Society

FSI researchers work to understand continuity and change in societies as they confront their problems and opportunities. This includes the implications of migration and human trafficking. What happens to a society when young girls exit the sex trade? How do groups moving between locations impact societies, economies, self-identity and citizenship? What are the ethnic challenges faced by an increasingly diverse European Union? From a policy perspective, scholars also work to investigate the consequences of security-related measures for society and its values.

The Europe Center reflects much of FSI’s agenda of investigating societies, serving as a forum for experts to research the cultures, religions and people of Europe. The Center sponsors several seminars and lectures, as well as visiting scholars.

Societal research also addresses issues of demography and aging, such as the social and economic challenges of providing health care for an aging population. How do older adults make decisions, and what societal tools need to be in place to ensure the resulting decisions are well-informed? FSI regularly brings in international scholars to look at these issues. They discuss how adults care for their older parents in rural China as well as the economic aspects of aging populations in China and India.

Authors
Rafiq Dossani
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Two countries with a common and ancient civilization, India and Pakistan, celebrated 60 years of independence from colonial rule this week. At the time of independence, both countries were in danger of collapsing from internal and external threats. This greatly influenced both countries' subsequent turn toward centralism - in India's case, statism, and in Pakistan's case, army rule.

For four decades, both statism and army rule seemed irreversible. This was despite failures across the board: In both countries, territory was lost and the economy stagnated. Resources were spent on developing nuclear weaponry and on dealing with the Kashmir insurgency, which was fostered by Pakistan and repressed by India. What was left was often wasted through corruption. By 1990, it was common for Pakistan to be labeled a failed state and India, perhaps more damningly, a failed democracy.

Pakistan's army and feudal landlords, who shared political power via an informal coalition throughout the first 40 years, deserve most of the blame for Pakistan's failures. They carved up the economy among themselves, and let the poor survive by growing food and providing simple services to the rich. India's greater failures hid these strategies from national or global attention. Pakistan even overtook India for a while until Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's nationalizations of the 1970s brought them on par again.

Pakistan, a day older than India, but with an even younger population, seems to have aged more poorly over the past two decades. As the Indian economy picks up speed on the back of the 1991 reforms, India is on its way to becoming a global player in services and acquiring as formidable a reputation as China for job creation. The IT sector alone creates three new jobs every minute of each working day. In the four statistics that really matter - literacy, life expectancy, infant mortality rates and the female-to-male ratio - only in the last does Pakistan perform better than India and that, too, marginally. In the others, it is substantially worse.

There is no single reason for Pakistan's poorer performance. It turned as reformist as India in the 1990s. This has benefited some parts of its economy. For instance, the country adds over 2.5 million new cell phone users each month, or 1 for every second of the day. Though below India's rate of 2.7 new cell phone users per second, it is a much better ratio to the population.

Religious fervor is often accused, but has not - in either the subcontinent's history or in Pakistan's shorter one - been a barrier to development. Despite incidents such as led to the recent siege of the Red Mosque in Islamabad, theocratic parties have never received more than 15 percent of the popular vote - and that was three decades ago. Evidence within all the countries of South Asia provides proof of the proposition that the poor, regardless of faith or ethnicity, seek the means of development, particularly the acquisition of education. Muslims are no exception to this proposition. For instance, the first administrative district to reach 100 percent literacy in the subcontinent was the Muslim-majority district of Malappuram in the Indian state of Kerala.

Finally, one cannot simply blame performance on Pakistan not being a full democracy. The world abounds with more failed than successful democracies, while China provides the most stunning counterexample of a successful dictatorship. Pakistan's current state of governance - in which the military, the courts and parliament share power and the press is relatively free - has been achieved through decades of negotiation and may well be the best framework given its current stage of political maturity.

Yet, there is one difference that may be the real reason for Pakistan's backwardness, and it is now becoming evident - again, by comparison with India. It is linked to bad governance but does not always follow from the democratic tradition. The difference is, in a word, freedom. India provides a good example: The government used to decide how resources were spent, leaving citizens with few choices on careers, education and lifestyles - on participation in their nation's growth. Since the 1990s, the Indian state has worked hard to give its citizens more freedom. The result is an invigorated India.

Pakistan, meanwhile, has moved slowly on freedom. The state has withdrawn from the economy, but now grants favors selectively to the private sector, with the inevitable corollary of massive corruption and loss of freedom of action.

This suggests that Pakistan is only a crucial freedom step away from success. In reality, the immediate future does not look promising because the country's citizens do not have the political will to achieve real change. It is a sad commentary that Pakistan's choices for the next cycle of political rule look like bad ones: the continuation of the present system of quasi-military rule or its replacement with the destructive feudal forces that Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif represent. Surely, Pakistan's citizens deserve much better - something worth pondering as their nation celebrates turning 60.

