International Development

FSI researchers consider international development from a variety of angles. They analyze ideas such as how public action and good governance are cornerstones of economic prosperity in Mexico and how investments in high school education will improve China’s economy.

They are looking at novel technological interventions to improve rural livelihoods, like the development implications of solar power-generated crop growing in Northern Benin.

FSI academics also assess which political processes yield better access to public services, particularly in developing countries. With a focus on health care, researchers have studied the political incentives to embrace UNICEF’s child survival efforts and how a well-run anti-alcohol policy in Russia affected mortality rates.

FSI’s work on international development also includes training the next generation of leaders through pre- and post-doctoral fellowships as well as the Draper Hills Summer Fellows Program.

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アルゴリズム革命とは、
情報処理能力の飛躍的向上により、
あらゆる人間活動が計測され
機械によって代替される流れのこと。
Fintech
IoT
Cloud
Computing
AIなど、
シリコンバレーの最先端の動きと
これから日本で起こることを、
スタンフォード大学の研究員がわかりやすく解説。

――目次――
【CHAPTER 1】アルゴリズム革命とAIのインパクト
●シリコンバレーは世界の姿を一変させる
●アルゴリズムで人間の活動を置き換える
●人工知能は人の仕事を奪うのか
●スケールしないビジネスは生き残れない
●次に破壊されるのはどの業界か
★シリコンバレーの強さの秘密1――循環する人材

【CHAPTER 2】クラウド・コンピューティングの本質とは
●クラウドで人類の情報処理能力が豊富なリソースへ
●クラウドは巨大な設備投資で実現
●インフラとしてのクラウドの可能性
●クラウドは安全なのか
●豊富な情報処理能力はコモディティ化の波を作る
●大企業がクラウドを使いこなす日
★シリコンバレーの強さの秘密2――資金調達+インフラ環境

【CHAPTER 3】IoTとビッグデータの真価とは
●あらゆるものが計測可能になる
●売りっぱなしモデルからの脱却
●日本的「ものづくり」とIoT
●ロボットのいる生活
●「規制」に関する幻想と事実
★シリコンバレーの強さの秘密3――失敗を次に活かす文化

【CHAPTER 4】フィンテックの恩恵はあらゆる企業に及ぶ
●スタートアップが切り開く新しい金融サービス
●企業の資金調達が様変わりする
●決済手段が多様化する
●仮想通貨の技術で「信用確保」
●ロボアドバイザーの時代
★シリコンバレーの強さの秘密4――産学連携

【CHAPTER 5】日本企業がこれからすべきこと
●外部の力を取り込む「オープンイノベーション」
●シリコンバレーで人脈をつくる
●トップがコミットし、現場に裁量を与える
●デザインとコンセプトを買うという発想
●ロボティクスに活路を見出す
●日本のものづくりの真の強みは何か
★シリコンバレーの強さの秘密5――政府が果たす役割

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Kenji E. Kushida
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Stanford students are applying lean start-up techniques to some of the world’s most difficult foreign policy issues.

The fall 2016 quarter class, Hacking for Diplomacy: Tackling Foreign Policy Challenges with the Lean Launchpad, is a first-of-its-kind course for studying statecraft, created as a reflection of the best that Stanford and Silicon Valley offers in the way of pioneering paradigms. Hacking for Diplomacy is co-taught by Joe Felter, a senior researcher at Stanford’s Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC). It is based on the Lean LaunchPad methodology, created by course designer Steve Blank, a Stanford lecturer and entrepreneur.

The teaching team also includes Jeremy Weinstein, a political science professor at the Freeman Spogli Institute; Zvika Krieger, the U.S. Department of State's Representative to Silicon Valley; and Steve Weinstein, the CEO of MovieLabs.

'Breaking free'

The class is based on cultivating ideas and imagination, breaking free of the traditional “business plan” approach to rolling out new products and solutions. In the case of diplomacy, the lean start-up method is fast and flexible above all. It has three key principles based on concepts such as "mission model canvas," "beneficiary development," and "agile engineering,” according to Felter, also a research fellow at the Hoover Institution.

“The first principle is accepting that any proposed solution to a problem whether in the commercial world or public sector is initially just a set of untested hypotheses – at best informed guesses – as to what may solve the needs of a customer or beneficiary,” said Felter.

Regarding beneficiary development, he said, experiential learning is central.

“There are no answers to complex challenges ‘inside the building,’ if you will, and students must ‘get out of the building’ to find out –in as intimate detail as possible – the various pains and gains experienced by the various beneficiaries, stakeholders and end users that must be addressed to find viable and deployable solutions to their problems,” Felter said.

The last principle, “agile development,” is based on the view that proposed solutions are generated and constantly updated through a collecting of data and feedback. This in turn, Felter explained, is rapidly tested and new solutions are designed based this iterative process.

Overall, he noted, the core idea is that entrepreneurs are everywhere, and that lean startup principles favor experimentation over elaborate planning, offering a faster way to get a desired product or solution to market.

Real-world instruction

In the class, student teams analyze real-world foreign policy challenges. They then use lean startup principles to find new approaches to seemingly intractable or very complex problems that have bedeviled the foreign policy world. The teams actually work with mentors and officials in the U.S. State Department and other civilian agencies and private companies.

Each week, the teams present their findings (“product”) to a panel of faculty and mentors, who will critique their solutions. The outcomes will range, as they vary from problem to problem. Examples include human rights, food security, refuges and labor recruitment, and mosquito disease threats, among others.

