Stanford University

Investment

India's Intellectual Property Regime: A Counterbalance to Market Liberalization?

Paragraphs

The impact of intellectual property laws on national economic development is complex and poorly understood. With limited success, studies have attempted to analyze the degree to which intellectual property protection and enforcement spurs development and the point at which it ceases to contribute, or worse, hinders development. Prior to the adoption of the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement), the lack of harmonization in intellectual property protection across countries enabled analysis of locational determinants for investment and knowledge transfer. Analysts hypothesized that the TRIPS Agreement would reduce investment selectivity decisions based on strength of Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) protection, and investors would focus on regions with high rate of returns.

All Publications button
1
Publication Type
Working Papers
Publication Date
Journal Publisher
CDDRL Working Papers
Authors

Carbon Capture and Storage at Scale: Lessons from the Growth of Analogous Energy Technologies

Paragraphs

Carbon capture and storage (CCS) is a promising technology that might allow for significant reductions in CO2 emissions. But at present CCS is very expensive and its performance is highly uncertain at the scale of commercial power plants. Such challenges to deployment, though, are not new to students of technological change. Several successful technologies, including energy technologies, have faced similar challenges as CCS faces now. In this paper we draw lessons for the CCS industry from the history of other energy technologies that, as with CCS today, were risky and expensive early in their commercial development. Specifically, we analyze the development of the US nuclear-power industry, the US SO2-scrubber industry, and the global LNG industry.

We focus on three major questions in the development of these analogous industries. First, we consider the creation of the initial market to prove the technology: how and by whom was the initial niche market for these industries created? Second, we look at how risk-reduction strategies for path-breaking projects allowed the technology to evolve into a form so that it could capture a wider market and diffuse broadly into service. Third, we explore the "learning curves" that describe the cost reduction as these technologies started to capture significant market share.

Our findings suggest that directly applying to CCS the conventional wisdom that is prevalent regarding the deployment and diffusion of technologies can be very misleading. The conventional wisdom may be summarized as: "Technologies are best deployed if left in the hands of private players"; "Don't pick technology winners" or "Technology forcing is wrong"; and "Technology costs reduce as its cumulative installed capacity increases". We find that none of these readily applies when thinking about deployment of CCS.

Through analyzing the development the analogous industries, we arrive at three principal observations:  

  • First, government played a decisive role in the development of all of these analogous technologies. Much of the early government role was to provide direct backing for R&D work and demonstration projects that validated the technological concepts. For example, the US government directly supported for over two decades most of the basic science and engineering research in both SO2 scrubbers and nuclear power. Most of the demonstration projects were significantly underwritten by government as well; the Japanese government was the principal backer of LNG technology through its promises to buy most of the world's LNG output over many years. Direct government support created the niche opportunities for these technologies.
  • Second, diffusion of these technologies beyond the early demonstration and niche projects hinged on the credibility of incentives for industry to invest in commercial-scale projects. In each of the historical cases, government made a shift in its support strategy as the technology diffused more widely. In the early phase (when commercial uncertainties were so high that businesses found it extremely risky to participate in more than small, isolated projects) success in achieving technology diffusion required a direct role for government. But as uncertainties about the technology's performance reduced and operational experience accumulated, direct financial support became less important, and indirect instruments to lower commercial risk rose in prominence. Those instruments included tax breaks, portfolio/performance standards, purchase guarantees, and low-interest-rate loans linked to specific commercial-scale investments. It is conceivable that such incentives could have been supplied by non-governmental institutions, such as large firms or industry associations, but the three analogs point strongly to a governmental role-perhaps because only government action was viewed as credible. (In the United States, many of the key decisions to support new technologies were crafted at the state level, such as through rate base decisions to allow utilities to purchase nuclear plants.)
  • Third, the conventional wisdom that experience with technologies inevitably reduces costs does not necessarily hold. Risky and capital-intensive technologies may be particularly vulnerable to diffusion without accompanying reductions in cost. In fact, we find the opposite of the conventional wisdom to be true for nuclear power in the US (1960-1980) and global LNG (1960-1995). Costs increased as cumulative installed capacity increased. A very rapid expansion of nuclear power plants in the US around 1970 led to spiraling costs, as the industry had no chance to pass lessons from one generation of investment to the next-a fact evident, for example, in the failure to standardize design and regulation that would allow firms to exploit economies of scale. For natural gas liquefaction plants, costs stayed high for decades due to a market structure marked by little competition among technology suppliers and the presence of a single dominant customer (Japanese firms organized by the Japanese government) willing to pay a premium for safety and security of supply. The same attributes that allowed LNG to expand rapidly-namely, promises of assured demand made credible by the singular backing of the Japanese state-were also a special liability as the technology struggled to compete in other markets. The experience with SO2 scrubbers was more encouraging-costs declined fairly promptly once industrial-scale investment was under way. But that happened only after sufficient clarity on technological performance and capability of FGD systems had been established. What followed was a strict performance standard-in the form of a government mandate, imposed by environmental regulators-that effectively picked FGD as a technology winner. The guaranteed market for FGD led to serious investment, innovations, and learning-by-doing cost reductions. We do not argue that this technology-forcing approach was economically efficient but merely underscore that rates of diffusion of FGD technology akin to what is imagined for CCS technology today were possible only under this technology-forcing regulatory regime.

