Society

FSI researchers work to understand continuity and change in societies as they confront their problems and opportunities. This includes the implications of migration and human trafficking. What happens to a society when young girls exit the sex trade? How do groups moving between locations impact societies, economies, self-identity and citizenship? What are the ethnic challenges faced by an increasingly diverse European Union? From a policy perspective, scholars also work to investigate the consequences of security-related measures for society and its values.

The Europe Center reflects much of FSI’s agenda of investigating societies, serving as a forum for experts to research the cultures, religions and people of Europe. The Center sponsors several seminars and lectures, as well as visiting scholars.

Societal research also addresses issues of demography and aging, such as the social and economic challenges of providing health care for an aging population. How do older adults make decisions, and what societal tools need to be in place to ensure the resulting decisions are well-informed? FSI regularly brings in international scholars to look at these issues. They discuss how adults care for their older parents in rural China as well as the economic aspects of aging populations in China and India.

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Countries like the Asian “tigers” that experienced rapid economic growth inevitably encounter slowdowns that signal a fundamental shift in their economies. At this juncture, transitioning their institutions and policies often proves to be a most daunting task. Cautionary comparisons like these set the tone for the conference titled “China’s Possible Futures” on May 12, 2017, when the China Program celebrated its 10th anniversary.

As China nears the end of four decades of reforms, “China’s Possible Futures” was a fitting theme to mark the China Program’s first decade at Stanford’s Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center. The launch of the Program in 2007 began with an international conference titled “Growing Pains: Tensions and Opportunities in China’s Transformation,” which resulted in a book of the same title. This year’s 10th anniversary conference appropriately heralded both change and continuity of the themes that were explored in 2007. A decade ago, the conference showcased the tremendous reach and rise of China as an economic and international powerhouse, and in 2017, the conference expanded to highlight the critical juncture that China is again facing on its developmental path.

The full-day conference, held under Chatham House Rule, was divided into four sub-themes with speakers addressing China’s economic future; its political future; the future of its international relations and global economic engagements; and a comparative panel that examined China’s prospects from experiences drawn from Japan, South Korea and former Soviet and Eastern European countries.

Panel I: China’s Economic Future

Speakers agreed that China’s tremendous growth over the last 40 years has no easy parallels in history. Some argued, however, that the policies realized over the next few years will prove critical to China’s long-term growth. Favorable factors, such as demographic, migratory and structural changes supported by a stable international order, enabled China’s spectacular, double-digit growth over the last 40 years. When “miracle growth” countries of Northeast Asia – like Japan, Korea and Taiwan – entered their periods of moderate growth, however, painful readjustments were necessary. Restructuring was required because the very policies and institutions set up to enable rapid growth were counterproductive to creating a foundation for moderate, sustained growth. Speakers variously emphasized China’s need to invest in human capital and undertake financial reforms, urban-rural reforms and state-owned sector reforms.

In addition, several speakers noted that China is facing mounting demographic challenges as its population ages and as its elderly population lives longer. According to one speaker, people who are aged 60 and over in China will equal the population of people aged 0 to 14 within the next couple years; and by year 2045, the population of people who are 65 and older in China will be as large as the entire population of the United States today. This situation implicates rising costs in healthcare and calls for major institutional reforms in China’s health sector.

One speaker spoke of the rapid rise in China’s returns to education, i.e., the rise in income for each additional year of education, over the past four decades, which now looks more closely aligned with that of the international average of approximately 10 percent. Another speaker asked whether China was now pursuing a different developmental model with increasing focus on inland industrial development and explored what this might mean for social inclusion and labor conditions of workers.

Panel II: China’s Political Future

One speaker argued that Chinese President Xi Jinping’s reform agenda does not mark a break with the past, as many have argued, but rather continuity with his predecessors’ policies. Other speakers discussed the scope and scale of Xi’s corruption crackdown; fiscal imbalances in central-local state relations that underpin China’s corruption problems; and the implications of social media on Chinese governance. All speakers spoke about mounting difficulties in the political sphere, including powerful interest groups; local paralysis arising from corruption crackdowns; mounting local government debt and misalignment of central-local interests; and governance challenges stemming from the social media revolution. Overall, speakers seemed to suggest mounting difficulties for Xi’s reform agenda, which the Chinese government must push through to avoid a sharper downturn and slower growth prospects for China’s future.