On Oct. 10, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry visited the class. “Brilliant minds are applying technology to world’s toughest problems. Their perspective will inform,” Kerry tweeted after the class.

Kerry’s State Department gave the students seven challenges to address – human trafficking, avoiding space collisions, tracking nuclear devices, and countering violent extremism. The students will explore and analyze these issues through the rest of the quarter.

One student, Kaya Tilev, later asked Kerry what the students should be striving for to make their “solutions” a reality for national policymakers.

Kerry said, “Well, you’re doing it. You’re in it. You’re in the program. And I have absolute confidence if you come up with a viable solution it is going to be implemented, adopted, and institutionalized.”

Zvika Krieger, the state department official, told the students that Kerry was impressed with them and the class.

“He (Kerry) brought up our class in all of his meetings that day, including at a lunch with the CEOs/founders of Google, Airbnb, and Lyft; in a podcast interview with Wired magazine, and in remarks at the Internet Association's conference,” Krieger wrote in an email to them.

Global flashpoints are proliferating around the globe – the Syrian War, conflict and civil wars across the Middle East and in parts of Africa; the pursuit of weapons of mass destruction by states and non-state groups; the most significant flow of refugees since World War II; North Korea nuclear testing; Russian adventurism on its borders; China’s forays into the South China Sea; and a changing climate.

In other words, there is no shortage of thorny problems for young minds to solve as they embark on their careers.

‘Hungry to apply their energy’

Jeremy Weinstein, the political science professor, described the students as “hungry to apply their energy and talents to real-world problems, and to use hands-on experiences as a way of accelerating their learning.”

The class taps into that motivation by bringing together data scientists, engineers, and social scientist, he noted. In the end, the idea is for students to learn how to “innovate inside government.”

Weinstein is optimistic that this class – and a stronger connection between the State Department and Stanford’s technical and policy expertise – can drive more innovation inside government.

“Technology can play a critical role in addressing many of today’s foreign policy challenges, and this class is one new way for senior U.S. officials to tap into the passion, creativity and talent of Silicon Valley,” he said.

Hacking for defense

Last year, Felter and Blank also led a Hacking for Defense class based on the same lean start-up principles. Hacking for Diplomacy is co-listed as both an International Policy Studies and a Management Science and Engineering course – it counts for international relations and political science majors as well.

Blank, a consulting associate professor in engineering, told the Stanford News Service in a recent story that he seeks to cultivate in students a passion for giving back to society and their world.

“We’re going to create a network of entrepreneurial students who understand the diplomatic, policy and national security problems facing the country and get them engaged in partnership with islands of innovation in the Department of State,” said Blank, who also wrote about the new hacking for Diplomacy course in the Huffington Post.

“Teams must take these products out to the real world and ask potential users for feedback,” he noted.

 

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The new Stanford class, "Hacking for Diplomacy," gives students the opportunity to analyze global challenges and apply "lean start-up" methods to solving them. On Oct. 10, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry visited the class, which is co-taught by CISAC senior research scholar Joe Felter.
Courtesy of Zvika Krieger
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An in memoriam event recognizing the legacy of Stephen W. “Steve” Bosworth was held last week. Organized by the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC), the event drew Stanford faculty, students and community members, paying tribute to the foreign affairs scholar and three-time U.S. ambassador.

Bosworth, who died in January 2016, was the Payne Distinguished Lecturer at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies in 2014. During that time, he delivered three lectures at Stanford that highlighted lessons from his tenure in public service and in academia as dean of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy and senior fellow at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs.

Bosworth had also been a key participant over the years at Shorenstein APARC. He was active with the New Beginnings project that sought to bolster the U.S.-South Korea alliance and the Koret Workshop series focused on dialogue about North Korea.

Shorenstein APARC Distinguished Fellow Michael Armacost described him as a “longtime friend and colleague” and a mentor, having both worked to lay groundwork for the restoration of democracy in the Philippines as U.S. ambassador there.

“I admired Steve as a consummate diplomat, but he was a lot more than that,” Armacost said. “He was a man of intellectual acuity. He was a man of moral fortitude. He had a wry sense of humor. And, he had that remarkable ability of being able to stand-up and speak thoughtfully about almost any subject.”

Armacost was followed by remarks from Kathleen Stephens, the William J. Perry Distinguished Fellow and former U.S. ambassador to South Korea, and Sung Kim, the U.S. special envoy for North Korea, and discussion with the audience.

The collection of Bosworth’s Payne lectures has been published as a booklet. The booklet can be viewed here.

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The Japan Program held the fourth annual Stanford Juku on Japanese Political Economy from September 29 – October 1. Over 40 scholars from various parts of the US and Japan participated in the conference, which took place at the Oksenberg Conference Center at Encina Hall. The first portion of the program (9/29 and morning of 9/30) focused on research in political science/political economy and international relations, and the latter portion of the program (afternoon of 9/30 and 10/1) focused on research in economics.

The main goal of the program is to attract young researchers who will go on to become leaders in the study of Japanese politics and Japanese economy in the near future.  Distinctive features of the Juku are the long times allotted to each paper to allow for two in-depth discussants and discussion among participants, as well as ample time for informal discussions and interactions among participants allowing for collaborations and expansion of the network of researchers on Japan in political science and economics. We received a large volume of quality paper submissions this year, which made the selection process very competitive. 

