International Development

FSI researchers consider international development from a variety of angles. They analyze ideas such as how public action and good governance are cornerstones of economic prosperity in Mexico and how investments in high school education will improve China’s economy.

They are looking at novel technological interventions to improve rural livelihoods, like the development implications of solar power-generated crop growing in Northern Benin.

FSI academics also assess which political processes yield better access to public services, particularly in developing countries. With a focus on health care, researchers have studied the political incentives to embrace UNICEF’s child survival efforts and how a well-run anti-alcohol policy in Russia affected mortality rates.

FSI’s work on international development also includes training the next generation of leaders through pre- and post-doctoral fellowships as well as the Draper Hills Summer Fellows Program.

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Applications are open for the China Scholars Program, an intensive, college-level online course on contemporary China for U.S. high school students. The China Scholars Program is offered by the Stanford Program on International and Cross-Cultural Education (SPICE), Stanford University, and is open to rising 10th, 11th, and 12th graders. The Fall 2020 online course will run from late August through December. Applications are due June 15, 2020.


Stanford University China Scholars Program for high school students
Fall 2020 session (late August through December)
Application period: April 25 to June 15, 2020
 

Accepted applicants will engage in a rigorous academic exploration of key issues in China, spanning politics, economics, social issues, culture, and the arts, with an emphasis on the relationship between the United States and China. In real-time conversations with leading scholars, experts, and diplomats from Stanford University and other institutions, participants will be exposed to the cutting edge of U.S.–China relations and scholarship. Students who complete the online course will be equipped with a rare degree of expertise about China and international relations that may have a significant impact on their choice of study and future career.

As in previous sessions of the China Scholars Program, the Fall 2020 cohort will comprise high school students from across the United States. Participants in the current cohort represent states across the nation, including California, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Michigan, Missouri, Nebraska, New Jersey, New York, and Washington.

The immense diversity of student backgrounds and experiences within each online course allows for an especially rich exchange of ideas and perspectives among the young scholars—a crucial and invaluable component of the learning experience.

“Learning from Stanford’s knowledgeable East Asian studies experts remains one of my most formative educational experiences,” noted Rebecca Qiu, an alum of the program now at Tufts University. She continued, “Synchronous live lectures and lively discussion boards allowed me to learn from our professors and students alike, facilitating tremendous academic growth.”

More information on the China Scholars Program is available at http://chinascholars.org. Interested high school students can apply now at https://spicestanford.smapply.io/prog/china_scholars_program/. The deadline to apply is June 15, 2020.

To be notified when the next China Scholars Program application period opens, join our email list or follow us on Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram.


The China Scholars Program is one of several online courses for high school students offered by SPICE, Stanford University, including the Reischauer Scholars Program (on Japan), the Sejong Korea Scholars Program, the Stanford e-Japan Program (on U.S. society, offered to high school students in Japan), and the Stanford e-China Program (on technologies changing the world to high school students in China).


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Japan's startup ecosystem has matured dramatically over the past decade, with greater societal legitimacy, business success, and government support than most observers would have expected 20 years ago. Despite the challenging times ahead with the global pandemic, Japan's startup ecosystem is still poised to inject flexibility and innovation in a system often criticized as too rigid. This panel brings together scholars who have studied and participated in the ecosystem, and one of the key government officials pushing policy supporting the startup ecosystem. 

PANELISTS

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Masahiro Kotosaka, Associate Professor, Keio University
 
Masahiro Kotosaka is an Associate Professor at Keio University and advisor to several global start-up companies. Before moving to Keio, he was a faculty at Ritsumeikan, a junior faculty at University of Oxford, and was a consultant at McKinsey & Company (Frankfurt/Tokyo). As a practitioner, he worked for sixteen client organizations across nine industries and nine countries, and spent four years running three profitable IT/Retail businesses before joining McKinsey. He graduated from University of Oxford with D.Phil. (PhD) in Management Studies and MSc in Management Research with Distinction.

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Yoshiaki Ishii, Director of Science, Technology and Innovation, Cabinet Office, Government of Japan

Since getting his start at the government's Small and Middle Enterprise Agency, Dr. Yoshiaki Ishii has shaped his career almost exclusively around supporting young companies and enhancing innovation. Now, he is the director of the Cabinet Office and responsible for determining how to execute the government's mission of supporting deep tech start-ups and creating an innovation ecosystem. Previously, he served as director of the New Business Policy Office, Economic and Industrial Policy Bureau, METI. He has demonstrated expertise in Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (SME), and Venture Business Policy, Industrial Organisation, and Innovation Policy. Dr. Ishii earned his PhD from Waseda University, in 2012, after completing an MBA at Aoyama Gakuin, in 2000.