Panel III: China’s International Relations and Global Economic Engagements

Speakers spoke at length regarding the history of U.S.-China relations since Deng Xiaoping’s “reform and opening”; territorial disputes in the South and East China Seas; China’s “Belt and Road” policy; and China’s outbound capital flows into various regions of the world. The speakers held varying views regarding Beijing’s motivations and intentions in the world, both militarily and economically. Speakers held different opinions about whether Beijing has a well-defined vision for its global role. One speaker questioned whether China’s maritime assertiveness in the South and East China Seas characterizes the expansionary policies of a rising power; or whether it represents something more singular as China protects what it considers its “core interests” in the region. One speaker expressed the view that the United States and the U.S.-led international order is still too important for China’s development for it to threaten its functioning in any meaningful way. Another speaker discerned a “broad brush strokes” of a developmental concept in China’s “One Belt, One Road” policy that the United States might do well to heed as it considers whether to join any parts thereof.

Panel IV: China’s Future: A Comparative Perspective

The conference also included speakers who provided comparative examples from Japan, South Korea, the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe to inform their views on China’s “possible futures.” One speaker warned against directly applying Japan’s development model to China, warning that Japan experienced a massive credit boom and debt accumulation in the 1980s like China is experiencing today. Zombie firms were a key factor in Japan’s economic stagnation. As the speaker warned, zombie firms also proliferate in China’s economy. Another panel member highlighted Korea’s struggles to attract and retain global talent and drew lessons for China as it strives to escape the middle-income trap and build an innovation-driven economy.

Another panel member spoke of the key difference between China’s political environment in 1978 when Deng Xiaoping announced his “reform and opening” policy and today when Xi is implementing his Third Plenum decision of 2012. Vested interest groups are stymieing the implementation of urgently-needed reforms, especially in the state-owned sector and in China’s financial sector. In 1978, by contrast, the catastrophic results of the Cultural Revolution ironically enabled Deng to successfully champion and implement his agenda because bureaucratic interests had been gutted by Mao. The speaker spoke of the urgent need for Xi to change course in the next 3-4 years and use his personal power to push through tough, market-oriented reforms. Beijing’s leaders must not only craft correct policies and identify the most effective structural correctives, they must also break through the political logjam of entrenched interests that have benefited from the current system.

Panelists pointed to the increasingly difficult challenges that the government faces as China tries to avoid the middle-income trap after four decades of impressive gains and usher in sustained economic growth driven by innovation and domestic consumption. Speakers also agreed that the leadership is encountering a more complex and diverse society, a fractured elite, and the Gordian knot of economic and demographic predicaments, which require not only painful structural adjustments but also tremendous political will to realize policies that will ensure an optimal future for China.

Related links:

Brochure: Celebrating the First 10 Years of the China Program

Former ambassador reflects on US-China relations, Thucydides Trap

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(from left to right) Thomas Fingar, Shorenstein APARC Fellow; Alice Miller, research fellow at the Hoover Institute; Andrew Wedeman, professor of political science at Georgia State University; and Jean Oi, director of the China Program and professor of political science discuss issues in China’s politics at the China Program’s 10th Anniversary Conference titled “China’s Possible Futures.” | Rod Searcey
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Andrew J. Grotto, a former top National Security Council cybersecurity official in the White House, will join Stanford’s Center for International Security and Cooperation this summer.

Grotto will hold the William J. Perry International Security Fellowship and serve as a research fellow at the Hoover Institution. His appointment is for two years, and he will also be a fellow in the Stanford Cyber Initiative

Cybersecurity focus

Grotto has been involved in virtually every major U.S. cyber policy initiative of the past nine years, from his time on Capitol Hill through his tenure in the Obama Administration as Commerce Secretary Penny Pritzker's senior advisor on technology policy, and to his recent service for two presidents as senior director for cyber policy at the National Security Council. 

