Agricultural productivity in sub-Saharan Africa remains significantly less than the rest of the world, and 25 percent of people in the region still suffer from an insufficient dietary intake of calories. Yet sub-Saharan Africa has more arable land than Asia or Latin America, and a more diverse set of cereal grains. Agriculture also accounts for 20-25 percent of GDP for the region compared with only five percent for the rest of the world.

So why is productivity in sub-Saharan Africa so low when agriculture is such a big part of the economy, asked Rosamond L. Naylor, director of the Center on Food Security Environment at last week’s Connecting the Dots conference. Lack of irrigation is part of the problem. 95 percent of farms in sub-Saharan Africa are rainfed and rely on water from a short, 4-5 month rainy season. 

“During the rainy season kids are fed pretty well,” explained Naylor. “But during the peak of the dry season up to one-third of children are severely malnourished in parts of West Africa where we have been working.”

Sub-Saharan Africa has largely missed out on the benefits of the Green Revolution that increased crop production in Asia two to three fold. Asia’s heavily irrigated agriculture took advantage of new crop varieties that were bred to take up nutrients with sufficient water availability. Groundwater sources in sub-Saharan Africa, on the other hand, are more fractured and not well understood, and surface water isn’t necessarily close to where the people are.

“But Africa has water” said Naylor. “Groundwater resources have not been sufficiently explored and rivers such as the Nile and Niger remain underutilized due to a mindset that irrigation systems must be large scale.”

This requires big investments and institutional involvement that have thus far not resulted in great payoffs. Corruption in some areas coupled with institutional and tribal issues have also contributed to failed investments.

“We need to change our investment strategies from large-scale to small-scale irrigation systems,” suggested Naylor. “Evaluate the returns from treadle, solar-power, and diesel pumps to see what works where, so that we stop investments that aren’t working and support investments where they are.”

Treadle pumps can work well if they are close to surface water, but require a lot of labor, explained Naylor. There is a huge energetic cost and an opportunity cost for someone to work the treadle pump, so it is necessary to ‘get the right technology to suit the water and labor conditions’.

Irrigation is not just about access (drawing water). It is also necessary to think about how to best distribute that water to crops (e.g. drip irrigation) and what you use them on. Production of leafy greens, for example, leads to higher income and nutritional returns.

FSE’s solar market garden project in Benin is a good example of where appropriate technologies are being applied in a cost-effective manner. Solar-powered, drip irrigation pumps have improved incomes and nutrition for participating farming groups through the year-round production of high-value crops. Proven to be a viable and profitable investment, the project is now scaling up in other villages in Benin and West Africa.

“According to the World Bank, investment in agriculture is the best bang for your buck than any other investment,” said panel moderator Jenna Davis, assistant professor in the department of civil and environmental engineering and affiliated FSE fellow.

Fortunately, the World Bank is beginning to recognize the viability and efficiency of investments in small-scale irrigation projects. NGOs and academia also have a role to play in facilitating these projects. Through these partnerships and shifts in investment strategies, the development community has a better chance of improving access to freshwater resources for some of the world’s most vulnerable and effectively addressing sub-Saharan Africa's water and food security crisis.

In the first decade of the 21^st century, global production of ethanol and biodiesel increased nearly tenfold. If that trend continues, says Rosamond L. Naylor, director of Stanford University’s Center on Food Security and the Environment, national biofuels policies will have an increasingly powerful impact on food prices, food security, energy security, and rural incomes in the developing world.

During a two-hour symposium held on the Stanford campus last Wednesday, Naylor addressed the role of biofuels in global food price volatility and the implications of biofuels development in rural Africa and Asia. Although she acknowledged that global income and population growth have contributed to increased demand for biofuels, she also emphasized “the unbelievable dominance of policy” in driving current trends.

“The main part of this that I think is so significant is the use of mandates,” Naylor said. “Policies such as the United States’ Renewable Fuels Standard (RFS), which sets a national target of using 15 billion gallons of corn-based ethanol per year by 2015, have reshaped price and supply dynamics in both food and fuel markets. “

“When you think about the fact that the US provides half of the world’s corn…the fact that we’re using so much in our gas tanks, biofuels really is changing the nature of global markets,” Naylor said. Policies that fix demand for corn from the ethanol market, she explained, have a destabilizing effect on corn prices, especially in the face of supply shortages.

“When you have mandates you have a quantity that you’re absolutely insisting you use, regardless of the price,” she said. “That inelastic demand leads to more volatile prices with supply shocks.”

Because of the substitutability of basic food commodities, Naylor said, price volatility in the corn market has far-reaching consequences. “Prices of corn ripple through all of the world food economy markets…it affects the demand and supply of wheat and rice and soy, and other things,” she explained. And for poor households in the developing world, she said, “it has big income effects…when you’re spending 70 to 80 percent of your budget on food, you’re going to be hurt the most.”

