Nuclear Energy
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Abstract: The expected increasing world energy demand makes it necessary for us to seriously and urgently study the questions of global warming due to greenhouse gas effect emissions and the depletion of fossil resources. This clearly means producing more energy, while emitting a minimum amount of CO2, and keeping the costs under control and acceptable for the user.

A growing number of prospective studies thus envision that nuclear energy, because it is carbon-free, will play an important and essential role in the world energy mix of the 21st century.

However, the increased use of nuclear power to generate electricity brings with it, threats to regional and global security - specifically, increased risks of nuclear weapon proliferation and nuclear terrorism: nuclear power reactors inevitably produce plutonium as a by-product, plutonium that could be used by countries or terrorist groups to fabricate nuclear weapons. Several states still have not signed the NPT, while others have not clarified their real intentions.

Even though this aspect should by no means be neglected, the issue of nuclear energy expansion should be examined globally, accounting for the context, the current needs, as well as all kinds of concerns.

The context is the one described above, characterized by growing energy demand and climate change: nuclear energy is unanimously recognized as a solution well adapted to such a context. Its overall assets are numerous, it is a clean and competitive source of energy, which has very good safety records, with more improvements to come, it contributes to security of energy supply. All these assets should not be swept away for reasons solely linked to proliferation concerns. As a matter of fact, intensive works are being carried out, to improve even more nuclear energy's track record, by ensuring its sustainability: waste minimisation, increased safety, competitiveness, economy of uranium resources, resistance to nuclear proliferation, and application to fields wider than shear electricity production.

Jacques Bouchard is Special Adviser to the Chairman of the French Atomic Energy Commission (CEA). In 2006, he was appointed Chairman of the Generation IV International Forum (GIF) for 3 years.

Born in 1939, Jacques Bouchard holds an engineering degree from the "Ecole Centrale de Paris", and specialized in reactor physics.

Mr. Bouchard joined the CEA in 1964 and became Head of the Experimental Physics unit in 1973, then head of the Nuclear Engineering Department in 1975. In that capacity, the work he conducted was mainly in support of pressurized water reactor technology, and he also led studies in physics for fuel cycle applications.

In 1982, he became head of the Fast Neutron Reactor Department in Cadarache. In 1990, he was appointed head of the CEA's Nuclear Reactor Division, then, from 1994 to 2000, he became the Director of CEA's military application division.

From 2000 to 2004, he was in charge of the entire nuclear energy sector in CEA.

Since 2005, he is Special Adviser to the Chairman of the CEA.

Jacques Bouchard was also the President of the French Nuclear Energy Society from 2001 to 2003 and professor at the reknown "Ecole des Mines de Paris". He has serve on the board of directors of several companies working in the nuclear field, and he is member of many advisory committees to national and international nuclear organizations.

If you would like to be added to the email announcement list, please visit https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/stsseminar 

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Jacques Bouchard Special Adviser to the Chairman of the French Atomic Energy Commission Speaker
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Varun Rai
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Executive Summary

Carbon capture and storage (CCS) is a promising technology that might allow for significant reductions in CO2 emissions. But at present CCS is very expensive and its performance is highly uncertain at the scale of commercial power plants. Such challenges to deployment, though, are not new to students of technological change. Several successful technologies, including energy technologies, have faced similar challenges as CCS faces now. In this paper we draw lessons for the CCS industry from the history of other energy technologies that, as with CCS today, were risky and expensive early in their commercial development. Specifically, we analyze the development of the US nuclear-power industry, the US SO2-scrubber industry, and the global LNG industry.

We focus on three major questions in the development of these analogous industries. First, we consider the creation of the initial market to prove the technology: how and by whom was the initial niche market for these industries created? Second, we look at how risk-reduction strategies for path-breaking projects allowed the technology to evolve into a form so that it could capture a wider market and diffuse broadly into service. Third, we explore the "learning curves" that describe the cost reduction as these technologies started to capture significant market share.

Our findings suggest that directly applying to CCS the conventional wisdom that is prevalent regarding the deployment and diffusion of technologies can be very misleading. The conventional wisdom may be summarized as: "Technologies are best deployed if left in the hands of private players"; "Don't pick technology winners" or "Technology forcing is wrong"; and "Technology costs reduce as its cumulative installed capacity increases". We find that none of these readily applies when thinking about deployment of CCS.

