Martha Crenshaw is a pioneer in terrorism studies, one of a handful of scholars worldwide who started investigating the subject long before Sept. 11, 2001.

Crenshaw, who joined CISAC this year as a senior fellow at FSI and a political science professor by courtesy, brings three decades of study to her current agenda of examining distinctions between so-called old and new terrorism, how terrorism ends, and why the United States is the target of terrorism.

"We are very fortunate to have Martha Crenshaw join CISAC as a senior fellow," said Scott Sagan, CISAC co-director. "Her detailed knowledge of the inside workings of terrorist organizations and her deep understanding of earlier counter-terrorist campaigns have brought much-needed historical perspective to contemporary policy debates after 9/11."

Associate professor of law Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, who led the search that resulted in Crenshaw's hiring, said her "combination of attention to historical detail, interdisciplinary methods, and knowledge of institutional context has made her one of the nation's foremost scholars of terrorism. Her appointment is great news for CISAC and Stanford, where she will strengthen an already significant scholarly community working on homeland security and terrorism."

Coming to Stanford from Wesleyan University, where she was the Colin and Nancy Campbell Professor of Global Issues and Democratic Thought and a government professor, Crenshaw said she found the opportunity to join an interdisciplinary research center a welcome change.

"CISAC's and my interests merged perfectly," she said, as the center was looking to build its research expertise in terrorism. She said she looks forward to teaching graduate students in the Ford Dorsey Program in International Policy Studies as well as working with research colleagues at CISAC and across campus.

Crenshaw's terrorism studies began with a graduate seminar paper she wrote on actions by the FLN, or National Liberation Front, during Algeria's war for independence from France in the 1950s and 60s. She arrived at the topic the way many professors advise students to do--she noted in a study of Vietnam-era guerrilla warfare the comment that "no one has studied terrorism."

That seminar paper inspired her dissertation, which formed the basis of her 1978 book, Revolutionary Terrorism: The FLN in Algeria, 1954-1962, a case study in the strategic use of terrorism by a revolutionary nationalist movement.

Having written numerous articles and edited four books on terrorism, Crenshaw is now editing a book tentatively titled The Consequences of Counterterrorist Policies in Democracies. The Russell Sage Foundation supported the research, which Crenshaw said illuminates issues such as "the strength of executive power, effects of counterterrorism legislation on minorities, and unintended consequences of counterterrorism policies."

As a lead investigator with the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism at the University of Maryland, a Department of Homeland Security Center of Excellence, Crenshaw is also researching why the United States is the target of terrorism, a study that could be especially useful in informing counterterrorism policy.

Crenshaw "trace[s] the evolution of anti-American terrorism over time--since the mid-1960s," she said, comparing groups that used terrorism to others with similar ideas that have not resorted to terrorism. Comparing case studies, she explained, allows her to "analyze incentives for the use of terrorism."

In "The Debate over 'New' versus 'Old' Terrorism," a paper Crenshaw presented at the American Political Science Association annual meeting in September--and which will be published as a chapter in an edited volume, she questions oft-heard claims that terrorism in recent years has taken on a new character to become more religious and lethal. She found the distinctions too hastily drawn and possibly dangerous.

"There is no fundamental difference between 'old' and 'new' terrorism," she said.

"Rejecting our accumulated knowledge of terrorism by dismissing it as 'obsolete'" would be a mistake that could lead to bad policy choices, she added. Before 9/ll, assumptions that "new" terrorism would forsake the "old" technique of hijacking and turn to weapons of mass destruction turned out to be wrong, she pointed out.

Crenshaw said researchers and policymakers should "ask why some groups cause large numbers of civilian casualties and others do not, rather than assuming that religious beliefs are the explanation for lethality."