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Kenji Kushida, Research Scholar, Shorenstein APARC Japan Program (Moderator)
 
Kenji E. Kushida is a Japan Program Research Scholar at the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center and an affiliated researcher at the Berkeley Roundtable on the International Economy. Kushida’s research interests are in the fields of comparative politics, political economy, and information technology. He has four streams of academic research and publication: political economy issues surrounding information technology such as Cloud Computing; institutional and governance structures of Japan’s Fukushima nuclear disaster; political strategies of foreign multinational corporations in Japan; and Japan’s political economic transformation since the 1990s. Kushida has written two general audience books in Japanese, entitled Biculturalism and the Japanese: Beyond English Linguistic Capabilities (Chuko Shinsho, 2006) and International Schools, an Introduction (Fusosha, 2008). Kushida holds a PhD in political science from the University of California, Berkeley. He received his MA in East Asian studies and BAs in economics and East Asian studies, all from Stanford University.

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Masahiro Kotosaka, Keio University
Kenji Kushida, Stanford University
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The following is Part 2 of a two-article series on facilitating cross-cultural online learning. For Part 1, please go here.


Last month, I shared my reflections on a March 20, 2020 virtual class (VC) session that SPICE facilitated for high school students in Japan and the United States to engage in a cross-cultural online exchange. This online discussion engaged my U.S.-based students of the 2020 Reischauer Scholars Program and Waka Brown’s Japan-based students of the Spring 2020 Stanford e-Japan Program in a Zoom session, during which they talked and learned with and from one another on a range of topics, including the impact of COVID-19 within their respective communities.

During the main portion of the session, the 45 students were divided into six small breakout rooms to engage in 40 minutes of discussion. Each group had a designated volunteer student moderator and a notetaker/reporter; the latter was asked to share the key points of discussion from his or her small group when we reconvened towards the end of the 90-minute VC. All discussions were conducted in English, with the exception of one group, which was designated as a bilingual space for students who felt comfortable conversing in both English and Japanese.

Since this was the 2020 students’ first opportunity to meet (another joint VC on comparative education took place on April 10), we felt it important to preface the session by setting a few ground rules for discussion. Communication styles and norms—particularly in group settings—tend to be quite different in Japan and the United States. We have found it helpful, for example, to address these differences up-front to alleviate potential cross-cultural misunderstandings.

For assessment purposes, we also asked students to send feedback on their experiences in the session. Some of their comments are included below as we turn to the student perspectives on what they experienced in this joint online discussion. More specific points from our observations and students’ feedback fall into five areas.

First, the session provided a platform for students to talk openly about the COVID-19 pandemic and also to learn about perspectives from another country. Risako of Stanford e-Japan reflected, “I could … learn about the way American students perceive political issues and coronavirus through an absorbing discussion and was surprised to discover that their perspectives were much more similar to Japanese students than I had expected.” Alika of the RSP noted, “It was really interesting to me to see how different countries are coping with the virus. I was pretty surprised to hear that many Japanese people still use public transport/eat out at restaurants and go on with their daily lives in the face of the global pandemic.” She continued, “I think some of the e-Japan students were also surprised to hear that California has a ‘6 feet apart’ rule and that many restaurants have closed as a precaution.” Yasuyuki from Japan added, “It’s not difficult to look up the news to find out about what’s going on in America, but living in Japan, you hardly ever get the chance to talk with people in America and hear from the horse’s mouth.”

Second, the session underscored the importance of empathy at times like this. Kristie from the RSP commented, “I always enjoy finding commonalities between me and others, and I think our shared experiences with the coronavirus really allowed us to connect and understand one another. I think the most important thing I will take away from this experience is that youth in Japan and America are really no different—despite our varied experiences and interests we were able to communicate about issues facing our countries and relate to one another on a deeper level.” Similarly, Yuna of Stanford e-Japan noted, “Since I have had only [a] few opportunities to interact with American high schoolers, it was a precious time for me. It was wonderful especially because we both were interested in each other. Talking ... with them made me realize how [thin] the border between our minds actually are. We were, after all, just friends.”

Third, the session prompted students to reexamine their own culture. For example, Hiromu of Stanford e-Japan noted, “I feel very pleased to have such a wonderful opportunity to teach them [the RSP students about Japanese language] and, simultaneously, however, recognized how I lack information about Japanese culture. I think this integrated meeting is vital in that it provides us opportunities for looking back on our culture and broaden[ing] our narrow-minded thoughts.” Jin of the RSP added, “What’s more, they [the Stanford e-Japan students] all spoke fluent English. This made me reflect on the world languages education in the U.S. I think the U.S. should incorporate more global studies (both language and culture) in the education system. America-centric curriculum will cause the younger generation to lose a global vision, and become unaware of Japan as a major political and economic ally in East Asia.”

Fourth, the session shed light upon how diverse both countries are. Jin of the RSP noted, “I’ve always thought that Japan has a rather homogeneous population, but talking to e-Japan students has given me a new perspective on Japanese society. I encountered a student from Myanmar who is living in Japan currently, a Japanese student who used to live in NYC for four years, and a student from Singapore who has been studying abroad in Europe for a couple years.” Rinako of Stanford e-Japan reflected, “Up until now, even when I had the chance to communicate with people outside of Japan, it was usually done in English. However, this time, all three of the Reischauer Scholar students [in her small group] spoke fluent Japanese which made me very happy as we were able to use both English and Japanese.”

