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Roundtable at Stanford

On June 26-27, the Stanford Program on Regions of Innovation and Entrepreneurship (SPRIE) hosted a circle of leaders from academia, industry, and the public sector who are driving the understanding and best practice for smart green cities to gather for a dynamic and interactive roundtable at the Graduate School of Business at Stanford University.

The aim was to convene a productive mix of researchers and experts for presentations and fruitful discussion on the challenges and opportunities at the intersection of information technologies and energy that can transform buildings and transportation on the urban scale.

Smart and Green

Innovations at the intersection of smart and green-- in technologies, products and services--are transforming how we work and live. Smart represents ubiquitous information and communication technology, driven by advances in computing, internet, cloud, and mobile. Green signals bringing clean tech to energy consumers to reduce carbon emissions and increase energy efficiency.

Buildings and Transportation in Cities

More than half of the world’s population now resides in cities, with urbanization projected to intensify in key areas, such as in China and Africa.  In cities, buildings and transportation account for the largest proportion of energy use; together they also shape the quality of daily life and work.

Learning from Innovations Deployed or Ready to Demo

In these two key application areas, there has been a great deal of R&D, investment and experimentation, ranging from designs for whole new cities in Son

"Innovations for Smart Green Cities" Conference program
gdo and Masdar to installations of services on mobile devices in Seoul and Barcelona.  These advancements have been joined by innovations in public private partnerships, financial models, and policy instruments. Now that early phase innovations have been built, installed and tested by users, some products and services have proven to be successful. Others are less effective, economical or scalable than hoped; others are emerging as more disruptive and valuable than anticipated.  What have we learned to date?  What is on the horizon?

Key Questions

With the early phases of technologies, products and services now deployed, it is important to take stock.  What is working (and what is not)?  Why?  How can feedback from researchers, designers, vendors, and—importantly—users be leveraged for future improvement in design and strategy?   What new developments are ready to demo or be commercialized that may also significant impact the next generation of smart green cities?

During the “Smart Green Innovations” Roundtable, discussions focused on an array of questions, such as:

  • In the key application areas of buildings and transportation, what lessons have been learned through implementation of smart green products and services deployed to date?
  • What are critical bottlenecks for the development of smart green cities?  How to overcome challenges, such as facilitating rapid learning, proving financial viability, or integrating innovations into complex systems?
  • What frameworks and tools can be used to better analyze and improve smart green cities?
  • Which cities around the globe have demonstrated effective smart and green innovations?  Which are leading case studies that illustrate lessons on what is effective and scalable? 
  • What government roles and policies have been effective?  What partnerships—including those that are cross-discipline, cross-sector, cross-organization,  or cross-border—are helping accelerate the development and deployment of high impact innovations that can shape smart green cities?
  • How is the landscape for smart and green shifting globally--where are the hotspots or centers of knowledge and excellence?
  • Who are some of the key innovators, labs, firms, and organizations pioneering the way? What technologies, products, services, and business models are driving the next generation of innovation?
  • What firms and entrepreneurs look promising for leading the next wave of change for smart green cities?

Knight Management Center, Stanford Graduate School of Business

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Adrian Bonifacio, a second generation Filipino-American from Chicago, is one of the recipients of the Program on Human Rights and the McCoy Family Center for Ethics in Society's 2012 Human Rights Fellowship.  The Program on Human Rights at the Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law together with the McCoy Family Center for Ethics in Society offer four annual summer fellowships in human rights open to Stanford undergraduates interested in working for organizations, government agencies, NGOs or international organizations that promote or defend human rights.

This summer, Bonifacio will work with the Asian Pacific Mission for Migrants, a non-governmental organization based in Hong Kong that promotes and defends the rights of migrant workers, a majority of whom are Filipino. Filipino immigrants in Hong Kong work predominately as domestic workers. The situation of Filipino diasporas is very complex with more than 10% of the Filipino population abroad, and over 4,000 Filipinos leaving the country every day.

Passionate about Filipino and Filipino-American issues relating to human rights such as migration, exploitation, and servitude, Stanford undergraduate Bonifacio has joined Filipino groups such as Stanford’s Pilipino American Student Union (PASU) and Anakbayan Silicon Valley, a youth organization based in Santa Clara County. He is currently pursuing a major in international relations with a minor in economics as well as co-term masters degree in sociology.