However, Naylor also noted that biofuel mandates in the developed world could provide valuable market opportunities for developing-country farmers.

In rural Africa and Asia, she said, farmers “see the US having a big mandate, EU having a big mandate, and they think, can they supply into that mandated need?”

For now, it seems, the answer is “maybe.” In Africa, for example, efforts are underway to increase the use of jatropha – an inedible, drought-resistant shrub – as a biofuel feedstock. But Naylor said that low yields and high labor costs are likely to severely limit the economic returns from jatropha-based biofuels.

And in marginal growing conditions, the use of more conventional feedstocks is often restricted by resource availability. In India, for example, where almost all sugarcane is grown under irrigated conditions, expansion of sugarcane area to supply the ethanol market could lead to water shortages. Even if these countries can make large-scale biofuel production economically viable, the benefits to poor farmers could vary widely depending on the structure of the market.

“The implications of biofuel development are going to be quite different,” Naylor said, “depending on the organization of the value chain.”

Dr. Siwa Msangi, a Senior Research Fellow with the International Food Policy Research Institute, agreed. In comments following Naylor’s presentation, Msangi said biofuel development contributes most effectively to rural income growth “when you can have vertical integration…people all along the value chain have to be making money.”

Msangi also noted that commodity price increases, including those driven by ethanol mandates, could benefit small farmers if they are controlled and predictable. “Sharp, fast, sudden price rises – those are the ones that are bad for consumers,” he explained. But prices rises “can be positive…especially if those price rises can be gradual and sustained over time, because that gives people the opportunity to mobilize resources to make use of higher returns.” For example, small farmers at the local or national level can increase their production of crops in high demand for biofuel production.

The emerging connections between agriculture and energy markets are complex, Msangi said, but can be advantageous if handled carefully. “If there are good opportunities for agribusiness, I think there’s a case for taking them,” he said, “but also for being aware of the context and all the issues.”

This was the eighth talk in FSE’s Global Food Policy and Food Security Symposium Series. 

As the Arab world undergoes an unprecedented period of political transition, many are looking towards a new development model to spur economic growth and social advancement. The Program on Arab Reform and Democracy (ARD) at Stanford's Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law examined this question during its third annual conference on April 26-27, 2012 at Stanford University. The conference featured leading academics, practitioners, and activists, who looked beyond economics to present a more integrated framework for development.

According to ARD Program Manager Lina Khatib, "A goal of the conference is to present an integrated approach to development in the Arab world, particularly in places witnessing democratic transition, which links social, political, and economic factors."

The conference included a diverse array of speakers hailing from the political and social sectors, representing youth leaders, religious minorities, women's rights advocates, and civil society representatives, who joined economists to discuss new regional frameworks for development.

Conference speakers included: Mona Makram Ebeid, who has a long and distinguished career as a parliamentarian in Egypt, commenting on the challenges facing minority rights in democratic transition; Hedi Larbi, director of the Middle East department at the World Bank, who will address the issue of oil dependency and how it constrains economic development in the Gulf region; Libyan NGO leader Rihab Elhaj who co-founded The New Libya Foundation and who will speak about the important role civil society plays in the development equation; and Valentine Moghadam, professor of sociology at Northeastern University and a leading expert on gender issues, who will examine political development through a gender lens.

To view the complete program and download the presentation documents and conference report, please click here.

On March 22, a military coup abruptly ended two decades of uninterrupted democracy in Mali, the well-reputed West African country and key counter-terrorism partner of the United States. The coup leader Army Captain Amadou Sanogo and his mutinous troops suspended the 1992 democratic constitution, took over the presidential palace, the state television and several institutions, arrested members of the government, and promised a more efficient fight against Tuareg rebels. Interruption of the Malian democracy by a belligerent military faction is a serious threat to stability, peace, and human rights given the domestic context.

Since the coup, the conflict with the Tuareg rebels has continued to worsen. The two main Tuareg groups — the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) and Islamist Ansar Dine — have gained ground and seized new territories in the north of the country, pushing for sharia law. If a domestic solution is not found quickly, African regional organizations and the international community should act in concert with Malian democratic defenders - either diplomatically or coercively  - to restore democracy and peace, and stop rebel progression before it is too lateAfrican regional organizations and the international community should act in concert with Malian democratic defenders — either diplomatically or coercively — to restore democracy and peace, and stop rebel progression before it is too late.

The Coup in Mali: Who is Behind it and Why?

Plotters deposed the widely respected and democratically elected President Amadou Toumani Touré, a little over a month before the scheduled presidential election on April 29. Coup leader Captain Sanogo justified the unconstitutional seizure of power under the guise of national security, accusing President Touré of inefficiently fighting the decades-old Tuareg rebellion, and not providing enough resources to the army.