Amy Zegart, CISAC's co-director for the social sciences and a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution, said, "Grotto is one of the world's leading cyber policymakers. He brings deep knowledge, penetrating insights, and experience at the highest levels on issues ranging from trade to espionage to cyber warfare. We are delighted to have him join the cyber community at CISAC and Hoover."

In an interview, Grotto said that cyber policy remains underdeveloped as a distinct policy domain. And that has drawn him to CISAC, he noted, “for its commitment to becoming a leading institution supporting the development of this domain.”

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Grotto added, “In more established national security domains, such as nonproliferation and counterterrorism, there is a well-developed corpus of scholarly work, historical precedent, and practical experience within the domain that we can draw from to inform, contextualize and evaluate policy decisions. This corpus is still thin with respect to cyber policy making. We don’t have the luxury of waiting decades to create this corpus for cyber – we need to develop it quickly.” 

Grotto first became familiar with CISAC's work during an earlier phase of his career when he focused on U.S. policy towards nuclear weapons - how to prevent their spread, and their role in U.S. national security strategy. CISAC core faculty member Scott Sagan was an early mentor of Grotto’s and first exposed him to CISAC and its scholarly work. Grotto describes the center as a “first-rate research institution at a world class university, with great people. I'm thrilled to be a part of it.”

 

Topics to explore

Cybersecurity policy is a vast field, Grotto said, because virtually every national security challenge facing the country has a cyber dimension to it. 

“I'd be hard pressed to identify a single directorate within the National Security Council that my team and I did not at some point work with on a ‘cyber and…’ problem: cyber and the financial services sector, cyber and the electric grid, cyber and global economic competitiveness, cyber and China, to name a few. So, there's no shortage of cyber-related topics to write on,” he said. 

Several policy problems stand out as foundational for Grotto, and these will be the focus of his research and writing while at CISAC:

• Development of analytic frameworks for defining the dimensions and boundaries of private sector responsibility, especially infrastructure, for defending against cyber threats, versus the government’s responsibility, and using these frameworks to evaluate cybersecurity regulation and identify opportunities and challenges for more effective cybersecurity partnerships between the government and the private sector.

• Cyber-enabled information operations as both a threat to, and a tool of statecraft for, liberal democracies.

• Opportunities and constraints facing offensive cyber operations as a tool of statecraft, especially those relating to norms of sovereignty in a digitally connected world. 

For example, Grotto explained, an adversary physically located in Country X may have cyber infrastructure in Country Y and Country Z, such that an operation against that adversary generates effects in one or more third countries. “How we approach this ‘third country’ issue will have dramatic ramifications for the practical role of offensive cyber operations in U.S. national security strategy,” he noted.

• Governance of global trade in information technologies, especially cybersecurity-related regulation, norms of behavior in cyberspace for governments and private actors, and the appropriateness of applying traditional arms control tools such as export controls to limit the proliferation and use of malicious cyber capabilities.

National Security Council highlights

Grotto said working at the National Security Council was “a privilege of a lifetime. It was the most challenging and intense job I have ever had, and easily the most rewarding.” 

His portfolio spanned a range of cyber policy issues, including defense of critical infrastructure—financial services, energy, communications, transportation, health care, electoral infrastructure, and other vital sectors—cybersecurity risk management policies for federal networks, consumer cybersecurity, and cyber incident response policy and incident management. He also covered technology policy topics with a nexus to cyber policy including encryption, surveillance, privacy, Internet of Things, and the national security dimensions of artificial intelligence and machine learning. 

Grotto said his first job out of graduate school was at a prominent Washington, D.C. think tank. “I viewed it as a waypoint on the path to becoming a law professor, and an academic career focused on international trade law and policy,” he said.

There he was surrounded by people who had served in government, and their “passion for public service was infectious,” he recalled.

He left the think tank to join the Professional Staff of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, where he served as then-Chairman Dianne Feinstein’s (D-CA) lead staff overseeing cyber-related activities of the intelligence community and all aspects of NSA’s mission. He also served as committee designee first for Senator Sheldon Whitehouse (D-RI) and later for Senator Kent Conrad (D-ND), advising the senators on oversight of the intelligence community, including of covert action programs, and was a contributing author of the “Committee Study of the Central Intelligence Agency’s Detention and Interrogation Program.”

