Leave-Taking Led to Higher Support

The findings are not only timely, but they also provide the strongest evidence yet of how COVID has changed employers’ minds about paid family leave, Rossin-Slater says. Since 2016, she and her co-authors — Ann Bartel, Meredith Slopen, and Jane Waldfogel of Columbia University, and Christopher Ruhm of the University of Virginia — have been surveying employers with 10-99 employees in New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania to learn about the effects of paid family leave. As part of their annual questionnaire, they have asked firms in New York and New Jersey to share their overall attitudes toward the policy. This is how they were able to reliably gauge in this latest study how small business owners and managers were feeling about paid leave on the eve of the pandemic.

Another advantage of the survey is that it focuses on employers’ experiences with paid family leave during COVID and not, as most other polls have done, only on workers.

Rossin-Slater says that assessing employers’ overall attitudes, in addition to measuring effects on operational issues, provides further evidence as to whether businesses are harmed by paid leave.

“Actual views provide a summary of how businesses think the policy is affecting operations,” she says. “If it was a disaster and really hard for them, they’re probably not going to be very supportive. The opposite is likely if their experience was smooth and not complicated.”

In all, 539 New York and New Jersey businesses that participated in the 2019 survey also responded in 2020, rating their opinions on paid family leave according to a 5-point scale. The researchers analyzed changes in opinions within each firm and controlled for other factors that could have changed over the time period, such as the total number of employees and their characteristics. They found that the share of employers reporting that they were very or somewhat supportive of the policy rose by 9.6 percentage points, from 61.6 percent to 71.2 percent. Meanwhile, the portion of firms that were somewhat or very opposed declined by 8.8 percentage points, to 11.2 percent.

The increase in support was somewhat larger among employers with 50-99 workers, although the rise in favorable opinions was also meaningful among even the smallest employers in the study. The researchers also found that employee use of state paid leave during COVID was associated with more favorable employer views.

“What’s striking,” Rossin-Slater says, “is that during COVID — when it’s become incredibly clear how important it is for workers to be able to take time off work with pay and job protection to care for ill family members or for kids who are out of school — employers became even more supportive of paid family leave.”

Rossin-Slater says that one drawback to the study is its relatively small sample size. Over the years, she and her collaborators have surveyed 4,711 employers. Of the 1,151 that responded to the 2020 survey, 887 were operating. About two-thirds of those still in business answered questions about their attitudes toward leave and whether workers used it during the pandemic.

Even so, shedding any light on what employers think about paid family leave is important, she says.

“As economists, we focus a lot on measurable impacts like productivity or turnover rates, and those are important to quantify,” Rossin-Slater says. “But at the end of the day, whether these policies get passed is ultimately a political question, and people’s attitudes shape the public discourse in this country. Understanding how attitudes change, especially during a pandemic, is insightful for thinking about where this policy is ultimately headed.”

There’s a great deal of support for community policing, but not a lot of concrete data on whether it works. What makes this a challenging issue to study?

Christia: Building trust between police and the citizens they are tasked to protect is at the core of community policing. As such, an important challenge lies with identifying the right measures to capture this often-complex police-citizen interaction. This was even more of a pronounced challenge in our study as we conducted six coordinated experiments across a diverse set of sites in the Global South in Brazil, Colombia, Liberia, Pakistan, the Philippines and Uganda.

To make progress in understanding the impacts of community policing, we needed to develop a set of common strategies for the police to implement that made sense in each national context, which we call locally appropriate community policing interventions. We also needed to agree upon a shared research design across countries and to introduce common outcome measures to ensure that we were looking at the impacts of these programs in similar ways. This approach to launching coordinated, multi-site, randomized controlled trials across contexts has been pioneered by the organization that sponsored this work, Evidence in Governance and Politics (EGAP).

Your team partnered with six communities across the Global South in Brazil, Colombia, Liberia, Pakistan, the Philippines and Uganda. Based on your research, what evidence did you find for or against the use of community policing practices?

Blair: We find that community policing doesn’t live up to its promise when implemented in the Global South. Community policing doesn’t build trust between citizens and police, it doesn’t lead to citizens to share the kinds of tips and information with police that might improve police efficiency, and, perhaps not surprisingly then, it does not lead to lower crime. This disappointing result was apparent across all six contexts and for all of the primary outcomes we measured.

Is there an alternative to community policing, or ways to reform these systems, that would make them more efficacious at creating the desired outcomes?

