If the U.S. abandoned the Iran nuclear deal, it would harm America’s credibility on nonproliferation issues and make it more difficult to solve the North Korean crisis, Stanford scholars say.

The Trump administration is soon expected to “decertify” or send the Iran nuclear agreement to Congress for reconsideration. Signed in 2015, the nuclear deal framework is between Iran and what is known as the “P5+1” group of world powers: the United States, United Kingdom, France, China, Russia and Germany.

Advocates of the deal say it helped avert a possible war with Iran and a Middle Eastern nuclear arms race. Critics say it will only delay Iran’s march toward a nuclear bomb. The agreement aims to limit Iran’s ability to create nuclear weapons; in return, Iran received relief from economic penalties and sanctions.

The Stanford News Service spoke with two experts about the deal.

• Siegfried Hecker is a top nuclear security expert, former Los Alamos National Laboratory director and senior fellow at the Center for International Security and Cooperation.
• Abbas Milani is the Hamid and Christina Moghadam Director of Iranian Studiesand affiliate at FSI’s Center on Democracy Development and the Rule of Law.

If the U.S. cancels the Iran nuclear deal, could Iran follow a similar path that North Korea has taken? 

Hecker: An important lesson the Trump administration should learn is from what happened in October 2002 when the Bush administration couldn’t wait to walk away from the Clinton administration’s “Agreed Framework” deal with Pyongyang. That led to North Korea withdrawing from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, expelling the international inspectors and building a nuclear bomb. Walking away from the Iran deal now could similarly open the doors for Tehran to build a nuclear bomb.

How might this change our relationships with other countries and nuclear powers?

Hecker: The other parties that signed the Iran deal are all strongly in favor of keeping the deal, so it will leave the U.S. even more isolated than it has already become. It is not clear what the effect would be in Israel where Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu opposes the deal, but where many voices favor it.

Are the inspection standards in this deal rigorous? 

Hecker: The deal has more stringent inspection regimes and rights than previous nuclear agreements. Some in the U.S. call for even more intrusive inspections, such as to defense sites, that essentially no country is willing to have inspected. I think the agreement was able to get more than I ever thought possible.

How is the deal perceived in Iran?

Milani: I think the critical point to know is that there is not one voice or view that reflects the hopes and aspirations of Iran. The radical conservatives among the clergy and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps were critical of the deal. They condemned it as the most “shameful” agreement in modern Iranian history. They lambasted Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif and President Hassan Rouhani for having made far too many concessions. Ali Khamenei, the Supreme Leader, tried to keep a safe distance from the deal – lest he antagonize his badly needed and shrinking radical conservative base – and yet, at every major turn, endorsed it.

For the regime, faced with calamitous economic challenges, having the deal and ending the sanctions was an existential must. For the same reason, the vast majority of Iranians, facing the drudgeries of a dying economy, favored the deal. They also hoped that the deal would usher in new relations with the world and the U.S. – a possible harbinger for a more free Iran.

How would Iran likely react to a strict enforcement approach often urged by the Trump administration?

Milani: It is not clear what the Trump administration means by a more “strict enforcement.” The agreement has placed fairly rigorous limits on Iran’s nuclear activity given the unique abilities of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to monitor the program. Might Iran cheat? It might, but no “strict” enforcement can eliminate such a possibility.

There are, moreover, areas that have by all accounts been consciously left ambiguous in the deal. Is, for example, Iran required to curtail its missile program or contain its regional activities? Iran is adamant that these provisions were never part of the deal. Finally, the Trump administration’s notion that Iran is not abiding by the “spirit” of the deal is hard to enforce. One side’s perceived spirit might be deemed by the other side as nothing but wishful thinking.

Are there ways the deal could be strengthened and Iran’s regional ambitions checked?

Milani: There surely are ways to strengthen any deal.  The first step is, by clear indication, that all sides will abide by it. The U.S. is now the only country in the agreement that has indicated its desire to abrogate the deal. You can’t strengthen a deal you no longer are a part of.

It will be a bonanza for the radical conservatives if the U.S. unilaterally walks away from the deal. Khamenei’s mantra that the U.S. can never be trusted will be confirmed, Iran will harvest the economic benefits of the end of sanctions and radical conservatives will be able to blame their own failed management on U.S. sanctions.

