As the Internet evolves, people around the world have faster, easier ways to connect. Innovative plans and economic opportunities are being hatched online, but so are ideas that challenge governments. Voices of dissent are amplified by social media tools like Facebook, Twitter and YouTube, leaving some countries confused about how to balance free expression rights against perceived threats to national security and government stability.

Working with the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford’s Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, Eileen Donahoe is trying to make government officials feel more comfortable with online technology. Donahoe, the U.S. ambassador to the United Nation’s Human Rights Council, recently brought about 35 diplomats from around the world to Stanford. The group met with academics, Internet developers and technology business leaders to address the questions posed by a free and open Internet.

“I know the technology feels mysterious and challenging,” says Donahoe, who was an affiliated scholar at CISAC before becoming an ambassador. “So part of what we tried to do was demystify it. But we also conveyed the message that you’re not going to control technological change. And you’d better get used to it. It’s part of our world.”

In the following interview, Donahoe and CISAC co-director Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar discuss the challenges and potential promised in the online frontier.

Why did you arrange this meeting of diplomats in Silicon Valley?

Donahoe: Some ambassadors who are otherwise very committed to human rights have started to feel that the protections for freedom of expression and freedom of assembly could be weakened or lessened when you bring technology into the mix. There was a sense that governments could legitimately squelch free speech and free assembly when it happened in the online world. That’s a problem because so much of what happens today happens online. The Internet is now so central to the ability to speak freely. It was our responsibility to call them out and make them understand that technology should not change the equation in the protection of human rights.

How has the Internet changed the way we need to think about human rights and free expression?

Donahoe: In some ways, it hasn’t changed anything – free speech is free speech. But new technology has created new media, and that’s all changing at an exponential pace. People are being required to adjust in timeframes that were unimaginable before, and governments can’t keep up. Individuals can hardly keep up. It’s the pace and innovation that’s challenging. But there’s no change in our responsibility to protect the longstanding values of free expression.

What does a free and open Internet have to do with global security?

Cuéllar:  Some governments lack a commitment to basic rights and the rule of law. Technology can help people respond by raising their voices. They can organize and respond when their own government threatens citizens’ security.  Cyber technologies can also empower law enforcement officials, intelligence agencies and armed forces, raising fundamental questions about the role of government and the nature of conflict in the years to come. The Internet is an evolving technology that reflects vulnerability and enormous potential. Societies depend on government and private sector systems that face a variety of threats.  For all these reasons, the future of cyberspace is an important security issue at the very center of our agenda at CISAC.

Why do some governments feel threatened by the Internet?

Donahoe: It comes from the volume of voices you can have online. It comes from the pace of change. And there’s another aspect to online technology that’s intriguing: It is inherently democratizing. Citizens are becoming journalists. Anyone with a cell phone can broadcast live to the planet anything they’re observing. That can be threatening, but I believe it’s ultimately going to be a very positive force for transparency and government accountability.

How do you convince governments worried about those threats that open Internet access is ultimately in their best interest? 

Cuéllar: If the leaders of a state see it merely as a vehicle for control and stability, then much of the technology we have been discussing will appear profoundly threatening.  States seeking to build or maintain lasting institutions capable of meeting the needs of their citizens will tend to take a different approach, focused on the value of the public’s feedback and participation in governance.

Donahoe: A compelling point – especially for developing countries that may not otherwise place emphasis on the benefits to freedom from technology – is the recognition that there’s an economic upside to a free and open Internet. It can be framed as a development issue. Many government leaders can see that the future of all our economies is so intricately connected to this technology that if they try to squelch or shut down Internet development for political reasons, there will be dramatically negative effects for their economies. And that will lead to political problems. The economic value isn’t my primary human rights emphasis, but it helps to remind governments they run the risk of shutting themselves out of economic development if they don’t get comfortable with the technology.

What role, if any, should governments play in regulating the Internet?

Donahoe: Governments do need to play a role in regulation, just as they do in the offline world. But just because technology is brought into the equation doesn’t mean governments and regulators should be free to regulate too broadly or without concern for the costs to freedom. Just like in the offline world, regulation must be narrowly tailored and serve important government interests. Part of the challenge comes from the sense that governments can’t keep up with the technological advances. So they’re inclined to regulate more – and more bluntly – rather than in a more tailored way. This is where governments need to get more sophisticated about how to adjust to technological change.

What do policymakers need to know and understand before passing regulations?

Cuéllar: The future of cyberspace implicates security, economic development and the protection of civil and political rights – and all of these challenges are deeply interrelated.  A country's decision to restrict certain forms of Internet traffic can discourage economic innovation. Internet access in poor communities can lead to new economic opportunities, changing the larger context in which governance and security problems arise.  It is crucial to recognize these connections as societies think through the future of cyberspace.

Since opening its doors to the world in 1978, China has pursued a sometimes erratic but reasonably steady course leading to increasing global economic and political interaction. Its interests now extend from Pyongyang to New York and Sydney to Riyadh. U.S. President Barack Obama’s announcement of a new “pivot” toward Asia, recent events on the Korean Peninsula, and China’s upcoming leadership transition provide additional reasons to seek greater understanding of China’s goals and interactions with other nations.

Thomas Fingar, Stanford’s Oksenberg-Rohlen Distinguished Fellow, is leading a new multiphase Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (Shorenstein APARC) initiative to explore the nuances and complexity of China’s foreign relations and domestic issues. The China and the World research project aims to contextualize and better understand China’s regional and global interactions, both from the perspective of China itself and from that of other countries. Beginning with Northeast Asia, the project will analyze China’s relations region-by-region throughout the world, and will involve experts from Stanford, China, and the regions studied. It kicks off with a Shorenstein APARC-organized workshop held Mar. 19 and 20 at the new Stanford Center at Peking University.

Fingar discusses the development of China’s foreign relations since 1978, and describes the project and workshop’s background.

In the three decades since Deng Xiaoping enacted his 1978 Open Door reforms, what have been the main trends in China’s global engagement?

The general trend since 1978 has been for China to become increasingly active and engaged in a growing number of places around the world. There have been a number of phases to this.

The “honeymoon period” of U.S.-China relations (1979–1989) was a period of essentially no competition to China’s interaction within the U.S.-led world economic system. China concentrated on the OECD countries—especially the United States, Japan, and Western Europe—that had money to invest and willingness to trade.

After the 1989 Tiananmen Square Incident, China’s international options became more constrained as its relations with the developed world plateaued. It began to reach out to the places that would deal with it: Southeast Asia and particularly Africa. This was in part diplomatically motivated, and in part a search for new markets for the low-end goods it was beginning to produce. It was also the beginning of its search for energy.

Around 2000, China transitioned from building a more modern economy towards being one—beginning the era of its “rise.” China’s demand for resources went up, as did its capacity to supply more markets and its ability to invest more of its growing foreign exchange earnings. It became globally active, proclaiming that it had a new, less exploitative model than what the United States and Europe offered.

What Northeast Asia issues do you think China will focus on this year, especially as it plans for a major leadership transition?

North Korea’s stability and China’s growing investments in the DPRK. Beijing is acutely interested in whether Kim Jong Un will prove a viable leader and whether the regime will be able to manage its new challenges. China is concerned about possible North Korean provocations that might trigger responses by South Korea and/or the United States, putting at risk the peaceful regional and international situation China needs for its political and economic development.

The second issue is answering the question: what does the U.S. pivot toward Asia mean? What does it mean in terms of security, economics, and relations with Japan and Korea? China is the largest trading partner for each of these countries. They value it as a market, and as a source of resources. Yet they also worry about being excessively dependent on China. They appear not to have worried about this quite so much when their dependence on the U.S. market was comparable.

Two full workshop sessions will be devoted to Japan and South Korea, both countries with close U.S. ties. What are the most important factors with regard to China’s rise for these two countries? What about for Southeast Asia?

One of the reasons for our upcoming Beijing workshop is to develop a general template of questions we can ask for each region. We want to avoid focusing the questions too narrowly on Northeast Asia.

For Japan and Korea, one factor has to do with economic opportunities and with their own vulnerabilities. The other has to do with the security challenges of China’s rise, and the uncertainty of its military aspirations. Japan and Korea do not want to be drawn into U.S.-led activities, but they still value the United States for protection. They are concerned about managing the decoupling of economic and security dependence, about no longer being dependent on the same country for both.

Many regional issues are interrelated, such as maritime territorial claims and naval expansion. China is an economic player in Southeast Asia, and the Philippines and Thailand have an alliance with the United States. Indonesia is a rising county in Southeast Asia, and India is an outside player in the region. The U.S. 7th Fleet currently defends the shipping lanes to Northeast Asia that go through Southeast Asia, which probably is not the long-term solution.  

Russia played an important role in shaping the political ideology in the early days of the People’s Republic of China, and the politics of both countries—especially Russia—have changed so much. What is their relationship like now?

Correct and limited. The West imposed a military hardware embargo on China after Tiananmen, so Russia is a limited alternative for that, and it is also a source of energy and other resources. It is fair to say China has something close to disdain for Russia, for what it sees as political confusion and economic mismanagement. The idea of a strategic triangle—using Russia to balance U.S. influence—is something China sees as unviable.

As you move forward with this project, what is the ultimate goal?

The goal is to understand the dynamics of interaction—to understand the bigger picture. Other countries have objectives and concerns with regard to China, while China has objectives and concerns of its own. It is about identifying things such as where they see the same and different kinds of opportunities; what concerns they have about third country interests or involvement; and how they evaluate the success of policies to date.  

Riding around on the back of a motorcycle in 2009, Jeremy Menchik snapped photos of hundreds of Indonesian campaign posters. That number has now grown to over 5000 images, which Menchik and Colm Fox have painstakingly coded and analyzed to better understand the politics of identity in Indonesia. The initial results of their research reveal similarities between the United States and Indonesia, and shed light on the transitional democracies of the Arab Spring.

Menchik is a 2011–12 Shorenstein Fellow at Stanford University, and will take up a position as an assistant professor in international relations at Boston University in 2013.

Fox is a doctoral student at the George Washington University’s Department of Political Science.

How important is political identity in Indonesia? Why?

Indonesia is the largest Muslim-majority country in the world, and one of the most diverse. But what we found was that rather than being unique, Indonesian politicians behave remarkably similar to American politicians in using a variety of regional, religious, and ethnic identity symbols to court voters.

For example, just recently on NPR, I heard Mitt Romney and Newt Gingrich using broken Spanish to appeal to Latino voters in Florida. That is no different than candidates for mayor in northern Sumatra, who often print one poster with them wearing Islamic clothing for one neighborhood, and another poster with them wearing Batak clothing for a different neighborhood. And a third where they are draped in the Indonesian flag.

Our research suggests that despite the obvious differences between a developed, Western country like the United States, and a developing, Muslim-majority country like Indonesia, politicians often act similarly when they are trying to win elections.

What is an important factor in determining a candidate’s use of identity symbols?

What we found is that the election rules matter, a lot. Candidates are far more likely to use religious and ethnic symbols in a plurality (“winner-take-all”) system like the United States than in a proportional representation system (PR) like Indonesia. This is an important finding, because tinkering with election rules is one of the tools that international relations practitioners can use to reduce ethnic and sectarian violence. And what we are saying is that it works. Changing election rules can change the types and levels of identities that are politicized. And that is an important lesson for conflict resolution.

What are some of the most surprising results to come out of your research?

The first is how badly the dominant explanations for identity politics—modernization theory and secularization theory—fared when they were tested on a large dataset. We are at an interesting juncture in time, where our theories of religion and politics have not caught up with the way the world works.

A second surprising finding is how much electoral rules shape the use of identity symbols. Indonesia is a Muslim-majority country, but you would not know it in many of the PR elections. Having strong party backing is so crucial to winning seats in the legislature that it overrides candidates’ religious identity. This points to a similarity between a developed, consolidated Western democracy like the United States, and a developing, unconsolidated Muslim-majority country like Indonesia. The rules are really important for understanding "how politics works" in the Muslim world.

Finally, it was interesting to see the continued importance of history for understanding contemporary political behavior. Regional rebellions that happened in the 1950s continue to echo in politics today. There are certainly ways that changing electoral rules and economic development can result in a shift in political identity, but without understanding the specific Indonesian context, a lot of our results do not make sense. That is an important lesson that for understanding how people in a Muslim country vote; the regionally specific history of that country is very important.      

During last year’s Arab Spring, the ideal of democracy was celebrated throughout the world. How might your research shed light on understanding the complexities of these transitioning democracies?

Well this research has clear implications for the Arab Spring, particularly for understanding the future of Egypt. Just because religious parties like the Muslim Brotherhood or the Salafist Nour party come into office does not mean that democracy is doomed, or that religious minorities are going to suffer. As long as secular Muslims, Christians, liberals, and other groups have a stake in elections, we are likely to see cross-ethnic and cross-religious coalitions emerge. This is a very good thing. One obvious difference, however, is that we did not see a lot of overt military participation in politics in Indonesia after 1999. The military was largely absent. And that is one way that Egypt is very different from Indonesia. If there is a big threat to democracy in Egypt, it is not coming from the politicization of identity—it is coming from the suppression of the people's voice by the military.