China’s State Council has put forth draft legislation that would ban smoking in public spaces, part of the government’s larger advocacy efforts to help curb tobacco use nationwide. Matthew Kohrman, a professor of anthropology at Stanford University, said it’s a step forward but the ban’s long-term success would depend on local enforcement.

Despite popular belief, global cigarette production has tripled worldwide since the 1960s. Leading the surge has been China.

“China has become the world’s cigarette superpower,” said Kohrman, in an interview on National Public Radio’s program, Marketplace.

Moreover, local governments in China have become dependent on tax revenues generated from tobacco sales, thus reinforcing the cigarette’s ubiquity and ease of access.

China has implemented smoking bans in the past, but with varied success. Now rising healthcare costs caused by tobacco-related diseases are creating urgency for new regulations.

“Whether or not these new regulations will be enforced will, in the end, come down to local politics,” he said.

Matthew Kohrman is part of the Asia Health Policy Program at the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center, and leads the project, Cigarette Citadels, a peer-sourced mapping project that compiles more than 480 cigarette factories globally.

The full audioclip is available on the Marketplace website.

In conversation with Shorenstein APARC, Yong Lee, the SK Center Fellow, discusses his initial draw to architecture and urbanism, and the nexus of public policy and economics. Lee highlights some of his recent research activities focused on international sanctions on North Korea and educational policy as it relates to migration and housing patterns in South Korea. 

Your background is quite multifaceted, including years working in architecture and a master’s of public policy in addition to a doctorate in economics. How do all of these areas fit together to inform your research?

It took a while for me to figure out what I wanted to pursue as a career. As a high school student in Korea I had to choose a track that focused on either the physical sciences or the humanities/social sciences. At that age, it’s hard to know what you want to be. Simply because my father was an engineer, I chose the physical sciences track. When it was time to apply for college (one actually had to determine a major when applying for college back then), I became interested in international relations and wanted to become a diplomat. But given my training in the hard sciences and the fact that one had to choose a major when applying, I had to decide on a science or engineering major. After browsing through the library a few architecture books caught my eye, and I opted for architectural engineering as my major. 

I truly enjoyed my six years of architectural training but after working for an architectural firm for several years in Seoul, I realized I was more interested in the abstract ideas of architecture and urbanism and less of the actual design process that goes on in an architectural firm. I searched for my next career, became interested in urban and development policy, and pursued a master’s of public policy at Duke University. However, then I realized that economics would allow me to rigorously analyze the policy questions I was interested in. Fortunately, Brown University accepted me as a Ph.D. student and I eventually became an economist. It was through this search process, that I developed an interdisciplinary interest in policy relevant questions. My personal choices constrained by education policy, comparatively experiencing Korea’s transition while living between Korea and the United States each decade since the 1980s, and my interest in architecture and cities have shaped my research interest in economic development and growth with a focus on education, firms and cities.  And now being at FSI, I can immerse myself in international studies, something I had wanted to pursue all along. By joining Stanford, I think I finally discovered what I had wanted to do.

One of your research streams looks at the effects of sanctions on domestic populations, looking at the case study of North Korea. How did you derive data about the closed-off regime? What are your key findings?

Research on North Korea is challenging because of the dearth of data. I had been interested in how sanctions impact the domestic population, but to examine this question one would need regional level data within in North Korea. I decided to use the satellite night-lights data, which in recent years has been used as an alternative means to measure economic activity. I found that sanctions actually increase urban-rural inequality. An additional sanctions index increases the urban-rural luminosity gap by about 1 percent. However, if I focus on the more central urban areas the gap increases to about 2.6 percent. Since urban areas are more than ten times brighter than rural areas, the results imply that the gap further increases by 1 to 2.6 percent with additional sanctions.  Furthermore, I find that the urban areas actually get brighter while the rural areas get darker.

Another of your research focuses on the impact of 1970s education policy in South Korea on intergenerational mobility and migration. Can you explain this phenomenon? Does the case of South Korea relate to reform experiences in other countries?