Weinstein: We carefully examined each of the six contexts, including through interviews with the police agencies and the research teams, to make sense of this null result. We identified three primary constraints that may have impeded the implementation of community policing: (a) a lack of prioritization of these new practices by police leadership (b) the rotation to new posts of police officers who had championed the effort and were trained to implement it and (c) limited resources to follow up on the concerns raised by citizens.

The bottom line is that community policing isn’t positioned to deliver increased trust and collaboration in environments with limited incentives and resources to enable police to change their behavior. Our conclusion is that community policing should be seen as an incremental reform that can make a difference in well-resourced police departments with strong incentives to be responsive to citizen concerns. But when those conditions are absent, an incremental approach can’t deliver. More systemic reforms are required.

How does the data from your work fit into broader issues of equity, just representation, and racism that communities across the world continue to grapple with?

Blair: In many ways community policing appears to be the ideal policy for this moment, where so many are demanding that police abuse be reduced while also reducing crime victimization. Community policing is meant to do both, constructing a virtuous cycle between citizen-police cooperation, trust, and crime reduction. Our null results sound a note of caution: it may not be so simple. We observed big barriers to implementing this shift in policing, and barriers that likely affect other incremental policies. To address equity in the way governments enforce the law, we may need more systematic changes to how we organize the police and hold them accountable.   

The Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) is a regional economic forum with 21 member economies, including the US, China, and Russia, headquartered in Singapore. As a summer graduate intern at APEC, I worked closely with APEC’s policy unit that oversees and conducts policy research and analysis for publications and reports, which are used as key discussion agendas in ministerial level discussions and conferences. The Policy Support Unit (PSU)’s core areas of work are 1) trade and investment liberalization and facilitation, 2) structural reform, 3) connectivity including supply chain connectivity and global supply chains, 4) economic and financial analysis, and 5) sustainable economic development. During my summer internship, I was able to gain direct experience with almost all of these core areas through conducting quantitative and qualitative research.

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The PSU has been working on a publication that analyzed the impacts of travel restrictions during the pandemic. The report provided evidence and policy recommendations for APEC economies to resume cross-border travel in a safe and equitable way. I was tasked to draft two sections of the report, including a literature review of various multilateral organizations’ initiatives on safe re-opening, and an analysis of the disproportionate impacts of travel restrictions on vulnerable population, especially women. Women were not only experiencing economic impacts from border closures, such as loss of jobs and business closures, but women seeking abortion procedures in countries with restrictive regulations faced significant challenges when cross-border travel was limited to “essential workers.” Such challenges were even more pronounced for lower-income women or women with disabilities who may not be able to access services through other means domestically. 

I also worked on drafting APEC’s flagship publication, APEC in Charts 2021, which resides within APEC’s fourth core area of work, economic and financial analysis. APEC in Charts is an annual publication that provides a visual overview of the region’s economic, trade and investment performance. Using data from international organizations like the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and the United Nations, I calculated aggregate statistics for the APEC region on the following indicators: trend in trade, tariff liberalization indicators such as free trade agreements, trend in FDI inflows and outflows, COVID-19 vaccination status, and various sustainability indicators such as household food waste and greenhouse gas emissions trends.

Since APEC includes Taiwan and Hong Kong, both of which did not have disaggregated data, the most challenging part of this task was to locate and calculate the information using limited data. While data disaggregation was challenging, I was thankful for all those nights that I stayed up in the first quarter to complete data aggregation for economic analysis assignments for the Global Economy course, INTLPOL 302, which built a foundation for key skills required at APEC.

I also immersed myself in the topic of climate change over the summer. Policy actions on climate change became one of the center of APEC’s agendas to build economic resilience post-COVID. I drafted a section on climate change in APEC’s Regional Trends Analysis (ARTA) report by conducting quantitative and qualitative research on green indicators. Calculating carbon emissions was one challenge, but comparing how much each economy had pledged to reduce emissions and what it would actually take to keep global warming below 2°C was another challenge. 

Climate change was not a topic I was very familiar with from a research standpoint, but I took the opportunity to self-educate through reading various literature, including the most recent publication from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). It was striking that more than 60% of global greenhouse gases were generated by APEC economies. Unless APEC as a region curbs cumulative emissions, the expected repercussions are disastrous. Again, the most vulnerable – including women and girls, migrants, those in poverty, mountain communities and people in urban slums – will experience more severe consequences, and the repercussions are even more pronounced for those in developing nations.

This 11-week internship experience at APEC over the summer was a rewarding one that helped me understand the way multilateral organizations work. I was motivated by working with an organization responsible for shaping economic policies through cooperation to build resilience in the post-COVID world. Plus, I was able to tone up key techniques learned from MIP’s core courses such as STATA and advanced excel skills. Although it was a remote internship, I benefited from learning from my fellow interns and co-researchers on their broad range of expertise and experience. I strongly recommend future MIP students work with APEC over the summer as policy interns!