Fifth, we came to realize how invaluable international and cross-cultural dialog—especially during times of crisis—can be for students. Having a session during such an unprecedented time seemed to add special significance to the experience. Brandon of the RSP noted, “Overall, it was an extremely memorable discussion, and I hope that we can continue this kind of online cross-cultural connection throughout the rest of the program.” Many Stanford e-Japan students like Fuka also reflected upon the opportunity to discuss critical topics like the coronavirus at this time. She noted, “It gave me a chance to think about familiar issues not just with people of my own country but with people from all kinds of backgrounds.”

Students are among those most acutely experiencing the direct impact of this global pandemic. As they look into the future with confusion and uncertainty about their educational prospects and options, our students seemed to find comfort in this opportunity to connect with their like-minded peers across the Pacific. As they reflected upon their differences, they deepened their understanding of one another and forged what I hope become lasting friendships.


For more information about the Reischauer Scholars Program or the Stanford e-Japan Program, please visit our programs’ webpages at reischauerscholars.org and stanfordejapan.org. SPICE also offers other online courses to U.S. high school students on China (China Scholars Program) and Korea (Sejong Korea Scholars Program), and an online course to Chinese high school students on the United States (Stanford e-China Program).

To stay informed of SPICE news, join our email list and follow us on Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram.


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Sakura (cherry blossoms) at Stanford University | Yosuke Hatano, Visiting Scholar, Stanford University
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To celebrate its May release, contributors Karen Eggleston, Barry Naughton, and Andrew Walder will join editors Thomas Fingar and Jean Oi for a panel discussion of their volume Fateful Decisions: Choices That Will Shape China’s Future (Stanford University Press).  China has enjoyed an extraordinary run of rapid growth and development over the last 40 years.  Yet, as Fingar and Oi point out, China’s future is hardly set in stone.  Sustained economic growth, social welfare and stability will depend upon tough policy decisions confronting Beijing’s leaders today in what is a watershed moment.  Casting doubt on Beijing’s aversion to major reforms and its return to certain Mao-era policy tools, Oi and Fingar argue that China’s challenges are not only complex, but high-stakes – challenges that have become even more daunting in the aftermath of COVID-19.  As China battles the difficulties caused by an aging population, the loss of comparative economic advantage, a politically entrenched elite, and a population with rising expectations, today’s policy decisions will weigh heavily on its future. Topics explored in the volume include China's healthcare challenges in a slowing economy, its global ambitions and track record, economic aims and realities, the country’s mounting governance pressures, and more. 

 

Fateful Decisions is available for purchase here.

 

Fore more information on Fateful Decisions, check out these articles:

Karen Eggleston Examines China’s Looming Demographic Crisis, in Fateful Decisions

Now It Gets Much Harder: Thomas Fingar and Jean Oi Discuss China’s Challenges in The Washington Quarterly

China’s Challenges: Now It Gets Much Harder

 

Portrait of Karen EgglestonKaren Eggleston is a senior fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (FSI) at Stanford University, director of the Stanford Asia Health Policy Program, and deputy director of the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center at FSI. She is also a fellow with the Stanford Center for Innovation in Global Health and a faculty research fellow of the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER). Eggleston earned her PhD in public policy from Harvard University, studied in China for two years, and was a Fulbright scholar in South Korea. Her research focuses on comparative health systems and health reform in Asia, especially China; government and market roles in the health sector; supply-side incentives; healthcare productivity; and economic aspects of demographic change.

 

Portrait of Thomas FingarThomas Fingar is a Shorenstein Distinguished Fellow in the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center at Stanford University. From May 2005 through December 2008, he served as the first deputy director of national intelligence for analysis and, concurrently, as chairman of the National Intelligence Council. Previous positions include assistant secretary of state for Intelligence and Research (2000-2001, 2004–2005), principal deputy assistant secretary (2001–2003), deputy assistant secretary for analysis (1994–2000), director of the Office of Analysis for East Asia and the Pacific, and chief of the China Division. Fingar is a graduate of Cornell University (AB in government and history) and Stanford University (MA and PhD, both in political science). His most recent books are Uneasy Partnerships: China’s Engagement with Japan, the Koreas, and Russia in the Era of Reform (editor) (Stanford University Press, 2017); The New Great Game: China’s Relations with South and Central Asia in the Era of Reform (editor) (Stanford University Press, 2016); and Reducing Uncertainty: Intelligence Analysis and National Security (Stanford University Press, 2011).

 

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Barry Naughton is the So Kwanlok Professor at the School of Global Policy and Strategy, University of California–San Diego. Naughton’s work on the Chinese economy focuses on market transition; industry and technology; foreign trade; and political economy. His first book, Growing Out of the Plan, won the Ohira Prize in 1996, and a new edition of his popular survey and textbook, The Chinese Economy: Adaptation and Growth, appeared in 2018. Naughton did his dissertation research in China in 1982 and received his PhD in economics from Yale University.

 

Jean C. OiJean C. Oi is the William Haas Professor of Chinese Politics in the Department of Political Science and a senior fellow in the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford University. She directs the China Program at the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center and is the Lee Shau Kee Director of the Stanford Center at Peking University. Oi has published extensively on China’s reforms. Recent books include Zouping Revisited: Adaptive Governance in a Chinese County, coedited with Steven Goldstein (Stanford University Press, 2018), and Challenges in the Process of China’s Urbanization, coedited with Karen Eggleston and Yiming Wang (2017). Current research is on fiscal reform and local government debt, continuing SOE reforms, and the Belt and Road Initiative.

