The acceptance of human rights and minority rights, the increasing role of international financial institutions, and globalization have led many observers to question the continued viability of the sovereign state. Here a leading expert challenges this conclusion. Stephen Krasner contends that states have never been as sovereign as some have supposed. Throughout history, rulers have been motivated by a desire to stay in power, not by some abstract adherence to international principles. Organized hypocrisy--the presence of longstanding norms that are frequently violated--has been an enduring attribute of international relations

Political leaders have usually but not always honored international legal sovereignty, the principle that international recognition should be accorded only to juridically independent sovereign states, while treating Westphalian sovereignty, the principle that states have the right to exclude external authority from their own territory, in a much more provisional way. In some instances violations of the principles of sovereignty have been coercive, as in the imposition of minority rights on newly created states after the First World War or the successor states of Yugoslavia after 1990; at other times cooperative, as in the European Human Rights regime or conditionality agreements with the International Monetary Fund.

The author looks at various issues areas to make his argument: minority rights, human rights, sovereign lending, and state creation in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Differences in national power and interests, he concludes, not international norms, continue to be the most powerful explanation for the behavior of states.

Extensively revised since the first edition was published in 1989, this analytically balanced and empirically rich volume thoroughly examines the historical, cultural, social, economic, political, and international factors that affect both the prospects for and the nature of political democracy in Latin America.

The book reflects improvements in democratic trends in some countries, but also the erosion of democratic advances in others, with substantial malaise regarding key political actors and institutions and continuing concerns about the impact on democratic consolidation of economic constraints, weak states, judicial inefficacy, and high degrees of inequality. A comprehensive introduction precedes the nine country chapters, which follow a similar format to facilitate comparisons.

Why Poor Countries Are Becoming Richer, Democratic, Increasingly Peaceable, and Sometimes More Dangerous

It is easy to be confused about the world’s prospect. On the one hand, since the collapse of the Soviet Union and its empire, many millions of people have been freed from economic and political shackles that had long kept them under authoritarian rule and in poverty—or at least far poorer than they should be. On the other hand, several parts of the world are beset by political turmoil and conflicts, rapid population increases, and falling incomes.

The next time Bill Clinton and Boris Yeltsin meet at a U.S.-Russian summit,

three kinds of issues will dominate their agenda's arms control, regional conflicts,

and human rights. In fact, these three issues may dominate the agenda of

future U.S.-Russian summits for a long time. Regarding arms control, the Russian

ratification of START II stands as one of the major stumbling points in U.S.-

Russia relations. The two presidents probably will not meet again until this agreement

has been ratified by the Russian parliament. Regarding regional conflicts,

the American and Russian governments have radically divergent positions concerning

trade with Iran. For several years, the United States has objected to the

Russian-assisted construction of nuclear reactors in Iran, yet the Russian Ministry

of Atomic Energy continues with the project. Regarding human rights,

American officials have quite rightly expressed their outrage concerning the passage

of a new draconian law on religion that restricts the freedom of worship of

most "nontraditional" Russian faiths. In reaction to this law, the U.S. Senate has

threatened to end all aid to Russia.

Although Africa has been one of the least democratic regions of the world, it has been experiencing widespread pressures for democratic change since 1990. Although pressure-from both domestic civil societies and international donors-has failed to bring about a transition to democracy in most cases, it has succeeded in many. Today, about a third of all African countries are at least electoral democracies, and virtually all regimes in sub-Saharan Africa have at least legalized opposition parties. Conventional political science theories view Africa's democratic prospects as grim because of its extreme poverty and deep ethnic divisions. This essay takes a more hopeful and "developmental" view. It argues that democratic change can occur in Africa and must if it is to develop economically. But this will inevitably involve a long-term process of political and social change and, in particular, institution building. African countries need new, more appropriate, and more effective institutions to control corruption, provide a market-oriented enabling environment for economic growth, and generate incentives for political parties to craft broad multiethnic appeals and constituencies. If institutions of governance, electoral politics, and civil society can be strengthened and innovatively designed, there is hope for democracy in Africa. But this will also require heavy international conditionality and pressure for more responsible policies and more effective institutions, as well as greater international support for those African regimes that appear serious about democracy and good governance. African societies are ready for a new democratic beginning, but they require the right institutional frameworks at home and vigorous engagement of the international community if deeply entrenched patterns of statism, corruption, repression, ethnic exclusion, and violence are to be overcome.