Reprinted with permission by The San Jose Mercury News.

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Stanford Law School
Transatlantic Technology Law Forum
559 Nathan Abbott Way
Stanford, CA 94305-8610

(650) 723-8532
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Distinguished Austrian Chair Professor (2010)
Visiting Professor, Stanford Law School
fina_kl_245x331.jpg JD, J.S.D

Siegfried Fina is co-director of the Stanford-Vienna Transatlantic Technology Law Forum (a joint venture of Stanford Law School and the University of Vienna School of Law) and an associate professor of European Union Law and Technology Law at the University of Vienna School of Law in Austria. His work focuses on the business-related and the technology-related law and policy of the European Union as well as on the legal aspects of the EU-U.S. trade and the economic governance issues of the transatlantic marketplace.

Until 2002, Fina was an associate professor of law at the Vienna University of Technology. He also is an adjunct associate professor of law at Danube University Krems in Austria. He is a member of the board of directors of the International Federation for European Law (FIDE) and a member of the European Union Studies Association of the U.S. and Austria. Fina received a JD and JSD from the University of Vienna School of Law. In addition, he received a Diploma in Business Administration from the Vienna University of Economics and Business Administration, a Diploma in Political Science from the University of Vienna Department of Government and Political Science, and a post-graduate Diploma in International Studies from the University of Vienna.

Co-Director, Stanford-Vienna Transatlantic Technology Law Forum
Europe Center Research Affiliate
Associate Professor of Law, University of Vienna, Austria
Authors
Daniel C. Sneider
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Commentary
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Japan's ruling party suffered a historic defeat Sunday. For the first time since the conservative Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) was formed in 1955, an opposition party has become the largest party in the upper house.

The powerful message delivered by Japanese voters has significant implications not only for Japan but also for the rest of the world, not least for its close ally, the United States.

The election result revives momentum in Japan toward creation of a viable two-party system, potentially ending the conservative postwar monopoly on power. Japanese voters expressed deep anxiety about the impact of economic change upon their treasured social order. They embraced the campaign of the Democratic Party (the main opposition) against growing income inequality and the failure of the state to take care of an aging population.

Equally important, the vote was a humiliating defeat for Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's agenda of giving priority to revising Japan's antiwar Constitution and allowing its military to take on a global role in support of the US. Democratic Party leader Ichiro Ozawa effectively portrayed Mr. Abe as a man out of touch with the concerns of ordinary Japanese. But he also articulated an alternative vision of Japan's international role, calling for closer ties to its Asian neighbors and sending troops overseas only under the auspices of United Nations peacekeeping missions.

Since 9/11, Japan has been among the most loyal, if not unquestioning, of US allies. It sent troops to Iraq, provided logistical support to the war in Afghanistan, and outdid the US in putting pressure on North Korea. Most recently, Abe echoed the rhetoric of the Bush administration, calling for formation of a "values-based" alliance of democracies along with India and Australia, implicitly aimed at containing a rising China. The election results will certainly slow, if not reverse, this tight synchronization.

For the business community, the vote will raise concerns that needed economic policy actions such as fiscal reforms will get stalled in a gridlocked parliament. The vote reminds politicians that the economic recovery has left an awful lot of Japanese behind, with real wages falling, youth unemployment high, and the elderly drawing down their savings to survive. Abe's feel-good rhetoric and focus on security just angered those Japanese.

There remains strong support for gradual change. Most Japanese want the country to take on a more "normal" security role, but one that will stop far short of overdrawn fears of a remilitarized Japan. And many Japanese, particularly in the younger generation, back economic reform, though not at the expense of social stability.

The most intriguing question is the future of Japan's democracy. Abe is resisting calls for his resignation, attributing the vote to a series of scandals in his Cabinet and most of all to the revelation that the government's national pension system had lost the records of some 50 million people. The election result was bad luck, Abe claimed, not a repudiation of his administration's overall policies -- a view shared by Washington policymakers.

Exit polls do confirm that voters were strongly motivated by these issues. But they also express little faith in the personal leadership of Abe, who tried to cover up the pension debacle. He suffered from an unfavorable comparison to his predecessor, Junichiro Koizumi, one of Japan's most popular postwar leaders.

But the election suggests that Mr. Koizumi's personal charisma only temporarily reversed a longer trend of drift away from the ruling conservatives, particularly by unaffiliated swing voters in Japan's cities and suburbs. Mr. Ozawa, one of Japan's most brilliant politicians, managed to both regain those voters and steal away traditional conservative backers in rural areas among farmers and pensioners worried about their future.

Ozawa, whom I have known for more than two decades, is a man of uncommon political vision. He is a former LDP stalwart who has relentlessly pursued the goal of creating a clearly defined two-party system that can create real competition. He was the architect of a split in the LDP that briefly brought the opposition to power in the early 1990s.