The first day included four papers in political science/political economy and international relations. Daniel Smith from Harvard University presented a paper co-authored by Yusaku Horiuchi (Dartmouth College) and Teppei Yamamoto (Massachusetts Institute Technology) entitled, "Identifying Voter Preferences for Politicians' Personal Attributes: A Conjoint Experiment in Japan," with discussants Ethan Scheiner (University of California, Davis) and Mike Tomz (Stanford University).

Amy Catalinac (New York University) presented a paper co-authored by Frances Rosenbluth (Yale University) and Hikaru Yamagishi (Yale University) entitled "Party Strategies and Foreign Policy in Post-Electoral Reform Japan." The Discussants for the paper were Gary Cox (Stanford) and Teppei Yamamoto (MIT).

Jacques Hymans from University of Southern California presented his paper on “The Limits of Japan's Energy Angst: The Case of Geothermal Power.” Mark Thurber (Stanford) and Steve Vogel (University of California, Berkeley) were the discussants.

The fourth paper was “Democratic Community and Its Consequences: Evidence from Japan” by Jonathan Chu (Stanford), discussed by Christina Davis (Princeton University) and Megumi Naoi (University of California, San Diego).

Christina Davis (Princeton) started off the second day by presenting her paper “Joining the Club: Accession to the GATT/WTO." Discussants were Jonathan Chu (Stanford) and Phillip Lipscy (Stanford).

The political science/political economy section ended with Megumi Naoi (UC, San Diego) presenting a paper co-authored by Chun-Fang Chiang (National Taiwan University), Jason Kuo (Post-doc, Georgetown University), Jing-tan Liu (National Taiwan University) entitled, "What Do Voters Learn from Foreign News? Experimental Evidence on PTA Diffusion in Japan and Taiwan." Discussants were Kenji Kushida (Stanford) and Yuki Takagi (Stanford). 

After lunch, two economics papers were presented.  Wataru Miyamoto (Bank of Canada) presented a paper co-authored by Thuy Lan Ngyuen (Santa Clara University) and Dmitriy Sergeyev (Bocconi University) entitled, "Government Spending Multipliers under the Zero Lower Bound: Evidence from Japan" with discussants Yuriy Gordonichenko (UC, Berkeley) and Johannes Wieland (UC, San Diego).

The second paper was “Government Spending Multipliers under the Zero Lower Bound: Evidence from Japan”, by Robert Dekle (USC), Nobuhiko Kiyotaki (Princeton) and Tsutomu Miyagawa (Gakushuin University).  Huiyu Li (Federal Bank of San Francisco) and Shuichiro Nishioka (West Virgina University) were the discussants.  A group dinner followed the second day.

The final day included four papers in economics.  The first was “Will the Sun Also Rise? Five Growth Strategies for Japan by Yoko Takeda (Mitsubishi Research Insitute).  Discussants were Michael Hutchison (US, Santa Cruz) and Ryo Kambayashi (Hitotsubashi University).

The second paper was "Natural Disaster and Natural Selection" by Hirofumi Uchida (Kobe University), Daisuke Miyakawa (Hitotsubashi), Kaoru Hosono (Gakushuin), Arito Ono (Chuo University), Taisuke Uchino (Daito Bunka University) and Iichiro Uesugi (Hitotsubashi).  Discussants were Nobuhiko Hibara (Waseda University) and Johannes Wieland (UC, San Diego).

Koichiro Ito (University of Chicago) presented a paper co-authored by Takanori Ida (Kyoto University) and Makoto Tanaka (GRIPS) entitled “Information Frictions, Switching Costs, and Selection on Elasticity: A Field Experiment on Electricity Tariff Choice.”  Karen Eggleston (Stanford) and Hitoshi Shigeoka (Simon Fraser University) were the discussants.

The final paper was “Good Jobs and Bad Jobs in Japan: 1982-2007” by Ryo Kambayashi (Hitotsubashi) and Takao Kato (Colegate University), discussed by Takeo Hoshi (Stanford) and David Vera (California State University, Fresno).

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CISAC nuclear scientist Siegfried S. Hecker earlier this year released a book, Doomed to Cooperate, about how American and Russian scientists joined forces to avert some of the greatest post-Cold War nuclear dangers. Physics Today and Arms Control Today recently ran reviews on the work. Below is a Nov. 1 article that Hecker wrote on this subject for Russia Matters:

By Siegfried S. Hecker

Recalling why U.S.-Russian nuclear cooperation was essential during the late 1980s, Russia’s then-First Deputy Minister of Atomic Energy Lev D. Ryabev said: “We arrived in the nuclear century all in one boat—a movement by any one will affect everyone… [Russian and American nuclear scientists] were doomed to work on these things together, which pushed us toward cooperation.”

Russia mattered then and it matters now. Today, like 30 years ago, the size of its nuclear program—namely its nuclear weapons, facilities, materials, experts—and its safety, security and environmental challenges are rivaled only by the United States. They dwarf all others in the world combined.

The dangerous difference between then and now is that the hard-won cooperation that amazingly prevented nuclear weapons, materials and technologies from spilling out of the disintegrating Soviet empire and into the hands of actors bent on deploying them has been replaced with animosity, tension and a freeze on substantive collaboration. Within the past month two U.S.-Russian agreements—on plutonium disposition and on cooperation in nuclear- and energy-related scientific research and development—have been suspended. Another one—on conversion of Russian research reactors—has been terminated altogether. Meanwhile, officials in Europe and the United States have tracked a number of disturbing activities suggesting that the Islamic State and its sympathizers may be pursuing nuclear and radiological terrorism as the group has been pushed on the defensive.

