ABOUT THE SPEAKER: James Cameron, Stanton Nuclear Security Postdoctoral Fellow at CISAC for 2013-14, completed his PhD in July 2013 at the University of Cambridge. James is very interested in the contribution history can make to informing today’s debates on nuclear strategy and U.S.-Russian relations. After completing his master’s in Russian and East European Studies at the University of Oxford, he was a business consultant specializing in the former Soviet Union. 

His dissertation, “The Development of United States Anti-Ballistic Missile Policy, 1961-1972”, used the transformation of the American anti-ballistic missile (ABM) program from John F. Kennedy to Richard M. Nixon as a prism through which to examine changing patterns of presidential nuclear leadership during this period. Employing both new American and Russian sources, the thesis shows how successive occupants of the Oval Office and their most trusted advisers managed the tension between their publicly articulated nuclear strategies and their inner convictions regarding the utility of nuclear weapons during this pivotal decade of the Cold War.

ABOUT THE TOPIC: Richard Nixon did not believe in mutual assured destruction. Yet he signed the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty in 1972, which enshrined MAD as a central fact of the U.S.-Soviet strategic nuclear balance. Conversely his predecessors, John F. Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson, publicly defended American nuclear superiority and pushed ahead with ABM, despite their private skepticism regarding the utility of both and desire to moderate the arms race. Employing newly available evidence from declassified telephone recordings and documents, this paper attempts to account for this contradiction. It does so by placing the perpetual presidential struggle to reconcile private convictions with public demands at the center of the emergence of assured destruction and the limitation of ABM as elements of U.S.-Soviet détente through strategic arms control.

ABOUT THE TOPIC: In his talk, Jack Goldsmith will explain why he is skeptical about significant cybersecurity cooperation among military rivals, especially at the treaty level. He will, however, argue that the Snowden revelations make such cooperation more, not less, likely.

ABOUT THE SPEAKER: Jack Goldsmith is Henry L. Shattuck Professor of Law at Harvard University, where he specializes in national security law, international law, internet law, and presidential power. Goldsmith is the author of five books and numerous articles covering these topics. His recent books include: Power and Constraint: The Accountable Presidency After 9/11 (W.W. Norton, 2012); The Terror Presidency: Law and Judgment Inside the Bush Administration (W.W. Norton, 2007); Who Controls the Internet? Illusions of a Borderless World (Oxford Press, 2006, with Tim Wu); and The Limits of International Law (Oxford Press, 2005, with Eric Posner). Prior to his time at Harvard, Goldsmith was Assistant Attorney General in the Office of Legal Counsel from October 2003 to July 2004 and Special Counsel to the General Counsel to the Department of Defense from September 2002 through June 2003. 

ABOUT THE SPEAKER: Daniel Altman is a Stanton Nuclear Security predoctoral fellow at CISAC for the 2013-2014 academic year. He is a doctoral candidate in the Political Science Department at MIT and a meber of the MIT Security Studies program.

His dissertation, “Red Lines and Faits Accomplis in Interstate Coercion and Crisis,” offers a framework for explaining crisis behavior and outcomes that differs from the conventional wisdom. The traditional way to understand crises is to suppose that policymakers think primarily in the form of the question, “How can we convince the other side that we are willing to fight in order to get them to back down?” This dissertation instead approaches crises as if states ask themselves, “What can we get away with unilaterally taking without starting a war?” The result is a theory of coercive conflict that explains why “vulnerable” red lines with any of four characteristics elicit faits accomplis, result in crisis defeats for the states setting them, and make war more likely. It tests this theory against the conventional wisdom with case studies of the 1948-1949 Berlin Blockade Crisis and the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, as well as a quantitative analysis of interstate crises from 1918 to 2007 which makes use of original data on red lines and faits accomplis.

Daniel is working on several additional research projects on topics which include misperception as a cause of war, trade as a cause of peace, and the use of preventive force against nuclear programs.

ABOUT THE TOPIC: “Red Lines and Faits Accomplis in Interstate Coercion and Crisis” offers a framework for explaining crisis behavior and outcomes that differs from the conventional wisdom.  The traditional way to understand crises is to suppose that policymakers think primarily in the form of the question, “How can we convince the other side that we are willing to fight in order to get them to back down?”  This dissertation instead approaches crises as if states ask themselves, “What can we get away with unilaterally taking without starting a war?”  The result is a theory of coercive conflict that explains why “vulnerable” red lines with any of four characteristics elicit faits accomplis, result in crisis defeats for the states setting them, and make war more likely.  This theory is tested against the conventional wisdom with case studies of the 1948-1949 Berlin Blockade Crisis and the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, as well as a quantitative analysis of interstate crises from 1918 to 2007 which makes use of original data on red lines and faits accomplis.

