Science and Technology
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This special workshop was organized in honor of George Bunn -- a nonproliferation expert and pioneer and a consulting professor at CISAC -- on the occasion of his 79th birthday. Four expert panelists, who have worked with Professor Bunn, gave presentations on "The Future of Global Efforts to Secure Nuclear Weapons Materials," "Prospects for Strengthening the Nonproliferation Regime," "Prospects for the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty," and "The Future of Space Weaponization and Arms Control."

Bechtel Conference Center

Christopher F. Chyba Moderator
Matthew Bunn Project on Managing the Atom, Harvard University
Thomas Graham senior U.S. diplomat and negotiator of international arms-control agreements
Daryl Kimball executive director Arms Control Association
John Rhinelander attorney and negotiator of major arms-control agreements
Conferences
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Reuben W. Hills Conference Room

CISAC
Stanford University
Encina Hall
Stanford, CA 94305-6165

(650) 725-1314
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Senior Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies
Theodore and Frances Geballe Professor in the School of Humanities and Sciences
Professor of Political Science
rsd26_013_0052a.jpg PhD

James Fearon is a senior fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, where he is also the social science co-director at its Center for International Security and Cooperation. He is the Theodore and Frances Geballe Professor in the School of Humanities and Sciences and a professor of political science, as well as an affiliate at the institute's Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law. His research interests include civil and interstate war, ethnic conflict, the international spread of democracy and the evaluation of foreign aid projects promoting improved governance. Fearon was elected to the National Academy of Sciences in 2012 and the American Academy of Arts and Sciences in 2002. Some of his current research projects include work on the costs of collective and interpersonal violence, democratization and conflict in Myanmar, nuclear weapons and U.S. foreign policy, and the long-run persistence of armed conflict.

Co-director, Center for International Security and Cooperation
Affiliated faculty at the Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law
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Jim Fearon Professor of Political Science Stanford University
Seminars
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U.S. President George W. Bush came to power emphasizing that he did not regard nation-building as an appropriate activity for the U.S. military. As he prepares to run for re-election, the United States is engaged in two of the most ambitious nation-building projects in its history in Afghanistan and Iraq. The U.S. undertook a lead role in part because of the circumstances in which the two conflicts commenced, but also as an extension of the present administration's more general opposition to multilateral institutions such as the United Nations. Though the United States determined that it did not need the UN going into Iraq, however, it appears that it has belatedly realized it might need the UN in order to get out.

Simon Chesterman is Executive Director of the Institute for International Law and Justice at New York University School of Law. Prior to joining NYU, he was a Senior Associate at the International Peace Academy and Director of UN Relations at the International Crisis Group in New York. He had previously worked for the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs in Belgrade and at the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda in Arusha.

He is the author of You, The People: The United Nations, Transitional Administration, and State-Building (Oxford University Press, 2004) and Just War or Just Peace? Humanitarian Intervention and International Law (Oxford University Press, 2001), which was awarded the American Society of International Law Certificate of Merit. He is the editor, with Michael Ignatieff and Ramesh Thakur, of Making States Work: State Failure and the Crisis of Governance (United Nations University Press, forthcoming) and of Civilians in War (Lynne Rienner, 2001). He regularly contributes to international law and political science journals, as well as mass media publications such as the International Herald Tribune. His has taught at the Universities of Melbourne, Oxford, Southampton, and Columbia.

Encina Hall, east wing ground floor conference room E008

Simon Chesterman Executive Director Institute for International Law and Justice at New York University School of Law
Seminars
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Lunch provided to those who RSVP to Yumi Onoyama at yumio@stanford.edu by Tuesday, May 25.

12:00pm The Challenges and Opportunities to PetroChina in the Stock Market

Ruisheng Yong, PetroChina Company, Ltd.

12:20pm What Are the Conditions for Creating a Second Silicon Valley in Shizuoka Prefecture?

