU have long disagreed about EU membership for Turkey, the direction of state building in the Balkans, and integration of some of Europe's neighbor states into NATO.

Finally, responding to the question of whether this divergence comes from a conflict over the "European power constellation" or rather is simply the result of issue-specific philosophical differences, Dr. Tassinari offers three arguments:

1. Strategic: EU policy reflects multi-level integration, wherein countries can be "more than partners and less than members." Tassinari believes even countries with no prospect for membership should be integrated as much as possible. 
2. Normative - in reality, the US and EU share goals for Europe's "neighborhood" - promoting democracy, human rights, and other values. Despite this, each side's initiatives are viewed with suspicion by the other. 
3. Institution - US policymakers buy in to the EU enlargement policy, with its firm commitments and well-rehearsed conditionality process, and don't see alternative policies such as the "neighborhood" approach as being useful. 

A Q&A session following the talk raised such issues as: Will the EU’s problems with “deepening” its relationships with neighbors hurt its prospects for “widening” through enlargement? What are the reasons for the mixed signals to Turkey from the EU? Do arguments about the EU’s denial of Turkey’s membership being based on racism hold any merit? If the Lisbon Treaty is ratified, what cross-border policy areas will remain the prerogative of nation-states and which might fall under EU Commission jurisdiction?

 

Fariz Ismailzade, Azerbaijan, is director of the Advanced Foreign Service Program at the Azerbaijan Diplomatic Academy (ADA) within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Prior to joining ADA, Fariz worked for 10 years in the NGO sector of Azerbaijan, most recently as director of political programs at the International Republican Institute. Fariz has also conducted research at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.  His research mainly focuses on the geopolitics of the Caucasus region and CIS affairs. Fariz is a regular correspondent for Eurasianet.org, Transitions on Line, Jamestown Daily Monitor and Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst and has written on the politics and economics of Azerbaijan and the Caucasus region for Institute for War and Peace Report, East-West Institute, Analysis of Current Events, Freedom House, CaucasUS Context, Azerbaijan International and Collage. Fariz has also presented at international conferences, including the Middle Eastern Studies Association, NATO Advanced Research Workshop in Kiev, Ukraine, and the Association for Studies of Nationalities in New York.  Since 2006, he has been a recipient of the International Policy Fellowship Research Award.  Fariz earned his BA in political science from Western University in Baku and holds a Masters in social and economic development from Washington University in St. Louis.
 
Elin Suleymanov, Azerbaijan, is Azerbaijan’s first Consul General to Los Angeles, California with personal rank of Envoy Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary. Prior to that he served as Senior Counselor at the Foreign Relations Department, Office of the President in Baku, Azerbaijan and as Press Officer of the Azerbaijani Embassy in Washington, DC. Before joining diplomatic service, Mr. Suleymanov worked with United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees in Azerbaijan and with the Open Media Research Institute in Prague, Czech Republic. A graduate of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy in Medford, Massachusetts, Mr. Suleymanov also holds graduate degrees from the Political Geography department of the Moscow State University, Russia, and from the University of Toledo, Ohio. Mr. Suleymanov speaks Azerbaijani, English, Russian and Czech languages.

CO-SPONSORED BY CREEES

According to Professor Muiznieks, since the early 1990s, the Baltic states have been seen as unfriendly in the eyes of Russians due to their "return to the West" attitude. Professor Muiznieks explains the key features of Baltic-Russian relations while looking at how these problems may be resolved in the future.

Synopsis

Professor Muiznieks begins by discussing the less than warm relations between the Baltic states and Russia. He explains how this is particularly due to the Baltic states’ desire to “return to the West” since the early 1990s and escape Russian influence after so many years of occupation. This is particularly evident in the EU and the UN where Poland and Baltic States form a sort of anti-Russian “axis.” However, the Baltic states’ membership of such organizations means a share of their secrets, which, as Professor Muiznieks explains, the Russians subsequently exploit for intelligence purposes.

At the same time, Professor Muiznieks cites another crucial security issue for the Baltic states, energy security. Currently, there is less oil transit through the Baltic states then there was before; Professor Muiznieks believes this has helped issues of corruption. However, he notes energy companies still play a significant role both locally and in relations with Russia. Looking the future, Professor Muiznieks believes that while there are options for the Baltic states to lessen their electrical dependence on Russia by looking to Scandinavia, the shutting of Lithuania’s nuclear plant will most likely mean Latvia and Lithuania will turn to Russia for further supply. To Professor Muiznieks, the current situation holds opportunities but also many risks.

Unfortunately, the strategic power-plays continue on another platform, memory wars. Professor Muiznieks feels World War II is the key point of debate between the Baltic states and Russia. While Russia sees the war as a great triumph, the Baltic states view the conflict as a catastrophe which led to further occupation. Professor Muiznieks discusses the fact that this battle plays out locally through monuments or textbooks but also internationally through border disputes and UN resolutions. He cites the European Court of Human Rights as a new strategic arena for this war because of its utmost authority on the continent and the fact that its rulings can cement one group as victims and force others to pay compensation.  However, Professor Muiznieks believes any truce is unlikely. For him, this conflict is too linked to many personal family histories and not government based enough to be put to a real end.

Professor Muiznieks also looks to “compatriots” as a focal point of Baltic-Russian relations. “Compatriots,” in this case, are Russian citizens living abroad, particularly in the Baltic states. This issue is serious because Russian speakers comprise over a quarter of both Latvia and Estonia’s populations. Professor Muiznieks explains that tension was caused in the Baltic states after Russia’s war with Georgia as to how Russian policy would change towards its diasporas. In addition, Professor Muiznieks reveals that there is further concern over the possibility that Russia is encouraging speakers abroad to take up citizenship to create legal basis for any action against other states in the future. Professor Muiznieks also argues that funding for these “compatriots” is perhaps to counteract increasing EU influence in the region.

Overall, Professor Muiznieks believes that the Baltic states are seriously suffering from the global economic crisis which in turn is making it difficult for them to counteract Russian policy and be effective. Professor Muiznieks argues this makes the Baltic states quite vulnerable.

In a lengthy question-and-answer session, a multitude of points were raised. One of the key issues addressed was where the Baltic States, and in particular Latvia, fit in the European framework. This led to discussion of several other issues such as Scandanivia's changing role in the Baltic States, the role of the Baltic States in NATO, and language integration. Finally, another possibility much emphasized was the potential creation of nuclear power plants as a way to offset surging prices for Russian energy.