As CCS commercialization proceeds, policymakers must remain mindful that cost reduction is not automatic-it can be derailed especially by non-competitive markets, unanticipated shifts in regulation, and unexpected technological challenges. At the same time, there may be some inevitable tradeoffs, at least for a period, between providing credible mechanisms to reduce commercial risk, such as promises of assured demand for early technology providers, and stimulating market competition that can lead to lower costs. History suggests that government-backed assurances are essential to creating the market for capital-intensive technologies; yet those very assurances can also create the context that makes it difficult for investors to feel the pressure of competition that, over successive generations of technology, leads to learning and lower costs.

We are also mindful that our history here-drawn on the experience of three technologies that have been successful in obtaining a substantial market share-is a biased one. By looking at successes we are perhaps overly prone to derive lessons for success when, in fact, most visions for substantial technological change actually fail to get traction.

All Publications button
1
Publication Type
Working Papers
Publication Date
Journal Publisher
Program on Energy and Sustainable Development, Working Paper #81
Authors
Varun Rai
David G. Victor
Mark C. Thurber
External URL

Counting the walking wounded

Authors
Lawrence M. Wein
News Type
Commentary
Date
Paragraphs

The American troops in Iraq daily face the risk of death or injury--to themselves or their fellow soldiers--by homemade bombs and suicide attackers. So it is not surprising that post-traumatic stress disorder is a common problem among returning soldiers. But how many, exactly, are affected?

This question is key to determining how large an investment the Department of Veterans Affairs needs to make in diagnosing and treating the problem. The United States Army’s Mental Health Advisory Team, which conducted a survey of more than 1,000 soldiers and marines in September 2006, found that 17 percent suffered from P.T.S.D. Similarly, a Rand study put the number at 14 percent.

But these estimates do not take into account the many soldiers who will eventually suffer from P.T.S.D., because there is a lag between the time someone experiences trauma and the time he or she reports symptoms of post-traumatic stress. This can range from days to many years, and it is typically much longer while people are still in the military.

To get a better estimate of the rate of P.T.S.D. among Iraq war veterans, two graduate students, Michael Atkinson and Adam Guetz, and I constructed a mathematical model in which soldiers incur a random amount of stress during each month of deployment (based on monthly American casualty data), develop P.T.S.D. if their cumulative stress exceeds a certain threshold, and also develop symptoms of the disorder after an additional amount of time. We found that about 35 percent of soldiers and marines who deploy to Iraq will ultimately suffer from P.T.S.D. — about 300,000 people, with 20,000 new sufferers for each year the war lasts.

Consider that only 22 percent of recent veterans who may be at risk for P.T.S.D. (based on their answers to screening questions) were referred for a mental health evaluation. Less than 40 percent of service members who get a diagnosis of P.T.S.D. receive mental health services, and only slightly more than half of recent veterans who receive treatment get adequate care. Those who seek follow-up treatment run into delays of up to 90 days, which suggests there is a serious shortage of mental health professionals available to help them.

Proper P.T.S.D. care can lead to complete remission in 30 percent to 50 percent of cases, studies show. Thorough screening of every soldier upon departure from the military, immediately followed by three to six months of treatment for those who need it, would reduce the stigma that is attached to current mental health referrals. The Rand study estimates that treatment would pay for itself within two years, largely by reducing the loss of productivity. This is the least we can do for our veterans.