Freedom in the World is an indispensable annual survey of political rights and civil liberties from Freedom House, the nation's leading human rights advocacy group. Well- established as a standard reference, "Freedom in the World" ranks each country in the world according to degree of political rights and civil liberties its citizens enjoy - or are deprived of. It offers a full overview of each country, identifies its political and economic systems, and provides vital data about life expectancy, population, ethnic composition, and economic indicators. Regional and country reports are accompanied by the annual Map of Freedom, regional maps, charts, tabulated ratings, and other graphic tools that allow immediate comparison between countries. "Freedom in the World" is a crucial resource for all those concerned about progress in human rights.

On 26-27 January 1996, the National Endowment for Democracy's International Forum for Democratic Studies and the Pacific Council on International Policy convened a one-and-a-half-day conference on democratic development and economic growth in East Asia and Latin America. The conference sought to shed light on the relationship between constructing democratic governance and building market economies in both regions.Participating in the meeting were 18 eminent scholars from Asia, Latin America, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Not all participants were able to attend the second day's morning session. About 30 additional scholars, business and community leaders, and members of the press attended as observers. Carl Gershman, president of the National Endowment for Democracy, gave the luncheon address. (Names in italics in this report are identified in the appendix.)

This report summarizes the presentations and comments made during the conference. While every effort has been made to portray accurately the range of opinions expressed, space and organizational considerations have required omissions and paraphrasing. This report was written by Chappell Lawson, a graduate student in political science at Stanford University, and edited by the International Forum for Democratic Studies and the Pacific Council on International Policy. Any errors in fact or interpretation should be attributed to the author and editors.

The conference and this report were made possible in part by a grant from the Carnegie Corporation of New York to the International Forum for Democratic Studies and grants from the Carnegie Corporation of New York, the General Service Foundation, and the James Irvine Foundation to the Pacific Council on International Policy. The funders do not take responsibility for any statements or views expressed in this document. The views expressed in this report do not necessarily represent those of the National Endowment for Democracy, the International Forum for Democratic Studies, or the Pacific Council on International Policy. Photocopies may be made. When using any part of this document, please cite the International Forum for Democratic Studies and the Pacific Council on International Policy. This report was produced by Debra Liang-Fenton, Conferences & Publications Coordinator of the International Forum.

The tasks of preventive diplomacy and conflict prevention are neither self-evident nor value-neutral, as some of their proponents seem to believe. Diplomacy that aims to resolve long-standing conflicts may have to take sides and coerce powerful parties into concessions. Diplomacy that aims to manage conflict so that it does not become violent may have to sacrifice a quest for justice in deference to the powerful. Prevention might conflict with important national and even global interests. If, as President Clinton has suggested many times, the primary American interest in Bosnia is thwarting the spread of the war, then the arms embargo has been an unqualified success. If, however, the primary American and global interest has been denying Serbian aggression and upholding the principle of Bosnian sovereignty, then the embargo has failed.

A focus on prevention ignores the role that conflict plays in driving political change in societies. For grievances to be redressed, they must be vocalized. If they are vocalized, those with a stake in the status quo will attempt to suppress them. Often the balance of change depends on the ability of the grieved to amplify the conflict to increase their support. If we have learned anything from the disparate cases of conflict resolution in recent decades -- the civil rights movement in the United States, the fight for human rights in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, the fight for national self-determination in the Middle East, the fight against apartheid in South Africa -- it is that some conflicts must be intensified before they are resolved.

Preventive diplomacy and conflict prevention do not lessen the difficulty of choices for leaders, nor do they really lessen costs. For either to succeed, policymakers must still spell out their interests, set priorities among cases, and balance goals with resources. The president will still need to educate the American people about the rationale behind a policy and convince them of the need for action. Absent well-defined interests, clear goals, and prudent judgment about acceptable costs and risks, policies of preventive diplomacy and conflict prevention simply mean that one founders early in a crisis instead of later.

International regimes are systems of norms and rules agreed upon by states to govern their behaviour in specific political contexts or `issue areas' whether this be trade policy, proliferation of nuclear weapons, or the control of transboundary air pollution in some region of the world.

In a competitive international society increasingly faced with issues that transcend the physical and political limits of individual states they are an outstanding example of international governance, and central to any analysis of world politics.

In this volume, experts from the USA and Europe join forces for the first time for a rigorous exploration of the concept of international regimes. They discuss the fundamental conceptual and theoretical problems of regime analysis, study how regimes are formed and how they change, examine approaches to explaining the success or failure of attempts to form regimes, and look at the consequences of regimes for international relations.