Over dinner last fall, Ozawa laid out to me what seemed then like an incredibly audacious plan to regain power. First to win a series of local elections, leading up to a defeat of the LDP in the upper house election, forcing in turn the dissolution of the lower house and new elections. He clearly hopes to split the LDP again and pry away its coalition partner, the New Komeito Party, as part of his strategy of realignment.

The Democratic Party has yet to demonstrate its own ability to rule, but it would be unwise to underestimate Ozawa. And it would be foolish to dismiss the desire for change delivered by Japanese voters on Sunday.

Reprinted with permission by the Christian Science Monitor.

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This project examines the law and policy of the European Union for e-business activities as well as the relevant economic governance issues and regulatory practices including the transatlantic (EU-U.S.) marketplace. In its initial stage, the project includes the "European Union E-commerce Law: Consolidated Legislation" project. This project focuses on the legal framework of the European Union for pursuing e-business activities in Europe.

In the debates surrounding genetically modified organisms in the food supply, the issue of labeling has become ever more salient. The EU is developing regulations to require labeling and traceability for all foods containing or derived from GMOs. Other countries, including Australia, Brazil, Japan, New Zealand, Russia, South Korea and Thailand are also in the process of developing voluntary labeling guidelines. In January of 2000, 130 countries adopted the Cartagena Protocol on Bio-safety which calls for bulk shipments of GMO commodities, such as corn or soybeans that are intended to be used as food, feed or for processing, to be accompanied by documentation stating that such shipments "may contain" living modified organisms and are "not intended for intentional introduction into the environment." Will these labeling systems prevent trade disruptions and enhance the international trading system established by the WTO? Or will they act as non-tariff barriers that obfuscate consumer decisions and lead to greater expense, confusion and ultimately to new trade wars?

Any GMO labeling debate must take into consideration the political, economic, legal, operational and administrative aspects of such labeling. The political considerations include the maintenance of confidence in the food system and how policy makers balance the demands of domestic constituencies against their various international obligations, such as under WTO Technical Barriers to Trade Agreement. The economic questions focus on a cost/benefit analysis of segregation and identity-preservation and whether labels provide information or capture a premium for producers. The legal issues include the possible challenge of discrimination in trade and the extent of liability under domestic law for misleading or incorrect labels. Operational adn administrative questions center on whether to make labels mandatory, whether to take a product or process approach, how feasible and costly are particular approaches and whether it is necessary it is necessary to require full traceability.

The workshop will be hosted by the European Forum of the Institute for International Studies at Stanford University. The goal of the workshop is to make a significant contribution to the ongoing policy debate. Participants will include academic, government and private sector specialists and bring expertise in economics, law and political science.

Seminars
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Professor Winkler portrays the 'German Question" through the lens of history in the past 150 years. He examines a variety of key issues that have arisen throughout German history and acknowledges that this 'German Question' period has come to an end. Professor Winkler also looks to Germany's future in Europe.

Synopsis

To Prof. Winkler, the reunification of Germany in 1990 resolved the ‘German Question.’ However, he argues that it has been a question not just since World War I but since the dissolution of the Holy Roman Empire in 1806. Prof. Winkler believes that this event was not simply a struggle for territory but also involved striving for unity and freedom. These two key values, which Prof. Winkler emphasizes throughout his lecture, can be characterized by a constitutional nation-state. Prof. Winkler explains that although the 1848 Revolution was a failure, it was a step forward in that Germany realized that Austria was not going to be part of this nation-state when it would be created. Prof. Winkler cites that in creating the Prussian nation-state in 1871, Bismarck took care of the unity aspect. However, “parliamentization,” as he Prof. Winkler puts it, only occurred in 1918. He argues that this democratization of post-World War I Germany helped Hitler’s rise to power and then collapsed once Hitler started taking control of the government.

However, Prof. Winkler explains that Hitler’s fall initiated a learning process for the German people that was even more severe than after 1918, but this time not all had the chance to turn to democracy. Although many Germans longed to be reunited with their compatriots, a new mission for European integration of West Germany arose in as early as the late 1940s. Prof. Winkler explains it was an intellectual movement, primarily advanced by Catholic conservatives, which gradually shifted more to the middle and left. By 1986, this movement had shifted thoroughly left, at a time where many Germans had come to feel that the separation of East and West Germany was necessary, pointing to Auschwitz to support their point.