All News button
1

Larry Diamond: How to save democracy

Authors
Larry Diamond
News Type
Commentary
Date
Paragraphs
Bush gave democracy promotion a bad name, Larry Diamond writes in Newsweek. The new administration needs to get it right.

The new U.S. President will face more than one kind of global recession. In addition to the economic downturn, the world is suffering a democratic contraction. In Russia, awash with oil money, Vladimir Putin and his KGB cronies have sharply restricted freedom. In Latin America, authoritarian (and anti-American) populism is on the rise. In Nigeria, the Philippines and once again in Pakistan, democracy is foundering amid massive corruption, weak government and a loss of public faith. In Thailand, the government is paralyzed by mass protests. In Africa, more than a dozen fragile democracies must face the economic storm unprepared. And in the Middle East—the Bush administration's great democratic showcase—the push for freedom lies in ruins.

In the past decade, the breathtaking democratic wave that swept the world during the final quarter of the 20th century reversed course. Making democracy work proved harder than bringing down authoritarian rule. And receptive peoples everywhere were alienated by the arrogance and unilateralism of President George W. Bush's approach, which associated "democracy promotion" with the use of force and squandered America's soft power. Advancing democracy abroad remains vital to the U.S. national interest. But the next president will have to craft a more modest, realistic and sustainable strategy.

It's easy today to forget how far freedom has advanced in the past 30 years. When the wave of liberation began in 1974 in Portugal, barely a quarter of the world's states met the minimal test of democracy: a place where the people are able, through universal suffrage, to choose and replace their leaders in regular, free and fair elections. Over the course of the next two decades, dictatorships gave way to freely elected governments first in Southern Europe, then in Latin America, then in East Asia. Finally, an explosion of freedom in the early '90s liberated Eastern Europe and spread democracy from Moscow to Pretoria. Old assumptions—that democracy required Western values, high levels of education and a large middle class—crumbled. Half of sub-Saharan Africa's 48 states became democracies, and of the world's poorest countries, about two in every five are democracies today.

This great shift coincided with an unprecedented moment of U.S. military, economic and cultural dominance. Not only was America the world's last remaining superpower, but U.S. values—individual freedom, popular sovereignty, limited government and the rule of law—were embraced by progressive leaders around the world. Opinion surveys showed democracy to be the ideal of most people as well.

In recent years, however, this mighty tide has receded. This democratic recession has coincided with Bush's presidency, and can be traced in no small measure to his administration's imperial overreach. But it actually started in 1999, with the military coup in Pakistan, an upheaval welcomed by a public weary of endemic corruption, economic mismanagement and ethnic and political violence. Pakistan's woes exposed more than the growing frailty of a nuclear-weapon state. They were also the harbinger of a more widespread malaise. Many emerging democracies were experiencing similar crises. In Latin America and the post-communist world, and in parts of Asia and Africa, trust in political parties and parliaments was sinking dramatically, as scandals mounted and elected governments defaulted on their vows to control corruption and improve the welfare of ordinary people.

Thanks to bad governance and popular disaffection, democracy has lost ground. Since the start of the democratic wave, 24 states have reverted to authoritarian rule. Two thirds of these reversals have occurred in the past nine years—and included some big and important states such as Russia, Venezuela, Bangladesh, Thailand and (if one takes seriously the definition of democracy) Nigeria and the Philippines as well. Pakistan and Thailand have recently returned to rule by elected civilians, and Bangladesh is about to do so, but ongoing crises keep public confidence low. Democracy is also threatened in Bolivia and Ecuador, which confront rising levels of political polarization. And other strategically important democracies once thought to be doing well—Turkey, South Africa and Ukraine—face serious strains.

This isn't to say there haven't been a few heartening successes in recent years. Indonesia, the world's most populous Muslim country, has become a robust democracy nearly a decade after its turbulent transition from authoritarian rule. Brazil, under the left-leaning Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, has also strengthened its democratic institutions while maintaining fiscal discipline and a market orientation and reducing poverty. In Africa, Ghana has maintained a quite liberal democracy while generating significant economic growth, and several smaller African countries have moved in this direction.

