President Trump hosted Chinese President Xi Jinping last week at Mar-a-Lago for their first meeting which set out to address economic, trade and security challenges shared between the two countries. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC) experts offered analysis of the summit to various media outlets.

In advance of the summit, Donald K. Emmerson, an FSI senior fellow emeritus and director of the Southeast Asia Program, wrote a commentary piece urging the two leaders to prioritize the territorial disputes in the South China Sea in their discussions. He also suggested they consider the idea of additional “cooperative missions” among China, the United States and other countries in that maritime area.

“A consensus to discuss the idea at that summit may be unreachable,” Emmerson recognized in The Diplomat Magazine. “But merely proposing it should trigger some reactions, pro or con. The airing of the idea would at least incentivize attention to the need for joint activities based on international law and discourage complacency in the face of unilateral coercion in violation of international law.”

Kathleen Stephens, the William J. Perry Fellow in Shorenstein APARC’s Korea Program, spoke to the Boston Herald about U.S. policy toward North Korea and a potential role for China in pressuring North Korea to hold talks about denuclearization. She addressed the purported reports that the National Security Council is considering as options placing nuclear weapons in South Korea and forcibly removing North Korean leader Kim Jong-un from power.

“The two options have been on the long list of possible options for a long time and they have generally been found to have far too many downsides,” Stephens said in the interview.

Writing for Tokyo Business Today, Daniel Sneider, the associate director for research at Shorenstein APARC, offered an assessment of the summit. He argued that two events - the U.S. airstrike on an airbase in Syria following the regime's chemical weapons attack and the leaked reports about tensions between White House staff - shifted the summit agenda and sidelined, at least for now, talk of a trade war between China and the United States.

“Instead of a bang, the Mar-a-Lago summit ended with a whimper,” Sneider wrote in the analysis piece (available in English and Japanese). “On the economy, the summit conversation was remarkably business-as-usual, with President Trump calling for China to ‘level the playing field’ and a vague commitment to speed up the pace of trade talks. When it came to North Korea…the two leaders reiterated long-standing goals of denuclearization but ‘there was no kind of a package arrangement discussed to resolve this.”

The Association for Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), a coalition of 10 Southeast Asian countries formed to promote regional development and security, will mark its 50th anniversary this year. While ASEAN’s longevity is a cause for celebration, it also calls for creative introspection regarding what it can and should do, according to Southeast Asia Program Director Donald K. Emmerson.

“There is a lot that ASEAN cannot do in its present form, under its present leaders, and in presently China-challenged conditions. Yet no one could objectively scan ASEAN’s first fifty years and conclude that the organization has remained the same – once a cow, always a cow.

“Whatever ASEAN does become, its alternative futures should be considered now, carefully and creatively, while there is still time to prefer one scenario over the others and to follow up with steps that make it more likely,” he writes in a paper featured in the February edition of TRaNS: Trans-Regional and -National Studies of Southeast Asia.

ASEAN, he says, needs to reexamine its goals and consider new means to achieve them, to brainstorm better ways of protecting its region from external control, and to reevaluate the nature and efficacy of the “ASEAN Way,” including its self-paralyzing commitment to unanimity as a precondition for collective action.

That commitment has already been breached for economic policy arrangements that allow a “two-speed ASEAN” to exist, where for less developed members, deadlines for economic reform are postponed, while for all other members, the deadlines remain unchanged. So, why not adapt that idea to regional security initiatives as well?

According to Emmerson, the Southeast Asia region is being threatened by China’s efforts to control land features in the South China Sea for the purposes of projecting coercive power. China uses the ASEAN Way’s requirement of consensus by promising economic support to specific ASEAN members in hopes of coopting them into vetoing any move by ASEAN to counter China’s campaign in the South China Sea.

Abetting China’s expansion, he says, are the rival claims to maritime sovereignty by some of ASEAN’s own members. Their failure to settle their own disagreements precludes the bargaining power that a unified ASEAN might bring to the table in talks with China.