Students in South Korea traditionally had to take an entrance exam to enter high schools. After the exam, high schools would choose students based on the exam scores. Given the variation in school quality, a hierarchy of high schools had existed and students who performed well would enter the top tier high schools. This system was heavily criticized since wealthier families could tutor children to prepare for the entrance exam. Eventually in the mid-1970s, the South Korean government abolished the exam-based system and moved to a school district based system where students would attend high schools based on residential location. By moving away from an exam system to a district system, policymakers hoped that educational opportunities would alleviate the persistence of inequality. However, what I find is that, to the contrary, the district system generated substantial sorting of households by income. Now wealthier households could simply move to districts and cities with the prestigious high schools. Given that the purchase of housing is purely determined by income, school quality became even more segregated by income and actually exacerbated the persistence of inequality across generations. This transition is now happening in several Chinese cities and in the United States – the sorting across school districts by educational outcome has created highly segregated towns. The Korea experiment allowed me to examine not just an equilibrium outcome, but also the transition when the policy changed.

In the coming year, you’ll be teaching courses related to the economies of East Asia. Can you provide an outlook on this?

I’ll be teaching an International Policy Studies course titled, “Economic Growth, Development, and Challenges of East Asia,” in the spring. The course will focus on China, Japan, and Korea, but also draw on Southeast Asian countries, when relevant. I will cover the rapid economic growth in recent decades and development policies pursued. However, I will also cover the current major economic challenges these countries face, some of which are rising income inequality, entrepreneurship, and an aging workforce. I hope to add to our rich set of courses by providing an economics and empirical viewpoint.

Tell us something we don’t know about you.

I sometimes split my sleep. That is, I go to bed to sleep for a few hours and then wake up in the middle of the dark, do some reading or work, and then sleep for one or two hours before I start my morning routine. It started during my high school years and it has stuck with me for quite a while now. Don’t worry, though. I sleep fine most of the time. I just sometimes enjoy the dead of the night.

The rise of China as a global and regional power has created areas where the interests of China and the United States overlap in competition, the senior U.S. military commander in the Pacific told a Stanford audience. But Admiral Samuel Locklear III, the commander of U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM), rejected the traditional realpolitik argument, which predicts inevitable confrontation between the United States, a status quo power, and China, a rising power.

“Historians will say this will lead to conflict,” Locklear said, during an address at the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center last Friday. “I don’t believe it has to.”

The United States and China have a “mutual skepticism of each other,” the Pacific Commander acknowledged, but he characterized the relationship as “collaborative, generally.”

He said the dangers of direct military confrontation between the two powers is low, but warned against Chinese tendencies to perceive the United States as engaged in an effort to ‘contain’ the expansion of China’s influence. Instead, Locklear urged China to work with the United States to build new security and economic structures in the region.

Economic interdependence between the countries makes it impossible for the two countries to avoid working together, he told the seminar, co-sponsored by the Center for International Security and Cooperation and the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford University.

He said that China has also benefited from the security environment that the United States has helped shape and maintain in the region.

Locklear reminded the audience of the central importance of the vast area under his command, which stretches from the Indian subcontinent across the vast Pacific Ocean. More than nine out of 10 of the largest ports in the world are in the Asia-Pacific region, and over 70 percent of global trade passes through its waters. The U.S. rebalance to Asia, a policy pursued by the Obama administration as early as year 2009, largely happened because of the economic and political importance of that area.

The mutual interest in economic prosperity depends, however, on a stable security environment. Washington has an interest in maintaining the structure of security that has ensured peace for the last few decades. Beijing seeks to change the status quo, to build a regional system that reflects its growth as a power.

Locklear called on China to work with the United States and other nations in the region, such as Japan and Australia, as well as the countries of Southeast Asia, to take the current “patchwork quilt” of bilateral and multilateral alliances and build a basis to maintain economic interdependence and security. He pointed to the U.S.-led effort to form a Trans-Pacific Partnership as a 12-nation economic structure, which could eventually include China.

“We want China to be a net security contributor,” he said, “And my sense is that both the United States and the nations on the periphery of China are willing to allow China to do that – but with circumstances.” He said conditions for the United States included open access to shared domains in sea, air, space and cyberspace.

The Pacific Commander cautioned against the danger, however, of unintended conflict, fueled by territorial disputes and Chinese assertiveness that worries its neighbors. Locklear stressed the need for more dialogue, including among the militaries in the region, an effort that the U.S. Pacific Command is currently carrying out.