But the combination of tough economic times, diminished U.S. power and the renewed energy of major authoritarian states will pose a stiff challenge to some 60 insecure democracies in Asia, Africa, Latin America and the former Soviet bloc. If they don't strengthen their political institutions, reduce corruption and figure out how to govern more effectively, many of these democracies could fail in the coming years.

Part of the tragedy is that Washington has made things worse, not better. The Bush administration was right that spreading democracy would advance the U.S. national interest—that truly democratic states would be more responsible, peaceful and law-abiding and so become better contributors to international security. But the administration's unilateral and self-righteous approach led it to overestimate U.S. power and rush the dynamics of change, while exposing itself to charges of hypocrisy with its use of torture and the abuse of due process in the war on terror. Instead of advancing freedom and democracy in the Middle East, 2005 and 2006 witnessed a series of embarrassing shocks: Hamas winning in the Palestinian territories and Islamist parties winning in Iraq; Hizbullah surging in Lebanon and the Muslim Brotherhood surging in Egypt. After a brief moment of optimism, the United States backed away and Middle Eastern democrats grew embittered.

The new American administration will have to fashion a fresh approach—and fast. That will mean setting clear priorities and bringing objectives into alignment with means. The United States does not have the power, resources or moral standing to quickly transform the world's entrenched dictatorships. Besides, isolating and confronting them never seems to work: in Cuba, for example, this policy has been a total failure. This does not mean that the United States should not support democratic change in places like Cuba, Burma, Iran and Syria. But it needs a more subtle and sophisticated approach.

The best strategy would be to open up such places to the freer flow of people, goods, ideas and information. The next administration should therefore start by immediately lifting the self-defeating embargo on Cuba. It should offer to establish full diplomatic ties with Havana and free flows of trade and investment in exchange for a Cuban commitment to improve human rights. Washington should also work with Tehran to hammer out a comprehensive deal that would lift economic sanctions, renounce the use of force to effect regime change and incorporate Iran into the WTO, in exchange for a verifiable halt to nuclear-weapons development, more responsible behavior on Iraq and terrorism, and improved human-rights protection and monitoring. Critics will charge that talking to such odious governments only legitimizes them. In fact, engaging closed societies is the best way to foster democratic change.

At the same time, the United States should continue to support diaspora groups that seek peaceful democratic change back home, and should expand international radio broadcasting, through the Voice of America and more specialized efforts, that transmits independent news and information as well as democratic values and ideas.

In the near term, however, Washington must focus on shoring up existing democracies. Fragile states need assistance to help them adjust to the shocks of the current economic crisis. But they also need deep reforms to strengthen their democratic institutions and improve governance. This will require coordinated help from America and its Western allies to do three things.

First, they must ramp up technical assistance and training programs to help the machinery of government—parliaments, local authorities, courts, executive agencies and regulatory institutions—work more transparently and deliver what people want: the rule of law, less corruption, fair elections and a government that responds to their economic and social needs. This also means strengthening democratic oversight.

Second, we know from experience that these kinds of assistance don't work unless the political leaders on the receiving end are willing to let them. So we need to generate strong incentives for rulers to opt for a different logic of governance, one that defines success as delivering development and reducing poverty rather than skimming public resources and buying support or rigging elections. This will mean setting clear conditions that will have to be met before economic and political aid is doled out to governments.

The third priority is to expand assistance to independent organizations, mass media and think tanks in these fragile states that will increase public demand for better governance and monitor what governments do. This means aiding democratic professional associations, trade unions, chambers of commerce, student groups and organizations devoted to human rights, women's rights, transparency, civic education, election monitoring and countless other democratic activities. Ordinary people must be educated to know their rights and responsibilities as citizens—and be ready to defend them.

While Western countries have provided this kind of aid for more than two decades, economic assistance handed out at the same time has often undermined democracy efforts by subsidizing corrupt, abusive governments. Aid donors should thus strike a new bargain with recipients, telling them: if you get serious about containing corruption, building a rule of law and improving people's lives, we will get serious about helping you. Those that show a real commitment should get significant new rewards of aid and freer trade. Those unwilling to reform should get little, though the West should continue to fight disease and directly help people in dire need wherever they are.