Prof. Winkler argues that once the Berlin Wall fell, the post-national identity that West Germany had created still remained. This created issues with many desiring European integration before German reunification. However, Prof. Winkler explains this notionwas argued down by notables such as Willy Brandt, who felt the guilt of World War II could not fade through indefinite division. Prof. Winkler argues that once Germany was reunified, although post-war guilt still remained, it had finally achieved unity and freedom, thus resolving the ‘German Question.’ Prof. Winkler finishes by revealing his belief in the uniqueness of German history in that while it belonged to the West, it had continually rejected the democratic enlightenment. Prof. Winkler emphasizes his belief that it is time for Germany to understand its history in order to know where ti stands now and how it can contribute to Europe. He argues that the way Germany confronts its history will be “crucial” to Europe as well.

About the speaker

Heinrich August Winkler studied history, philosophy, and public law in Tubingen, Heidelberg, and Munster. He was associate professor at the Freie Universitat in Berlin in 1970-72 and then professor of modern history in Freiburg until 1991. He has been at the Humboldt-Universitat in Berlin since 1992, and has been a visiting scholar in Princeton, at the Wilson Center in Washington, at the Institute for Advanced Studies in Berlin, and at the Historisches Kolleg in Munich. He is the author of numerous works including "Germany: The Long Road West," for which he won the Friedrich Schiedel Prize for Literature in 2002.

Encina Ground Floor Conference Room

Heinrich August Winkler Speaker
Seminars
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On March 18, 1871, Taewongun (Grand Prince) who held real power when King Kojong (r. 1863-1907) assumed power at the age of 12, issued a historical order that was enforced nationwide: All Confucian private academies ever built, except for the forty-seven royal-chartered ones, were to be destroyed. To justify this unprecedented repression, Taewongun argued that the academies were "the fundamental causes for the decaying nation." During the period from 1865 to 1871, over 800 academies were abolished and these intermediate organizations largely disappeared from the central scene of the Korean history and politics. Taewongun's startling regulation of private academies was rather surprising. From the sixteenth to the eighteenth centuries, Choson monarchs enthusiastically encouraged and sponsored the establishment of the academies on the ground that the academy growth would contribute to country's moral reform and state-building. Why did the dramatic change of governmental policy on the academies occur? How can we resolve this historical enigma? To answer these questions, Koo situates this historical drama in a broader -structural- sociological context involving political competition between the state and nascent civil society, in association with his aim of overcoming the current historical explanations emphasizing more imminent causes of the abolition, such as military and fiscal abuses of the academies.

Jeong-Woo Koo is a visiting scholar at the department of sociology, Stanford University. He received his Ph.D. in Sociology from Stanford University in 2007. His interests include comparative-historical sociology, organizations, sociology of education, political sociology, quantitative method, and East-Asian studies. His dissertation explores a long term political competition between state and civil society in Choson Korea. He is currently working on two projects, one on the worldwide expansion of international human rights and its impact on nation-states (with John Meyer and Francisco Ramirez), and the other on the formation of regionalism in East Asia (with Gi-Wook Shin). His publications include "The Origins of the Public Sphere and Civil Society: Private Academies and Petitions in Korea, 1506-1800," Social Science History 31: 3 (Fall 2007), and "World Society and Human Rights: Worldwide Foundings of National Human Rights Institutions, 1978-2004," Korean Journal of Sociology 41: 3 (Spring 2007).

Philippines Conference Room

Jeong-Woo Koo Visiting Scholar, Department of Sociology, Stanford University Speaker
Seminars
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Hermann Simon is a historian and director of the New Synagogue Berlin-Centrum Judaicum Foundation. From 1988 to 1995 he supervised the restoration of the historical building which houses the New Synagogue. He read history and oriental studies at the Humboldt University in Berlin, and undertook graduate work on oriental numismatics in Prague, receiving his doctorate in 1976. From 1977 to 1988 he was active in this field, working as curator of oriental coins at the Bode Museum and as Director of Public Relations at the Staatliche Museen, Berlin. He has directed numerous exhibitions at the New Synagogue Berlin-Centrum Judaicum Foundation and elsewhere.

Dr. Simon has authored numerous articles on the history of Jews in Germany and numismatics as well as the book Das Berliner Jüdische Museum in der Oranienburger Straße, the third edition of which appeared in 2000. He is editor of the book series, Jewish Memoirs and Jewish Miniatures, and coeditor of the book series Jews in Berlin (with Andreas Nachama and Julius Schoeps).

Dr. Simon's wife, Deborah Simon, will also be at this seminar. Ms. Simon studied translation and interpreting (English and Spanish) at Humboldt University in Berlin. She has spent her working life teaching German-English translation at her alma mater. Besides translating numerous articles, Ms. Simon has created teaching materials for a variety of university courses in translation studies.

Sponsored by the Forum on Contemporary Europe, the Taube Center for Jewish Studies, and the German Consulate of San Francisco.

CISAC Conference Room

Hermann Simon Director of the New Synagogue Berlin - Centrum Judaicum Foundation Speaker
Seminars
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