“There’s a trust deficit in Asia among the nations, as it relates in particular to China,” he said.

Relations have been so icy that the top political leaders of Japan and China didn’t meet for nearly two years, only breaking the divide for a 20-minute meeting at the Asia-Pacific Economic Summit (APEC) in Beijing last month.

Refusing to engage at the highest level has made it difficult for countries to work on solutions to shared problems. The region now sees a confluence of old and new challenges that could threaten global stability if ill-managed, said Locklear, who has led the U.S. military command in the Pacific since 2012.                 

For decades, China and Japan have been at odds about sovereignty claims over islands in the East China Sea. In the past, during the time of Deng Xiaoping’s rule in China, the two countries agreed to, as Deng reportedly put it, ‘kick the issue into the tall grass’ for future generations to deal with it. These disputes have resurfaced in recent years, threatening to trigger armed conflict between the air and naval forces of the two countries.

Locklear said he believed that China and Japan would avoid inadvertent escalation, thanks to improved communications and tight command and control over their forces. But he also warned  that at least seven nations have conflicting claims in the South China Sea, which could easily escalate into direct conflict.

These situations, paired with an upsurge in Chinese military spending and the growing belief that the United States is a declining power, raise doubts about China’s intentions in the region. China’s Asian neighbors increasingly question the intensions of the world’s most populous nation, and second largest economy.

“Is it a return to the old days where you had basic tributary states? Is that the model that China is looking for? Or is it a 21^st century model?”

Locklear said China and other nations in the Asia-Pacific, as well as the United States, need to work harder to form shared views and consensus, particularly among those who “own the guns.”

Dialogue and interactions among the militaries are crucial, especially those who are called upon to make quick decisions during a possible flashpoint, for instance an accidental clash of boats or planes.

“Trust really does fall in many ways to military leaders to get it right and to lead, to some degree, the politicians and the diplomats,” he said. Locklear spoke of a tangible example of collaboration in the Rim of the Pacific Exercise, also known as RIMPAC, hosted by USPACOM. Twenty-two countries participate in the world’s largest maritime warfare exercise in Hawaii, which this year included naval forces from China.

“Does it fix those friction points? No, it doesn’t.” But, Locklear concluded, “We hope that this kind of thing opens the door for future interaction.”

The audio file and transcript from the event can be accessed by clicking here. 

The recently manifested massive failure of America's intervention in Iraq has led outside observers to speculate that the ongoing rapid drawdown of international military forces in Afghanistan will lead to similar chaos in that country, Karl Eikenberry writes in this Foreign Policy commentary about the new Asia Foundation survey of the Afghan People.

Eikenberry notes that Ahmed Rashid, a commentator on Afghanistan security issues and author of the superb book Taliban, wrote in a recentNew York Times op-ed that the U.S. troop withdrawal plan formulated in 2009 "is proving catastrophically wrong now." Senators John McCain and Lindsey Graham warned two months ago: "If the President repeats his mistakes from Iraq and withdraws all U.S. troops from Afghanistan, based on a certain date on a calendar, we fear a similar failure will unfold ... as we have seen Iraq."

Eikenberry, the William J. Perry Fellow in International Security at CISAC and former U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan, writes that the Asia Foundation's just-released 2014 Survey of the Afghan People indicates that while the Afghans do worry about the future of their country, they by no means share the deep pessimism of the foreign prophets of doom who assert that it is only a matter of time until the disaster on the Euphrates is repeated on the Kabul River. Comparing the attitudes of the Afghan and Iraqi people on key political, security, and economic issues helps explain why this is so.

In March 2011, an earthquake and tsunami hit the eastern coast of Japan and caused one of the worst nuclear meltdowns ever seen. In the lead-up to that week, U.S. officials there were bracing themselves for a media firestorm following a controversial Wikileaks release, Japan’s new foreign minister was ushered into office, and an apology statement was delivered on behalf of the United States in Okinawa, explained the top U.S. diplomat who was posted there at the time.

“And that, was just a microcosm of all kinds of things going on during my tenure there,” said John Roos, who served as the U.S. ambassador to Japan from 2009 to 2013.