Finally, the new president should keep in mind the power of example. Washington can't promote democracy abroad if it erodes it at home. The contradictions between the rhetoric of Bush's "freedom agenda" and the realities of Abu Ghraib, Guantánamo, torture, warrantless surveillance and boundless executive privilege have led even many of the United States' natural allies to dismiss U.S. efforts as hypocritical. Thus the new president must immediately shut down Guantánamo and unequivocally renounce the use of torture; few gestures would restore American credibility more quickly. The United States should also reduce the power of lobbyists, enhance executive and legislative transparency and reform campaign-finance rules—both for its own good and for the message it would send.

Make no mistake: thanks to the global economic crisis and antidemocratic trends, things may get worse before they get better. But supporting democracy abroad advances U.S. national interests and engages universal human aspirations. A more consistent, realistic and multilateral approach will help to secure at-risk democracies and plant the seeds of freedom in oppressed countries. Patience, persistence and savvy diplomacy will serve the next president far better than moralistic rhetoric that divides the world into good and evil. We've seen where that got us.

All News button
1

The big winner is coal

Authors
David G. Victor
Varun Rai
News Type
Commentary
Date
Paragraphs
Coal is looking like the energy winner in the current economic crisis, David Victor and Varun Rai say in Newsweek.

"2009 was shaping up to be the year the world got its environmental act together. Now it's looking like the global environment may be one of the biggest losers in the current financial crisis."

Saving the planet was never going to be easy. Avoiding the most catastrophic effects of climate changes will require cutting carbon emissions by 50 to 80 percent over the next four decades, scientists say. After years of deadlock, 2009 was shaping up to be the year the world got its environmental act together. Now it's looking like the global environment may be one of the biggest losers in the current financial crisis.

Lower prices for oil-which some analysts predict will hit $25 a barrel-is bad news for investors in green energy. But the big winner is likely to be dirty coal. It already accounts for about 40 percent of the world's emissions of carbon dioxide, the leading cause of global warming. The fuel is plentiful, and its price has fallen about one third since last summer's peak to $80 per ton. In China, the world's largest coal burner, prices have fallen by half and are likely to plummet further. All the top emitters of greenhouse gases depend mainly on coal for electric power. Dirty coal is now getting cheaper relative to other fossil fuels, such as natural gas and oil.

New "clean coal" plants would capture carbon and store it away underground, or at least to extract as much energy as possible for each kilogram of carbon pollution. The problem is that clean-coal plants are a lot more expensive than conventional "dirty coal" technology, and the financial crisis is obliterating schemes that would have paid the extra cost. Before the crisis, a team at Stanford University found that the world was investing only about 1 percent of what's needed on advanced coal technologies to meet carbon-emissions targets. Now a spate of canceled projects darkens the picture. There are lots of ways, in theory, to build low-emission power plants. One option is to turn coal into a gas and burn it in an ultra-efficient turbine. This "gasification" approach is not only highly efficient but it also produces nearly all of its carbon dioxide pollution in a concentrated stream that could be pumped safely underground, where it won't warm the atmosphere. So far, few investors are building plants that offer a model for how the technology would be deployed at scale. Before the crisis, a few power companies tried to build just the efficient gasification units, which are cheaper than the whole integrated plant, but most of those plans have evaporated in the last month. Only one large plant is still going forward in the United States, and that one won't include carbon storage.

Another route is to burn coal in pure oxygen without gasification, which also yields pure waste that can be pumped underground. A 30-megawatt demonstration plant is operating in Germany. A consortium of utilities is also testing a technology to remove CO2 from plant emissions, but no investor is willing yet to build a full-scale project. These options could double or triple the cost of a power plant.

A 300-megawatt plant that cut emissions nearly 90 percent would cost $1 billion to $2.5 billion, and the United States would need about 1,000 such plants to match its current coal-power output. China would need another 1,000. Since the 1960s, when U.S. utilities last made major investments in new plants, their average bond rating has fallen from AA to BBB, and now the credit crisis has made it all but impossible to finance any new plant, much less an expensive, clean one. The European Union has no money for its plan to build a dozen "zero-emission plants." The price of CO2 in Europe is too low to attract investors to this technology. The latest scheme to fix the problem—a giveaway of emission credits to investors who build clean-coal plants—is falling victim to the financial crisis, which has halved the price of emission permits, and thus the value of emission credits. The U.K. has been holding a contest for public funds to jump-start clean-coal technology. In November 2008 BP pulled out of the competition, citing its inability to form a successful consortium. Early in 2008 the U.S. government killed its investment in advanced coal due to exploding costs.