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Carbon capture and storage (CCS) is a promising technology that might allow for significant reductions in CO2 emissions. But at present CCS is very expensive and its performance is highly uncertain at the scale of commercial power plants. Such challenges to deployment, though, are not new to students of technological change. Several successful technologies, including energy technologies, have faced similar challenges as CCS faces now. In this paper we draw lessons for the CCS industry from the history of other energy technologies that, as with CCS today, were risky and expensive early in their commercial development. Specifically, we analyze the development of the US nuclear-power industry, the US SO2-scrubber industry, and the global LNG industry.

We focus on three major questions in the development of these analogous industries. First, we consider the creation of the initial market to prove the technology: how and by whom was the initial niche market for these industries created? Second, we look at how risk-reduction strategies for path-breaking projects allowed the technology to evolve into a form so that it could capture a wider market and diffuse broadly into service. Third, we explore the "learning curves" that describe the cost reduction as these technologies started to capture significant market share.

Our findings suggest that directly applying to CCS the conventional wisdom that is prevalent regarding the deployment and diffusion of technologies can be very misleading. The conventional wisdom may be summarized as: "Technologies are best deployed if left in the hands of private players"; "Don't pick technology winners" or "Technology forcing is wrong"; and "Technology costs reduce as its cumulative installed capacity increases". We find that none of these readily applies when thinking about deployment of CCS.

Through analyzing the development the analogous industries, we arrive at three principal observations:  

  • First, government played a decisive role in the development of all of these analogous technologies. Much of the early government role was to provide direct backing for R&D work and demonstration projects that validated the technological concepts. For example, the US government directly supported for over two decades most of the basic science and engineering research in both SO2 scrubbers and nuclear power. Most of the demonstration projects were significantly underwritten by government as well; the Japanese government was the principal backer of LNG technology through its promises to buy most of the world's LNG output over many years. Direct government support created the niche opportunities for these technologies.
  • Second, diffusion of these technologies beyond the early demonstration and niche projects hinged on the credibility of incentives for industry to invest in commercial-scale projects. In each of the historical cases, government made a shift in its support strategy as the technology diffused more widely. In the early phase (when commercial uncertainties were so high that businesses found it extremely risky to participate in more than small, isolated projects) success in achieving technology diffusion required a direct role for government. But as uncertainties about the technology's performance reduced and operational experience accumulated, direct financial support became less important, and indirect instruments to lower commercial risk rose in prominence. Those instruments included tax breaks, portfolio/performance standards, purchase guarantees, and low-interest-rate loans linked to specific commercial-scale investments. It is conceivable that such incentives could have been supplied by non-governmental institutions, such as large firms or industry associations, but the three analogs point strongly to a governmental role-perhaps because only government action was viewed as credible. (In the United States, many of the key decisions to support new technologies were crafted at the state level, such as through rate base decisions to allow utilities to purchase nuclear plants.)
  • Third, the conventional wisdom that experience with technologies inevitably reduces costs does not necessarily hold. Risky and capital-intensive technologies may be particularly vulnerable to diffusion without accompanying reductions in cost. In fact, we find the opposite of the conventional wisdom to be true for nuclear power in the US (1960-1980) and global LNG (1960-1995). Costs increased as cumulative installed capacity increased. A very rapid expansion of nuclear power plants in the US around 1970 led to spiraling costs, as the industry had no chance to pass lessons from one generation of investment to the next-a fact evident, for example, in the failure to standardize design and regulation that would allow firms to exploit economies of scale. For natural gas liquefaction plants, costs stayed high for decades due to a market structure marked by little competition among technology suppliers and the presence of a single dominant customer (Japanese firms organized by the Japanese government) willing to pay a premium for safety and security of supply. The same attributes that allowed LNG to expand rapidly-namely, promises of assured demand made credible by the singular backing of the Japanese state-were also a special liability as the technology struggled to compete in other markets. The experience with SO2 scrubbers was more encouraging-costs declined fairly promptly once industrial-scale investment was under way. But that happened only after sufficient clarity on technological performance and capability of FGD systems had been established. What followed was a strict performance standard-in the form of a government mandate, imposed by environmental regulators-that effectively picked FGD as a technology winner. The guaranteed market for FGD led to serious investment, innovations, and learning-by-doing cost reductions. We do not argue that this technology-forcing approach was economically efficient but merely underscore that rates of diffusion of FGD technology akin to what is imagined for CCS technology today were possible only under this technology-forcing regulatory regime.