However, given the electoral timing, reasons advanced by Captain Sanogo to justify the coup are illogical. President Touré was not a candidate in the 2012 presidential election, and had just over a month left in his second and last term in office. As a visionary leader, he respected the unique Malian societal and political culture, improved governance, and put the country on a path to sustainable economic growth. Therefore, it is not surprising that Freedom House has continued over the past two decades to classify Mali as a democratic regime — whether electoral or liberal — despite several challenges such as; weak public institutions and central government, poverty, aid dependency, the Tuareg separatist rebellion, and labor or social unrests. The coup leader’s argument is further weakened because the democratic Malian government was offering public space to potentially unsatisfied military personnel to negotiate within the constitutional framework, along with the option to openly discuss issues of concern with presidential candidates.

The Coup is Reinvigorating Fear of a Repressive Military Regime 

The coup is reinvigorating fear of the resurgence of repressive rule that reigned for decades after successive military coups. Such repressive rule must be prevented. In 1968, Lieutenant Moussa Traoré ousted the civilian government, eight years after Mali gained its independence from France. Because he was resistant to democratic changes, Traoré was ousted in 1991 by Amadou Toumani Touré in the face of widespread civil unrest and demands for greater political rights and democratic reforms.

In 1991, the Transitional Committee for the Salvation of the People (CTSP) was formed by various groups representing civil society and under the supervision of Amadou Toumani Touré. The Committee organized successful political liberalization, which included; a national conference, a constitutional referendum, a founding election won by President Alpha Oumar Konaré (1992-2002), and consequently a democratic transition in 1992. Many hope that twenty years of democratic developments are not eradicated by this coup. Captain Sanogo still has the window of opportunity to respect the Malian values and people, and end his rule, as requested by the people.

The Devastating Consequences of the Coup in Mali and Africa

The coup has significant implications on the political developments in Mali, West Africa and the African continent. It weakens the already fragile democratic institutions, and calls into question the solidity of the unique political culture, visionary leadership, and the subordination of the military to the executive that were considered by many as the foundation of Malian democracy.The coup weakens the already fragile democratic institutions, and calls into question the solidity of the unique political culture, visionary leadership, and the subordination of the military to the executive that were considered by many as the foundation of Malian democracy. In addition, it worsened the situation in the north of the country, with rebel militias controlling more towns than before the coup. The coup has consequently increased the risk of disproportionate use of force, potentially leading to more violent and deadly conflicts threatening minority groups in Mali, with negative consequences for the entire West African region.

 The coup also gives reasons — not necessarily valid — to citizens and pessimistic observers to despair about the prospect of democracy in West Africa. The spirit of democracy has recently been challenged in countries such as Cote d’Ivoire, Senegal, Mauritania, Guinea and Guinea-Bissau. If most plotters manage to stay in power, Africa may face a resurgence of military coup plots, reviving the violent nightmare of the two last decades of the twentieth century.

 Malian and International Reactions to the Coup

Malian domestic leadership and the international community have all taken serious steps towards returning the country to civilian rule and restoring the democratic system. Malian political and civil society leaders have clearly shown deep opposition to the rupture of the constitutional order, and they have requested return to the rule of law. They are peacefully demonstrating to avoid violence and to preserve national unity. On March 28, the ousted President Touré called for a consensual solution and told French Radio station RFI "what is important is democracy, institutions, and Mali." In the same vein, the international community has strongly condemned the coup, applied some diplomatic sanctions, and requested a return to an elected civilian government.

The U.N. Secretary General has called for immediate restoration of constitutional rule, and the U.N. Security Council echoed a similar sentiment by calling for "the restoration of constitutional order and the holding of elections as previously scheduled." The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) reiterated its policy of “zero tolerance” for unconstitutional seizures of power, organized high-level meetings with heads of state to persuade the junta to step-down, readied its stand-by forces, and placed an economic embargo on Mali.

The African Union immediately suspended the membership of Mali until constitutional rule is restored, and the U.S. paused military aid to Mali and urged rebels to end fighting. France has suspended its official cooperation with Mali, but maintained humanitarian aid and is pushing the U.N. Security Council to explore avenues to support ECOWAS in their efforts to restore order. Canada, the African Development Bank, the European Union, and the World Bank have all suspended their aid. These diplomatic actions, especially from ECOWAS, have pressured the junta to announce (formally but not yet effectively) the restoration of the 1992 constitution on April 1, a few days after unconstitutionally promulgating a new one. Further actions should be made in a timely manner to pressure the junta to step-down, to ensure that power is transferred back to civilian rule and constitutional order restored.

Restoring democracy and peace in Mali — diplomatically or coercively — is imperative. It will send a strong warning to those who try to undermine democratic efforts that unconstitutional appropriation of power and threats to peace and security will not be tolerated. Citizens will also be shown that they are supported in their battle for democracy and peace.