Ikuzo Matsushita, Shizuoka Prefectural Government

12:40pm Lessons of Entrepreneurial Education for Japan's Young Generation

Yoshinori Ueda, Kansai Electric Power Company

1:00pm Non-technology Issues Awaiting the E-paper Content Market--From Marketing & Legal Perspectives

Taizo Shiozaki, Impress Corporation

1:20pm Pension Investment and Fiduciary Duty in the United States

Fumiaki Tonoki, Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry

1:40pm Renewable Energy and Environmental Policies in the Power Industry

Shinichiro Goko, Electric Power Development Company

2:00pm Application of 'Web Service' to Electronic Media

Atsushi Sato, Asahi Shimbun Company

Philippines Conference Room, Encina Hall

Seminars
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Breakfast provided to those who RSVP to Yumi Onoyama at yumio@stanford.edu by Monday, May 17. 9:00am ?The Changes and the Challenges of the Venture Capital Industry: The United States and Japan? Hirohisa Takata, Development Bank of Japan 9:20am ?Cosmeceuticals Market in the United States? Shojiro Matsuoka, Kommy Corporation 9:40am ?The Past, Present, and Future of the High-Tech Industry? Kenji Tashiro, Kumamoto Prefectural Government 10:00am ?Progression of the Broadband Infrastructure and Promising Contents Business? Takehiro Fujiki, Tokyo Electric Power Company 10:20am ?The Silicon Valley Model and Its Success in Japan? Takashi Shimotori, Sumitomo Corporation 10:40am ?Legislation of the CRA in Japan? Teruhisa Kurita, Ministry of Finance (Advisor: Dan Okimoto)

Oksenberg Conference Room, Encina Hall

Seminars
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Dr. Sáez's recent paper offers a new perspective on the relationship between ex ante barriers to entry and ex post second-generation reforms. Building upon theoretical insights from the literature on new entry, the paper will show why some types of barriers to entry exist in transitional economies. The paper will then show how market segmentation imposes structural barriers to entry will likely affect the level of political opposition that builds during the implementation of second generation reforms. In order to provide empirical support for this theoretical construct, the paper will specifically highlight the experience of financial services reform in India in order to develop an argument about the existing challenges and likely success of second-generation reforms that stemmed from initial barriers to entry.

Lawrence Sáez is a senior associate member at St. Antony's College, Oxford and he teaches international politics at the School of Oriental and Asian Studies in London. Prior to living in England, Dr. Sáez was an assistant research political scientist at the Institute of East Asian Studies and visiting scholar at the Center for South Asia Studies, University of California, Berkeley. He was also the associate editor for South Asia at Asian Survey. He holds a B.A. in political science from the University of California, Berkeley; an M.A.L.D. in international relations from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy; and a Ph.D. in political science from the University of Chicago.

His research is focused around comparative political economy and fiscal federalism in developing countries. He is currently working on trying to understand how globalization has affected subnational economic growth and the provision of public goods in emerging markets. He is the author of Banking Reform in India and China (Palgrave MacMillan 2004).

Daniel and Nancy Okimoto Conference Room

Lawrence Sáez Visiting Fellow, Center for International Studies Speaker London School of Economics
Seminars
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Dr. Levite has served as the Principal Deputy Director General (Policy) of the Israeli Atomic Energy Commission (IAEC) since September 1, 2002. Dr. Levite has extensive experience dealing with issues of nuclear proliferation as both a scholar and practitioner. Prior to his current position, Dr. Levite was a Visiting Fellow at the Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC) from 2000-2002, where he also served as co-leader of the CISAC Discriminate Force project. His previous jobs include Deputy National Security Advisor (Defense Policy) and Head of the Bureau of International Security at the Israeli Ministry of Defense.

Dr. Levite will update his argument ("Never Say Never Again: Nuclear Reversal Revisited," International Security, Winter 2002/2003) regarding government decisions to slow or stop officially sanctioned nuclear weapons programs in light of recent developments in Libya, North Korea, and Iran.

Readings attached. Limited copies available at Alice Chen's cubical, Encina Hall (C206-7).

Tea & Cookies will be served at 3:15.

Reuben W. Hills Conference Room

Ariel Levite Principal Deputy Director General Speaker IAEC
Joe Felter Graduate Student Moderator Department of Political Science
Seminars
Authors
News Type
Commentary
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Any strategic vision in the war on terrorism requires broad international cooperation. But the United States and Russia appear to be headed down the path of isolation, according to an op-ed piece by William J. Perry, published May 7 in the Moscow Times.

Faced with the deadly menace posed by transnational terror organizations, the nations of the world must redouble their cooperative efforts. The tasks ahead -- to disrupt terror groups and preempt their attacks -- require intense coordination among a multitude of national intelligence, national law enforcement, and military organizations. Unprecedented cooperation among all of the nuclear powers is needed to prevent nuclear weapons from falling into the hands of terror groups.