Speaking at Stanford, Ambassador Roos offered views on his tenure as ambassador at a seminar led by the Japan Program at the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC). The diplomatic posting, underpinned by the strong U.S.-Japan alliance, proved an essential role for coordination of U.S. aid when the disaster struck.

Roos spoke in conversation with Ambassador Michael Armacost, his counterpart who served in the same position from 1989 to 1993, who is now a distinguished fellow at Shorenstein APARC.

“By far, [it was] the biggest crisis I had to deal with in my career,” said Roos, who has years of experience in business and law, and is now the CEO of the Roos Group.

Roos said he first took steps to open lines of communication between local staff, and the Japanese and U.S. military commands there. He went with his team on a dozen trips across the country. Fact-finding missions were necessary to assess the situation, as much as they were symbolic in showing a commitment to the people of Japan, he said.

Asked about his background, Roos said his academic training was valuable throughout his career. He is a graduate of Stanford University and Stanford Law School.

Leaders tasked to coordinate response crisis efforts, especially those concerned with nuclear issues, are often across many intergovernmental organizations and in turn, lead to a conflicting set of opinions. He said his ability to navigate tough situations harkens back to his training at Stanford, which emphasized building consensus and thinking critically.

Later, Armacost also underscored the role of people – who’s involved and their individual personalities – and their influence on policy decisions.

“Personal relationships are so important,” Roos said, “they drive everything.”

People-to-people connections were a similar theme mirrored in Roos’ perspectives on the future of the Japanese economy and the country’s relations with neighboring countries. As ambassador, Roos started the Tomodachi Initiative, an educational exchange program linking young leaders from the United States and Japan.

Following the crisis, in 2012, Japan ushered in Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) became the ruling majority party. One facet of Abe’s vision includes a stimulus package, commonly referred to as ‘Abenomics,’ intended to restore the country’s economy after more than a decade of slow growth.

Roos said most Japanese have a tepid attitude toward Abe’s policy ever since implementation of the final round of policies which are intensely focused on structural reforms. The reforms are necessary to restart growth, he said, but the average citizen will likely feel an impact due to a paring down of resources across public services.

But, entrepreneurism provides a credible direction for the country’s economic revival, and could help carve out a defined role for Japan in the global marketplace.  

In Japan, “there is incredible innovation going on,” he said. Individuals and universities are producing a myriad of cutting-edge technologies, and the ecosystem to support this is growing, but not yet fully adopted.

He said a key driver behind Silicon Valley’s success is the spirit of entrepreneurism widely shared there. People actively take risks, exchange ideas, and most importantly, embrace failure.

Roos said he carried that message with him wherever he went in Japan, often referencing the example of Mr. Abe who came back for a second term as prime minister. “That’s the culture of Silicon Valley, and that’s the culture that we want to promote in Japan.”

Asia-Pacific leaders recently met in Beijing at the annual APEC summit, and after two days of discussion, concluded with some significant pledges and remarkable moments. President Xi Jinping of China and Prime Minister Shinzo Abe of Japan held a landmark meeting, and the United States and China discussed two agreements that are both symbolic, and lay groundwork for regional progress, say Stanford scholars.

High-level intergovernmental meetings are often more theatre than substance, but this year the 21-member Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, the oldest trans-Pacific regional organization, delivered important messages and may spur actions by member governments.

“Any summit is a ‘hurry up, get this done’ motivator,” says Thomas Fingar, the Oksenberg-Rohlen Distinguished Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies. “The head of state goes to the meeting – and generally speaking – he doesn’t want to arrive and say ‘my guys were asleep for the last year.’”

Fingar says the APEC summit prodded countries to work on “deliverables,” particularly the goals and projects on the agenda from previous meetings. He recently returned from Beijing, and shared his perspectives with students in the Asia-Pacific Scholars Program.

Writing for the East Asia Forum, Donald Emmerson, director of the Southeast Asia Program at the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center, said many of the commitments declared at the APEC summit, and at the subsequent meetings of the G20 in Australia and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations in Myanmar, will have implications for global governance, particularly as China holds a more influential role in the region.