As CCS commercialization proceeds, policymakers must remain mindful that cost reduction is not automatic-it can be derailed especially by non-competitive markets, unanticipated shifts in regulation, and unexpected technological challenges. At the same time, there may be some inevitable tradeoffs, at least for a period, between providing credible mechanisms to reduce commercial risk, such as promises of assured demand for early technology providers, and stimulating market competition that can lead to lower costs. History suggests that government-backed assurances are essential to creating the market for capital-intensive technologies; yet those very assurances can also create the context that makes it difficult for investors to feel the pressure of competition that, over successive generations of technology, leads to learning and lower costs.

We are also mindful that our history here-drawn on the experience of three technologies that have been successful in obtaining a substantial market share-is a biased one. By looking at successes we are perhaps overly prone to derive lessons for success when, in fact, most visions for substantial technological change actually fail to get traction.

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Program on Energy and Sustainable Development, Working Paper #81
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Varun Rai
David G. Victor
Mark C. Thurber
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Gabrielle Hecht is Associate Professor of History at the University of Michigan.  Her first book, The Radiance of France:  Nuclear Power and National Identity after World War II (MIT 1998), won awards from the American Historical Association and the Society for the History of Technology.  The French translation appeared with La Découverte in 2004, and MIT will publish a new English-language edition in 2009.  Her current project, entitled Uranium from Africa and the Power of Nuclear Things, draws on archival and field work conducted in Africa, Europe, and North America.  Focusing especially on Gabon, Madagascar, South Africa, Namibia, and Niger, this project examines uranium mining in these places and the flow of uranium from these places. It argues that the view from Africa transforms our understanding of the "nuclear" as a political, technological, and occupational category, as well as our perspective on the transnational power of nuclear things. 

Alexander Montgomery, a visiting assistant professor in 2008-09, was a postdoctoral fellow at CISAC in 2005-2006 and is an assistant professor of political science at Reed College. He has published articles on dismantling proliferation networks and on the effects of social networks of international organizations on interstate conflict. His research interests include political organizations, social networks, weapons of mass disruption and destruction, social studies of technology, and interstate social relations. His current book project is on post-Cold War U.S. counterproliferation policy, evaluating the efficacy of policies towards North Korea, Iran, and proliferation networks.

He has been a joint International Security Program/Managing the Atom Project Research Fellow at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs in the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University. He has also worked as a research associate in high energy physics on the BaBar experiment at Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory and as a graduate research assistant at the Center for International Security Affairs at Los Alamos National Laboratory. He has a BA in physics from the University of Chicago, an MA in energy and resources from the University of California, Berkeley, and an MA in sociology and a PhD in political science from Stanford University.

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Gabrielle Hecht Associate Professor of History and Director of Graduate Studies, Program in Science, Technology, and Society, University of Michigan Speaker
Alexander Montgomery Visiting Assistant Professor, CISAC; Assistant Professor of Political Science, Reed College Commentator
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Effective strategies for managing the dangers of global climate change are proving very difficult to design and implement. They require governments to undertake a portfolio of efforts that are politically challenging because they require large expenditures today for uncertain benefits that accrue far into the future. That portfolio includes tasks such as putting a price on carbon, fixing the tendency for firms to under-invest in the public good of new technologies and knowledge that will be needed for achieving cost-effective and deep cuts in emissions; and preparing for a changing climate through investments in adaptation and climate engineering. Many of those efforts require international coordination that has proven especially difficult to mobilize and sustain because international institutions are usually weak and thus unable to force collective action...."

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The Harvard Project on International Climate Agreements
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David G. Victor
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Speaker's Biography: Ariel (Eli) Levite is a nonresident senior associate in the Nonproliferation Program at the Carnegie Endowment. He is a member of the Israeli Inter-Ministerial Steering Committee on Arms Control and Regional Security and a member of the board of directors of the Fisher Brothers Institute for Air and Space Strategic Studies.

Prior to joining the Carnegie Endowment, Levite was the Principal Deputy Director General for Policy at the Israeli Atomic Energy Commission. Levite also served as the deputy national security advisor for defense policy and was head of the Bureau of International Security and Arms Control in the Israeli Ministry of Defense.

In September 2000, Levite took a two year sabbatical from the Israeli civil service to work as a visiting fellow and project co-leader of the "Discriminate Force" Project as the Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC) at Stanford University. 

Before his government service, Levite worked for five years as a senior research associate and head of the project on Israeli security at the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies at Tel Aviv University. Levite has taught courses on security studies and political science at Tel Aviv University, Cornell University, and the University of California, Davis.