On October 2 FSI Acting Director Michael A. McFaul commenced FSI's annual orientation gathering for the 2007-08 academic year. After introducing new faculty and staff, McFaul turned the orientation over to scholars from CDDRL, CHP/PCOR, CISAC, Shorenstein APARC, the Program on Food Security and the Environment, and the Forum on Contemporary Europe, all of whom presented new research and outlined projects for the upcoming year.

CISAC senior research scholar Paul Stockton began with a presentation on "The Politics of Homeland Security," and was followed by Jean C. Oi, FSI senior fellow and director of the new Stanford China Program, who spoke about the Stanford Center at Peking University. Kathryn Stoner, CDDRL associate director for research, presented on "Promoting Democracy." McFaul moderated a panel discussion Q&A and, after a short break, introduced the second panel of FSI scholars.

CHP/PCOR core faculty member Grant Miller presented research that examines if "what people want" interferes with sound health policy in the developing world . New FSI senior fellow Josef Joffe discussed how America is both "a model and a monster" in the European consciousness; FSE Director Rosamond L. Naylor reviewed some of FSE's projects on biofuels and food security, and highlighted what they would be working on this upcoming year. Joffe, Miller, and Naylor each answered questions from faculty and staff before McFaul adjourned the 2007 orientation.

The Institute welcomes five new full-time faculty and two distinguished visitors in the current academic year. The latest additions represent consolidation of ongoing programs, such as those in homeland security and international relations and expansion of its research agenda into Asian comparative healthcare and issues in contemporary Europe.

Below are brief profiles of FSI's new faculty, all of whom have offices in Encina Hall.

Martha Crenshaw--FSI Senior Fellow, CISAC

Formerly a professor of government at Wesleyan University, Martha Crenshaw has a distinguished record of scholarship and policy engagement in the area of terrorism studies. Her early work on the National Liberation Front in Algeria 30 years ago made seminal contributions to the understanding of terrorist psychology and organizational structure, themes that are helping to animate the agenda for future research in the field. Her work with the U.S. Department of State and the intelligence community in the wake of 9/11 has played an important role in a major Department of Homeland Security grant she brought to Stanford this year.

Karen Eggleston--FSI Center Fellow, Shorenstein APARC and CHP/PCOR

Karen Eggleston joined Stanford from Tufts as an Asian comparative healthcare scholar whose work focuses on health systems and design incentives, especially in lower- and middle-income countries. She has co-authored Welfare, Choice and Solidarity in Transition: Reforming the Health Sector in Eastern Europe with esteemed economist János Kornai, which has been translated into Chinese, Vietnamese, Polish, and Hungarian. Her current research examines the Chinese healthcare system and how ownership factors affect hospital performance.

Siegfried S. Hecker--FSI Senior Fellow, Professor (Research), Management Science and Engineering, and Co-director, CISAC

Director emeritus of the Los Alamos National Laboratory, material scientist Sig Hecker became CISAC's co-director in early 2007. His research interests include plutonium science, nuclear weapons policy and international security, nuclear security, including nonproliferation and counter terrorism, and cooperative nuclear threat reduction. Over the past 15 years, he has fostered cooperation with the Russian nuclear laboratories to secure and safeguard the vast stockpile of ex-Soviet fissile materials.

Josef Joffe--FSI Senior Fellow, Forum on Contemporary Europe, and the Marc and Anita Abramowitz Fellow, Hoover Institution

A journalist-scholar and publisher-editor of the German weekly Die Zeit, Joe Joffe is in residence at Stanford during fall quarter. His work focuses on U.S.-Europe relations, and is noteworthy for its ability to bridge the worlds of journalism, academics, and policy analysis. He serves on several editorial boards and is a member of the International Institute for Strategic Studies. His work has been acclaimed through a number of awards, including Germany's Theodor Wolff Prize.

Phillip Lipscy--FSI Center Fellow and Assistant Professor, Political Science

Just completing his PhD in government at Harvard, Phillip Lipscy joins Stanford as a jointly held appointment in political science and FSI. His research focuses on international relations in Asia with particular attention to the domestic sources of foreign policy conduct. He is a comparativist with training in international relations, a rarity in the field of contemporary Japanese politics. He is bicultural, having grown up in Japan, and his foreign policy interests encompass the entire East Asia region.