Environmentalists, in their opposition to coal of any kind, may provide the coup de grâce. Greenpeace, riffing on James Bond, is hawking a "Coalfinger" spoof on the Internet and is deep in a campaign to stop all new coal plants. U.S. environmental groups recently announced a campaign to expose clean coal as a chimera. Thanks to such efforts, in the United States it's now nearly impossible to build any kind of coal plant, including tests of clean technology. As the world economy recovers, nations will once again turn to their old stalwart, dirty coal.

All News button
1

Proliferation of International Dispute Settlement Mechanisms: The Threat of Fragmentation vs. the Promise of a More Effective System? - Some Reflections from the Perspective of Investment Arbitration

Paragraphs

(From the introduction) For more than a decade, international lawyers and international relations scholars have been fascinated by an ever-increasing number of international courts and tribunals. These are producing more international case-law, thereby replacing the traditional scarcity of international law precedents embodied in a few celebrated ICJ and PCIJ cases. Today, there is a host of frequently highly specialized international dispute settlement mechanisms like the WTO Dispute Settlement Body, the International Tribunal for the Law of The Sea, the International Criminal Court, various investment tribunals acting under The International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) Convention or other arbitration rules. All apply, interpret and probably ‘make’ international law. One question frequently raised in this context is whether these institutions contribute to the development of a single uniform body of international law or whether they make ‘their own’ ever more fragmented law. To the extent that they must apply specifically agreed upon rules, such as the WTO agreements, various bilateral investment protection treaties or the Law of the Sea Convention, etc., this is of course largely a false problem. In so far as they rely on common rules of international law, coherence vs. fragmentation does indeed arise and is a serious issue.

Scholars of international law have intensely debated these problems mostly under the heading ‘fragmentation’ of international law or ‘proliferation’ of international courts and tribunals. Gerhard Hafner has significantly contributed to this scholarly debate in a number of articles, and most importantly in a report prepared for the International Law Commission (ILC), which triggered the Commission’s work on fragmentation and was further pursued by Gerhard Hafner’s successor on the ILC, Martti Koskenniemi.

It thus appears appropriate to dedicate a few modest thoughts about these issues to a great international lawyer with whom I have had the privilege to work at the Department of International Law and International Relations at the University of Vienna during the last twenty years. Gerhard Hafner will understand that due to the space allotted in this liber amicorum, I must limit the scope of my remarks on fragmentation and proliferation to a specific subfield of international law. He will also appreciate that the chosen field is investment law and arbitration, which, in many respects, may be viewed as a test laboratorium of international law where many of the pertinent problems mentioned above have appeared in particularly visible form.

All Publications button
1
Publication Type
Books
Publication Date
Journal Publisher
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers in "International Law between Universalism and Fragmentation - Festschrift in Honour of Gerhard Hafner", J. Crawford/A. Pellet/I. Buffard/S. Wittich (eds.)
Authors

Prioritizing Climate Change Adaptation Needs for Food Security in 2030

Paragraphs
Investments aimed at improving agricultural adaptation to climate change will inevitably favor some crops and regions over others. We present several quantitative criteria that could be used to prioritize these investments, with a focus on global food security impacts by 2030. An analysis of climate risks for 94 crops across 12 food insecure regions is first conducted, based on statistical crop models and climate projections from 20 general circulation models. Subsets of crops are then identified based on different criteria, such as the impacts under "best case", "most likely", and "worst case" scenarios. Overall, results indicate South Asia and Southern Africa as two regions that, without sufficient adaptation measures, will likely suffer negative impacts on several crops important to a large food insecure population. The particular crops identified, however, depend on criteria that will vary for different institutions according to their capabilities, goals, and risk attitudes. Results from this work is helping inform investment decisions made by the Global Crop Diversity Trust. Press release and media coverage.
All Publications button
1
Publication Type
Journal Articles
Publication Date
Journal Publisher
Science
Authors
David Lobell
Rosamond L. Naylor
External URL