In the 1970s, Filipino dictator Ferdinand Marcos began the Labor Export Policy (LEP), a deliberate policy to send Filipino workers abroad. “This became a vicious cycle, the Philippines tried to achieve economic development based on remittances but because it sends both high skill and low skill workers abroad, and because the remittances they send are not usually put towards investment and long term development, there is not much progress happening in the country," explained Bonifacio. "Every president since Marcos has continued to promote the LEP in the name of national development.”

Last summer, Bonifacio worked for HURIGHTS OSAKA, a human rights non-profit organization, where he conducted research related to Filipino migrants in Japan to understand the link between human rights and remittances. “Although it was difficult integrating with the community in such a limited timeframe, a lot of different opportunities presented themselves—celebrating Philippine Independence Day, cooking Filipino food for events, even performing traditional dances," said Bonifacio. "My supervisor at work and all the migrants I have come to know made my transition into life in Japan, as well as my research, much easier.”

Japan and agencies in the Philippines that facilitate labor migration are notorious for abusing “entertainment visas” which allowed young women to be trafficked into Japan. Many Filipino women were promised jobs in high-end hotels as singers or dancers, but upon arrival in Japan, were trafficked into bars, with some entering prostitution rings and red light districts... Starting in the mid-1980s, many Japanese men in rural areas began to “import” Filipino women as mail-order brides, to solve the demographic problem of low birth rates caused largely by women moving out to cities to pursue professional careers.

Although the mail-order bride phenomenon has died down and Japan has since abolished the entertainment visa in 2006, there are still cases of abuse and human trafficking. Moreover, Filipino men have a history of working in construction, often as day laborers with insecure sources of income and housing. According to Bonifacio, “It is hard to determine the proportion of remittances that come from exploitation, but if you look at general trends and the types of employment Filipinos have all over the world—for example as “entertainers” in Japan or domestic workers in Hong Kong, Saudi Arabia, and even the United States—one could say that remittances and exploitation are closely connected.”

In preparation for his fellowship in Hong Kong Bonifacio says, “I was humbled by what I saw in Japan. I think that one of the best things one can do to educate oneself - and something that does not always happen in a classroom - is to understand the community we want to serve. We need to learn about the issues these communities face before considering fighting for change.”

Students interested in applying to the human rights fellowship for the summer of 2013 should contact Nadejda Marques to learn about the selection process and deadline for submission.

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Scarborough Shoal, a tiny rocky outcropping and lagoon off the west coast of the Philippines, sits at the center of the latest South China Sea tug-of-war. Protesters took to the streets in Manila on May 11 to criticize China’s support of fishermen who entered the disputed territory a month ago and sparked a yet unresolved naval standoff between the Philippines and China. On May 9, while ships from both sides maneuvered in the area, Manila's secretary of defense assured Filipinos that if Beijing attacked, Washington would come to the country’s defense.  

That expectation had been strengthened in Manila in November 2011 when the visiting American secretary of state, Hillary Clinton, referred to the South China Sea as the “West Philippine Sea.” Clinton’s slip of the tongue was not a major diplomatic incident. But some Flipinos saw it as a sign of U.S. support for their government's maritime claims.

Washington’s refusal to side with any of the claimant states had not changed. What had changed was the level of American concern. In the November 2011 issue of Foreign Policy Clinton had defended the idea of a “pivot” toward Asia, meaning a renewed U.S. focus on Asia after a decade of intense military activity in Afghanistan and Iraq.

The term “pivot” has fallen out of favor in Washington, but the Obama administration’s heightened interest in Asia is real and ongoing, says Donald K. Emmerson, director of Stanford’s Southeast Asia Forum. He recently discussed the nuances of what he describes as an important but “lopsided pivot.”

How does the pivot fit into the larger global picture?

In the continuing debate as to whether the United States is in decline, the key question is: relative to what? Certainly, if we compare the situation now with the period immediately after World War II, the United States is less powerful relative to the power of other states. But 1945 ushered in a uniquely unipolar moment in American history. Americans had escaped the physical devastation wreaked on Europe and much of Asia. Germany and Japan lay in ruins. Twenty million Russians were dead. China’s long-running civil war would soon resume. Suddenly America had no credible competitors for global power.

Today? Conventional wisdom holds that Asia has become the center of gravity in the global economy. Yet even if we use purchasing power parity rather than exchange rates to measure the American share of world GDP, that share has only modestly decreased. Meanwhile, China’s remarkable rise may be leveling off. The evidence is less that the United States is in secular decline than that the world is changing in ways to which Americans need to adapt if they are to regain economic health. If the pivot facilitates that adaptation, it will have been a success.

Do you interpret the pivot to the Asia-Pacific as more hype or reality?