William Howard Taft IV--The Warren Christopher Visiting Professor of International Law and Diplomacy, FSI and the Stanford Law School

Will Taft will be in residence at FSI and the Law School during the 2007-08 academic year as a visiting scholar and teaching Contemporary Issues in International Law and Diplomacy and Foreign Relations Law. Taft has held several private and public positions, including appointments at the Federal Trade Commission, Office of Management and Budget, and U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare. In 1981, he became general counsel to the Department of Defense followed by an appointment as the Deputy Secretary of Defense in 1984. Taft also served as U.S. ambassador to NATO and the U.S. Department of State's legal advisor, the highest legal position in the department. Taft is currently counsel in the office of Fried Frank Harris Shriver & Jacobson.

Alejandro Toledo--FSI Distinguished Payne Lecturer, CDDRL

Having overcome extreme childhood poverty, Alejandro Toledo became the first Peruvian president of indigenous descent to be democratically elected in 500 years. During his presidency, the Peruvian economy registered one of the fastest growing economies in Latin America. The central aim of his presidency was the fight against poverty through health and educational investment. Toledo will be in residence at CDDRL during the 2007-08 academic year. His work will be showcased in a series of talks, workshops, and other activities as part of his Payne lectureship.

The probability of a nuclear weapon one day going off in an American city cannot be calculated, but it is larger than it was five years ago. Potential sources of bombs or the fissile materials to make them have proliferated in North Korea and Iran. Russia's arsenal remains incompletely secured 15 years after the end of the Soviet Union. And Pakistans nuclear technology, already put on the market once by Abdul Qadeer Khan, could go to terrorists if the president, Gen. Pervez Musharraf, cannot control radicals in that country.

In the same period, terrorism has surged into a mass global movement and seems to gather strength daily as extremism spills out of Iraq into the rest of the Middle East, Asia, Europe and even the Americas. More nuclear materials that can be lost or stolen plus more terrorists aspiring to mass destruction equals a greater chance of nuclear terrorism.

Former Senator Sam Nunn in 2005 framed the need for Washington to do better at changing this math with a provocative question: On the day after a nuclear weapon goes off in a American city, "what would we wish we had done to prevent it?" But in view of the increased risk we now face, it is time to add a second question to Mr. Nunn's: What will we actually do on the day after? That is, what actions should our government take?

It turns out that much could be done to save lives and ensure that civilization endures in such terrible circumstances. After all, the underlying equation would remain a few terrorists acting against all the rest of us, and even nuclear weapons need not undermine our strong societies if we prepare to act together and sensibly. Sadly, it is time to consider such contingency planning.

First and foremost, the scale of disaster would quickly overwhelm even the most prepared city and state governments. To avoid repeating the Hurricane Katrina fiasco on a much larger scale, Washington must stop pretending that its role would be to support local responders. State and local governments--though their actions to save lives and avoid panic in the first hours would be essential--must abandon the pretense that they could remain in charge. The federal government, led by the Department of Homeland Security, should plan to quickly step in and take full responsibility and devote all its resources, including those of the Department of Defense, to the crisis.

Only the federal government could help the country deal rationally with the problem of radiation, which is unique to nuclear terrorism and uniquely frightening to most people. For those within a two-mile circle of a Hiroshima-sized detonation (in Washington, that diameter is the length of the Mall; in New York, three-fourths the length of Central Park; in most cities, the downtown area) or just downwind, little could be done. People in this zone who were not killed by the blast itself, perhaps hundreds of thousands of them, would get radiation sickness, and many would die.