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Ariel Levite Speaker
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Abstract:  Given that even minor changes to our nuclear weapons posture have been rejected as too risky, it is surprising that the baseline risk of our current strategy had not been estimated prior to my March 2008 paper. Even though that paper uses a simplified model which only lower bounds the risk, it is estimated to be thousands of times greater than that associated with a nuclear power plant near your home. The advantages of bringing quantitative risk analysis to bear on this problem will be discussed and next steps proposed.

Martin E. Hellman is Professor Emeritus of Electrical Engineering at Stanford University and a member of the National Academy of Engineering. While best known for his invention with Diffie and Merkle of public key cryptography, he also has a strong concern for averting nuclear war. With Anatoly Gromyko, he co-edited "Breakthrough: Emerging New Thinking," a book which appeared in English and in Russian late in 1987 calling for a long-term process to eliminate the nuclear threat.

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Martin E. Hellman is professor emeritus of electrical engineering at Stanford, a recipient (joint with Whit Diffie) of the million dollar ACM Turing Award, a member of the National Academy of Engineering, and an inductee of the National Inventors Hall of Fame. He became a CISAC affiliated faculty member in October 2012.

Hellman is best known for his invention, with Whitfield Diffie and Ralph Merkle, of public key cryptography. In addition to many other uses, this technology forms the basis for secure transactions and cybersecurity on the Internet. He also has been a long-time contributor to the computer privacy debate, starting with the issue of DES key size in 1975 and continuing with service (1994-96) on the National Research Council's Committee to Study National Cryptographic Policy, whose main recommendations were implemented soon afterward.

Prof. Hellman also has a deep interest in the ethics of technological development. With Prof. Anatoly Gromyko of Moscow, he co-edited Breakthrough: Emerging New Thinking, a book published simultaneously in Russian and English in 1987 during the rapid change in Soviet-American relations (available as a free, 2.6 MB PDF download). In 1986, he and his wife of fifty years published, A New Map for Relationships: Creating True Love at Home & Peace on the Planet, a book that provides a “unified field theory” for successful relationships by illuminating the connections between nuclear war, conventional war, interpersonal war, and war within our own psyches (available as a free, 1.2 MB PDF download).
 
His current research is devoted to bringing a risk-informed framework to nuclear deterrence and critically examining the assumptions that underlie our national security.

Prof. Hellman was at IBM's Watson Research Center from 1968-69 and an assistant professor of EE at MIT from 1969-71. Returning to Stanford in 1971, he served on the regular faculty until becoming Professor Emeritus in 1996. He has authored over seventy technical papers, six US patents and a number of foreign equivalents.

More information on Professor Hellman is available on his EE Department website. His publications, many  of which can be downloaded in PDF, are on the publications page of that site.
Martin Hellman Professor Emeritus of Electrical Engineering, Stanford University Speaker
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Nuclear energy is a clean and relatively economical source of electricity, generating nearly one-sixth of the world’s electricity today. It represents one of the few technologies that have the potential for significant scale-up to meet the growing global demand for energy without exacerbating global climate change. Yet, the power derived from splitting the nucleus can be used not only to electrify the world but to destroy it. Managing the balance between the promotion of peaceful uses of atomic energy and its destructive potential has been a major challenge since the first nuclear explosion in 1945. For the most part, this balance has been managed successfully during the growth of commercial nuclear power over the past 50 years.

The possibility for a substantial global expansion in civilian nuclear power in the coming decades, with attendant increases in uranium enrichment capacity and spent-fuel reprocessing and possibly growth in plutonium trade, gives rise to important security concerns. These expansions create both a challenge and an opportunity to strengthen the international system for monitoring and controlling the nuclear power enterprise.

To examine these concerns and opportunities more critically, and to consider options for mitigation, a workshop was held September 19–21, 2007, at Stanford University’s Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC), involving 45 experts from the nuclear and security communities. The workshop focused on the security implications associated with expanding nuclear power worldwide.

This report is not a consensus document but rather an attempt to summarize salient issues and observations put forward at the meeting, as augmented by the authors’ research. This report hopefully will contribute to a broader dialogue and help shape discussions of efforts to control, by both technical and political measures, the security risks associated with a global expansion in the use of nuclear power.

Finally, a workshop and report whose focus is specifically on the security concerns associated with nuclear power necessarily will have a negative tone, and perhaps even seem antinuclear. This was not our intention. Seen in a wider context, nuclear power may help alleviate global warming, foster development, contribute to energy security, and perhaps provide an arena for political cooperation. Finding comprehensive answers to a problem with this many dimensions was beyond the scope of both the three-day Stanford workshop and this report.

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