I must add that Russia also matters to me personally: It has been inextricably intertwined with my life. I was born during World War II in Europe. My father, a conscript in the German army, never returned from the Russian front. I grew up in post-war Austria, which until 1955 was under divided Allied and Soviet occupation. In 1956, I immigrated to the United States with my mother and siblings.

For the first 20 years after I received my bachelor’s degree in metallurgy and materials science from Case Institute of Technology in 1965, Russia also mattered because I spent most of that time employed at the Los Alamos National Laboratory. Our job was to deter the Soviet Union, which was in intense ideological, economic and military competition with the United States.

I became director of the laboratory in 1986 shortly after Mikhail Gorbachev took over leadership of the Soviet Union and dramatically changed geopolitics with his outreach to U.S. President Ronald Reagan and the West. At the end of 1991 the Soviet Union dissolved into 15 independent states. Remarkably and unexpectedly, the Cold War was over.

Mutually assured destruction was replaced by an acknowledgement of mutual nuclear interdependency. The West, rather than being threatened by the enormous nuclear might in the hands of Soviet leaders, was now threatened by Russia’s weakness and the potential for its new government to lose control of the nuclear assets it had inherited from the Soviet Union. The safety and security of Russia’s nuclear assets—its tens of thousands of nuclear weapons, over a million kilograms of fissile materials, a huge nuclear infrastructure and some one million employees of the once-powerful Soviet nuclear establishment—posed an unprecedented risk for Russia and the world.

Fortunately, collaboration replaced confrontation 25 years ago. President George H.W. Bush reached across the political divide to lend a helping hand during times of Soviet political and economic chaos to help Moscow manage its huge nuclear complex. Senators Sam Nunn and Richard Lugar pioneered the visionary landmark Cooperative Threat Reduction legislation (appropriately called Nunn-Lugar) to provide rationale and financial support to that helping hand. The nongovernmental community—led by academics at U.S. universities, foundations such as the Carnegie Corporation of New York, groups such as the Federation of American Scientists, the U.S. National Academies and the Natural Resource Defense Council—paved the way by reaching out to courageous Soviet/Russian organizations, such as its Academy of Sciences and other leading thinkers.

The role of the American and Russian nuclear weapons laboratories changed as well. They had become acquainted during the 1988 Joint Verification Experiment, underground nuclear tests conducted at each other’s nuclear test sites with on-site monitoring by the other side to develop confidence in nuclear test verification so as to facilitate ratification of the Threshold Test Ban Treaty, which had lingered unratified since its signing in 1974. That acquaintance and subsequent interactions at the Geneva TTBT negotiations prompted both sides, but led by the Russian nuclear weapons scientists, to push their governments to allow scientific collaboration between former adversaries.

In February 1992, less than two months after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Washington and Moscow approved exchange visits of the directors of their nuclear weapon design laboratories: Vladimir Belugin, director of the Russian Federal Nuclear Center VNIIEF, and Vladimir Nechai, director of the Russian Federal Nuclear Center VNIITF, visited the Lawrence Livermore and Los Alamos national laboratories; John Nuckolls, director of LLNL, and I, director of LANL, visited the formerly secret cities of Sarov and Snezhinsk, home to VNIIEF and VNIITF, respectively.

Those visits marked the beginning of a remarkable period spanning more than two decades of scientific and technical nuclear cooperation that we called lab-to-lab cooperation—the story told in a book called “Doomed to Cooperate” by dozens of Russian and American scientists, engineers and officials. The book demonstrates how the camaraderie and the interpersonal relationships among the scientists and engineers helped them overcome the radically different views of the nuclear challenges as seen by the two governments.

To the U.S. government, Russia’s nuclear complex was considered an inheritance from hell: the danger of loose nukes, loose nuclear materials, loose nuclear experts and loose nuclear exports. The Russian government considered its nuclear complex part of its salvation in that it would provide a basis to help the country achieve a competitive, modern industrial base and economy. In “Doomed to Cooperate,” we, the scientists and engineers, describe how we confronted the unprecedented safety and security challenges, and how we collaborated to discover new science and help Russia’s vastly oversized nuclear workforce use their talents in civilian and commercial pursuits.

Russia’s nuclear complex has mattered enormously over the past 25 years. It has survived the four nuclear dangers mentioned above to a large extent because of the Russian nuclear community’s dedication, professionalism and patriotism—and their ability to persevere during difficult times. But it also had the benefit of innovative U.S. government programs, collaborations championed by U.S. NGOs and the many hundreds of nuclear lab-to-lab collaborations. These efforts helped the huge Soviet nuclear complex transition those in Russia and several other former Soviet republics in a safe and secure manner.

Unfortunately, whereas a convergence of our governments’ interests immediately following the end of the Cold War allowed for innovative nuclear cooperation, growing political differences during the past 10 to 15 years have done the opposite. The current differences over Crimea, eastern Ukraine and Syria have all but brought meaningful nuclear collaboration to an end.