The pivot is definitely a reality, but the reality is partly about symbolism and atmospherics. The pivot conveys reassurance, particularly to Southeast Asia, that the United States cares about the Asia-Pacific region and that it is willing to cooperate more than before with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Part of that is simply “showing up”—a willingness to attend ASEAN regional meetings. Another part of the pivot, however, involves raising the American security profile in the region, which has so far strengthened ASEAN’s diplomatic hand in dealing with China’s sweeping claim to the South China Sea.

How has the pivot been received and interpreted in Asia?

Generally speaking, the pivot has been welcomed in Southeast Asia, despite worries that if it becomes an effort to contain China, a Sino-American cold war could result. The specific responses of Southeast Asian governments have differed, however, on a spectrum from passive acquiescence to active support.

In Japan, the rotation of prime ministers in and out of office has understandably focused that country’s politics more on domestic concerns, and the still not fully resolved disposition of U.S. forces on Okinawa has drawn energy from the bilateral relationship.

As a “middle power,” South Korea has been supportive of multilateral frameworks and solutions. Seoul is pleased to see a renewed American interest in working with Asians in multilateral settings such as ASEAN and the East Asia Summit.

China’s response has varied between cool and hostile. The foreign ministry has treated the pivot with some equanimity compared with the hostility of those in the People’s Liberation Army who view increased American involvement in Asia as a threat to Chinese aims and claims, especially regarding the South China Sea. China’s foreign policy is the outcome of contestation between various groups inside the country that do not necessarily see eye to eye on how best to handle the United States.

What do you see as the main implications, repercussions, and complications of the pivot?

The pivot, as Hillary Clinton advertised it in her Foreign Policy article, signals a shift in U.S. priorities away from Iraq and Afghanistan. For a time following the 9/11 attacks on America in 2001, the United States tended either to neglect Southeast Asia or to treat it as a second front in the “war on terror.” Economically, the pivot implies an acknowledgment that if America is to prosper in this century it will have to pay closer attention to Asia as an engine of global economic growth. Diplomatically, the pivot implies that with regard to Asian states, Washington cannot merely manage its relations bilaterally as the hub where their spokes meet, but must cultivate multilateral diplomacy as well. Militarily, the pivot implies that even while the American global force posture is drawn down in some parts of the world, it needs to be upgraded in Asia in response to Asian and American concerns over the terms on which China’s rise will take place.

A major constructive repercussion of the pivot has been the evolution of China’s own diplomacy in Southeast Asia. Previously China had disavowed multilateral diplomacy with Southeast Asians over claims to the South China Sea—a bilateralist strategy that in Southeast Asian eyes resembled an effort to “divide and rule.” America’s willingness to reach out to ASEAN and take part in ASEAN events has helped diplomats in any one Southeast Asian country to resist having to face China alone. Multilateral discussions, involving China and meant to prepare the way toward an eventual Code of Conduct, are now underway.

But as we saw recently during Hillary Clinton’s visit to the Philippines, it is important for Washington to maintain its independence and impartiality while facilitating peace in the region.

Complications? Yes, there is a danger that Washington could be dragged into supporting, or appearing to support, the claims of one of the Southeast Asian parties to the dispute. The Obama administration is aware of this risk, however, and I strongly doubt that an American official will again refer to the “West Philippine Sea.” 

A more serious complication in the longer run may arise from the pivot’s emphasis to date on Asian-Pacific security, and its relative lack of attention to creating and cultivating American economic opportunities in Asia.

China’s economic footprint in Asia is large and growing. It has moved up to become the main trading partner of many countries that used to trade proportionally more with the United States. An unbalanced relationship in which China saves and lends what Americans borrow and spend is unhealthy for both countries, and it cannot last. The pivot should forestall an invidious division of labor whereby Washington through the Seventh Fleet subsidizes the regional peace that enables Asians to prosper doing business with China. A higher priority needs to be placed on promoting American trade and investment in Asia, including China.

The Obama administration is hoping to persuade more Asian economies to join an arrangement called the Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership (TPP), but the bar that it sets is high. The TPP’s strict protections for the environment, labor, and intellectual property rights and its comprehensive cuts in both tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade have raised its quality but lowered its appeal, especially to the region’s larger economies. Meanwhile, anticipated cuts in American budgets for defense will only intensify the need to refocus the pivot on economic as well as military access to Asia.

Related Resources

Foreign Policy: “America’s Pacific Century”
November 2011 article by Hillary Clinton introducing the concept of the "Asia pivot."

