This event is presented in conjunction with the Japan Society of Northern California.

Unintended Consequences of Repression: Alliance Formation
in South Korea’s Democracy Movement (1970-1979)

Paul Y. Chang, Singapore Management University

Research regarding the impact of repression on social movements
has yielded conflicting findings; some argue that repression
decreases the total quantity of protest events while others argue
that it motivates protest. To move beyond this impasse, various
scholars have suggested exploring how repression influences
the quality of social movements. This study assesses the
impact repression had on the formation of alliances between
different social groups participating in South Korea’s democracy
movement. Results from negative binomial regression analyses
show that repression facilitated the formation of alliances
between movement actors at a time when the overall number of
protest events decreased. This study contributes to the literature
on coercion and mobilization by pointing to the possibility of
movement development during low levels of a protest cycle.

Recent studies of social movements have identified repression as one important aspect of the larger political opportunity structure that significantly shapes movement trajectories (Davenport, Johnston and Mueller 2005; Zwerman and Steinhoff 2005; Earl 2003, 2006; Goldstone and Tilly 2001; della Porta 1996). Empirical findings from past studies have revealed a "paradox" regarding the impact of repression on social movements (Brockett 2005, 1995). While some argue that repression reduces movement vitality (Olzak, Beasley and Olivier 2003) because of the added costs associated with repression (Tilly 1978), others argue that repression increases the rate of protest and collective action (White 1989; Khawaja 1993, 1994). In reviews of this literature researchers have puzzled over the fact that, "Both threats and opportunities can mobilize activism… For some challengers, increased political openness enhances the prospects for mobilization, while other movements seem to respond more to threat than opportunity." (Meyer and Staggenborg 1996:1645,1634; see also Earl 2006; Lichbach 1987).

Research and writing for this study was funded in part by the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center, Stanford University. For comments on previous drafts, I thank Gi-Wook Shin, Susan Olzak, Doug McAdam, David S. Meyer, John Meyer, Jeong-Woo Koo, Myung-Koo Kang, Ehito Kimura, Yong Suk Jang, members of Stanford University’s Workshop on Social Movements and Collective Action and anonymous reviewers for Social Forces.

Direct correspondence to Paul Y. Chang, School of Social Sciences, Singapore Management University, 90 Stamford Road, Level 4, Singapore 178903. E-mail: paulchang@smu.edu.sg.
© The University of North Carolina Press Social Forces 87(2), December 2008


For full text of the article, please visit http://socialforces.unc.edu/epub/folder.2007-02-09.8541500563/copy_of_december08

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