MEDIA CONTACTS

Siegfried Hecker, Center for International Security and Cooperation: (650) 725-6468, shecker@stanford.edu

Abbas Milani, Iranian Studies: (650) 721-4052, amilani@stanford.edu

Clifton B. Parker, Center for International Security and Cooperation: (650) 725-6488, cbparker@stanford.edu

Read this story on the Stanford News Service web site.

Harold Trinkunas, CISAC's deputy director, and Richard Feinberg, a UC San Diego professor, co-authored the following op-ed in The Hill:

In an escalation of hostilities toward Cuba that is rapidly dismantling the Obama era détente, the Trump administration on Tuesday expelled 15 Cuban diplomats. The administration has also sharply drawn down the staff of the U.S. Embassy in Havana. The administration argues that the Cuban government has failed to provide safety to U.S. diplomats, 22 of whom fell victim in a mysterious rash of illnesses, even as the precise causes and perpetrators have yet to be identified. The U.S. government does not accuse the Cuban government for the unexplained illnesses.

A State Department travel advisory preceded the diplomatic expulsions, warning Americans against going to Cuba, although not one visitor has been affected by these illnesses. This extraordinary measure will undermine the island’s fastest growing source of foreign exchange earnings. Many of our professional diplomats, both those stationed in Havana and those at the State Department, oppose the dramatic downsizing of the U.S. and Cuban missions. While all are concerned for the safety of U.S. personnel, the health incidents seem to be in sharp decline. The U.S. diplomats in Havana are proud of the gains in advancing U.S. interests in Cuba, and they wish to continue to protect and promote them.

These punitive measures are about much more than protecting U.S. citizens. Rather, this White House and its pro-embargo allies in Congress have opportunistically seized on these mysterious illnesses affecting U.S. diplomats to overturn the pro-normalization policies of a previous administration, using bureaucratic obstruction and reckless language when they cannot make the case for policy change on the merits alone.

By taking these precipitous actions, this White House is doing exactly what our adversaries in the region seek to provoke. Overt U.S. hostility empowers anti-American hardliners in the Cuban regime opposed to stronger bilateral relations between the two countries. In addition, American travel to Cuba benefits the privately-operated segments of the Cuban tourism sector, and strengthens the emerging Cuban middle class. The travel advisory will harm these progressive segments of Cuban society.

Furthermore, a breakdown in U.S.-Cuban relations allows Russia, China, Iran and Venezuela to deepen their influence in Cuba and the broader Caribbean Basin. By pushing Cuba away, the U.S. is pushing it towards other actors whose interests are not aligned with our own. The Trump administration’s ill-considered actions towards Cuba are part of a broader pattern of disrespect for U.S. diplomacy from this White House, apparently without careful consideration of the geopolitical consequences. From attacking the deal to restrain Iran’s nuclear ambitions to provoking a nuclear North Korea to attacking the NAFTA trade accord with America’s two largest trade partners, Mexico and Canada, the Trump White House has steadily diminished U.S. influence and credibility abroad.

Our partners in Latin America welcomed the change in U.S. policy towards Cuba in 2014 as a sign that the Cold War had finally ended in the Western Hemisphere. The administration’s retreat from the opening towards Cuba alarms our friends in the Americas and calls into question the enduring value of U.S. commitments, much as belligerent statements toward Iran and North Korea harm our credibility with our allies in Europe and Asia. This pattern of reckless animus towards diplomacy comes at a cost to the international reputation of the U.S. with no apparent gain for our interests abroad.

There might have been an opportunity for creative diplomacy in this latest crisis. The Cuban government has been unusually collaborative with the U.S. in investigating these incidents involving U.S. diplomats. Cuba has allowed the FBI to operate independently in Cuba for the first time in more than 50 years, a signal of the importance that President Raul Castro assigns to improved relations with the U.S. But this White House seems bound and determined to continue down the path of obstruction, despite the costs. U.S. hostility risks damaging the coming transition to a new Cuban government after President Raul Castro steps down in early 2018 by strengthening the hand of anti-American hardliners who oppose further economic opening on the island.