 

Portrait of Andrew WalderAndrew G. Walder is the Denise O’Leary and Kent Thiry Professor of Sociology in the School of Humanities and Sciences, and a senior fellow in the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford University. A political sociologist, Walder has long specialized in the study of contemporary Chinese society and political economy. After receiving his PhD at the University of Michigan, he taught at Columbia, Harvard, and the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology. At Stanford he has served as chair of the Department of Sociology, director of the Asia-Pacific Research Center, and director of the Division of International, Comparative, and Area Studies in the School of Humanities and Sciences. His most recent books are Fractured Rebellion: The Beijing Red Guard Movement (2009), China under Mao: A Revolution Derailed (2015), and Agents of Disorder: Inside China’s Cultural Revolution (2019).

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Karen Eggleston <br> Senior Fellow at FSI; Director of the Asia Health Policy Program, Shorenstein APARC, Stanford University <br><br>
Thomas Fingar <br> Shorenstein APARC Fellow, Stanford University <br><br>
Barry Naughton <br> Sokwanlok Chair of Chinese International Affairs, School of Global Policy and Strategy, UC San Diego <br><br>
Jean C. Oi <br> Director, Stanford China Program; William Haas Professor of Chinese Politics, Stanford University <br><br>
Andrew Walder <br> Senior Fellow at FSI; Denise O'Leary and Kent Thiry Professor, Stanford University <br><br>
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The following is Part 1 of a two-article series. For Part 2, please go here.


Stanford e-Oita is an online course for high school students throughout Oita Prefecture in the southwestern island of Kyushu, Japan, that is sponsored by the Oita Prefectural Government. Launched in fall 2019, it is offered by the Stanford Program on International and Cross-Cultural Education (SPICE) in collaboration with the Oita Prefectural Board of Education. SPICE is grateful to Oita Prefectural Governor Katsusada Hirose whose vision made this course possible. 


Social media posts, video-conference invites, and webinar notifications flood our inboxes ever since COVID-19 drove traditional classroom instruction online. Distance learning has gone mainstream.

While distance learning may never replace traditional classroom instruction, it’s certainly transforming how we teach, learn, and behave. Amid the coronavirus pandemic, 30 Stanford e-Oita students in Japan—on the other end of my virtual classroom—showed me what distance learning can offer: a greater appreciation of where we live, renewed cross-cultural perspectives, and a chance to enhance one’s communication skills in a foreign language without a textbook, classroom, or a trip overseas.

Students from 15 high schools throughout Oita Prefecture—from the capital city of Oita to the tiny island of Hotojima—logged onto their laptops, tablets, and smart phones on Saturday mornings for my bi-weekly distance learning class. It’s a course offered to highly motivated students with a certain proficiency in English. They could attend a class as if they were in Palo Alto without ever having to leave their tatami-mat living rooms.

Stanford e-Oita focuses on three areas: U.S.–Japan relations, United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (UNSDGs), and entrepreneurship. These are the collective objectives of SPICE, the Oita Prefectural Board of Education, and Oita’s Governor Hirose. For six months, I explored their intersections with my students.

I designed a course curriculum that engages students to think critically about global issues, empowers them to take pride in their hometowns, and encourages them to give back to their communities. We took what’s happening in the world and made it relevant to their daily lives in Oita. Students took this a step further by exploring issues that were personally meaningful.

Students worked individually and collaboratively through guided group discussions, submitted written assignments, developed research projects, watched documentary films, and prepared multi-media slideshows as part of their final presentations—all in English. I also created virtual experiential learning opportunities for students by introducing them to guest speakers via Zoom. In the pre-COVID-19 days, I took students along with me on fieldtrips to National Historic Sites in Seattle’s International District and visited social activists on Vashon Island, Washington.

Stanford e-Oita is taught in English, but it is not an English language course. I offer my students a chance to become confident in English, competent in critical thinking, and fluent in accessing the technologies of a digital classroom. We use online platforms like Zoom and Canvas and take advantage of discussion boards, breakout sessions, and other digital tools which are not often used in Japanese schools.

In order to ensure access and equity, students who did not have access to a computer or Wifi were able to return to their schools on Saturday mornings to take the class in the computer labs. Most students worked on tablets (some used smartphones) and grew accustomed to the online format within a few weeks. For the most part, e-Oita students were excited and open to technology enabled learning. One student noted, “For me, using Zoom in this new style of class is really refreshing. Students are scattered all over Oita and you’re in America but we’re all communicating through my tablet. It’s so cool!”

Getting Japanese students on board Stanford’s rigorous distance learning program, in a foreign language, was a challenge at first. In fact, the learning curve was steep for all of us. I taught my students the word “troubleshoot” early on and walked them through online setting changes to video presentation uploads.
 

Here are some lessons learned:

Distance learning provides learning opportunities for students in less accessible communities—in rural towns or islands—where traditional classrooms are unable to serve.