Yet, Russia continues to matter—and cooperation between Moscow and Washington on common nuclear challenges is essential. They must take steps to reverse what appears to be a return to an arms race and potential nuclear confrontation. They must continue to share experiences and best practices to keep their huge nuclear complexes safe and secure. Although Russia has made enormous improvements in these areas, lessons from the United States nuclear complex demonstrate that this job is never done. Together, Moscow and Washington have a greater stake than anyone in ensuring that the nuclear nonproliferation regime is strengthened rather than crippled. And more than anyone in the world they have a responsibility to join their technical, professional and military talents to help the world avoid nuclear terrorism.

The stakes couldn’t be higher: Russia matters; nuclear cooperation is essential; isolation invites catastrophe.

 

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CISAC nuclear scientist Siegfried S. Hecker, second from the right, says that American and Russian scientists need to work together on averting nuclear dangers – as they have done so in the past.
Courtesy of Siegfried Hecker
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Stanford Juku on Japanese Political Economy 2016

September 29 - October 1, 2016

Oksenberg Conference Room

Stanford Japan Program at Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center

The Japan Program at the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (S-APARC) at Stanford University started Stanford Summer Juku (SSJ) in 2013.  In SSJ, researchers on Japanese politics and Japanese economy get together and discuss their research in a relaxed setting. The fourth annual meeting is held at Stanford on September 29 - October 1, 2016.  The first portion of the program focuses on research in political science/polilitcal economy and international relations, and the latter portion of the program focuses on research in economics.

Takeo Hoshi, Kenji E. Kushida, Phillip Lipscy

 

Report - Stanford Juku 2016

 

Program

9/29/2016

8:30-9:00    Breakfast

9:00-10:15  Session I:

"Identifying Voter Preferences for Politicians' Personal Attributes: A Conjoint Experiment in Japan", Yusaku Horiuchi (Dartmouth College), Daniel Smith (Harvard University) and Teppei Yamamoto (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)

Discussants:
Ethan Scheiner (University of California, Davis)
Mike Tomz (Stanford University)
 

10:15-10:45  Break

10:45-12:00  Session II:

Party Strategies and Foreign Policy in Post-Electoral Reform Japan, Amy Catalinac (New York University), Frances Rosenbluth (Yale University), Hikaru Yamagishi (Yale University)

Discussants:
Gary Cox (Stanford University)
Teppei Yamamoto (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)
 

12:00-1:00  Lunch

1:00-2:15    Session III:

The Limits of Japan's Energy Angst: The Case of Geothermal Power, Jacques Hymans (University of Southern Califorrnia) and Fumiya Uchikoshi, Ph.D. (University of Tokyo)

Discussants:
Mark Thurber (Stanford University)
Steve Vogel (University of California, Berkeley)
 

2:15- 3:30   Session IV:

Democratic Community and Its Consequences: Evidence from Japan, Jonathan Chu (Stanford University)

Discussants:
Christina Davis (Princeton University)
Megumi Naoi (University of California, San Diego)

 

9/30/2016

8:30-9:00   Breakfast

9:00-10:15 Session I:

“Joining the Club: Accession to the GATT/WTO”, Christina Davis (Princeton University) and Meredith Wilf (University of Pittsburgh)

Discussants:
Jonathan Chu (Stanford University)
Phillip Lipscy (Stanford University)
 

10:15-10:45  Break

10:45-12:00  Session II:

What Do Voters Learn from Foreign News? Experimental Evidence on PTA Diffusion in Japan and Taiwan”, Chun-Fang Chiang (National Taiwan University), Jason Kuo (Post-doc, Georgetown University), Jin-tan Liu (National Taiwan University), and Megumi Naoi (University of California, San Diego)

Discussants:
Kenji Kushida (Stanford University)
Yuki Takagi (Stanford University)
 

12:00-1:00  Lunch

1:00-2:15    Session III:

Government Spending Multipliers under the Zero Lower Bound: Evidence from Japan”, Wataru Miyamoto  (Bank of Canada), Thuy Lan Ngyuen (Santa Clara University) and Dmitriy Sergeyev (Bocconi University)

Discussants:
Yuriy Gordonichenko (University of California, Berkeley)
Johannes Wieland (University of California, San Diego)
 

2:15-3:30    Session IV:

Product Dynamics and Aggregate Shocks: Evidence from Japanese product and firm level data”, Robert Dekle (University of Southern California), Atsushi Kawakami (Teikyo University), Nobuhiro Kiyotaki (Princeton University) and Tsutomu Miyagawa (Gakushuin University)

Discussants:
Huiyu Li (Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco)
Shuichiro Nishioka (West Virginia University)
 

6:30        Group Dinner at Tacolicious
 

 

10/1/2016

8:30-9:00    Breakfast

9:00-10:15  Session I:

Will the Sun Also Rise? Five Growth Strategies for Japan”, Yoko Takeda (Mitsubishi Research Institute)

Discussants:
Michael Hutchison (University of California, Santa Cruz)
Ryo Kambayashi (Hitotsubashi University)
 

10:15-10:45  Break

10:45-12:00  Session II:

Natural Disaster and Natural Selection”, Hirofumi Uchida (Kobe University), Daisuke Miyakawa (Hitotsubashi University), Kaoru Hosono (Gakushuin University), Arito Ono (Chuo University), Taisuke Uchino (Daito Bunka University) and Iichiro Uesugi (Hitotsubashi University)

Discussants:
Nobuhiko Hibara (Waseda University)
Johannes Wieland (University of California, San Diego)
 

12:00-1:00  Lunch

1:00-2:15    Session III:

