The Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC) has broadened its fellowship and funding opportunities to support Stanford students working in the area of contemporary Asia. The Center introduced these expanded offerings in response to the harsh impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic on student’s academic careers and their access to future jobs and valuable work experience, and in recognition of the critical need to make the field of Asian Studies more diverse and inclusive.

APARC’s diversity grant aims to encourage Stanford students from underrepresented minorities (URM) to engage in the study and research of topics related to contemporary Asia and U.S.-Asia relations, including economic, health, foreign policy, social, political, and security issues. The grant, which was first announced in June 2020, is now an ongoing offering. APARC will award a maximum of $10,000 per grant. Current  Stanford undergraduate and graduate students in the URM category from any major or discipline are eligible and encourage to apply.

APARC also invites Stanford Ph.D. candidates specializing in topics related to contemporary Asia to apply for its 2021-22 predoctoral fellowship. Up to three fellowships are available and the application deadline is May 1, 2021.

In addition, APARC continues to offer an expanded array of research assistant internships. The Center is currently seeking highly motivated Stanford undergraduate- and graduate-level students to join our team as paid research assistant interns for the spring and summer quarters of 2021. Applications for spring 2021 research assistant assignments are due on February 22, for summer 2021 assignments on March 8.

Stanford e-Oita is an online course for high school students in Oita Prefecture in the southwestern island of Kyushu, Japan, that is sponsored by the Oita Prefectural Government. Launched in fall 2019, it is offered by the Stanford Program on International and Cross-Cultural Education (SPICE) in collaboration with the Oita Prefectural Board of Education.

On January 8, 2021, Stanford e-Oita students were treated to a lecture by Sumire Hirotsuru, a professional violinist who was born and raised in Oita Prefecture. After graduating from Oita Uenogaoka High School, Hirotsuru attended and graduated from Harvard University and The Julliard School. She has performed with Yo-Yo Ma and the Silkroad Ensemble, and as a soloist at major venues in the United States and Japan, including Carnegie Hall, John F. Kennedy Center for the Performing Arts, and Suntory Hall, and at the Beppu Argerich Music Festival in Oita. After graduation from The Julliard School, Hirotsuru started her own company in New York City where she manages her own music promotional business. She is currently living in Japan.

Hirotsuru’s talk was titled “Sumire’s Journey in the U.S. and Japan.” While sharing thoughts on her upbringing in Oita, she had invaluable advice to the students like encouraging them to think about their strengths and the importance of balancing academics and extracurricular activities, in her case, practicing the violin. While introducing a typical day at Harvard, she emphasized the importance of building community in formal settings (e.g., through classes and musical practices and performances) as well as informal settings (e.g., having meals in her dorm with friends with diverse interests).

Since completing college, she has published several books. While sharing one of her publications, she underscored the critical importance of time management and setting benchmarks to reach one’s goals. She engaged students in thinking about a 2021 new year’s resolution and considering what needs to be achieved by June 2021, and even thinking about what needs to be done daily to meet their resolution.

Setting benchmarks resonated with Stanford e-Oita Instructor and fellow Harvard alumna, Kasumi Yamashita. Yamashita commented, “My e-Oita students were inspired by Sumire, who shared her personal journey from her hometown of Oita to the world stage. There’s a tendency to look outward and far away for new experiences but Sumire showed them how change can start in their own backyard. She talked about a cross-cultural program that she co-founded called ‘Summer in JAPAN,’ where Harvard undergraduates are invited to Oita to teach workshops and engage with Japanese students from many countries in English. It was one way that she brings her global experiences back to Oita, which is something I encourage my students to do.” Hirotsuru noted that she was inspired to begin Summer in JAPAN in Oita because she didn’t have any resource like that when she was growing up in Oita. “That was definitely one of my motivations to start a program like this.”

The emphasis on goal setting inspired a student to ask Hirotsuru about her current goal as a violinist. Hirotsuru replied that she aspires “to reach more people through music because right now, I feel like… classical music is often considered the music of people who have money… and access to concert halls. But I would like to bring my music to many people who are not only rich… I think music is something really important when you’re growing up.”