In 2013, he left the committee to become Commerce Secretary Penny Pritzker’s senior advisor on technology policy, advising Pritzker on all aspects of technology policy, including Internet of Things, net neutrality, privacy, national security reviews of foreign investment in the U.S. technology sector, and international developments affecting the competitiveness of the U.S. technology sector.

While serving on the NSC, Grotto played a key role in shaping President Obama’s Cybersecurity National Action Plan and driving its implementation. He was also the principal architect of the Trump Administration's cybersecurity executive order, “Strengthening the Cybersecurity of Federal Networks and Critical Infrastructure.”

During his time on Capitol Hill, he led the negotiation and drafting of the information sharing title of the Cybersecurity Act of 2012, which later served as the foundation for the Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act that President Obama signed in 2015.

Grotto received a master’s degree in public administration from Harvard University, a law degree from UC Berkeley, and a bachelor’s degree in philosophy from the University of Kentucky.

MEDIA CONTACT:

Andy Grotto, Center for International Security and Cooperation: grotto@stanford.edu

Clifton B. Parker, Center for International Security and Cooperation: 650-725-6488, cbparker@stanford.edu

 

 

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Andrew J. Grotto, a former top National Security Council cybersecurity official, will join Stanford’s Center for International Security and Cooperation this summer. | Getty Images
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The 2017 Forum will feature a luncheon keynote address on “Primary Care in the Netherlands: Lessons for China” by Jeroen N. Struijs, Senior Researcher in the Department of Quality of Care and Health Economics, National Institute of Public Health and the Environment, The Netherlands. Additional prominent speakers include Dr. Huncheol Bryant Kim, Cornell University, US, speaking on health policy in South Korea; Dr. Bei Lu, University of New South Wales, Australia, speaking on China’s efforts to integrate long-term care with primary care--Experiences of Qingdao’s Long-term Care Insurance program; Dr. Xiaoyun Liu, Peking University, on China’s primary care workforce; Dr. Jiayan Huang, Fudan University, on a model of integrated care from southern China; and Dr. Qiulin Chen, China Academy of Social Sciences, speaking on “Strengthening China’s primary care: A view from Inner Mongolia.” In addition, select policymakers and providers will introduce China's overall healthcare system reforms as well as discuss challenges to strengthening primary care in China.

Stanford Center at Peking University

Jeroen N. Struijs Senior Researcher in the Department of Quality of Care and Health Economics, National Institute of Public Health and the Environment, The Netherlands
Huncheol Bryant Kim Cornell University, US
Bei Lu University of New South Wales, Australia
Xiaoyun Liu Peking University, China
Qiulin Chen China Academy of Social Sciences, China
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Amy Zegart
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CISAC's co-director Amy Zegart wrote this essay, "James Comey's 'Shock and Awe' Testimony," for The Atlantic in its June 8 edition and was also quoted in this Stanford News Service article:

Imagine that two years ago, you sequestered a jury of 12 Americans, kept them in a news-free zone, and brought them today to hear former FBI Director James Comey testify before the Senate Intelligence Committee. Chances are that all of them—no matter what their political beliefs—would be stunned and outraged.

From the perspective of one of these Americans, Comey dropped bombshell after bombshell: The Russians are mucking around in American democratic elections, trying to change how we think, how we act, how we vote—and they will be back. The attorney general cannot be trusted to ensure impartial enforcement of the law. The president fired the FBI director and then lied about why he did it. Yet by the time Comey said these things in an open hearing, all of it was old news. It should have been more shocking than it was, but on some level, Americans were used to it.

Some historical context here is important. Only one FBI Director has ever been fired since J. Edgar Hoover took the job back in 1924: William Sessions, who was sacked by President Bill Clinton in 1993 after the Justice Department's own Office of Professional Responsibility found so many severe ethical lapses, they filled a 161-page report. It included schemes to avoid paying taxes, using government funds to build an expensive home fence that actually reduced the security of the property, using FBI resources for personal purposes, and involving his wife, Alice, in bureau management in “entirely inappropriate” ways. Comey, by contrast, was fired by President Trump for doing his job. Big difference. One was miscarrying justice and abusing power; the other was carrying out justice and speaking truth to power.