Distance learning allows students to re-invent themselves with a new audience, with people you have never met.

Distance learning can create an informality that breaks down the wall between teachers and students and makes their relationship less hierarchical. This is a new experience for students from Japan.

Distance learning allows instructors to invite speakers whose participation is not limited by geography, departmental budgets, disabilities, or availability of a considerable amount of time. All they need is a quiet corner, a laptop with Wifi, and a time commitment of 30 minutes to an hour.   


Section Manager Hironori Sano and Teachers’ Consultant Keisuke Toyoda of the Global Education Acceleration Project Team (High School Education Division) of the Oita Prefectural Board of Education, reflected, “The most amazing thing is seeing how our students developed through the program. They have acquired five important skills: (1) the ability to cooperate with people around them; (2) the ability to state their ideas; (3) knowledge of Japan and Oita; (4) the confidence to communicate in English; and (5) the confidence to make a contribution in the world.”

Kasumi Yamashita Kasumi Yamashita
“Teach-from-Home” mandates have altered not only where and what we teach but how we learn: it has reset our mindset. As I reflect on the past six months as the instructor of SPICE’s e-Oita program, I recognize the lessons in patience, resilience, and empathy that my students have taught me. My students were neophytes to distance learning but were digital natives from halfway around the world.

In part two of this series, I will focus on Stanford e-Oita’s priorities (United Nations Sustainable Development Goals), guest speakers, final student presentations, and assessment.

 


SPICE also offers online courses to U.S. high school students on Japan (Reischauer Scholars Program), China (China Scholars Program), and Korea (Sejong Korea Scholars Program), and online courses to Chinese high school students on the United States (Stanford e-China Program) and to Japanese high school students on the United States and U.S.–Japan relations (Stanford e-Japan). 

To stay informed of SPICE news, join our email list and follow us on Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram.


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Hotojima, Oita Prefecture | Honoka Takatsuka, Stanford e-Oita student
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Since March, a series of escalations have heightened tensions in the South China Sea. From the sinking of a Vietnamese fishing boat to an ongoing standoff with the Malaysian navy, China has been accused of taking advantage of the COVID-19 pandemic to further its control of the South China Sea. Beijing’s actions on the water are not all that different than what it was doing just a few months ago. But having them continue amid a global health crisis has sparked a new level of outrage. And the nationalistic response from Chinese authorities has only added fuel to the fire. These developments highlight the new normal in the South China Sea, which will continue long after COVID-19 fades.

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Gregory B. Poling is Senior Fellow for Southeast Asia and Director of the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative at CSIS. His research interests include the South China Sea disputes, democratization in Southeast Asia, and Asian multilateralism. Mr. Poling’s writings have been featured in Foreign Affairs, the Wall Street Journal, Nikkei Asian Review, and Foreign Policy, among others. He has authored or coauthored multiple works including The Thickening Web of Asian Security Cooperation (RAND Corporation, 2019), Building a More Robust U.S.-Philippines Alliance (CSIS, August 2015), and A New Era in U.S.-Vietnam Relations (CSIS, June 2014). Mr. Poling received an M.A. in international affairs from American University and a B.A. in history and philosophy from St. Mary’s College of Maryland.

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Gregory B. Poling Senior Fellow for Southeast Asia and Director, Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, Center for Strategic and International Studies
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Early this year, Vladimir Putin had big plans for an excellent spring:  first, constitutional amendments approved by the legislative branch and public allowing him the opportunity to remain in power until 2036, followed by a huge patriotic celebration of the 75th anniversary of the defeat of Nazi Germany.  Well, stuff happens—specifically, COVID-19.  Putin’s spring has turned out quite differently from what he had hoped.

Big Plans for the Spring

The president surprised Russians on January 15 in his annual speech to the Federal Assembly (the lower house of the Russian legislative branch).  He proposed amending the constitution to reduce the authority of the presidency, increase the power of the Federal Assembly, and provide a legal basis for a State Council.

The amendments prompted speculation that Putin, who likes to have options, sought to create ways to hold on to power after 2024, when term limits would require him to step down from the presidency.  He might become an empowered prime minister or head the State Council.

Then, on March 10, another surprise.  A Federal Assembly deputy proposed an additional amendment that would, in effect, allow Putin to run for president twice more, opening the possibility that he could remain in office until 2036.  He had consistently argued in the past against ending term limits.  However, according to the Kremlin spokesperson, Putin was so taken with the deputy’s justification that he changed his mind on the spot.

Things can move fast in Russia—especially when Putin wants them.  On March 11, the Federal Assembly approved the constitutional amendments by a vote of 383-0, and the Federal Council (Russia’s senate) gave its approval 160-1.  (Nothing like having a rubber-stamp legislative branch.)  Within two days, all 85 regional parliaments had approved the amendments.  The Constitutional Court worked over a weekend and, on March 16, unsurprisingly found the amendments consistent with the constitution.

All told, it took just six days to check the legal requirements for amending the constitution.  Putin, however, desired more.  He called in January for a nationwide referendum on April 22 to approve the package of amendments.  The constitution provides no requirement for such a vote.  Putin wanted it to further legitimize the changes to the constitution.  Popular endorsement would undercut any future challenge should he decide to run for reelection in 2024.