Yet, paradoxically, the two nations that have suffered the worst terror attacks -- the United States and Russia -- are regressing more and more to national strategies. They have been unwilling to make the extra effort to reap the benefits of real international cooperation.

I believe that the United States' strategic vision of the war on terrorism is flawed. I fear it is following the isolationist path of the United States after World War I rather than pursuing the broad international programs it successfully undertook to protect its security interests after World War II.

The terrorists posing the greatest threat to the United States and to Russia are transnational, with cells in many different countries. To support their training and operations, they raise funds in many countries and maintain these in international bank accounts. They use satellite-based television as their principal means of propaganda, the World Wide Web as their principal means of communication and international airlines as their principal means of transportation. Their efforts to get weapons of mass destruction are based on penetrating the weakest security links among the nations possessing these weapons, and their successful guerrilla operations depend on their ability to get support from sympathizers among the more than 1 billion Islamic people around the world.

An international operation is clearly needed to successfully deal with this threat. But the United States is not making full use of other nations and international institutions to dry up the terrorists' funds in international bank accounts, to gain intelligence on their planning for future attacks, to penetrate their cells so that it has a chance of preempting these attacks, to organize all nuclear powers with effective security of their nuclear weapons and fissile material, and to conduct counterinsurgency operations wherever they are needed. Dealing effectively with transnational terror groups that operate with impunity across borders requires an international operation with the full cooperation of allies and partners in Europe and Asia.

This is not "mission impossible." In 1993, the United States was able to get all of the former members of the Warsaw Pact to join up with NATO in forming the Partnership for Peace to cooperate in peacekeeping operations. In 1994, the United States with the full cooperation of Russia was able to negotiate an agreement by which all nuclear weapons were removed from Uzbekistan, Belarus and Kazakhstan and by which substantial improvements were made in the security of nuclear weapons in Russia. In 1995, the United States was able to get an agreement under which NATO took responsibility for the peacekeeping operations in Bosnia, an operation that was believed at the time to be as dangerous and filled with religious and sectarian strife as Iraq today, and it was able to get dozens of non-NATO nations -- notably including Russia -- to join it in that operation.

Securing Russian cooperation required listening to Russian views and making accommodations wherever possible. As U.S. defense secretary, I had to meet with my Russian counterpart four different times before I came to understand how to structure the command in Bosnia in a way acceptable to both Russians and NATO. The general lesson from this example, which is still applicable today, was best expressed by Winston Churchill, who observed during World War II, "The problem with allies is they sometimes have ideas of their own." But in reflecting on that problem, he also said, "The only thing worse than fighting a war with allies is trying to fight a war without allies."

What lessons can we learn from Churchill today? Had the Bush administration understood better the dangers of the post-conflict phase, surely it would have worked harder to get the support of those countries before invading Iraq. In any event, after the war it would have reached out to them and tried to achieve an accommodation that would have allowed their support during the reconstruction phase.

Instead, the administration took the position that any nation that was not with the United States during the war would not have a role in the reconstruction. To compound the problem, the United States did not seek meaningful assistance from the United Nations. Today, in the light of the difficulties experienced in restoring security in Iraq, the administration is reaching out to the United Nations and requesting that it play a major role in the political reconstitution of Iraq, but it is still not working effectively with the governments of France, Germany and Russia.

Just as the United States erred in believing that it did not need more international support in Iraq, so did the Russian government err in believing that it did not need more international support as it reconstituted its government after the Soviet era. The Putin administration believed -- correctly -- that it could turn around the Russian economy without significant assistance from other countries, and it believed that it could deal most effectively with its terrorist threat without interference from other countries. It also apparently believed that moving toward a level of democracy conflicted with the controls necessary for economic recovery and for fighting its terror war. So today we see a Russia that has enjoyed a healthy 7 percent growth rate each of these past five years, but has stopped -- indeed reversed -- its move towards becoming a liberal democracy. This reversal over the long term will have profoundly negative consequences for the Russian economy and for the Russian people, and unquestionably it is setting Russia on a course that will alienate it both from the United States and the European Union.

Both the Bush administration and the Putin administration have apparently made the decision that they can achieve their goals without broad international support. Both governments have erred in that judgment. But it is not too late to correct the judgment, and I fervently hope that both of governments will do so. The most important step in that process is reviving cooperation between the United States and Russia.

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