Similarly, the only episode in recent history approximating the cloud hanging over the attorney general’s office occurred during the Watergate scandal. That attorney general chose to resign rather than fire White House special prosecutor Archibald Cox and impede an investigation reaching into the White House. This attorney general, by contrast, appears to be implicated in an investigation that reaches into the White House.

Finally, never in American history has a foreign power so deliberately, powerfully, and maliciously tried to distort the cornerstone of American democracy. Comey sent this point home in the hearing, declaring, “There should be no fuzz on this whatsoever. The Russians interfered in our election during the 2016 cycle. They did it with purpose. They did it with sophistication. They did it with overwhelming technical efforts. … It is a high confidence judgment of the entire intelligence community. ... It's not a close call.”

Comey’s testimony delivered a “shock and awe” campaign, FBI-style: calm, cautious, and candid, at once stoic and relatable. It was as though Comey were trying to reach through our television sets and shake the body politic into our collective senses.

And yet, his shock and awe testimony may not shock and awe for long. The biggest story of the day is how unlikely this is to remain the biggest story. In all likelihood, after the Twittersphere dies down, partisans will retreat to their respective corners and business as usual will return to Washington.

Why?

Because of something called the “normalization of deviance:” the more frequently exceptional things happen, the less we think of them as exceptional.  Over time, we become desensitized to events that fall far outside the normal range—often with disastrous consequences. The space shuttle Challenger exploded in 1986 despite previous shuttle launches that revealed O-ring seals in the shuttle’s rocket boosters were cracking in cold weather. They shouldn’t have been cracking at all. But NASA “normalized” the poor performance of O-rings as acceptable and okayed the launch, even with record low temperatures forecast for liftoff. Seven astronauts, including Christa McAuliffe, the first teacher in space, were killed.

We experience the normalization of deviance in daily life, too. Ever hear a funny noise in your car? The first time, it seems alarming. After living with it for a few days, however, you think it must not be so serious after all. You tell yourself the car seems to be running just fine. You grow accustomed to the noise. After a while you don’t notice it anymore. And maybe the car really is fine. Or maybe the funny noise is an indication that the car is about to experience a catastrophic breakdown (which is what happened to me one night, when I assumed a strange noise in my car was really nothing, until the car broke down on the freeway, at night, in Los Angeles, “without warning.”)

The Trump era has brought the normalization of deviance to politics. In four short months, this administration’s national-security advisor has had to resign in disgrace for lying about his contacts with Russians and now faces possible criminal charges. The attorney general is so tainted by his own Russian-related activities that he has had to recuse himself from the bureau’s investigation of Russian-related activities. And the FBI director, who by law serves a 10-year term precisely to ensure independence from the president, was fired by the president because he was independent. This is bizarro world. Any one of these events would in normal times be enough to bring down a president. And yet senators today were talking about whether President Trump’s exact words to Jim Comey constituted a hope, a wish, an order, a directive, a threat, or as one senator characterized it, simply a “light touch” approach.

Comey was right about one thing: The Russians “are coming after America.” They may not have to. In this era of normalized deviance, we are defeating ourselves.

Read Amy Zegart's comments and those from other Stanford faculty in this Stanford News Service article.

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Former FBI Director James Comey moves from an open hearing to a closed hearing during a break in testimony before the Senate Intelligence Committee in the Hart Senate Office Building on June 8, 2017 in Washington, DC. CISAC's Amy Zegart says Comey was right about one thing: The Russians “are coming after America.” They may not have to, she added -- in this era of normalized deviance, we are defeating ourselves. | Chip Somodevilla/Getty Images
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North Korea’s economy continues to move ahead despite years of isolation and international trade restrictions. The economy is performing at a moderate rate with a mean GDP growth rate of 0.7 percent from 2004 to 2015, and appears to be a focus of the regime’s policy decision-making, researchers have found.

“The government has embraced markets as an acceptable and effective way to improve performance and enhance legitimacy but maintains the ability to regulate marketized activities,” SK Center Fellow Yong Suk Lee and Shorenstein APARC Fellow Thomas Fingar wrote in a joint report released today.

