Abstract: Imagine two guys. Second-generation Muslim-American Ahmad feels threatened by the ‘corrupting influences’ within his suburban factory town, detests his mother’s ‘western’ ways, and seeks out a radical imam for guidance. In contrast, Palestinian-born Mike worked as an Intel engineer, married an American Christian, and played company softball in his spare time. If only one is a terrorist, it is easy to pick out which one. Right? Wrong. Maher “Mike” Hawash served a six-year sentence for conspiring to aid the Taliban. Ahmad Mulloy is the fictional protagonist of John Updike’s novel, Terrorist.

It is easy to assume that terrorists are poorly integrated or disconnected from society. But this talk argues that such assumptions about the ‘typical terrorist’ are not only wrong, but dangerous. I argue that better immigrant integration will not stop terrorism – because most terrorists are just as well, if not better, integrated into western societies than other immigrants. Further, policies that exacerbate differences between immigrants and the native-born actually may facilitate radicalization of new terrorists; they provide new fuel for the argument that immigrants, and especially Muslims, are being disproportionately targeted.

About the Speaker: Betsy Cooper is a Law and International Security Postdoctoral Fellow with CISAC, working on projects related to state immigration policy. Dr. Cooper recently finished serving as a Yale Public Interest Fellow, working with the Department of Homeland Security's Office of Policy on Comprehensive Immigration Reform and related issues. She is a 2012 graduate of Yale Law School, after which she clerked for Judge William Fletcher on the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Dr. Cooper is the author of over twenty manuscripts and articles on US and European immigration and refugee policy, and has consulted for Atlantic Philanthropies (Dublin, Ireland), the Prime Minister's Strategy Unit in London, the World Bank, and a number of immigration think tanks. In addition to her law degree, Betsy holds a DPhil in Politics from Oxford University, an M.Sc. in Forced Migration from Oxford University, and a B.A. in Industrial and Labor Relations from Cornell University.

Abstract: The development and maintenance of a nuclear weapons arsenal is primarily about managing risk trade-offs. However, there is no integrated method for performing the high-level risk analysis that would allow for the more explicit examination of those trade-offs, or the testing of assumptions and alternatives. Quantitative risk analytic methods can provide powerful insights to policy and decision makers by explicitly examining estimates of consequences, disparate uncertainties, interdependencies, and trade-offs. Even the initial process of framing a formal risk analysis can provide increased clarity and valuable insights. I will present the current status of my efforts to construct a first version of a quantitative risk analytic method and the associated models. I will also discuss some of the challenges that must be addressed to fully implement those models, and my plans for further development. 

About the Speaker: Jason C. Reinhardt is a national security systems analyst, and is currently pursuing a Ph.D. in Risk Analysis from Stanford University’s Department of Management Science and Engineering Engineering Risk Research Group, focusing on nuclear weapons arsenal management. Specifically, he is developing quantitative risk models to examine the trade-offs faced by nuclear armed nations in the process of disarmament. He is also pursuing research aimed at modeling and quantifying the catastrophic risks posed by near earth asteroid encounters. Other research interests include game theoretic applications to risk analysis and management, as well as adversary models. While at CISAC, he hopes to engage subject matter and policy experts to strengthen his modeling and analysis of nuclear weapon arsenal risk.

Prior to beginning his current studies, Jason managed a group of experts at Sandia National Laboratories that focused on technical studies to guide policy and decision makers across government. He joined Sandia National Laboratories in August of 2002, and has worked on a diverse set of projects both as an engineer and as an analyst, including the development of instrumentation for in-situ atmospheric measurement, embedded systems design, borders security analyses, and nuclear counter-terrorism strategy development.

He has worked extensively with the Department of Homeland Security on nuclear matters, and has also worked with the Department of Energy, the Department of Defense, the intelligence community, and within the national laboratory enterprise on a diverse array of national security projects. He has participated in the planning and hosting of international conferences and engagements, briefed congressional representatives, and served as a subject-matter expert on the topics of border security and nuclear and radiological defense.

Jason holds a B.S. in Electrical Engineering from the Purdue School of Electrical Engineering at Indianapolis, and a M.S. in Electrical Engineering from Stanford University.

Abstract: With the development of cyber capabilities by an increasing number of states, policymakers as well as scholars have been calling for the negotiation of a new international treaty to regulate cyber warfare. This paper provides an account and analysis of relevant debates in the United Nations with a focus on the position of four states – Russia, China, the US and the UK. Discussions have been concentrated in the First Committee of the General Assembly which has been seized with the issue since 1998 when the Russian Federation submitted a proposal for an international convention to govern the use of information and communication technologies for military purposes. While these efforts towards a wholesale international treaty have not materialized, Russia and China continue to advocate a change in the legal status through the promulgation of additional norms. In contrast, the US and the UK have been firm supporters of applying current legal regimes, including the UN Charter and the Geneva Conventions, to the use of cyber capabilities by states. In advancing these positions, two powerful narratives have emerged each emphasizing different aspects of the cybersecurity debate.