Stanford Daily: "Obama pivots policy toward Asia"
Summary of Donald K. Emmerson's May 1, 2012 talk.

LinkAsia: "Treat Scarborough Shoal Incident as a 'Wake Up Call'"

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Hillary Clinton departs a U.S. navy ship docked in Manila Bay, November 2011.
Flickr / U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Andrew Ryan Smith; http://bit.ly/LyyYYd
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Karl Eikenberry has spent the better part of the last 40 years in uniform, and much of it in combat zones. Then as U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan, he continued a mission of service to his country.

Now he's offering his thoughts on the future of the military, and even turning a critical eye on the institution he has long served.

But, he told an audience during his second Payne Lecture, hosted by Stanford's Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, "We must not confuse dissent for disloyalty."

Eikenberry, who left the Army in 2009 when he became ambassador, said he has been disturbed in recent years by how political leaders have been using the military and by what he characterized as the military's outsized role in determining national security and foreign policy.

"These are problems that have to be acknowledged and debated publicly for the good of the nation and, I believe, our Armed Forces," he said during the May 3 lecture.

He said the dissolution of the draft after the Vietnam War led to the creation of an incredibly competent and capable military, but one that elected officials are more willing to deploy.

Drafted vs. voluntary armed forces

"Question No. 1," Eikenberry asked the audience, "If we had a conscript Armed Forces in 2003 and that conscript Armed Forces then are the sons and daughters, drafted, of constituents of our members of Congress, I want you to raise your hand if you think in 2003 we would have invaded Iraq."

Eikenberry questioned, as well, whether Congress would have held hearings – which it hasn't done – into the killings of Americans and allied servicemen by Afghan soldiers and police if the victims had been draftees rather than enlistees.

After only a few hands went up, Eikenberry said, "When you see those results, is there something wrong with the system?"

The former lieutenant general, who did not endorse a draft, urged a debate on ownership of the military: Does it belong to the American people or politicians?

He warned that the separation between soldiers and civilians – in daily life on bases, for example – also leads to ignorance of how the other lives. The separation can mean less judiciousness by lawmakers when determining whether to send service members into war, he said.

He also criticized the lack of oversight of the military by Congress and the media.

"I witnessed this up close and personal in Afghanistan when I transitioned from general to the top diplomat," he said. "Formerly treated with great deference by members of Congress, both I and my embassy team were now constantly on the witness stand."

He said lawmakers were right to challenge them: "We're spending a good deal of taxpayers' money."

He said as a member of the military, he never experienced that kind of scrutiny, as lawmakers are reluctant to be seen as less than fully supportive of troops.

"But by not subjecting the military to the same rigorous standards of scrutiny, they were applying a double standard and I don't think they were doing their complete jobs," he said.

He also said the media have failed to provide critical analysis of military engagements because of relentless pressure to file stories and fear they'll lose authoritative sources if they question actions.

Eikenberry spoke about responsibility and accountability within the military itself, as well.

Regarding the second Iraq war, he said the failure to anticipate the post-invasion environment was a massive failure of military command and planning, not just civilian.

"The costs of this failure have been enormous," he said. "And yet, there has been no accounting."

The 'strategic corporal'

He also talked about the "strategic corporal," a term coined by then-Marine Corps Commandant General Charles Krulak in 1999. The strategic corporal refers to the serviceman whose missteps, wittingly or unwittingly, can have a strategic impact on the outcome of a military campaign.

He said in World War II there were no strategic corporals, only strategic commanders. A corporal's missteps would likely not affect military advancement in a battle.

"In the 21st century, however, in an era of instantaneous global communications and decentralized combat fought across very complex political, ethnic and religious mosaics, the strategic corporal does decidedly exist," he said, mentioning Abu Ghraib, the recent Koran burnings and the suspected murder of 17 Afghan civilians by an Army soldier.

"When the president of the United States has to apologize frequently for the misdeeds of members of our Armed Forces on the global stage as he's had to do in recent months, I have to say, I don't think that he or the American people are being well served," Eikenberry said.

He said in those cases of misdeeds, the mission may be too risky or the strategy not well planned out, and policy should possibly be reconsidered.

As the war in Afghanistan winds down and the military's mission is refocused, Eikenberry said the biggest security threat to the U.S. is a faltering economy. He echoed the sentiments of former Joint Chiefs of Staff Adm. Mike Mullen, who said in 2010 that he considered the country's growing debt to be its No. 1 security threat.

"With a broken economy, our country cannot make the foundational investments in education, research and development, and infrastructure that are absolutely essential to sustaining a strong defense," Eikenberry said.