Hirotsuru’s talk also prompted one of the student musicians—a flutist of her high school brass band—to ask how Hirotsuru managed to balance both academics and violin practice. Hirotsuru responded by sharing, “You have a capacity of more than 100 percent… I think that you can put your effort completely on academics and flute at the same time by managing your time very efficiently.” Yamashita hopes that this lesson will be one that students will embrace far into their futures.

Reflecting on her experience with the students in Oita, Hirotsuru noted the following, “I was impressed by the students’ active participation in class—even through Zoom, I was able to see how their eyes were filled with excitement and passion for the future. I truly believe that there will be more opportunities for the students to expand their perspectives from Oita and beyond, as long as they keep their minds open.”

SPICE is grateful to Oita Governor Katsusada Hirose whose vision made this course possible. SPICE is also appreciative of Teacher Consultants Keisuke Toyoda and Hironori Sano for their unwavering support of Stanford e-Oita.

The incoming Biden-Harris foreign policy team recognizes well that technology now sits at the epicenter of geopolitics: all aspects of government power — military, economic, and normative — increasingly derive from dominance in technology. The new U.S. team also recognizes that the transatlantic alliance should be working together to drive a 21^st-century digital agenda that reflects democratic values. Unfortunately, during the Trump administration, the prospect of such cooperation diminished. Instead, the transatlantic rift over technology policy has grown. Disagreements over government surveillance, private sector data collection and sharing, platform content restrictions, digital competition, and protection of fundamental freedoms like privacy and free expression mean that Europe and the United States find themselves increasingly at odds

Just this summer, the EU Court of Justice struck down the Privacy Shield arrangement, negotiated during the Obama-Biden administration to facilitate cross-border data transfers, putting $7 trillion in digital trade at risk. Instead of democratic unity, some European leaders have embraced a concept of “digital sovereignty” (similar to the Chinese concept of “cyber sovereignty”) in the face of a perceived technology cold war between the U.S. and China. .

Ironically, one area of agreement seems to be the threat posed by dominant U.S. technology companies. Last month, the European Union unveiled new regulation that would impose fines of up to 10 percent of revenue on large “gatekeeper” companies -- a euphemism for US “Big Tech” -- that abuse their market power. In the waning days of the Trump administration, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) filed an anti-trust lawsuit against Facebook and launched an investigation into data collection at nine companies. At a time when Europe and the United States are divided on many tech issues, they have converged on one point: big tech companies are bad for democracies.

No doubt, a democratic regulatory framework for digital services is long overdue. This should be a focal point for the new administration. The heart of that framework should be protection of fundamental rights to privacy, free expression, freedom of assembly and association, as well as transparency and accountability mechanisms that support user’s procedural rights.

But policymakers on both sides of the Atlantic need to be careful not to hit the wrong target. The real threat to democracies isn’t the size or dominance of U.S. tech companies: it’s China’s rapidly spreading model of digital authoritarianism. Rather than focusing primarily on competition within their borders, Europe and the United States need to raise their sights and consider the much more ominous competitive threat posed by Chinese technological dominance.

The global tech race is about far more than market competition – it is a normative battle. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) understands that geopolitical and normative power stem from dominance in digital technologies. It has focused on becoming a global innovation powerhouse through fusion of its civil-military tech R&D and direct support of its tech industry. The immensity of Beijing’s investment in emerging technologies is staggering, with no less than 16 different “Manhattan Project”-scale initiatives in fields as varied as artificial intelligence, quantum computing, cryptography, 5G, facial recognition, and genomics.

As China’s tech industry grows, so does its ability to set international norms and standards that reflect authoritarian values and interests. Beijing has deployed ground-breaking technology for repression, most notably against the Uighur minority in Xinjiang, where an unprecedented system of mass surveillance monitors the movement of people, phones, and vehicles to detect inappropriate activity that merits investigation or detention. At the same time, China presumes state control over all data and seeks to normalize its concept of “cyber sovereignty” (a concept uncomfortably close to the EU’s chosen term “digital sovereignty”) which rejects outside scrutiny of its use of technology to violate human rights.