ABOUT THE SPEAKER: Elaine Korzak joined CISAC in September 2013 as a predoctoral cybersecurity fellow. She is a PhD student in the Department of War Studies at King's College London. Elaine's thesis evaluates how cyber attacks challenge current legal norms and whether the identified challenges ultimately warrant a new legal framework. The analysis focuses on two areas in particular: international law on the use of force (jus ad bellum) and international humanitarian law (jus in bello). During her time at CISAC, Elaine is conducting empirical research examining states' responses to the legal challenges created by cyber attacks. Her analysis focuses on various state positions in key international forums, including the United Nations and the International Telecommunication Union.

Elaine earned a Bachelor's degree in International Relations from the University of Dresden (Germany) before focusing her research interests at the interface of international law and security studies. She holds both an MA in International Peace and Security from King's College London and an LL.M in Public International Law from the London School of Economics. Her professional experience includes various governmental and non-governmental institutions (both national and international), where she has worked on various disarmament and international security issues. These include, most recently, NATO's Cyber Defence Section as well as the European Commission's Director-General on Information Society and Media.

ABOUT THE TOPIC: With their unique characteristics such as swiftness, its non-kinetic nature and anonymity, computer network attacks fundamentally challenge the current international legal paradigm which is based on a state-centered concept of armed force involving some degree of kinetic energy transfer through blast and fragmentation. It has been argued that a revolution in military affairs has been ushered in by technological advancements that cannot be accommodated within the existing legal framework. Both practitioners and scholars have called for a new regulatory framework to govern computer network attacks. This presentation will give an overview of Elaine's doctoral research project which evaluates these claims by examining if and how computer network attacks challenge key norms of international law on the use of force and international humanitarian law and whether the identified challenges ultimately warrant a new legal framework.   

About the Topic: What do the National Security Agency’s bulk surveillance programs reveal about Americans?  This talk presents ongoing studies of Internet and telephone metadata.  Preliminary results suggest that technical restrictions are far less effective than many observers have assumed. 

If you would like to read about the topic before the seminar, Jonathan’s work on the subject is available at http://bit.ly/1iMdkkM and http://stanford.io/1iMdjNM.

Speaker bio:

Jonathan Mayer is a Ph.D student in Computer Science and a J.D. student in Law at Stanford University. He joined CISAC as a predoctoral cybersecurity fellow in 2012, and continued as a cybersecurity fellow at CISAC for 2013-2014.

His research aims to advance difficult problems in technology policy. His recent work has focused on how to protect consumer privacy while promoting online innovation. In one line of studies, Jonathan has used web measurement to shed light on the information collected about consumers online. Another project aims to develop third-party web services that deliver functionality without tracking users.

Jonathan completed his undergraduate degree at Princeton University in 2009, with a concentration in the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs. 

Abstract: 

The recent events in Chelyabinsk serve as a reminder that while rare, encounters with near-Earth objects (NEOs) can have significant consequences for humanity. Understanding and mitigating the risks posed by asteroids is important to the scientific and policy-making communities as observation and mitigation missions are considered. Qualitative and quantitative studies have been done to assess such risks, and some reasonable point estimates have been proposed. However, due to the low probability/high consequence nature of asteroid risks, these measures provide limited actionable insights and may even lead to false confidence when interpreted inappropriately. Project Fox aims to provide a probabilistic model that evaluates the collective threat from asteroids events by evaluating the full distributions over consequences. Results of initial modeling efforts show that the catastrophic risks from asteroid impacts are significant, and that the majority of risk for global effects resulting from NEO impacts is attributable to a range of diameters smaller (and more frequent) than previously known. 

Speaker bio:

Jason C. Reinhardt is a national security systems analyst, and is currently pursuing a Ph.D. in Risk Analysis, focusing on nuclear weapons arsenal management. Specifically, he is developing quantitative risk models to examine the trade-offs faced by nuclear armed nations in the process of disarmament. He is also pursuing research aimed at modeling and quantifying the catastrophic risks posed by near earth asteroid encounters. Other research interests include game theoretic applications to risk analysis and management, as well as adversary models. While at CISAC, he hopes to engage subject matter and policy experts to strengthen his modeling and analysis of nuclear weapon arsenal risk.

Prior to beginning his current studies, Jason managed a group of experts at Sandia National Laboratories that focused on technical studies to guide policy and decision makers across government. He joined Sandia National Laboratories in August of 2002, and has worked on a diverse set of projects both as an engineer and as an analyst, including the development of instrumentation for in-situ atmospheric measurement, embedded systems design, borders security analyses, and nuclear counter-terrorism strategy development.

He has worked extensively with the Department of Homeland Security on nuclear matters, and has also worked with the Department of Energy, the Department of Defense, the intelligence community, and within the national laboratory enterprise on a diverse array of national security projects. He has participated in the planning and hosting of international conferences and engagements, briefed congressional representatives, and served as a subject-matter expert on the topics of border security and nuclear and radiological defense.

Jason holds a B.S. in Electrical Engineering from the Purdue School of Electrical Engineering at Indianapolis, and a M.S. in Electrical Engineering from Stanford University.