The report, available in English and Korean (forthcoming), is an outcome of research collaboration between the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC) and the Institute for National Security Strategy (INSS), a research body focused on national security policy that is part of the South Korean government.

Conducted over the course of six months, the collaboration included two roundtable meetings at Stanford and in Seoul with the report’s co-authors from the INSS, Kwang-Jin Kim and Hyung-Seog Lee, and Korea-focused scholars at Shorenstein APARC, including Gi-Wook Shin, director of the center; Kathleen Stephens, the William J. Perry Fellow; and Daniel Sneider, associate director for research.

“We set out with the research question ‘how is the current North Korean regime performing,’ and through our engagements with the INSS, were able to combine our expertise and look at the question from new and different angles,” said Shin, also a professor of sociology and director of the Korea Program, who initiated the collaboration.

The researchers participated in discussions and parsed through data and qualitative accounts, including surveys from the INSS and reporting by journalists. From their collaboration, they determined two approaches to understanding the country’s economic and institutional expansion since Kim Jong-un assumed power six years ago, both of which are outlined in the report.

Their first approach suggests that organizational and personnel changes in Kim Jong-un’s cabinet, key ministries and committees were undertaken, at least in part, to enact operational effectiveness and a more productive economy.

“There’s evidence that indicates new appointments by Kim Jong-un were intended to maintain or enhance the ability of the government to meet continuing and new policy objectives,” said Fingar, a political scientist with an emphasis on Northeast Asia.

Kim Jong-un has attempted to consolidate control by removing at least two-dozen officials in the government’s main governing body – the Korean Workers’ Party, and in some cases, promoting them to different positions.

In the report, the researchers mapped the systems of North Korea’s three rulers since its founding in 1948 and the significant leadership changes under Kim Jong-un, noting that recent vice-premier promotions have included new economic responsibilities.

Personnel changes in the military have also involved positions responsible for oversight of foreign relations, commerce, oil and statistics, which suggest that officials are judged not only on their loyalty to the regime, but also on their performance at the job, Fingar said.

Their second approach suggests that North Korea’s improved economic performance is linked to its expansion of markets, and since 2009, its increased trade and investment with China.

“While the government maintains the ability to regulate market activities, North Korea’s growing dependence on the ‘private sector’ is a sign of the priority assigned to it and of its movement away from a socialist-style economy,” said Lee, an economist and deputy director of the Korea Program.

Officially licensed markets in North Korea have been estimated to number in the hundreds and the government collects taxes from them. There also exists a similar estimate for unofficial markets operating in the country, according to data cited in the report.

The researchers said it is improbable that North Korea will abandon market-oriented activities and capital inflows from outside its borders, particularly from China, in a time of tightening sanctions from the U.N. Security Council and other countries in response to North Korea’s repeated nuclear and missile tests.

“Taken together or apart, the two approaches we’ve put forth provide a comprehensive puzzle for future study,” said Lee. “We hope this report brings additional lenses that researchers can apply to analyze the performance of the North Korean regime and that policymakers can use to assess the efficacy of international sanctions.”

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A Chinese soldier stands at a bridge over the Yalu River on the China-North Korea border facing a mineral mine in Linjiang, China, April 8, 2008. | Getty Images
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Colonel Patrick Winstead, the 2016-17 FSI senior military fellow at Shorenstein APARC, writes about the second annual orientation at U.S. Pacific Command headquarters

The mission of the Department of Defense (DoD) in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region recently became a bit clearer for 22 faculty and military fellows from Stanford, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, the Naval Postgraduate School and the Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies (APCSS). The U.S.-Asia Security Initiative at the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC) in the Freeman Spogli Institute (FSI) organized a group of faculty and fellows for a two-day orientation of United States Pacific Command (USPACOM) and its component military organizations in and around Honolulu, Hawaii, April 13-14, 2017. The purpose of the orientation was to provide researchers with a comprehensive understanding of how America’s armed forces both develop and implement U.S. national security strategy, doctrine and policy throughout Asia.