Information Frictions, Switching Costs, and Selection on Elasticity: A Field Experiment on Electricity Tariff Choice”, Koichiro Ito (University of Chicago), Takanori Ida (Kyoto University) and Makoto Tanaka (GRIPS)

Discussants:
Karen Eggleston (Stanford University)
Hitoshi Shigeoka (Simon Fraser University)
 

2:15-3:30    Session IV:

Good Jobs and Bad Jobs in Japan: 1982-2007”, Ryo Kambayashi (Hitotsubashi University) and Takao Kato (Colegate University)

Discussants:
Takeo Hoshi (Stanford University)
David Vera (California State University, Fresno)

 

 

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In an analysis piece for CSIS, Shorenstein APARC Distinguished Fellow Thomas Fingar examines the geopolitical, economic and developmental considerations of Xi Jinping's call for China and the states of Central Asia to build a modern-day "Silk Road."

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The Economist quote's REAP's research on early childhood development. Read the original article here.

The Lancet reckons that 43% of under-fives in poor countries, in other words about 250m kids, will fail to meet their “developmental potential” because of avoidable deficiencies in early childhood development (ECD).

Their young brains are sensitive. In the first three or so years after birth, when up to 1,000 synapses are formed per second, they are vulnerable to trauma which triggers stress hormones. Though some stress is fine, too much is thought to hinder development. Neglect is also corrosive. Young children benefit from lots of back-and-forth dealings with adults. Research by the Rural Education Action Programme, based at Stanford University, suggests that rural children in China have “systematically low cognition”, partly as a result of being reared by grandparents who pay them little attention while parents work in cities.

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As a new U.S. administration assumes office next year, it will face numerous policy challenges in the Asia-Pacific, a region that accounts for nearly 60 percent of the world’s population and two-thirds of global output.

Despite tremendous gains over the past two decades, the Asia-Pacific region is now grappling with varied effects of globalization, chief among them, inequities of growth, migration and development and their implications for societies as some Asian economies slow alongside the United States and security challenges remain at the fore.

Seven scholars from Stanford’s Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC) offered views on policy challenges in Asia and some possible directions for U.S.-Asia relations during the next administration.

View the scholars' commentary by scrolling down the page or click on the individual links below to jump to a certain topic.

U.S.-China relations

U.S.-Japan relations

North Korea

Southeast Asia and the South China Sea

Global governance

Population aging .

Trade


U.S.-China relations

By Thomas Fingar

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Managing the United States’ relationship with China must be at the top of the new administration’s foreign policy agenda because the relationship is consequential for the region, the world and American interests. Successful management of bilateral issues and perceptions is increasingly difficult and increasingly important.

Alarmist predictions about China’s rise and America’s decline mischaracterize and overstate tensions in the relationship. There is little likelihood that the next U.S. administration will depart from the “hedged engagement” policies pursued by the last eight U.S. administrations. America’s domestic problems cannot be solved by blaming China or any other country. Indeed, they can best be addressed through policies that have contributed to peace, stability and prosperity.

Strains in U.S.-China relations require attention, not radical shifts in policy. China is not an enemy and the United States does not wish to make it one. Nor will or should the next administration resist changes to the status quo if change can better the rules-based international order that has served both countries well. Washington’s objective will be to improve the liberal international system, not to contain or constrain China’s role in that system.

The United States and China have too much at stake to allow relations to become dangerously adversarial, although that is unlikely to happen. But this is not a reason to be sanguine. In the years ahead, managing the relationship will be difficult because key pillars of the relationship are changing. For decades, the strongest source of support for stability in U.S.-China relations has been the U.S. business community, but Chinese actions have alienated this key group and it is now more likely to press for changes than for stability. A second change is occurring in China. As growth slows, Chinese citizens are pressing their government to make additional reforms and respond to perceived challenges to China’s sovereignty.

The next U.S. administration is more likely to continue and adapt current policies toward China and Asia more broadly than to pursue a significantly different approach. Those hoping for or fearing radical changes in U.S. policy will be disappointed..

Thomas Fingar is a Shorenstein Distinguished Fellow and former chairman of the U.S. National Intelligence Council. He leads a research project on China and the World that explores China’s relations with other countries.


U.S.-Japan relations

By Daniel Sneider

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U.S.-Japan relations have enjoyed a remarkable period of strengthened ties in the last few years. The passage of new Japanese security legislation has opened the door to closer defense cooperation, including beyond Japan’s borders. The Japan-Korea comfort women agreement, negotiated with American backing, has led to growing levels of tripartite cooperation between the U.S. and its two principal Northeast Asian allies. And the negotiation of a bilateral agreement within the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) talks brought trade and investment policy into close alignment. The U.S. election, however, brings some clouds to this otherwise sunny horizon.

Three consecutive terms held by the same party would certainly preserve the momentum behind the ‘pivot to Asia’ strategy of the last few years, especially on the security front. Still there are some dangers ahead. If Japan moves ahead to make a peace treaty with Russia, resolving the territorial issue and opening a flow of Japanese investment into Russia, that could be a source of tension. The new administration may also want to mend fences early with China, seeking cooperation on North Korea and avoiding tensions in Southeast Asia.