Emmerson, who addressed these matters at Stanford in March, argues that a more innovative ASEAN will lead to a more secure region.

Regarding the South China Sea, for example, ASEAN could encourage an effort by its four claimant members to settle their own differences first by drafting an ASEAN agreement, signing it and presenting it to China to sign as well. Even if China refuses, at least ASEAN would have established a common position among the ASEAN countries most directly concerned.

In the paper, he discusses several ways of restructuring ASEAN. They include:

• ASEAN minus X: A subset of ASEAN members would move ahead on economic or security arrangements with the understanding that the remaining subset would join later.
• ASEAN Pacific Alliance: ASEAN would work with Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru to create a coalition that would strengthen ASEAN’s trans-Pacific ties.
• East Asia Summit (EAS): ASEAN would try to elevate this annual gathering of leaders, including China and the United States, into a capstone venue for cooperation on regional security.

Emmerson also urges outside observers to generate innovative policy proposals related to ASEAN and present them for discussion informally or in Track II dialogue formats.

“It’s time for ASEAN watchers to generate ideas for the grouping to consider, including initiatives that could be pursued by one, two or more member countries,” he said in a later interview. “The creative involvement of scholars, journalists, businesspeople and other analysts inside member states could socialize such proposals in local policy circles to make them better known and more feasible.”

In line with this vision, Emmerson is co-organizing a trilateral workshop on ASEAN reform, regional security, infrastructure building and economic regionalism. Hosted by the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC) and planned for this fall, it will evaluate proposals on these topics generated or compiled by Shorenstein APARC’s Southeast Asia Program and U.S.-Asia Security Initiative; the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore; and the Strategic and Defense Studies Centre in Canberra. Details about the conference will be posted in the coming months.

U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson announced in Seoul “the policy of strategic patience has ended” and “all options were on the table” regarding the United States’ efforts to address the North Korean nuclear threat. Kathleen Stephens, the William J. Perry Fellow in Shorenstein APARC’s Korea Program, spoke on PBS NewsHour about Tillerson’s remarks, the viability of tougher sanctions against North Korea, and deployment of the U.S. ballistic missile defense system (THAAD) to South Korea.

Watch and read about the interview here.

The Japan Program at the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC), in collaboration with the United States-Japan Foundation and Japan Society for the Promotion of Science, has published a report with findings from the inaugural conference, Womenomics, the Workplace, and Women, held in November 2016.

The two-day conference, which gathered 20 speakers and a substantial audience at Stanford, initiated dialogue about women’s leadership and work-life balance in Japan and the United States and encouraged the formation of a cross-sector network of experts seeking to build pathways to advance opportunity for women in both countries.

“The conference provided a unique opportunity for a diverse group of individuals to come together and explore how to tackle challenges that women continue to face on both sides of the Pacific,” said Mariko Yoshihara Yang, a visiting scholar and Japan Program Fellow at Shorenstein APARC, who organized the conference. “I believe the knowledge, perspectives and networks shared will go far beyond the two days we convened at Stanford, and make a valuable contribution to the movement to achieve gender equality and revitalize the Japanese economy.”

The conference report includes a set of actions that Japanese and American policy researchers and practitioners can pursue to promote women's leadership. A statement with the actions is arranged by organization type and published directly below.

Download the statement and full report.

Ten Actions Japan can take to Promote Women’s Leadership

Authors: Shelley Correll, Diane Flynn, Ari Horie, Atsuko Horie, Takeo Hoshi, Rie Kijima, Chiyo Kobayashi, Sachiko Kuno, Mitsue Kurihara, Kenji Kushida, Yoky Matsuoka, Emily Murase, Nobuko Nagase, Akiko Naka, Mana Nakagawa, Yuko Osaki, Machiko Osawa, Myra Strober, Kenta Takamori, Kazuo Tase, Mariko Yoshihara Yang

Government

The Japanese government should establish concrete measures to achieve targets stipulated in the Fourth Basic Plan for Gender Equality, which was approved by the Japanese Cabinet on December 25, 2015, and went into effect in April 2016. The following reforms will help promote this process and distribute benefits to all workers equally. A special emphasis was placed on ensuring versatility across many sectors.