Topping off the spring would be the May 9 celebration of the 75th anniversary of VE Day.  Putin has built this holiday up to rival New Year’s Day, traditionally the biggest holiday for Russians.  The celebration of World War II veterans and a large military parade on Red Square not only remind Russians of their country’s part in defeating Hitler, but they also play well to the themes of nationalism and Russia’s place as a great power on the world stage that Putin has embraced and perpetuated, particularly over the past eight years.

COVID-19 Intrudes

Alas for Putin, reality intruded.  The number of COVID-19 cases began to grow in mid-March.  As of April 21, the country reported over 52,000 cases, with more than half of those just in Moscow.  The number undoubtedly is understated—as in many countries—if for no other reason than some are asymptomatic or suffer mild symptoms.  There are also indications that local health authorities are underreporting cases.

Moscow’s mayor adopted a shelter-at-home policy, but with lots of exceptions.  While the mayor asserted that the city’s hospitals had sufficient capacity, medical staff described more difficult situations, and videos showed ambulances in line to wait hours to admit patients.  The health infrastructure outside of Moscow and other large cities is weaker, raising concern about the virus’s impact in rural areas.

Much like his American counterpart, Putin responded slowly to the mushrooming health crisis, leaving it to mayors and regional authorities to manage.  Sounding a lot like Donald Trump in February, Putin told Russians on April 19 (Orthodox Easter) “the situation is under full control.”  He has raised his public profile the past ten days, conducting videoconferences from his residence outside Moscow.  Russia, however, may be just beginning its COVID-19 trial.

As the number of cases grew in March, questions arose about the feasibility of the April 22 referendum.  Putin apparently very much desired it, and the Kremlin wanted a large turnout to bolster the referendum’s legitimacy.  Some suggested the referendum could be conducted over several days, allowing voters to space out visits to polling stations.  But the Kremlin bowed to reality and announced on March 25 that the referendum would be postponed.

Likewise, the Kremlin hoped that the May 9 commemoration could go forward, and troops began practicing for the military parade (one video showed thousands of soldiers in close formation with no masks).  However, the day’s heroes—World War II veterans now in their 90s—constitute an age-group very vulnerable to COVID-19.  Going forward with a celebration that could devastate their ranks hardly made sense.  On April 16, Putin announced a postponement.

The Economic Prognosis Looks Grim

Instead of a big public endorsement of his constitutional amendments and a patriotic gala on May 9, Putin faces a daunting challenge:  the combination of COVID-19 and an economy in trouble.  Under the virus’s impact, Russia’s already anemic economy is headed for recession.  The International Monetary Fund expects it to contract by 5.5 percent in 2020.

Complicating the economic picture for the Kremlin is continued application of Western sanctions due to Russia’s seizure of Crimea and its conflict with Ukraine in Donbas.  Economists estimate they cost Russia 1-1.5 percent of its gross domestic product.  While Russian officials downplay the effect, they miss few opportunities to ask for their removal.  For example, Putin used his intervention in the March 26 videoconference of G20 leaders to call for an end to all international sanctions.

COVID-19 has another negative impact on the Russian economy.  It has crashed global demand for oil, by far Russia’s most important export.  Perhaps not expecting the economic consequences of the virus, Russia on March 6 did not agree to an OPEC proposal to reduce production.  Igor Sechin, head of the Rosneft Oil Company and a close associate of Putin, reportedly wanted to drive the price down to push U.S. shale oil producers out of the market (their production has boosted the United States to supplant Russia and Saudi Arabia as the world’s largest oil producer).

The price dropped, more than Sechin might have anticipated.  Saudi Arabia responded to Russia’s refusal to cut production by boosting its own output and cutting the price.  On March 8, the price of oil fell 30 percent.  The resulting havoc hurt both sides.  On April 9, Russia and OPEC agreed to cut production by about 10 million barrels per day.

Whether that will suffice is uncertain.  The global economic slowdown has caused demand for oil to drop by 20-25 millions barrels per day.  On April 21, the price of a barrel of Brent oil fell below $20, a price not seen since 2002.  That was down from $74 one year earlier (the Russian government budget was designed to balance at a price of $42 per barrel).  The per barrel export duty collected by the Russian government fell to below $1, also the lowest since 2002.  Russia has to cut 2.5 million of barrels per day of production to meet its part of the April 9 agreement.  With oil storage facilities nearing capacity, there may well be further price drops before things turn around.

None of this is good news for the Russian economy, but how hard a hit it will take remains to be seen.  Thus far, the Kremlin has adopted a stimulus package to counter the COVID-19 economic consequences that is relatively modest, especially compared to programs being implemented by the United States, Germany, Britain and other industrial countries.

Managing the health crisis and its economic consequences, which could affect Putin’s approval rating—something to which the Kremlin pays extraordinarily close attention—is now the Russian president’s top preoccupation.  This is not anything like he anticipated three months ago.