APEC countries account for over 40 percent of the world’s population and nearly half of global trade – and true to form, the grand vision of the summit is to advance regional economic integration.

Yet, “the ancillary things – things that went on in the margins – are in many ways more important,” Fingar says, referring to areas outside of the summit’s obvious focus, and what’s discussed on the sidelines of the public talks.

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Key outcomes from the 2014 gathering include:

• The leaders of Japan and China met for the first time since coming into office, afterward acknowledging that the two countries have “disagreements” in their official statements. Of the Xi-Abe meeting, Fingar says, “it helps clear the way for lower level bureaucrats to go to work on real issues."

• The United States and China announced a proposal to extend visas for students and businesspeople on both sides. While the immediate effects would be helpful, the change is symbolically superior. “You don’t give 5-10 year visas to adversaries,” he says, it shows that “‘we’re in [the relationship] for the long-term.’”

• China proposed the development of a new “Silk Road,” pledging $40 billion in resources toward infrastructure projects shared with South and Central Asian neighbors. “It’s tying the region together and creating economy-of-scale possibilities for other countries,” he says. “A real win-win situation.”

• The United States and China, the world’s two largest energy consumers, announced bilateral plans to cut carbon emissions over the next two decades. “It’s significant because those two countries must be the ones to lead the world in this area. Unless we are seen to be in basic agreement, others will hold back.”

• China codified the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), a global financial institution intended as an alternative to institutions like the World Bank. “China has been frustrated with its role in existing international institutions,” Fingar says, explaining a likely motivation behind the AIIB’s creation.

Emmerson said the outcomes of the APEC summit from the U.S.-China standpoint were better than expected, speaking to McClatchy News. The visa and climate deals, as well as their commitment to lowering global tariffs on IT products, will lessen chances of conflict between the two countries. 

However, the summit did leave some areas unsolved. One of the most important is the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), a trade pact proposed by the United States that includes 11 others countries in the region, but does not yet include China.

Leaders “made positive noises” coming out of the TPP discussions, Fingar says, but nothing was passed. The gravity and complexity of trade-related issues, especially agriculture and intellectual property, is likely to blame for slow action.

The city of Cupertino, California, is only about 15km from Stanford University, where I teach and live. It is home to the headquarters of Apple, a global leader in the computer and smartphone industries. It is also home to many Indian and Chinese engineers who are essential to Silicon Valley's technological innovation. One can easily find a variety of Asian restaurants and shops along the palm tree-lined streets -- an interesting Californian scene with a distinctly Asian flavor.

Many Asians -- businesspeople, officials and experts -- visit Silicon Valley hoping to unlock its secrets, to learn why it is such a hotbed of innovation. One known "secret" here, often overlooked by Asian visitors, is the importance of cultural diversity. More than half of the area's startups, including Intel, Yahoo, eBay and Google, were established by immigrants, and these companies owe much of their success to the contributions of Chinese and Indian engineers. Cultural diversity can be found throughout the schools, stores and streets, as well as the enterprises, there.

In Israel, too

The circumstances are quite similar in Israel, another economy known for technological innovation. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s, Israel admitted about 850,000 immigrants. More than 40 percent of the new arrivals were college professors, scientists and engineers, many of whom had abundant experience in research and development. These people played a critical role in promoting economic development and scientific and technological innovation in Israel. Many languages besides Hebrew can be heard on the streets of Tel Aviv, one of the country's largest cities.

It is no accident that Silicon Valley and Israel have become global high-tech centers. They opened their doors to a wide range of talented immigrants. Above all, an atypical sociocultural ecosystem -- a culture that respects and promotes the value of diversity -- is alive in both places.

In the United States, diversity is a key criterion in college admissions and faculty recruitment. Although "affirmative action" has disappeared in many parts of the country, diversity has come to play a key role in American university policies. Most American colleges, including Stanford, have a "diversity office" to promote diversity among students, faculty and staff. At Stanford, white students constitute less than 40 percent of the student body, and almost a quarter of the faculty come from minority groups. Similarly, only five of the 16 staff members at our Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center are Caucasian, with the rest from ethnic and national minorities.