1. Abolish the income tax deduction and social security premium exemption for dependent spouses and increase family care allowance. The spousal exemptions that allow income tax breaks and social security premiums discourage many married women from seeking full-time employment. The Japanese government has recently proposed to scale back the spousal tax break by raising the annual threshold from ¥1.03 to ¥1.5 million or less starting in 2018. However, this incremental measure will act only as a short-term solution. Japan needs a conclusive solution to best utilize women as the workforce. By completely eliminating the spousal exemption and providing family care allowance, more women will be incentivized to take on full-time and leadership positions in the workplace. Families with young children and aging parents will be compensated with family care allowance.

2. Expand the scope of corporate disclosure on gender equality and establish a “Women’s Empowerment Index.” The public database on gender equality, launched by the Cabinet Office in 2014 and administered by the Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare since 2016, remains limited in its scope and scale. The government should add more substantial measures in the rubric such as hours of overtime work and “re-entry/on-ramping” rate of women, and mandate the reporting requirement. Based on the expanded database, the government should calculate a Women’s Empowerment Index and issue certifications to people with high ratings. The index would be embedded in the parameters for stakeholder decision-making and provide financial incentives for corporations to sustain a more diverse work environment.

Large Corporations

To increase women’s participation in the workplace, companies need to eliminate gender-based stereotypes in hiring and promotion practices, encourage more women to pursue full-time positions, and support women who seek to re-enter the labor force after temporary leave. Large corporations in Japan can take the following actions to lead these changes:

3. Scrutinize the yardsticks used for recruitment and promotion, and eliminate evaluation criteria that systematically sorts out certain candidates. Companies need to provide training to mid-career managers and top leaders to address unconscious biases in the workplace. It is critical to ensure a level-playing field for women and men.

4. Introduce a legal ceiling and penalties for overtime work and lift compulsory job transfers that disrupt family life. This will help change the prevailing work culture of devotion and self-sacrifice. Companies should consider decentralizing personnel administration so local offices will more closely monitor individual needs and preferences of employees’ and reflect them into their career trajectories. Such reforms will encourage more women to apply for full-time employment and leadership opportunities while reducing premature resignations of women with families.

5. Create a mandate for departments to establish and provide clear job descriptions for each position to ensure consistency across departments. This would allow employees to better articulate their skill sets when seeking new job opportunities within organizations or when they re-enter the labor market after taking breaks in their careers. In the long term, this will help Japan develop a more robust external labor market that promotes mobility between organizations and across sectors, not just within companies.

6. Create clear evaluation criteria for women with specialized careers and raise their visibility within and outside the organization. Visibility of an employee’s technical skills is known to influence her or his prospect for advancement. When women propose ideas based on their specialization, they should employ “amplification” techniques, where they repeat each other’s ideas to increase their credibility during meetings and brainstorming sessions. Corporate leaders should also make a point of acknowledging their expertise and vouch for their competence. Large corporations should facilitate their promotion to manager and board member positions.

Start-ups

Although women are still underrepresented in entrepreneurial leadership positions, the gender gap is less severe in the startup sector than in large corporations. Thus, promotion of entrepreneurship in general will increase the chances for women’s empowerment and leadership.

7. Create platforms to catalyze startups led by women and raise the visibility of successful female entrepreneurs. There should be a platform where novice and experienced entrepreneurs can interact. Routine exchange among successful female founders and aspiring entrepreneurs will help build a community that catalyzes women-led startups as they try to turn ideas into full-time businesses. Similarly, there should be a platform where female leaders in small startups and large corporations meet regularly to provide mutual mentorship. Corporate executives could learn the latest business trends while female entrepreneurs expand their professional networks.