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Data-intensive technologies such as AI may reshape the modern world. We propose that two features of data interact to shape innovation in data-intensive economies: first, states are key collectors and repositories of data; second, data is a non-rival input in innovation. We document the importance of state-collected data for innovation using comprehensive data on Chinese facial recognition AI firms and government contracts. Firms produce more commercial software and patents, particularly data-intensive ones, after receiving government public security contracts. Moreover, effects are largest when contracts provide more data. We then build a directed technical change model to study the state's role in three applications: autocracies demanding AI for surveillance purposes, data-driven industrial policy, and data regulation due to privacy concerns. When the degree of non-rivalry is as strong as our empirical evidence suggests, the state's collection and processing of data can shape the direction of innovation and growth of data-intensive economies.

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Portrait of David Yang
David Yang’s research focuses on political economy, behavioral and experimental economics, economic history, and cultural economics. In particular, David studies the forces of stability and forces of changes in authoritarian regimes, drawing lessons from historical and contemporary China. David received a B.A. in Statistics and B.S. in Business Administration from University of California at Berkeley, and PhD in Economics from Stanford. David is currently a Prize Fellow in Economics, History, and Politics at Harvard and a Postdoctoral Fellow at J-PAL at MIT. He also joined Harvard’s Economics Department as an Assistant Professor as of 2020.

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David Yang Prize Fellow in Economics, History, and Politics; Department of Economics, Harvard University
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Seminar Recording: https://youtu.be/j9S_CKmku00

 

About this Event:

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bryan

Bryan Metzger

1:30 PM - 2:15 PM 

Introductions will start at 1:30pm. Each presentation will be 20 minutes with a 10 minute discussion.

Title: Lobbyists, Public Relations and “Malign Activities”: The JCPOA as a Case Study of Foreign Influence

Abstract: In July 2015, the P5+1 announced the conclusion of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), known colloquially as the “Iran nuclear deal,” an agreement between Iran and the P5+1 to place limits on the Iranian nuclear program. The agreement was controversial not only within American domestic politics, but also in the eyes of American allies in the Middle East that are commonly thought to exercise significant influence over American foreign policy. Using the JCPOA as a case study on foreign influence in American political decision-making, this thesis analyzes the influence strategies of Israel, Saudi Arabia, and Iran from 2013 to 2018 while assessing the efficacy of these strategies. Based on the theoretical literature, I propose four different influence strategies: direct and indirect lobbying, and direct and indirect shaping of the information space. As a result of nearly forty interviews with former government officials, ambassadors, policy advocates, and regional experts, this thesis finds that while foreign influence does not drive US foreign policy, it can act as an important intervening factor, raising or lowering the costs of political decision-making and amplifying existing preferences within the American political system. Thus, this thesis provides a nuanced perspective on foreign influence in American decision-making, showing the real impact that such campaigns can have while eschewing the idea that American policymakers lack agency in important foreign policy matters.

 

 

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andrew

Andrew Lokay

2:15 PM - 2:50 PM

Introductions will start at 1:30pm. Each presentation will be 20 minutes with a 10 minute discussion.

Title: The Repatriation Dilemma: European Countries and Islamic State Foreign Terrorist Fighters

Abstract: This thesis explains differences in European countries’ approaches to the repatriation of Islamic State foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs). Following the territorial defeat of the Islamic State, the United States urged European countries to take back their citizens who travelled to Syria and Iraq to join the caliphate. Some have done so, while others have not. This thesis is the first study to analyze the variation in responses to this request and uses an original dataset of FTF repatriation across 16 European countries. I apply a nested analysis research design to evaluate four explanatory variables: a country’s history of jihadist attacks, justice system capability, desire for a better relationship with the United States, and domestic political pressure. I arbitrate among these potential explanations though a medium-N analysis and case studies of the United Kingdom and the Republic of North Macedonia. I suggest that NATO aspirants are more likely to repatriate FTFs. The empirical evidence I collect does not support the other three hypotheses. I also propose that high evidentiary requirements in legal systems present a challenge to FTF repatriation. This thesis advances the literature’s understanding of the responsiveness of U.S. allies and partners to Washington’s demands, and it expands the counterterrorism scholarship to address a novel question regarding a salient and divisive policy debate.

 

 

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adam

Adam Elliott

2:50 PM - 3:20 PM

Introductions will start at 1:30pm. Each presentation will be 20 minutes with a 10 minute discussion.

Title: Keeping Pace: Addressing Life Sciences Dual Use Risk Across U.S. Government Agencies

Abstract: Why do different institutions address the same security challenge in different ways? Global biosecurity governance is ill-equipped to stay apace with advances in biotechnology. While almost all necessary life sciences research incurs the risk for misuse, certain experiments with higher risk to human health if misused are labelled dual use research of concern (DURC). U.S. government policies to guide public funding for DURC experiments attempt to outline lists of experiment types or select agents that constitute DURC. However, experts argue some experiments are definitionally DURC, but they do not fall within the scope of the U.S. policy. This thesis analyzes how the National Institutes of Health (NIH) and the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) approach funding two of these experiment types: gene drives and virus engineering for pandemic preparedness. Tracing each agency’s approach to funding these experiments, as well as their institutional history and culture, leads to several findings. First, when experiment types test the limits of what biosecurity policies are scoped to address, agencies tend to respond in accordance with their mission. However, decisions by agency directors may influence the response as well. Coherent leadership and strategies are critical for preserving the integrity of the scientific enterprise and for protecting humanity from biological threats – including natural, accidental, and deliberate release of biological products that could cause human suffering. By studying the ways different agencies respond when they have to address new biosecurity challenges, governments can better assess the effectiveness of existing biosecurity policies and design future policies in a way that allows society to enjoy the benefits of life sciences advances without undue exposure to risk.