Most concerningly, Beijing’s dominance in technology has translated into greater clout in the international diplomatic realm. Its influence has been visible in tech standard setting bodies like the ITU, where it has sought to embed its preferred protocols in next generation interoperability standards. At the UN Human Rights Council, China succeeded in convincing a majority of countries not to criticize its repressive uses of technology in Xinjiang and Hong Kong.

To combat the rise of China’s model of digital authoritarianism, Europe and the United States cannot focus solely on technology challenges within their own borders. They must overcome their own tech policy divisions and embrace responsibility to develop a democratic digital strategy that attracts global support. The agenda must simultaneously drive innovation and solidify a normative framework for governance of data and technology that protects fundamental rights. In an olive branch to the incoming Biden Administration, the EU proposed to set a joint transatlantic tech agenda. It then turned around to sign a massive trade deal with China. These mixed signals could send us in the wrong direction. The Biden administration should seize the first entrée and set up a process to immediately seek concrete progress on our shared technology interests. To be effective, such an agenda must emphasize three core areas.

First, the U.S. and E.U. must develop a joint plan to protect critical supply chains and invest in emerging technologies. This should include concrete mechanisms for U.S.-EU cooperation on innovation and increased joint investment in emerging technology research.

Second, the plan must articulate a democratic approach to cross-border data protection and a shared framework for governance of digital society consistent with universal human rights principles. A new process could be established to reconcile diverging policies on privacy and free expression, as well as norms on use of data and technology by governments and the private sector.

Third, transatlantic partners must reenergize their international diplomacy and develop a coordinated strategy to combat China’s influence in both tech standards and norm setting bodies. The United States and Europe must attract, and then leverage, the combined power of democratic coalitions at multilateral institutions to push back against China’s encroaching influence. Incorporating technology innovation as part of international development efforts will add to the attraction. 

A shared technology agenda can provide a new underpinning for the transatlantic alliance, on par with collective defense and a commitment to democratic values and principles. Regulation for regulation’s sake will only weaken democracies’ already waning dominance in digital technologies, and with it, our collective ability to set the international normative agenda on everything from artificial intelligence to cloud computing. Digital sovereignty that prevents collaboration is not the way forward. Working together to secure a democratic digital domain should be the ultimate goal. In this effort, U.S. tech companies are not the enemy.

On December 10, 2020, 44 educators from across the United States joined a webinar titled “Global Human Rights and Minority Social Movements in Japan.” The webinar was offered on Human Rights Day, 72 years after the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) was adopted. The featured speaker was Dr. Kiyoteru Tsutsui, who is the Henri H. and Tomoye Takahashi Professor and Senior Fellow in Japanese Studies at the Shorenstein APARC at Stanford University. He is also Director of the Japan Program, a Senior Fellow of FSI, and a Professor of Sociology.

The webinar can be viewed below:

Tsutsui has written extensively about human rights, including his latest book Rights Make Might: Global Human Rights and Minority Social Movements in Japan. In his talk, Tsutsui introduced the three most salient minority groups in Japan—the Ainu, an indigenous people in the northern part of Japan whose numbers range from 25,000 to 30,000; resident Koreans (Zainichi), a colonial legacy whose numbers have hovered around a half million; and the Burakumin, a former outcaste group whose numbers are approximately three million.

Tsutsui set the context for his talk by providing an overview of the global expansion of human rights dating from the UDHR in 1948 to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights—both adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1966 and came into force from 1976. Human rights are now established as one of the key principles in the international community. He noted that despite the wide recognition of human rights as an important international norm, whether the institutionalization of human rights in international society has done what it was intended to do still remains debatable.