 The same can be said of leading American corporations, many of which have institutionalized "diversity management" to capitalize on the range of individual differences and talents to increase organizational effectiveness. Of course, basic knowledge and skills are prerequisites. But Americans seem to firmly believe that having a variety of backgrounds and experiences can help hatch new ideas and innovative technologies. Perhaps this is why they say that culture accounts for 90 percent of the innovation in products from Silicon Valley, with technology claiming only 10 percent.

The power of diversity

Scott E. Page, professor of complex systems, political science and economics at the University of Michigan, shows in his book "The Difference" how "the power of diversity creates better groups, firms, schools, and societies." In his view, collections of people with diverse perspectives and heuristics outperform collections of people who rely on homogeneous ones, and the key to optimizing efficiency in a group is diversity. In this work, Page pays particular attention to the importance of "identity diversity," that is, differences in race, ethnicity, gender, social status and the like.

To be sure, Asian countries such as Japan and South Korea are different from settler societies such as the U.S. With the influx of foreigners, however, even such ethnically homogeneous Asian societies are becoming multiethnic. In addition to unskilled labor and foreign brides, the number of overseas students and professors is rising at Japanese and South Korean universities, while Japanese and South Korean companies are actively hiring foreign professionals. Both countries are opening their doors to foreigners, though in limited numbers, and have made multiculturalism a key policy objective.

Still, they fall far short of recognizing the value of diversity. While Japanese and South Korean institutes of higher learning have been trying to attract more foreign students, they have been doing so mainly to make up for the declining student population at home and because university ranking agencies use the ratio of foreign students and professors as a key yardstick for measuring internationalization. The approaches of these two countries to multiculturalism are also largely focused on assimilating foreigners into their own cultures and systems. People from abroad are seldom accepted as "permanent" members of their societies or regarded as valuable assets. Japan and South Korea may have become multiethnic, but they are not multicultural.

One of the biggest challenges facing foreign residents in Japan and South Korea is the lack of understanding of their religious and cultural beliefs. Indian engineers working in South Korea complain of the poor acceptance of Indians by the local population, and of an especially poor understanding of their religion and culture. Foreign professors teaching at Japanese universities tell me they live as "foreigners," never accepted into the "inner" circles. It is unlikely that these talented people would like to work long term for universities and enterprises that are unable to embrace differences in skin color and culture. Under these circumstances, even if some foreign professionals happen to be hired, they may not be able to realize the full potential of their abilities, let alone bring about innovation.

All these people with different ethnic and national backgrounds should no longer be regarded simply as "temporary" residents to fill particular needs. Rather, by promoting the cultural diversity of Japanese and South Korean society, they should be viewed as important assets and potential sources of innovation. It is an urgent but difficult task to institutionalize the value of diversity in societies long accustomed to the notion of a single-race nation.

Born on campuses

A country's global competitiveness can hardly be improved if its society is reluctant to respect differences and understand other groups. Universities, in particular, should help their students experience diversity through the regular curriculum and extracurricular activities. Foreign students can serve as excellent resources for promoting diversity. Universities are ideal settings for various groups of students to meet, generate new ideas and interact with one another. It is no accident that many of the innovative ideas associated with Microsoft, Yahoo, Google and Facebook were all born on American university campuses, where diversity is embraced.

Empirical research should be carried out to examine how cultural diversity can bring about technological innovation in Japanese and South Korean society. Based on such studies, governments and private enterprises should take into account diversity in personnel hiring, training, management and evaluation. These same institutions should also systematically work to create and support an organizational culture that values diversity.

Could those Indian and Chinese engineers working in Silicon Valley have brought about the same kind of technological innovation if they had remained in their own countries? Could they accomplish the same feat in Japan and South Korea? How can Asian countries create the kind of ecosystem necessary for promoting a flexible culture of accommodating a broad spectrum of talents? We first need to reflect deeply on these questions before trying to emulate the success of Silicon Valley.

Shin recently coauthored the paper, "Embracing Diversity in Higher Education: Comparing Discourses in the U.S., Europe, and Asia" with Yonsei University Professor Rennie J. Moon. It is one outcome of their research project, Diversity and Tolerance in Korea and Asia. This Nikkei Asian Review article was originally carried on Nov. 20 and reposted with permission.