8. Expand policies to encourage a culture of entrepreneurship with specific incentives for female entrepreneurs. The government should consider increasing the public funding for startups led by women and provide robust legal support for female entrepreneurs. Increased assistance to incubators and accelerators, specializing in supporting female founders, would also contribute to women’s empowerment.

Educational Institutions

Educational institutions play a key role in creating knowledge to ensure gender equality, promoting awareness and nurturing a bias-free mindset among young people. Furthermore, women’s advancement in education generally yields greater participation in the economy and society. Recent advancements have created a reversal among the OECD countries. More than half of all students graduating from secondary and higher education are female; however, Japan is still behind. The following two initiatives will help close the gap:

9. Strengthen gender equality promotion office at educational institutions. This includes hiring a dedicated diversity officer, who will help universities conduct gender analyses of leadership posts and monitor women in academic leadership positions. Furthermore, universities should introduce family friendly policies to support young faculty members. When faculty members take parental leave, universities should provide funding for temporary staff to lay the groundwork for their return. In addition, academic conferences held at universities should provide childcare services for out-of-town participants.

10. Create continuing education centers to offer certificate programs to provide skills and training for women and men looking to re-enter the workforce. The programs could provide specialized knowledge as well as skill development including self-assessment, counseling, resume-building, practice interviewing, and unconscious bias training. This will allow workers access to education and support throughout their onboarding process and transition into the workplace. These centers should also provide career services to match qualified workers with potential employers.

When a state is “shamed” by outsiders for perceived injustices, it often proves counterproductive, resulting in worse behavior and civil rights violations, a Stanford researcher has found.

Rochelle Terman, a political scientist and postdoctoral fellow at Stanford’s Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC), recently spoke about how countries criticized by outsiders on issues like human rights typically respond -- and it's contrary to conventional wisdom. Terman has published findings, “The Relational Politics of Shame: Evidence from the Universal Periodic Review,” on this topic in the Review of International Organizations. She discussed her research in the interview below:

What does your research show about state "shaming"?

Shaming is a ubiquitous strategy to promote international human rights. A key contention in the literature on international norms is that transnational advocacy networks can pressure states into adopting international norms by shaming them – condemning violations and urging reform. The idea is that shaming undermines a state’s legitimacy, which then incentivizes elites into complying with international norms.

In contrast, my work shows that shaming can be counterproductive, encouraging leaders in the target state to persist or “double down” on violations. That is because shaming is seen as illegitimate foreign intervention that threatens a state’s sovereignty and independence.  When viewed in this light, leaders are rewarded for standing up to such pressure and defending the nation against perceived domination. Meanwhile, leaders who “give in” have their political legitimacy undermined at home. The result is that violations tend to persist or even exacerbate.

When and where does it work better to directly confront a country’s leadership about such injustices?

At least two factors moderate the effects of international shaming. The first is the degree to which the norm being promoted is shared between the “shamer” and the target. For instance, the West may shame Uganda or Nigeria for violating LGBT rights. But if Uganda and Nigeria do not accept the “LGBT rights” norm, and refuse to accept that homophobia constitutes bad behavior, then shaming will fail. In this case, it is more likely that shaming will be viewed as illegitimate meddling by foreign powers, and will be met with indignation and defiance.

Second, shaming is quintessentially a relational process. Insofar as it is successful, shaming persuades actors to voluntary change their behavior in order to maintain valued social relationships. In the absence of such relationship, shaming will fail. This is especially so when pressure emanates from a current or historical geopolitical adversary. In this later scenario, not only will shaming fail to work, it will likely provoke defensive hostility and defiance, having a counterproductive effect.

Combing these insights, we can say that shaming is most likely to work under two conditions: when the target is a strong ally, and the norm is shared.