Eikenberry said retirement and health care costs in the Defense Department also are ballooning.

Eikenberry said it is important to keep our research and development lead, invest in education, ensure we have systems in place to defend U.S. borders against terrorism and invest more in alliances and partnerships as the world becomes more multi-polar.

He also said the military needs to know what it's after.

"With the end of the Afghan and Iraq conflicts, and our current fiscal crisis, our military leaders and our civilian leaders, they need to better define threats and they must be ready to address today and tomorrow these threats," he said.

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About the talk

Emerging economies such as China and India have become “hotspots” of multinational R&D investments. As some observers have argued, some unique products/services are first developed in and for emerging markets, then subsequently introduced to advanced markets. This is named “reverse innovation” and proclaimed to bring great challenges for existing industrial dominators (Immelt, Govindarajan & Trimble, 2009). If true, what would be its impact on multinational global R&D strategies and organizations? What kind of capabilities and mechanism should be developed to respond this change?

Based on case studies in China, Dr. Liang will discuss three new types of multinationals’ R&D units abroad. All of them are host-country-based instead of home-country-based, which indicates the latest change of multinational global R&D distribution. Furthermore, the talk will also explore the global R&D strategy and innovation pattern of Chinese home-grown companies such as Huawei and ZTE, and the relationship between multinationals’ R&D relocation in China, as well as their implications on global innovation landscape.

About the speaker

Dr. LIANG Zheng is currently working at the MIT Industrial Performance Center (IPC) as the Fulbright Visiting Research Scholar. Presently he is carrying out research projects on multinationals’ global R&D network expansion and integration, as well as the internationalization of new industrial leaders from emerging economies. He serves as the associate professor of the School of Public Policy and Management, Tsinghua University, as well as the research fellow and assistant director of China Institute for Science & Technology Policy at Tsinghua University (CISTP), which is jointly established by Ministry of Science and Technology of China and Tsinghua University, mainly focusing on the studies of S&T policy and the national strategy of S&T development. Before joining Tsinghua University, Dr. Liang served as the associate professor of the International Business School in Nankai University. He got his doctor’s degree of economics at Nankai University (2003) and accomplished the senior executive training program on leadership at Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University (2010). The main areas of his research focus on globalization of R&D, IPRs and standardization and the National Innovation System. Dr. Liang has also participated in some of China’s key research projects such as the Strategic Research for National Medium and Long Term Science and Technology Development Program.

E103, Faculty Building East, Knight Management Center, Stanford Graduate School of Business, 655 Knight Way, Stanford, CA 94305-7298

LIANG, Zheng Associate Professor, School of Public Policy and Management Speaker Tsinghua University
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FSI Senior Fellow Emeritus and Director-Emeritus, Shorenstein APARC
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Henry S. Rowen was a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution, a professor of public policy and management emeritus at Stanford University's Graduate School of Business, and a senior fellow emeritus of the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (Shorenstein APARC). Rowen was an expert on international security, economic development, and high tech industries in the United States and Asia. His most current research focused on the rise of Asia in high technologies.

In 2004 and 2005, Rowen served on the Presidential Commission on the Intelligence of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction. From 2001 to 2004, he served on the Secretary of Defense Policy Advisory Board. Rowen was assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs in the U.S. Department of Defense from 1989 to 1991. He was also chairman of the National Intelligence Council from 1981 to 1983. Rowen served as president of the RAND Corporation from 1967 to 1972, and was assistant director of the U.S. Bureau of the Budget from 1965 to 1966.

Rowen most recently co-edited Greater China's Quest for Innovation (Shorenstein APARC, 2008). He also co-edited Making IT: The Rise of Asia in High Tech (Stanford University Press, 2006) and The Silicon Valley Edge: A Habitat for Innovation and Entrepreneurship (2000). Rowen's other books include Prospects for Peace in South Asia (edited with Rafiq Dossani) and Behind East Asian Growth: The Political and Social Foundations of Prosperity (1998). Among his articles are "The Short March: China's Road to Democracy," in National Interest (1996); "Inchon in the Desert: My Rejected Plan," in National Interest (1995); and "The Tide underneath the 'Third Wave,'" in Journal of Democracy (1995).

Born in Boston in 1925, Rowen earned a bachelors degree in industrial management from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in 1949 and a masters in economics from Oxford University in 1955.

Faculty Co-director Emeritus, SPRIE
Senior Fellow, Hoover Institution
Henry S. Rowen Co-Director, SPRIE Host Stanford Graduate School of Business
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