The big challenge, however, will be guiding the TPP through Congress. While there is a strong sentiment within policy circles in favor of rescuing the deal, perhaps through some kind of adjustment of the agreement, insiders believe that is highly unlikely. The Sanders-Warren wing of the Democratic party has been greatly strengthened by this election and they will be looking for any sign of retreat on TPP. Mrs. Clinton has an ambitious agenda of domestic policy initiatives – from college tuition and the minimum wage to immigration reform – on which she will need their support. One idea now circulating quietly in policy circles is to ‘save’ the TPP, especially its strategic importance, by separating off a bilateral Japan-U.S. Free Trade Agreement. Tokyo is said to be opposed to this but Washington may put pressure on for this option, leaving the door open to a full TPP down the road. .

Daniel Sneider is the associate director for research and a former foreign correspondent. He is the co-author of Divergent Memories: Opinion Leaders and the Asia-Pacific Wars (Stanford University Press, 2016) and is currently writing about U.S.-Japan security issues.


North Korea

By Kathleen Stephens

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North Korea under Kim Jong Un has accelerated its campaign to establish itself as a nuclear weapons state. Two nuclear tests and multiple missile firings have occurred in 2016. More tests, or other provocations, may well be attempted before or shortly after the new American president is inaugurated next January. The risk of conflict, whether through miscalculation or misunderstanding, is serious. The outgoing and incoming administrations must coordinate closely on policy and messaging about North Korea with each other and with Asian allies and partners.

From an American foreign policy perspective, North Korea policy challenges will be inherited by the next president as “unfinished business,” unresolved despite a range of approaches spanning previous Republican and Democratic administrations. The first months in a new U.S. president’s term may create a small window to explore potential new openings. The new president should demonstrate at the outset that North Korea is high on the new administration’s priority list, with early, substantive exchanges with allies and key partners like China to affirm U.S. commitment to defense of its allies, a denuclearized Korean Peninsula and the vision agreed to at the Six-Party Talks in the September 2005 Joint Statement of Principles. Early messaging to Pyongyang is also key – clearly communicating the consequences of further testing or provocations, but at the same time signaling the readiness of the new administration to explore new diplomatic approaches. The appointment of a senior envoy, close to the president, could underscore the administration’s seriousness as well as help manage the difficult policy and political process in Washington itself.

2017 is a presidential election year in South Korea, and looks poised to be a particularly difficult one. This will influence Pyongyang’s calculus, as will the still-unknown impact of continued international sanctions. The challenges posed by North Korea have grown greater with time, but there are few new, untried options acceptable to any new administration in Washington. Nonetheless, the new administration must explore what is possible diplomatically and take further steps to defend and deter as necessary. .

Kathleen Stephens is the William J. Perry Distinguished Fellow and former U.S. ambassador to the Republic of Korea. She is currently writing and researching on U.S. diplomacy in Korea.


Southeast Asia and the South China Sea

By Donald K. Emmerson

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The South China Sea is presently a flashpoint, prospectively a turning point, and actually the chief challenge to American policy in Southeast Asia. The risk of China-U.S. escalation makes it a flashpoint. Future historians may call it a turning point if—a big if—China’s campaign for primacy in it and over it succeeds and heralds (a) an eventual incorporation of some portion of Southeast Asia into a Chinese sphere of influence, and (b) a corresponding marginalization of American power in the region.

A new U.S. administration will be inaugurated in January 2017. Unless it wishes to adapt to such outcomes, it should:

(1) renew its predecessor’s refusal to endorse any claim to sovereignty over all, most, or some of the South China Sea and/or its land features made by any of the six contending parties—Brunei, China, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan, Vietnam—pending the validation of such a claim under international law.

(2) strongly encourage all countries, including the contenders, to endorse and implement the authoritative interpretation of the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) issued on July 12, 2016, by an UNCLOS-authorized court. Washington should also emphasize that it, too, will abide by the judgment, and will strive to ensure American ratification of UNCLOS.

(3) maintain its commitment to engage in publicly acknowledged freedom of navigation operations (FONOPs) in the South China Sea on a regular basis. Previous such FONOPs were conducted in October 2015 by the USS Lassen, in January 2016 by the USS Wilbur, in May 2016 by the USS Lawrence, and in October 2016 by the USS Decatur. The increasingly lengthy intervals between these trips, despite a defense official’s promise to conduct them twice every quarter, has encouraged doubts about precisely the commitment to freedom of navigation that they were meant to convey.

(4) announce what has hitherto been largely implicit: The FONOPs are not being done merely to brandish American naval prowess. Their purpose is to affirm a core geopolitical position, namely, that no single country, not the United States, nor China, nor anyone else, should exercise exclusive or exclusionary control over the South China Sea.

(5) brainstorm with Asian-Pacific and European counterparts a range of innovative ways of multilateralizing the South China Sea as a shared heritage of, and a resource for, its claimants and users alike. .

Donald K. Emmerson is a senior fellow emeritus and director of the Southeast Asia Program. He is currently editing a Stanford University Press book that examines China’s relations with Southeast Asia.


Global governance

By Phillip Y. Lipscy

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The basic features of the international order established by the United States after the end of World War II have proven remarkably resilient for over 70 years. The United States has played a pivotal role in East Asia, supporting the region’s rise by underpinning geopolitical stability, an open world economy and international institutions that facilitate cooperative relations. Absent U.S. involvement, it is highly unlikely that the vibrant, largely peaceful region we observe today would exist. However, the rise of Asia also poses perhaps the greatest challenge for the U.S.-supported global order since its creation.

