Ambassador Charles L. Pritchard, an expert on U.S. relations with Japan and Korea, was a top aide to President Bush in the administration's negotiations with North Korea and the U.S. Representative to the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO). He was also special assistant to the President and senior director for Asian affairs in the Clinton administration. Pritchard joined the Brookings Institution as a visiting fellow in the Foreign Policy Studies program on September 2, 2003. While at Brookings, Pritchard has published "North Korea Needs A Personal Touch", Los Angeles Times (09/10/03); "A Guarantee to Bring Kim into Line", Financial Times (10/10/03); "Freeze on North Korea Nuclear Program is Imperative", The Korea Herald (01/09/04); "What I Saw in North Korea", New York Times (01/21/04), "While the US Looked for Iraqi WMD North Korea Built Theirs", YaleGlobal(01/01/04), and "U.S. Should Confide in Allies on North Korean Nukes", Asahi Shimbun/International Herald Tribune (08/06-07/04).

Following a twenty-eight year career in the army, during which he held military assign-ments with the Office of the Secretary of Defense, as its country director for Japan, and as the U.S. Army Attaché in Tokyo, Pritchard joined the National Security Council in 1996.

Pritchard obtained his B.A. in Political Science from Mercer University in Georgia and his M.A. in International Studies from the University of Hawaii. He is the recipient of the Defense Distinguished Service Medal.

Marc J. Ventresca is University Lecturer in Management Studies at Saïd Business School, University of Oxford, Fellow of Wolfson College, and University Fellow at the James Martin Institute for Science and Civilization. For 2004-5 he is a Research Fellow in Organizational Learning and Homeland Security, CISAC, IIS, Stanford University.

His research and teaching interests focus on institutions, organizations, and industry entrepreneurship; organizational learning; organization design and managing change; environmental management; power and leadership in organizations, and economic sociology of strategy.

He earned his Ph.D. in sociology at Stanford University, after master's degrees in policy analysis and education and in sociology. He has taught at the Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University, the University of Illinois, the Copenhagen Business School, the Center for Work, Technology, and Organizations at Stanford University, and the Stanford Institute for Research on Higher Education.

Prior to a faculty career, Dr. Ventresca worked as a policy analyst at the Congressional Budget Office in Washington D.C., studied language and politics in Florence, Italy, and worked as a technical writer for hopeful start-ups in Silicon Valley.

Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono is Indonesia's new president. He and his vice presidential running mate, Jusuf Kalla, were elected by a landslide on 20 September 2004 and inaugurated one month later. On 18 November, when Prof. Liddle speaks, the new government will have been in office for nearly a month. What can be said about its performance to date - and in the future? Prof. Liddle will cover a range of topics related to the new leadership in Jakarta, including the prospects for democratic consolidation.

R. William Liddle is a well-known Indonesia specialist. He has written about Indonesian politics since the early 1960s. His recent scholarly publications include: "Indonesia's Approaching Elections: Politics, Islam, and Public Opinion" (with Saiful Mujani), Journal of Democracy (January 2004) and "Indonesia's Democratic Transition: Playing by the Rules," in Andrew Reynolds, ed., The Architecture of Democracy (2002). Prof. Liddle writes and speaks often for international and Indonesian media.

Bahtiar Effendy has written widely on Islam and politics in Indonesia. His latest book is Islam and the State in Indonesia (2003). He is deputy director of the Institute for the Study and Advancement of Business Ethics. He also co-hosts a popular Indonesian television talk show on public affairs.

Australian Prime Minister John Howard's government has strongly reaffirmed the ANZUS (Australia-New Zealand-US) alliance and his country's cultural ties to Europe. Critics have replied that these policies impede the development of Australian relations with Southeast Asia, especially now that the US is so unpopular in much of the region. How valid is the critique? And how will likely trends in Southeast Asia and the outcome of the American presidential election affect Australia's search for a balance between its proximity to Asia and its alliance with America? In addition to addressing these questions, Dr. Engel will argue that in making foreign policy, identity politics need not be sacrificed to or precluded by pragmatic interest. In Southeast Asian international relations, rhetoric and realism hardly rule each other out.

Dr. David Engel's responsibilities at the Australian Embassy in Washington include policies toward Southeast Asia. He has directed the Indonesia section of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (2001-03) in Canberra, served in Jakarta (1998-2001) and Phnom Penh (1993-95), and worked on Australia's relations with Vietnam and Laos as well. He received his PhD from the University of Edinburgh in 1989.

This is the Forum's 1st seminar of the 2004-2005 Academic Year

I am a child of the Cold War. As such, my thinking for decades was conditioned by the great issue of that era: How to maintain freedom in the face of our perceptions of Soviet ambitions for world domination?

For the first few decades of the Cold War, the United States strategy for achieving this objective was containment backed up with a powerful nuclear deterrence. But as the nuclear arms race heated up, it became increasingly clear that this strategy risked precipitating a nuclear holocaust. Thus, by the late sixties, nuclear arms control had become the overriding security issue - certainly it dominated my thinking on security during that era.

But with the ending of the Cold War, the threat of nuclear holocaust receded and arms control, as we had practiced it during that era, was no longer the dominant security issue. The most serious threat to the United States became nuclear weapons in the hands of failed states or terrorists - used not in a standard military operation, but in extortive or apocalyptic ways. Therefore, in the present era, preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons replaces arms control as the organizing principle for our security. Certainly it has dominated my thinking on security for the last decade.