What are some well-known cases where "shaming" backfired?

The main example I use in my forthcoming paper is on the infamous “anti-homosexuality bill” in Uganda. When Uganda introduced the legislation in 2009 (which in some versions applied capital punishment to offenders) it provoked harsh condemnation among its foreign allies, especially in the West. Western donor countries even suspended aid in attempt to push Yoweri Musaveni’s government to abandon the bill. According to conventional accounts, the onslaught of foreign shaming, coupled with the threat of aid cuts and other material sanctions, should have worked best in the Uganda case.

And yet what we saw was the opposite. The wave of international attention provoked an outraged and defiant reaction among the Ugandan population, turning the bill into a symbol of national sovereignty and self-determination in the face of abusive Western bullying. This reaction energized Ugandan elites to champion the bill in order to reap the political rewards at home. Indeed, the bill was the first to pass unanimously in the Ugandan legislature since the end of military rule in 1999. Museveni – who by all accounts preferred a more moderate solution to the crisis – was backed into a corner.

A Foreign Policy story quoted Ugandan journalist Andrew Mwenda as saying, “the mere fact that Obama threatened Museveni publicly is the very reason he chose to go ahead and sign the bill.” And Museveni did so in a particularly defiant fashion, “with the full witness of the international media to demonstrate Uganda’s independence in the face of Western pressure and provocation.”

Uganda anti-homosexuality law was finally quashed by its constitutional court, which ruled the act invalid because it was not passed with the required quorum. By dismissing the law on procedural grounds, Museveni – widely thought to have control over the court – was able to kill the legislation “without appearing to cave in to foreign pressure.” But by that time, defiance had already transformed Uganda’s normative order, entrenching homophobia into its national identity.

Does this 'doubling down' effect vary in domestic or international contexts?

Probably. States with a significant populist contingent, for instance, are especially hostile to international pressure, especially when it emanates from a historical adversary, like a former colonial power. Ironically, democracies may also be more susceptible to defiance, because elites are more beholden to their constituents, and thus are less able to “give in” to foreign pressure without undermining their own political power. 

The international context matters a great deal as well. States are more likely to resist certain norms if they have allies who feel the same way. For instance, we see significant polarization around LGBT rights at the international level, with most states in Africa and the Muslim world voting against resolutions that push LGBT rights forward. South Africa – originally a pioneer for LGBT rights – has changed its position following criticism from its regional neighbors. 

Does elite reaction drive this response to state "shaming?"

To be quite honest, this is a question I’m still exploring and I don’t have a very clear answer. My hunch at the moment is no. The “defiant” reaction occurs mainly at the level of public audiences, which then incentives elites to violate norms for political gain.  These audiences can be at either the domestic or international level. For instance, if domestic constituents are indignant by foreign shaming, elites are incentivized to “double down,” or at least remain silent, lest they undermine their own political legitimacy.

That said, elites can also strategize and manipulate these expected public reactions for their own political purposes. For instance, if Vladimir Putin knows that the Russian public will grow indignant following Western shaming, he might strategically promote a law that he knows will provoke such a reaction in order to benefit from the ensuing conflict. This is what likely occurred with Russia’s “anti-gay propaganda” law, which (unsurprisingly) provoked harsh condemnation from the West and probably bolstered Putin’s domestic popularity.

Any other important points to highlight?

One important point I’d like to highlight is the long-term effects of defiance. In an effort to resist international pressure, states take action that, in the long term, work to internalize oppositional norms in their national identity. In this way, shaming actually produces deviance, not the other way around.

Follow CISAC at @StanfordCISAC and  www.facebook.com/StanfordCISAC

MEDIA CONTACTS:

Rochelle Terman, Center for International Security and Cooperation: (650) 721-1378, rterman@stanford.edu,

Clifton B. Parker, Center for International Security and Cooperation: (650) 725-6488, cbparker@stanford.edu