Global economic activity is increasingly shifting toward Asia – most forecasts suggest the region will account for about half of the global economy by the midpoint of the 21st century. This shift is creating important incongruities within the global architecture of international organizations, such as the United Nations, International Monetary Fund and World Bank, which are a central element of the U.S.-based international order and remain heavily tilted toward the West in their formal structures, headquarter locations and personnel compositions. This status quo is a constant source of frustration for policymakers in the region, who seek greater voice consummate with their newfound international status. 

The next U.S. administration should prioritize reinvigoration of the global architecture.  One practical step is to move major international organizations toward multiple headquarter arrangements, which are now common in the private sector – this will mitigate the challenges of recruiting talented individuals willing to spend their careers in distant headquarters in the West. The United States should join the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, created by China, to tie the institution more closely into the existing architecture, contribute to its success and send a signal that Asian contributions to international governance are welcome. The Asian rebalance should be continued and deepened, with an emphasis on institution-building that reassures our Asian counterparts that the United States will remain a Pacific power. .

Philip Y. Lipscy is an assistant professor of political science and the Thomas Rohlen Center Fellow. He is the author of the forthcoming book Renegotiating the World Order: Institutional Change in International Relations (Cambridge University Press, 2017).


Population aging

By Karen Eggleston

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Among the most pressing policy challenges in Asia, U.S. policymakers should bear in mind the longer-term demographic challenges underlying Asia’s economic and geopolitical resurgence. East Asia and parts of Southeast Asia face the headwinds of population aging. Japan has the largest elderly population in the world and South Korea’s aging rate is even more rapid. By contrast, South Asian countries are aging more gradually and face the challenge of productively employing a growing working-age population and capturing their “demographic dividend” (from declining fertility outweighing declining mortality). Navigating these trends will require significant investment in the human capital of every child, focused on health, education and equal opportunity.

China’s recent announcement of a universal two-child policy restored an important dimension of choice, but it will not fundamentally change the trajectory of a shrinking working-age population and burgeoning share of elderly. China’s population aged 60 and older is projected to grow from nearly 15 percent today to 33 percent in 2050, at which time China’s population aged 80 and older will be larger than the current population of France. This triumph of longevity in China and other Asian countries, left unaddressed, will strain the fiscal integrity of public and private pension systems, while urbanization, technological change and income inequality interact with population aging by threatening the sustainability and perceived fairness of conventional financing for many social programs.

Investment in human capital and innovation in social and economic institutions will be central to addressing the demographic realities ahead. The next administration needs to support those investments as well as help to strengthen public health systems and primary care to control chronic disease and prepare for the next infectious disease pandemic, many of which historically have risen in Asia. .

Karen Eggleston is a senior fellow and director of the Asia Health Policy Program. She is the editor of the recently published book Policy Challenges from Demographic Change in China and India (Brookings Institution Press/Shorenstein APARC, 2016).


Trade

By Yong Suk Lee

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Portrait of Yong Suk Lee.
Trade policy with Asia will be one of the main challenges of the new administration. U.S. exports to Asia is greater than that to Europe or North America, and overall, U.S. trade with Asia is growing at a faster rate than with any other region in the world. In this regard, the new administration’s approach to the Trans-Pacific Partnership will have important consequences to the U.S. economy.

Anti-globalization sentiment has ballooned in the past two years, particularly in regions affected by the import competition from and outsourcing to Asia. However, some firms and workers have benefited from increasing trade openness. The U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement of 2012, for example, led to substantial growth in exports in the agricultural, automotive and pharmaceutical sectors. Yet, there are winners and losers from trade agreements. Using an economist’s hypothetical perspective, one would assume firms and workers in the losing industry move to the exporting sector and take advantage of the gains from trade. In reality, adjustment across industries and regions from such movements are slow. Put simply, a furniture worker in North Carolina who lost a job due to import competition cannot easily assume a new job in the booming high-tech industry in California. They would require high-income mobility and a different skill set.

Trade policy needs to focus on facilitating the transition of workers to different industries and better train students to prepare for potential mobility in the future. Trade policy will also be vital in determining how international commerce is shaped. As cross-border e-commerce increases, it will be in the interest of the United States to participate in and lead negotiations that determine future trade rules. The Trans-Pacific Partnership should not simply be abandoned. The next administration should educate both policymakers and the public about the effects of trade openness and the economic and strategic importance of trade agreements for the U.S. economy.

Yong Suk Lee is the SK Center Fellow and deputy director of Korea Program. He leads a research project focused on Korean education, entrepreneurship and economic development.

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A woman walks past a construction site in Beijing, China, Sept. 2014.
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Purpose

The purpose of this paper is to describe the trends in residential solid waste collection (RSWC) services in rural China over the past decade and analyze the determinants of these services using nationally representative data.

Design/methodology/approach

The authors draw on panel data from three rounds of village-level surveys of 101 villages. The three surveys were conducted in 2005, 2008, and 2012 in five provinces. The authors used fixed-effected regression approach to analyze the determinants of these services.

Findings

The results show that in the aftermath of increased investment and policy attention at the national level, the proportion of villages providing RSWC services in rural China increased significantly from 1998 to 2011. However, half of all villages in rural China still did not provide RSWC services as of 2011. Based on econometrics analysis, the authors show that villages that are richer, more populous, and villages with more small hamlets are more likely to provide RSWC services.

Originality/value

The analyses are based on primary survey data and the first to quantify trends in waste management services in the beginning of the twentieth century. The authors believe that the results will have significant policy implications for China in its continuing quest for better waste management policy.

 

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