Virtual Seminar

Bryan Metzger, Andrew Lokay, and Adam Elliott
Seminars
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Seminar Recording:  https://youtu.be/sQynE60SFTc

 

About this Event:

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sophia

Sophia Boyer

1:30 PM - 2:15 PM 

Introductions will start at 1:30pm. Each presentation will be 20 minutes with a 10 minute discussion.

Title: AK-47s, Tanks, and F-16s: Understanding Shifts in Pakistan's Conventional Military Strategy in the post-Cold war era

Abstract: The United States has navigated a complex relationship with Pakistan since the country’s inception in 1947. The behavior of the Pakistan Army has been a central factor in that relationship. This thesis analyzes when, how and why the Pakistan Army has shifted its conventional military strategy in the post-Cold war era. An investigation of the Pakistan Army’s capabilities, doctrines, rhetoric and force distribution suggests that Pakistan shifted its conventional military strategy four times since 1989: a ‘Post-Cold war Strategy’ from 1989-1994, a ‘Defense Minimal strategy’ from 1994-2001, a ‘Two-Front Commitment Strategy’ from 2001-2010, and a ‘Three-Front Commitment Strategy’ from 2010-2019. Based on existing literature and interviews, this thesis argues that external threats, specifically those emanating from India and the U.S., and bureaucratic politics driven by leadership changes have impacted shifts in Pakistan’s conventional military strategy substantially. These findings can inform a calibrated US South Asia policy comprising the management of conventional military balance in nuclear South Asia.

 

 

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samantha

Samantha Feuer

2:15 PM - 2:50 PM

Introductions will start at 1:30pm. Each presentation will be 20 minutes with a 10 minute discussion.

Title: From the Shadows to the Front Page: State Use of Proxies for Cyber Operations.

Abstract: Why do some states delegate cyber operations to proxies while others rely on central commands? This thesis explores state use of cyber proxies in light of principal-agent problems. In particular, this work examines cyber proxies allegedly acting at the behest of China, Russia, Iran and North Korea by considering three variables: cost, skills and specialization, and plausible deniability. The use of case studies and process tracing analyses evaluate their explanatory power in the cyber realm. The data suggest that states may use cyber proxies to differing degrees and with differing motivations depending upon the type of mission or strategic aim, as well as their ability to pose credible threats to misbehaving proxies. Although cyber operations are comparatively “cheap” relative to physical missions - hence their appeal - some evidence suggests that using cyber proxies may provide additional cost savings compared to the use of their central commands for certain missions. States’ need for skills and specializations, not immediately attainable through central commands, may also lead them to use cyber proxies. Based on available evidence, it remains inconclusive whether states’ potential desire for plausible deniability influences their use of cyber proxies. During a period of global uncertainty in which our everyday lives have been forced online, critical infrastructure, the public sector and private industry are increasingly vulnerable to cyber-attacks from adverse actors. As data in this field improves, this thesis hopes to serve as a framework for future researchers to test, with more certainty, the causal links between these explanations and the use of cyber proxies within these four states.

 

 

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elena

Elena Crespo

2:50 PM - 3:20 PM

Introductions will start at 1:30pm. Each presentation will be 20 minutes with a 10 minute discussion.

Title: Blood and Treasure, but Mostly Blood: U.S. Electoral Accountability and the All-Volunteer Force

Abstract: In the wake of the American military’s transition to an all-volunteer force (AVF), scholars and military leaders alike cautioned that the Armed Forces defending the nation would come to disproportionately draw from the least advantaged and least politically powerful populations. Should that be the case, certain communities would pay higher costs of war while others would be relatively untouched, leaving the Executive free to command with little public accountability. This thesis adopts an experimental statistical counterfactual approach to examine the geographic casualty distribution across states during the Iraq War had there been a conscripted force. The data presented suggest that the conventional logic is partially correct: an all-volunteer force is not egalitarian. It disproportionately burdened certain states—predominantly in the South and Midwest—with higher casualty rates than would have a conscripted force. However, many of the states that shouldered the costs of war under an AVF also carry disproportionate political gravity as electoral swing states. These findings suggest that a President who chooses to use force is more likely to face electoral backlash for his or her decisions under an all-volunteer force than under a conscripted force. Ultimately, the thesis proposes that President George W. Bush may have increased the margin of his victory in the 2004 Presidential election and contributed to greater Republican victories in the 2006 Senate election had the Iraq War been fought with a conscripted force that more equally distributed casualties. This finding runs contrary to the popular contention that a conscripted force is inherently more democratic and will lead to better electoral accountability for use of force.

Virtual Seminar

Sophia Boyer, Samantha Feuer, and Elena Crespo
Seminars
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