Concerning the era of global human rights in Japan, Japan ratified the two International Covenants noted above in 1979 and has been a member of the UN Commission on Human Rights since 1982 and the UN Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights since 1984. These as well as participation in other forums have impacted ethnic minorities in Japan.

Tsutsui shared the historical backgrounds and key issues concerning the Ainu and resident Koreans. Concerning the Ainu, he underscored their lack of ethnic/indigenous pride—much less political activism—prior to the 1970s. This was largely because of their dependence on government welfare and strong pressure for assimilation. He then highlighted how Ainus’ self-perception changed after the 1970s as a result of their exposure to the Global Indigenous Rights Movement, which led to a reawakening of indigenous pride and the rise of Ainu activism.

Concerning resident Koreans, Tsutsui introduced their history prior to the 1970s as Japanese colonial era immigrants and their descendants who came to Japan or were brought to Japan by increasingly forceful means towards the end of World War II. He discussed issues concerning their loss of Japanese citizenship after World War II, resulting practices such as the fingerprinting of resident Koreans, and hurdles to mobilize for civil and human rights due to their non-citizen status and divided identities. Like the Ainu, things began to change from the 1970s with the beginning of the human rights era in Japan. For example, from the 1980s, encouraged by universal human rights principles, some resident Koreans refused to be fingerprinted, a practice they had previously resented but reluctantly complied with, and by 1985, over 10,000 resident Koreans joined in refusal. Resident Koreans made appeals to the UN Commission on Human Rights and other international forums to pressure the Japanese government. Amid mounting pressure domestically and internationally, the government terminated the fingerprinting practice for permanent residents in Japan (largely resident Koreans) in 1993, and for all alien residents by 2000.

Tsutsui summarized his talk by noting that global human rights galvanized minority social movements in Japan in four ways: (1) they empowered local actors with a new understanding about rights; (2) they provided political opportunities at the global level; (3) they increased international flows of mobilization resources; and (4) they provided vocabulary to frame their causes effectively. He closed his talk with a question, “Should we have hope or despair in terms of the future of human rights in the world?” and noted that the empowering capacity of global human rights is often overlooked, that reform takes time, that it is important to identify conditions conducive to improvement, and that contemporary backlash poses serious challenges.

In reflecting on the webinar with the educators, Tsutsui noted, “I was honored to present my work to the educators who can teach students in their formative years how important it is to continuously work to support human rights and how these efforts in the local context can change human rights practices not just locally but globally. This is a particularly important moment in the United States and in the world to reinforce the importance of human rights and democracy, as fundamental principles of democratic governance are challenged and protection of basic rights is in jeopardy. In these challenging times, I’d like to emphasize the importance of continuing grassroots-level work to support the principles of human rights and democracy. Ideas matter, and education shapes the future of our world.”

Teachers might consider some of the following as essential questions to raise with their students after viewing the lecture by Professor Tsutsui:

• How does the Ainu experience compare to the experience of Native Americans?
• How do textbooks in Japan cover ethnic minorities, and how is this similar and different to how ethnic minorities in the United States are covered in textbooks?
• How was ethnic minority participation in the Japanese military during World War II similar and different to ethnic minority participation in the U.S. military during World War II?
• What role can museums that focus on ethnic minorities play in educating the public, e.g., National Ainu Museum, National Museum of African American History and Culture?
• How is the backlash against ethnic minorities in Japan, e.g., being perceived as receiving special benefits, similar or different to that of ethnic minorities in the United States?
• Why is it important for young students to understand the significance of universal human rights?

The webinar was made possible through the support of the Freeman Foundation’s National Consortium for Teaching about Asia initiative. The webinar was a joint collaboration between SPICE and Stanford’s Center for East Asian Studies, and the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center. Special thanks to Dr. Dafna Zur, CEAS Director, and John Groschwitz, CEAS Associate Director, for their support; to Dr. Gi-Wook Shin, APARC Director, and Dr. Karen Eggleston, APARC Deputy Director, for their support; and to SPICE’s Naomi Funahashi for facilitating the webinar and Sabrina Ishimatsu for planning the webinar.