This interview was first published by the Stanford News Service.

When President Joe Biden meets with his Chinese counterpart President Xi Jinping next week, they will both want to show the world that the two countries have common and compatible objectives and that cooperation is possible, says Stanford scholar Thomas Fingar.

While there are real differences between the two countries, global threats exist that require joint effort to address, such as nuclear proliferation and the danger of new arms races, said Fingar in an interview with Stanford News Service.

In anticipation of the upcoming summit scheduled for Monday, Fingar discusses what to expect when the two leaders meet and what goals Biden will want to work towards as it fits with his larger objectives for the U.S.

Fingar is a Shorenstein fellow at The Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC), which is part of the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies. He is leading a multi-year study, China and the World, that seeks to better understand China’s global engagement.

Fingar returned to Stanford in 2009 after having served as the first deputy director of national intelligence for analysis and, concurrently, as chairman of the National Intelligence Council. Fingar served previously as assistant secretary of the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research (2000-01 and 2004-05), principal deputy assistant secretary (2001-03), deputy assistant secretary for analysis (1994-2000), director of the Office of Analysis for East Asia and the Pacific (1989-94) and chief of the China Division (1986-89). Between 1975 and 1986 he held several positions at Stanford University, including senior research associate in the Center for International Security and Arms Control.

Where does diplomacy between the U.S. and China now stand?

Friction between Beijing and Washington did not put an end to diplomatic exchanges, but having markedly different approaches has inhibited the two sides. Simply stated, the United States has sought to work on specific global and bilateral problems to achieve priority objectives such as limiting greenhouse gases and reducing the dangers of unconstrained nuclear, space and cyber competition. China has maintained that “building trust” and improvement of the overall bilateral relationship are prerequisites for progress on specific issues. Developments in the run-up to the summit, such as the joint climate statement in Glasgow, suggest that Beijing has relaxed its preconditions.

How does the summit symbolize a diplomatic reset?

Both symbolically and substantively, the summit will empower lower-level officials in both countries to work on issues within their purview. This is more significant in China, where clear signals from the top are necessary for subordinates to engage, but it will also help to mitigate paralysis on the U.S. side resulting from competing visions of how best to address China-related issues.

What issues will be top of mind for Biden and Xi?

Both will want to diminish exaggerated characterizations of bilateral friction as evidence that we have entered a new Cold War and may be on the verge of conflict, and that cooperation on any issue is impossible. We have very real disagreements, but we also have many common or compatible objectives. Helping domestic and external audiences to understand that things are not nearly as dire as many observers contend will be a priority objective. Beyond that, I think clarifying matters of greatest concern to the other side and establishing mechanisms to address them will be on the agenda.

What areas can they agree on and where can they make progress?

They are likely to find it easier to agree on issues requiring joint effort than on the best way to address issues like nuclear proliferation (Iran and North Korea), new weapons systems and the danger of new arms races (hypersonic glide vehicles, cyber and kinetic threats to nuclear surveillance and command and control systems) and transition to cleaner energy sources.

What areas will spark disagreement and will these issues come up?

I suspect that both leaders will feel compelled to raise all of the high salience concerns in their countries. For Biden, that list includes Xinjiang, Hong Kong, PRC [People’s Republic of China] actions near Taiwan and the rollback of opportunities for Americans in China. Xi will raise U.S. military operations around China’s periphery, arms sales and relations with Taiwan, restrictions on visas for Chinese citizens and Chinese investment in the U.S., among other issues.

What would signal that the meeting was productive?

The fact that it has occurred will be significant because it will open the door to other, hopefully, less contentious exchanges across a broad spectrum of issues. Easing of travel restrictions should be easy to achieve but of more than symbolic importance. I doubt that the meeting is designed to solve any of the difficult issues in our relationship.

What do you think about Biden’s approach to China?

I agree with the President’s focus on his largely domestic “Build Back Better” agenda. Spending the time, effort and political capital necessary to secure approval of measures to address infrastructure, energy, education, childcare, internet access and a host of social justice, pandemic and voter protection issues are, in my opinion, more important than trying to improve relations with China for the sake of improving the relationship. Where working with China is necessary and/or perceived to be possible for achieving other domestic and foreign policy goals, he should do so. I think the fact that this summit is taking place is a sign that he is attempting to do that, but I judge that he is unwilling to jeopardize his ability to achieve higher priority objectives by making concessions to Beijing merely to create the appearance of a better relationship.