Is Asia Still Rising? Repercussions Of Recession

-

Asia’s economies have been hard hit by the current global financial crisis, despite in most cases enjoying strong macroeconomic fundamentals and stable financial systems.  Early hopes were that the region might be “decoupled” from the Western world’s financial woes and even able to lend the West a hand through high growth and the investment of large foreign exchange reserves.  But that optimism has been dashed by slumping exports, plunging commodity prices, and capital outflows.  The region’s most open, advanced and globally-integrated economies—Hong Kong, Singapore, and Taiwan—are already in severe recession, with Japan, Korea and Malaysia not far behind, and dramatic slowdowns are underway in China, India, Indonesia, Thailand and Vietnam.  What role did Asian countries play in the genesis of the global crisis, and why have they been so severely impacted?  How is their recovery likely to be shaped by market developments and institutional changes in the West, and in Asia itself in response to the crisis?  Will the region’s embrace of accelerated globalization and marketization following the 1997-98 Asian financial crisis now be retarded or reversed?

Linda Lim is a leading authority on Asian economies, Asian business, and the impacts of the current global financial crisis on Asia, and she has published widely on these topics. Her current research is on the ASEAN countries’ growing economic linkages with China.

Forthcoming in 2009 are Globalizing State, Disappearing Nation: The Impact of Foreign Participation in the Singapore Economy (with Lee Soo Ann) and Rethinking Singapore’s Economic Growth Model. She serves on the executive committees of the Center for Chinese Studies and the Center for International Business Education at the University of Michigan, where formerly she headed the Center for Southeast Asian Studies. Before coming to Michigan, she taught economic development and political economy at Swarthmore. A native of Singapore, she obtained her degrees in economics from Cambridge (BA), Yale (MA), and Michigan (PhD).

Philippines Conference Room

Linda Yuen-Ching Lim Professor of Strategy, Stephen M. Ross School of Business Speaker University of Michigan
Lectures

Foreign Investors in the World's Workshop: Legislative Battles and Factory Struggles in China

-

This talk is an overview of the changing role of foreign investment in Chinese workplaces. Foreign investment inflows helped transform the Chinese industrial landscape in the 1990s. As ownership has become blurred and increasingly mixed between domestic-foreign and public-private in China, preferential policies and laws for foreign-invested firms have diminished. A more level playing field has raised the stakes for foreign business and led to their increased participation in national debates on labor legislation and legal protections for workers. This talk will focus on this new role for foreign investors and how it is changing Chinese laws and the Chinese workplace.

Professor Gallagher studies Chinese politics, law and society, and comparative politics. She is currently working on two projects. The first, funded by a Fulbright Research Award and the National Science Foundation, examines the development of rule of law in China by examining the dynamics of legal mobilization of Chinese workers. "The Rule of Law in China: If They Build It, Who Will Come?" focuses on the demand-side of rule of law through an exploration of legal aid plaintiffs in Shanghai, a four-city household survey on legal knowledge, attitude, and practice, and in-depth case analysis of labor disputes. The second project examines labor standards and practices in four Chinese regions. One goal is to find if there are diffusion effects in legislation, court behavior, and labor practices across different regions. Another goal is to look for evidence of a "race to the bottom" in labor standards and social welfare not between China and other competing economies, but within China's own domestic economy.

This talk is part of the Stanford China Program Winter 2009 China Seminar Series titled "30 Years of Reform and Opening in China: How Far from the Cage?"

Daniel and Nancy Okimoto Conference Room

Mary E. Gallagher Associate Professor of Political Science Speaker University of Michigan
Seminars

Incentive Mechanisms for Electricity Transmission Expansion

-

Electricity transmission pricing and transmission grid expansion have received increasing regulatory and analytical attention in recent years. There are two disparate approaches to transmission investment: one employs the theory based on long-run financial rights (LTFTR) to transmission (merchant approach), while the other is based on the incentive-regulation hypothesis (regulatory approach). The transmission firm (Transco) is regulated through benchmark or price regulation to provide long-term investment incentives. In this presentation I consider the elements that could combine the merchant and regulatory approaches in a setting with price-taking electricity generators and loads. A new price-cap incentive mechanism for electricity transmission expansion is proposed based upon redefining transmission output in terms of point-to-point transactions. The mechanism applies the incentive regulatory logic of rebalancing the variable and fixed parts of a two-part tariff to promote efficient, long-term expansion.

Download pdf

Reuben W. Hills Conference Room

Juan Rosellón Professor of Economics Speaker Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas, Mexico
Seminars
Instruments of Energy and Environmental Policy
Subscribe to Investment