It damages Cuban-Americans and their families by impeding travel and the flow of funding associated with their visits, and those of other American visitors, which have allowed the Cuban private sector to gain traction. It also damages U.S. relations with our partners in the region, who have long criticized what they see as senseless hostility between the U.S. and Cuba. And finally, the Trump administration’s approach serves to widen the door to U.S. geopolitical adversaries, such as Russia and Venezuela, to advance their interests in Cuba and in the region.

Harold Trinkunas is deputy director of the Center for International Security and Cooperation and a nonresident senior fellow at the Brookings Institution.

Richard Feinberg is a professor at the School of Global Policy and Strategy at the University of California San Diego and a nonresident senior fellow at the Brookings Institution. He is author of “Open for Business: Building the New Cuban Economy.”

On June 2, 2017, the 2017 U.S.-Japan Forum was held at Bechtel Conference Center at Stanford University.  The forum discussed three main topics: growth strategy; populism, globalization, and social equality; and technology innovation.

A summary report, full list of panelists, topics addressed and conference agenda can be viewed here.

Stanford University’s Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law (CDDRL) is proud to announce our three incoming fellows who will be joining us in the 2017-2018 academic year to develop their research, engage with faculty and tap into our diverse scholarly community. 

The pre- and postdoctoral program will provide fellows the time to focus on research and data analysis as they work to finalize and publish their dissertation research, while connecting with resident faculty and research staff at CDDRL. 

Fellows will present their research during our weekly research seminar series and an array of scholarly events and conferences.

Topics of the incoming cohort include policing and sectarian conflict in Iraq and Israel, global health and safety regulations and taxation in Southeast Asia.

Learn more in the Q&A below.

Hometown: Dunwoody, GA

Academic Institution: University of California San Diego

Discipline & Graduation Date:  Political Science, June 2017

Research Interests: Middle East Politics, sectarian conflict, policing and domestic security, comparative institutions

Dissertation Title: From the Bottom-Up: Policing and Sectarian Conflict in Divided Societies

What attracted you to the CDDRL Postdoctoral Fellowship program? I was drawn to the post-doctoral program at CDDRL by the broad range of experts at FSI and across the entire Stanford community. My research interests touch on a wide range of substantive and methodological issues, and I'm very excited to work with experts on a similarly broad range of areas. I was also attracted to CDDRL's focus on bridging the gap between academic scholarship and real-world policy applications.

What do you hope to accomplish during your nine-month residency at the CDDRL? My primary goal is to make progress in converting my dissertation, which is about policing and sectarian conflict in Iraq and Israel, into a publishable academic book. To this end, I intend to spend time honing my theoretical argument about the incentives and constraints generated by sectarian inclusiveness in the police and testing this argument using new and existing data. I also intend to continue progress on ongoing research on policing under low state legitimacy in the Philippines, and to lay the groundwork for follow-up research on the Iraqi police. 

Fun fact: During college, I rode a bicycle from Providence, RI to Seattle, WA

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Rebecca Louise Perlman

Hometown: Newton, MA

Academic Institution: Stanford University 

Discipline & Expected Graduation Date:  Political Science, 2018

Research interests: Regulation, Trade, International institutions

Dissertation Title: For Safety or Profit? The Determinants of Global Health and Safety Regulations

What attracted you to the CDDRL Pre-doctoral Fellowship program? CDDRL brings together an amazing group of scholars, with a diverse set of research interests. I was eager for the opportunity to work with and learn from these individuals, through workshops and day-to-day interactions. 

What do you hope to accomplish during your nine-month residency at the CDDRL? I'm looking forward to completing my dissertation and hopefully embarking on some collaborative projects with other CDDRL fellows and/or faculty.

Fun fact: I have a cat named Khaleesi.

The Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC) at Stanford is now accepting applications for the Shorenstein Postdoctoral Fellowship in Contemporary Asia, an opportunity made available to two junior scholars for research and writing on Asia.

Fellows conduct research on contemporary political, economic or social change in the Asia-Pacific region, and contribute to Shorenstein APARC’s publications, conferences and related activities. To read about this year’s fellows, please click here.

The fellowship is a 10-mo. appointment during the 2018-19 academic year, and carries a salary rate of $52,000 plus $2,000 for research expenses.

For further information and to apply, please click here. The application deadline is Dec. 20, 2017.