But most of a city's residents, being further away, would have more choices. What should they do as they watch a cloud of radioactive debris rise and float downwind like the dust from the twin towers on 9/11? Those lucky enough to be upwind could remain in their homes if they knew which way the fallout plume was blowing. (The federal government has the ability to determine that and to quickly broadcast the information.) But for those downwind and more than a few miles from ground zero, the best move would be to shelter in a basement for three days or so and only then leave the area.

This is a hard truth to absorb, since we all would have a strong instinct to flee. But walking toward the suburbs or sitting in long traffic jams would directly expose people to radiation, which would be the most intense on the day after the bomb goes off. After that, the amount would drop off day by day (one third as strong after three days, one fifth as strong after five days, and so on), because of the natural decay of the radioactive components of the fallout.

More tough decisions would arise later. People downwind could leave their homes or stay, leave for a while and then come back or leave and come back briefly to retrieve valuables. The choices would be determined by the dose of radiation they were willing to absorb. Except in the hot zone around the blast and a few miles downwind, even unsheltered people would not be exposed to enough radiation to make them die or even become sick. It would be enough only to raise their statistical chance of getting cancer later in life from 20 percent (the average chance we all have) to something greater--21 percent, 22 percent, up to 30 percent at the maximum survivable exposure.

Similar choices would face first responders and troops sent to the stricken area: how close to ground zero could they go, and for how long? Few would choose to have their risk of death from cancer go up to 30 percent. But in cases of smaller probabilities--an increase to 20.1 percent, for example--a first responder might be willing to go into the radiation zone, or a resident might want to return to pick up a beloved pet. These questions could be answered only by the individuals themselves, based on information about the explosion.

Next comes the unpleasant fact that the first nuclear bomb may well not be the last. If terrorists manage to obtain a weapon, or the fissile material to make one (which fits into a small suitcase), who's to say they wouldn' have two or three more? And even if they had no more weapons, the terrorists would most likely claim that they did. So people in other cities would want to evacuate on the day after, or at least move their children to the countryside, as happened in England during World War II.

The United States government, probably convened somewhere outside Washington by the day after, would be urgently trying to trace the source of the bombs. No doubt, the trail would lead back to some government--Russia, Pakistan, North Korea or other countries with nuclear arsenals or advanced nuclear power programs--because even the most sophisticated terrorist groups cannot make plutonium or enrich their own uranium; they would need to get their weapons or fissile materials from a government.

The temptation would be to retaliate against that government. But it might not even be aware that its bombs were stolen or sold, let alone have deliberately provided them to terrorists. Retaliating against Russia or Pakistan would therefore be counterproductive. Their cooperation would be needed to find out who got the bombs and how many there were, and to put an end to the campaign of nuclear terrorism. It is important to continue to develop the ability to trace any bomb by analyzing its residues. Any government that did not cooperate in the search should of course face possible retaliation.

Finally, as buildings and lives were destroyed, so would the sense of safety and well-being of survivors, and this in turn could lead to panic. Contingency plans for the day after a nuclear blast should demonstrate to Americans that all three branches of government can work in unison and under the Constitution to respond to the crisis and prevent further destruction.

A council of, say, the president, the vice president, the speaker of the House and the majority leader of the Senate, with the chief justice of the Supreme Court present as an observer, could consider certain aspects of the government's response, like increased surveillance. Any emergency measures instituted on the day after should be temporary, to be reviewed and curtailed as soon as the crisis ends.

Forceful efforts to prevent a nuclear attack--more forceful than we have seen in recent years--may keep the day from coming. But as long as there is no way to be sure it will not, it is important to formulate contingency plans that can save thousands of lives and billions of dollars, prevent panic and promote recovery. They can also help us preserve our constitutional government, something that terrorists, even if armed with nuclear weapons, should never be allowed to take away.

William J. Perry, a professor at Stanford, and Ashton B. Carter, a professor at Harvard, were, respectively, the secretary and an assistant secretary of defense in the Clinton administration. Michael M. May, also a professor at Stanford, is a former director of the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory.