International Development

FSI researchers consider international development from a variety of angles. They analyze ideas such as how public action and good governance are cornerstones of economic prosperity in Mexico and how investments in high school education will improve China’s economy.

They are looking at novel technological interventions to improve rural livelihoods, like the development implications of solar power-generated crop growing in Northern Benin.

FSI academics also assess which political processes yield better access to public services, particularly in developing countries. With a focus on health care, researchers have studied the political incentives to embrace UNICEF’s child survival efforts and how a well-run anti-alcohol policy in Russia affected mortality rates.

FSI’s work on international development also includes training the next generation of leaders through pre- and post-doctoral fellowships as well as the Draper Hills Summer Fellows Program.

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As recently as 2007, the United States seemed headed towards ever greater fossil fuel import dependence, as domestic oil and natural gas production dwindled and consumption continued to grow. Five years later, the landscape looks dramatically different. An explosion in natural gas production from shales has overturned paradigms and sparked bold talk of LNG exports. While less remarked-upon, unconventional oil production has followed suit, helping to boost liquids output 20% from 50-year lows and vaulting North Dakota ahead of Alaska to become the nation’s second-largest oil producer. A new order is emerging in the coal market as well, with efforts underway to ship cheap, low-sulfur coal from the western U.S. to China.

The new role for the U.S. as a hotbed of production and technology development for unconventional resources, a reduced import market, and a possible key exporter of natural gas and coal raises a host of political, economic, and environmental questions. The goal of this conference is to contribute to insightful and data-driven dialogue on these pressing (and often politically-charged) issues by bringing together academics, policymakers, industry experts, and other stakeholder groups.

Session topics will include: (1) the environmental and economic impacts of proposed exports of Powder River Basin coal to China; (2) which will happen first: major LNG exports from the U.S. or shale gas development at scale outside of the U.S. (and especially in China); (3) the changing role of the U.S. in the global oil market, and its geopolitical and economic implications; (4) the cases for and against pipelines connecting Canada’s oil sands with U.S. refineries; and (5) the trajectory of future natural gas demand from the U.S. transportation and power sectors.  

Each session will feature a presentation by an academic or industry expert summarizing the state of knowledge on the topic and pointing out major unresolved issues. Discussants from the policymaking and stakeholder communities will then provide their perspectives on the presentation. This will be followed by an opportunity for audience comment and discussion.

 

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Stanford seniors Stephen Craig and Clay Ramel have been awarded The Firestone Medal for Excellence in Undergraduate Research and The William J. Perry Prize, respectively, for their theses on German's foreign policy and the global politics of oil.

Both recipients are students of the CISAC's Undergraduate Honors Program in International Security Studies and will graduate next week.

Craig, a political science major, wrote "Tamed Tiger or Restless Beast? German Foreign Policy in the Post-Unification Period."

Ramel, a science, technology, and society major, wrote “Reconsidering the Roots of Crude Coercion: a Policymaking Analysis of `the Oil Weapon.'”

The Firestone Medal recognizes the top 10 percent of all honors theses in social science, science, and engineering. The Perry Prize is awarded to a student for excellence in policy-relevant research in international security studies. 

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This research area explores the national and international land and water laws that govern land tenure and property rights in sub-Saharan African countries, with the aim of understanding how large-scale land investments influence the tenure security, and therefore food security, of local farmers. The World Bank and others have identified a large agro-ecological region of African known as the Guinea Savannah as well-positioned for major agricultural development.

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This report discusses desirable policy directions and options in the aftermath of the Great Tohoku Earthquake. It argues that the importance of Japan’s productivity growth has not been invalidated by the disaster, and suggests that Japan should consider restoration and reconstruction from the earthquake as a great opportunity to reposition its policies.

It identifies concrete steps Japan can take to jump start growth in three broad themes: regulatory reforms (reducing the costs of doing business, stopping protection for zombie firms, deregulation especially in non-manufacturing sectors and growth enhancing special zones); opening-up of the Japanese economy (trade liberalization, reduction of agricultural subsidies and new immigration policy); and macroeconomic policy reforms (fiscal consolidation and monetary expansion to end deflation).

 

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Takeo Hoshi
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Mark C. Thurber, David R. Hults

National oil companies (NOCs) often behave in strikingly different ways from one another and from private, international oil companies (IOCs). Given that NOCs control about three-quarters of world oil reserves by equity share, their variation in corporate strategy has important implications for the world oil market. The recently released book Oil and Governance: State-owned Enterprises and the World Energy Supply, which we co-edited (along with our colleague, David Victor) and contributed to, explores the variation among NOCs through 15 detailed case studies and several cross-cutting pieces. Building off the research in that book, our aim in this essay is to discuss the differences among NOCs in their approach to risk

As described by Nolan and Thurber in Chapter 4 of our book, the notion of risk encapsulates both the likelihood of a negative outcome (e.g., of drilling a dry hole) and the loss that such an outcome would entail (e.g., the investment in an exploration well). Risks are pervasive in the oil industry because of the enormous sums of money on the line and the significant uncertainty around whether investments will prove successful. In this article we suggest that the goals of the state and its tools of governance may cause an NOC to tend towards one of three types of behavior: risk avoidance, risk taking, or risk management. Each of these three approaches to risk, we find, can be useful or counterproductive for the state depending on the context.

It can be useful for an NOC to avoid risk, as Sonangol has done, if its government is highly dependent on oil revenue, but this approach usually means that it must allow IOCs to shoulder risks if the oil sector is to thrive. Intelligent risk taking by the NOC, on the other hand, can help build domestic technological capability and may be a reasonable approach if the government has less need to maximize hydrocarbon revenue in the short term. Finally, commercial risk management by the NOC may be an appropriate model where the NOC has developed some competitive advantages and its government has few remaining expectations for the NOC apart from revenue generation. There is no “right” or “wrong” approach to risk for NOCs in a general sense. The goal of each government and its NOC should be to make sure that the way the NOC takes, avoids, or manages risk is of benefit to both the country and the NOC itself.

 

Link to article (free trial subscription available) => http://www.worldoil.com/June-2012-Risk-attitudes-shape-national-oil-company-strategies.html

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David Hults
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During the annual China-Japan-Korea summit, held mid-May in Beijing, Premier Wen Jiabao, Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda, and President Lee Myung-bak announced their intention to begin negotiating a trilateral free trade agreement (FTA).

The news closely followed the implementation of the Korea-U.S. FTA and negotiations over the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) FTA championed by the Obama administration, both taking place in March. It potentially places Japan and Korea on awkward footing as they balance relations with China, an important regional leader, and the United States, an ally of many decades’ standing.

What could this proposed East Asia FTA mean for the United States, for the three countries pursuing it, and for global economics and security?

Joseph L. C. Cheng, a visiting professor at Shorenstein APARC and a professor of international business at the University of Illinois where he also serves as director of the CIC Center for Advanced Study in International Competitiveness, suggests the FTA could have a far greater impact beyond boosting economic growth in East Asia. Possible outcomes range from reducing resources for strengthening the U.S. domestic infrastructure to providing leverage for negotiating with North Korea over its nuclear program.

In a recent interview, Cheng spoke in-depth about the nuances of the trilateral East Asia FTA.

If the proposed China-Japan-Korea FTA is realized, what could the impact be on the U.S. economy and economic policy?

These three countries are currently ranked the second (China), third (Japan), and fifteenth (Korea) largest economies in the world. With a combined population of 1.5 billion, they account for about 20 percent of the world’s GDP and total exports. In 2011, their three-way trade reached $690 billion, and the United States sold them a total of $213.6 billion worth of merchandise (over 14 percent of U.S. total world exports in 2011).

If realized, the proposed FTA could have both negative and positive effects on the U.S. economy. On the negative side:

  • First, cross-border trade and investment would most likely increase among China, Japan, and Korea, but not with the United States. Whether the FTA would result in decreased U.S. trade and investment with these countries and by how much will depend on the range of industries and product categories covered by the FTA and how rigorously it will be enforced. Most of this negative impact from the FTA would be with China. This is because the United States already has an FTA with Korea, and Japan (along with Canada and Mexico) is likely to join the U.S.-led TPP FTA which is currently under negotiation.
  • Second, if the FTA did cover the industries and product categories that disadvantage the United States, small-and-medium sized export firms (SMEs) would be the most negatively affected by the decline in U.S. exports to the three member countries. This is because over 90 percent of U.S. SMEs do not conduct manufacturing overseas (and thus cannot produce and sell in these three countries to benefit from the FTA), and their market access is dependent on the U.S. government’s trade initiatives. The SMEs account for about one-third of total U.S. exports and provide most of the domestic job growth.
  • Third, not only would the three member countries import less from the United States, they would also invest less in the United States (but invest more in one another). When announcing the FTA talks, China’s Premier Wen expressed hope that Japan and Korea will be the primary destination for China’s outward investment. This decline in foreign investment from the three member countries in the United States could have a negative impact on domestic job growth and funding for business expansion and public revitalization projects (e.g., infrastructure replacement and modernization).
  • Fourth, because FTAs disadvantage trade from non-member countries, U.S. multinational corporations (MNCs) could be forced to produce and sell goods from their plants in the three member countries (instead of those in the United States) in order to stay competitive. This would mean moving jobs overseas. Also, because these member countries have bilateral FTAs with many other countries in Asia (e.g., the China-ASEAN FTA introduced in January 2010), U.S. MNCs might find it beneficial to increase production there (China, Japan, and Korea) for export to the region. Again, this would result in transfers of jobs overseas and also reduced investment by U.S. MNCs at home (which could help create jobs and grow the domestic economy).

On the positive side, the proposed FTA could result in fewer imports from the member countries into the United States. This would provide an opportunity for U.S. manufacturers, particularly the SMEs, to increase their domestic production to fill the demand-gap and recapture the market-share that has been lost to imports. If U.S. manufacturers could produce unique, high-quality products at an affordable price, they would be able to not only attract new domestic customers and keep them but also open new export markets in other countries, including China, Japan, and Korea.

As for potential impact on U.S. economic policy, the Obama administration might feel the need to speed up the TPP negotiations (which might require making the final FTA less comprehensive and less rigorous than originally proposed) and put the agreement in place ahead of the proposed China-Japan-Korea FTA. Also, the administration might be pressured by the business community to start FTA talks with China, as has been suggested by Maurice Greenberg, chairman of Starr International Company Inc. and former AIG chief. These FTA talks will take years to conclude and implement. In the meantime, the United States should introduce new economic policies to revitalize the domestic manufacturing sector and help position it for enhanced international competitiveness.


Could there be an impact on the struggling economies of Europe?

The proposed FTA would most likely have a similar impact on Europe, namely decreased trade and investment with the three member countries of China, Japan, and Korea (assuming the agreement included industries and product categories that disadvantage Europe). Because of Europe’s worsening debt crisis, the negative impact there would likely be greater than it would be on the United States. Currently, the European Union (EU) has an FTA with Korea, but not with China or Japan. Also, with the exception of Norway, none of the European countries is in FTA talks with China. Switzerland is the only European country with an FTA with Japan. This is not good news for Europe if it wishes to benefit from increased trade and investment with China, Japan, and Korea.

Is there a potential upside for the global economy?

Most of the expected economic benefits resulting from the proposed FTA will go to the three member countries of China, Japan, and Korea. The Chinese government estimates that the FTA could raise China’s GDP by up to 2.0 percent, Japan by 0.5 percent, and Korea by 3.1 percent. The Korean finance ministry estimates that the FTA could boost the nation’s economic growth by up to 3.0 percent and create as many as 330,000 jobs over a decade. This is consistent with the experience of the introduction of the China-ASEAN FTA in January 2010, which caused trade in the region to increase by about 50 percent in that year.

The expected economic growth in the three member countries (and the Asia-Pacific region) could, in the longer term, lead to increased imports from the United States and other Western countries for goods and services that they cannot produce or do not produce enough of. This might result from increased spending by individual consumers on luxury and unique goods and/or government purchase of advanced technologies for infrastructure projects. The increased imports would certainly help lift the global economy by creating more jobs and generating greater incomes in the exporting countries.

When announcing the proposed FTA in Beijing, the three leaders from the member countries made it a point that they will work together to ease regional disputes and tensions, particularly on the Korean Peninsula. They also expect the FTA to help provide a comprehensive and institutional framework in which a wide range of bilateral and trilateral cooperation would evolve, with the goal of maintaining the Asia-Pacific region as the growth center of the world economy. (Currently over 50 percent of the world’s economic growth is taking place in Asia.) To the extent that this can be accomplished, the proposed FTA will have farther-reaching consequences than being just a regional trade agreement.



What is driving the announcement about the intended FTA at this specific point in time?

It is not clear if the announcement was purposefully timed to meet certain strategic objectives. However, a number of factors and recent developments suggest that the timing is quite beneficial to the member countries.

First, the three countries had been in discussion about the proposed FTA for over ten years prior to the announcement. Two of the three principals, China’s Premier Wen and Korea’s President Lee will be leaving office by year’s end and would certainly like to be remembered as architects of this important treaty by participating in its announcement. 

Second, the deteriorating economic crisis in the EU and the slow recovery of the U.S. economy make it very clear to the three leaders that they need to stimulate internal consumption and investment to maintain economic growth in their respective countries. Announcing the proposed FTA now helps ease concerns about the global economy and signal to international investors that the Asia-Pacific region will remain the center of the world’s economic growth for many years to come.

Third, from China’s standpoint, the recent scandals of Bo Xilai and the blind civil rights activist Chen Guangcheng brought negative attention to the country for the entire month of April. The mid-May announcement of the proposed FTA helps redirect the world’s attention to the economic success of China and its influential role in shaping the future of the global economy.

Finally, the recent threat of a third nuclear test from North Korea might have been another contributing factor to having the announcement made sooner rather than later. China might have thought about the proposed FTA as a message to North Korea that China is now working closely with South Korea and Japan to maintain the Asia-Pacific region as the world’s center of economic growth, and thus any new nuclear provocation from North Korea would be considered an unfriendly act.


What could be the biggest challenges to the ratification of the FTA? Can they be overcome?

Historical animosity and territorial disputes between the three member countries will be the greatest challenges to both the FTA negotiation and its final ratification. Korea has recently suspended the signing of agreements on military cooperation with Japan because of public opposition, particularly from the older generations who have bitter memories of Japan’s colonial rule. Japan and China have long been in dispute over territorial claims in the East China Sea. Both Japan and Korea have also been calling for China to put more pressure on North Korea to stop further nuclear provocations. 

In addition to these historical and political obstacles, there will be opposition from interest groups within each country against the proposed FTA for fear of negative economic consequences. For example, Chinese manufacturers might not want increased imports from Japan and Korea to reduce their market share. Japan currently has a big surplus from trade with Korea; thus Korea might not want to have more imports from Japan. Also, the three member countries are quite unbalanced in terms of the liberalization steps that they have already taken and they also have different visions for their economic future.

It will take great diplomatic skills on the part of the negotiators to overcome these challenges. The FTA talks will be difficult and take many years to produce an agreement. Alternatively, the three member countries might choose to smooth the negotiations by avoiding sensitive issues and making the agreement far less comprehensive and rigorous. This would, however, also make the FTA less economically important and consequential. 

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Abstract:

Voter education campaigns often aim to increase voter participation and political accountability. We follow randomized interventions implemented nationwide during the 2009 Mozambican elections using a free newspaper, leaflets and text messaging. We investigate whether treatment effects were transmitted through social networks (kinship and chatting) or geographical proximity. For individuals personally targeted by the campaign, we estimate the reinforcement effect of proximity to other targeted individuals. For untargeted individuals we estimate the diffusion of the campaign depending on proximity to targeted individuals. We find evidence for both effects, similar across the different treatments and across the different connectedness measures. We observe that the treatments worked through networks by raising the levels of information and interest about the election, in line with the average treatments effects. However, differently from those average effects, we find negative network effects of voter education on voter participation. We interpret this result as a free-riding effect, likely to occur for costly actions. 

Marcel Fafchamps is Professor of Development Economics at Oxford University, a Professional Fellow at Mansfield College and the Deputy Director of the Centre for the Study of African Economies. Fafchamps’ research is focused primarily on institutions that enable exchange, including risk-coping strategies, market institutions, intra-household allocation and the allocation of economic activity across space, with a concentration on the regions of Africa and South Asia. He is also interested in spatial networks and social networks from a methodological perspective. His scholarship on the topic of market institutions is summarized in Market Institutions in Sub-Saharan Africa, (MIT Press, 2004), which his work on risk coping is addressed in Rural Poverty, Risk, and Development (Elgar Press, 2003). Fafchamps studied law and economics at the Université Catholique de Louvain and spent nearly five years working on rural development in Africa for the International Labour Organization before earning his Ph.D. in agricultural economics at the University of California, Berkeley in 1989. He taught development economics at Stanford from 1989 until 1998.

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Marcel Fafchamps Professor of Development Economics, Oxford University; Professorial Fellow, Mansfield College; Deputy Director, Centre for the Study of African Economies Speaker

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Stanford, CA 94305

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Olivier Nomellini Senior Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies
Director of the Ford Dorsey Master's in International Policy
Research Affiliate at The Europe Center
Professor by Courtesy, Department of Political Science
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Francis Fukuyama is the Olivier Nomellini Senior Fellow at Stanford University's Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (FSI), and a faculty member of FSI's Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law (CDDRL). He is also Director of Stanford's Ford Dorsey Master's in International Policy, and a professor (by courtesy) of Political Science.

Dr. Fukuyama has written widely on issues in development and international politics. His 1992 book, The End of History and the Last Man, has appeared in over twenty foreign editions. His book In the Realm of the Last Man: A Memoir will be published in fall 2026.

Francis Fukuyama received his B.A. from Cornell University in classics, and his Ph.D. from Harvard in Political Science. He was a member of the Political Science Department of the RAND Corporation, and of the Policy Planning Staff of the US Department of State. From 1996-2000 he was Omer L. and Nancy Hirst Professor of Public Policy at the School of Public Policy at George Mason University, and from 2001-2010 he was Bernard L. Schwartz Professor of International Political Economy at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University. He served as a member of the President’s Council on Bioethics from 2001-2004. He is editor-in-chief of American Purpose, an online journal.

Dr. Fukuyama holds honorary doctorates from Connecticut College, Doane College, Doshisha University (Japan), Kansai University (Japan), Aarhus University (Denmark), the Pardee Rand Graduate School, and Adam Mickiewicz University (Poland). He is a non-resident fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. He is a member of the Board of Trustees of the Rand Corporation, the Board of Trustees of Freedom House, and the Board of the Volcker Alliance. He is a fellow of the National Academy for Public Administration, a member of the American Political Science Association, and of the Council on Foreign Relations. He is married to Laura Holmgren and has three children.

(October 2025)

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Six interdisciplinary student teams have been working with partner organizations in Nairobi to develop innovative prototypes using mobile technologies. They will do brief presentations and then you will have time to meet and discuss with them over light refreshments. For more information about the projects and partners see:

http://hci.stanford.edu/courses/cs379l/

Hasso Plattner Institute of Design
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http://dschool.stanford.edu/about/#getting-to-our-building

Student teams d.school Speaker Stanford University
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Almost every company is asking the question of survivability – how to balance business needs and growth, while meeting regulatory compliance and mitigating security risks? This question is facing organizations of all sizes, and for some the answer is changing the mission and scope of their IT security initiatives. In this session, Malcolm will discuss Intel’s approach to managing risk with its new “Protect to Enable” information security strategy.


Malcolm Harkins is vice president of the Information Technology Group and chief information security officer (CISO) and general manager of Information Risk and Security. The group is responsible for managing the risk, controls, privacy, security and other related compliance activities for all of Intel Corporation's information assets.


Before becoming Intel's first CISO, Harkins held roles in Finance, Procurement and Operations. He has managed efforts encompassing IT benchmarking and Sarbanes Oxley systems compliance. Joining Intel in 1992, Harkins previously held positions as the profit and loss manager for the Flash Products Group; general manager of Enterprise Capabilities, responsible for the delivery and support of Intel's finance and HR systems; and in an Intel business venture focusing on e-commerce hosting. Harkins previously taught at the CIO institute at the UCLA Anderson School of Business and was an adjunct faculty member at Susquehanna University in Pennsylvania. He received the 'Excellence in the Field of Security' award from the RSA conference as well as an Intel Achievement Award. Harkins received his bachelor's degree in economics from the University of California at Irvine and an MBA in finance and accounting from the University of California at Davis.

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Malcolm Harkins Vice President, Information Technology Group; Chief Information Security Officer; General Manager, Information Risk and Security Speaker Intel Corporation
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