The trip began with a visit to the headquarters of USPACOM at Camp H.M. Smith. After receiving briefings about USPACOM's mission and operations, the group engaged in roundtable discussions with General Terrence O’Shaughnessy (Commander, U.S. Pacific Air Forces); Major General Kevin B. Schneider (Chief of Staff, USPACOM); Rear Admiral Mark Montgomery (Director for Operations, USPACOM); Major General Steven Rudd (Director for Strategic Planning and Policy, USPACOM); as well as other key joint directors and members of the command staff. The faculty and fellows provided short presentations on the situation in the South China Sea, U.S.-Philippine relations and cyber warfare to an audience of mid-grade military officers and civilian personnel assigned to USPACOM.

In addition to meeting with the leadership of USPACOM, the group was also afforded the opportunity to interact with personnel from the four separate component commands. Deputy Commanding General of U.S. Army Pacific, Major General Charlie Flynn, provided a command briefing at the U.S. Army Pacific headquarters at Fort Shafter. The briefing stimulated a wide-ranging discussion about Army initiatives and activities in support of USPACOM’s mission in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region. At Marine Corps Base Hawaii at Kaneohe Bay, under the guidance of trainers, the visitors took part in a hands-on experience operating Humvee simulators in a virtual-reality convoy setting and firing simulated weapons that Marines typically employ in combat operations. The first day of the trip ended with a working dinner at the historic Nimitz House with the Commander of the U.S. Pacific Fleet, Admiral Scott Swift, where the conversation ranged from Chinese military modernization to evolving U.S. naval doctrine.

Those themes carried into the second day, when the group met for several hours with faculty at APCSS for plenary presentations and multiple breakout sessions to facilitate in-depth dialogue on select topics including the threats posed by nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula and in South Asia. The day continued with a tour of the U.S.S Hopper, an Arleigh-Burke class guided missile destroyer, based at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. Once onboard, the ship’s captain, Lieutenant Commander J.D. Gainey, provided briefings on Hopper’s mission and operational capabilities. In addition, the group spoke with members of the ship’s crew. The experience allowed the faculty and fellows to interact informally with sailors who serve in the Asia-Pacific theatre and to candidly discuss issues of concern. The second day of the orientation ended with a visit to the headquarters of U.S. Pacific Air Forces and a dialogue with O’Shaughnessy and his staff about the unique security challenges of the Indo-Asia-Pacific region, such as tyranny of distance, limited support bases and multiple emerging threats, and how those challenges impact the Air Force and the entire U.S. military’s preparations for contingencies in the region.

Overall, the orientation provided a unique opportunity to engage directly with high-level leaders of USPACOM and to learn first-hand about the challenges faced by those who serve in the armed forces. The orientation also provided a forum to discuss the United States’ national security interests in the region and its efforts to maintain peace and stability in the Indo-Asia-Pacific and to help maintain a rules-based, liberal democratic order.

Related links:

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A group of 22 faculty and military fellows participate in an orientation at U.S. Pacific Command headquarters, Honolulu, Hawaii, April 13-14, 2017, organized and sponsored by the U.S.-Asia Security Initiative. | Courtesy of the U.S.-Asia Security Initiative
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A growing body of evidence suggests that China’s schooling system, as it stands today, is unable to produce the high-skilled labor that will be needed if the nation is to avoid the middle-income trap. How does poor parenting and inadequate early childhood development attribute to this problem? Prof. Rozelle will discuss his research on cognitive delays among toddlers in rural China, and the national crisis that the country faces due to inadequate childhood development.  

 

Scott Rozelle holds the Helen Farnsworth Endowed Professorship at Stanford University and is Senior Fellow in the Food Security and Environment Program and the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center, Freeman Spogli Institute (FSI) for International Studies. For the past 30 years, he has worked on the economics of poverty reduction. Currently, his work on poverty has its full focus on human capital, including issues of rural health, nutrition and education. Rozelle has been the chair of the International Advisory Board of the Center for Chinese Agricultural Policy, Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) for the past 20 years. He is the co-director of the Rural Education Action Project (REAP). 

Registration: 

https://www.eventbank.cn/event/9642/

 

Stanford Center at Peking University

 

Scott Rozelle Senior Fellow Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies
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