About the Speaker: Elaine Korzak is a postdoctoral cybersecurity fellow at CISAC. She earned her Ph.D from the Department of War Studies at King´s College London in 2014. Her thesis examined the applicability and adequacy of international legal frameworks to the emerging phenomenon of cyber attacks. Her analysis focused on two legal areas in particular: international law on the use of force and international humanitarian law. Elaine holds both an MA in International Peace and Security from King´s College London and an LL.M in Public International Law from the LSE. Her professional experience includes various governmental and non-governmental institutions, including NATO´s Cyber Defence Section as well as the European Commission´s Directorate-General on Information Society and Media.

This event has been cancelled. We will update our website once the new date has been determined.

Many ethnically divided societies are ridden with inter-ethnic conflicts which inhibit their economic development. Many scholars have advocated the adoption of “consensual” political institutions to facilitate the peaceful resolutions of ethnic conflicts in relatively mature democracies. In this paper, we argue instead that achieving social peace may require, in weakly institutional political environments, the transfer of de facto political power to opposition groups, for example, through their co-optation into the military. If the military is divided (i.e. formed by a plurality of ethnic groups) rather than unified (i.e. comprised by the same ethnic group that controls the government), the state can credibly commit to implement fiscal policies in line with the interests of a broad spectrum of social groups. This is because the groups whose interests are not served, but who have some de facto power generated by being part of the army, can pose a credible coup threat to the government. This credible threat induces the government to implement consensual policies, and therefore allows to smooth the underlying ethnic conflicts, preventing not only ethnic coups but also secessions and civil wars. Nevertheless, the strategy of ethnic balancing of the army is potentially risky, since it may induce the soldiers to attempt a preemptive coup in order to block the reform, as a reorganization of the military will reduce the rents of incumbent soldiers. One important message of our paper is that there may not be silver-bullet solutions to the problems caused by ethnic conflicts in weakly politicized societies, as it may prove difficult to reconcile the goal of preventing civil wars and secessions with the goal of preventing coups.

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Professor Vindigni's research interests focus on the political economy of a broad class of institutions. In particular, he has written on the political determinants of job protection legislation, the political economy of democratic constitutional choice, the effects of wars on political institutions and democratic transitions, and more recently on the political and economic origins of state power, military dictatorships and of religious beliefs and ideologies, in both analytic and comparative-historical perspective.

This talk is part of the Comparative Politics Workshop series, co-sponsored by The Europe Center.

Is Europe "elderly and haggard", and could France become "the crucible of  Europe" (Jan. 10, 2015 NYTimes op-ed)?

On the one hand, Europe is warned by the US about an Asian "pivot", and is perceived here as less relevant and effective. Significantly, certainly as a wake up call, Pope Francis recently compared Europe to  a "grandmother, no longer fertile and vibrant, increasingly a bystander in a world that has apparently become less and less Eurocentric”. France had been previously presented here as an eminent representative of an "Old Europe".

On the other hand,  the US has been constantly, during the last decade, advocating for a stronger Europe  and stressing a special French role in this endeavour. A few days ago, after the terrorist attacks in Paris, President Obama publicly stated that "France was the US oldest Ally". 

At a time when we have to face common challenges in the Middle East and in Africa, to adapt to new emerged actors and a more assertive Russia, to deal with direct threats including in the field of proliferation and the cyber space, to define a multipolar world and organize our economic relation (TTIP), what can be the EU contribution? What can also be a special intellectual and diplomatic French input to this global realignment?

Co-sponsored by The Europe Center, the Center for International Security and Cooperation and the France-Stanford Center.

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Ambassador Eric Lebédel is a French diplomat, former ambassador to the OSCE and to Finland, with a deep experience in Transatlantic relationship (twice as Minister's advisor;  in the French embassy in Washington DC) and in European affairs. He is also involved in crisis management (PMs office), international security (embassy in Moscow, consul general in Istanbul) and multilateral diplomacy ( NATO's Director for crisis management, OSCE). Presently working on Strategic Partnerships for the French MFA and interested in e.diplomacy, he also regularly lectures  at Sciences-po and ENA (Ecole Nationale d'Administration) on crisis management and Europe.

Speaker Bio

Michael Bernstein

Michael Bernstein is an Assistant Professor of Computer Science at Stanford University, where he co-directs the Human-Computer Interaction group and is a Robert N. Noyce Family Faculty Scholar. His research in human-computer interaction focuses on the design of crowdsourcing and social computing systems. This work has received Best Paper awards and nominations at premier venues in human-computer interaction and social computing (ACM UIST, ACM CHI, ACM CSCW, AAAI ISWSM). Michael has been recognized with the NSF CAREER award, as well as the George M. Sprowls Award for best doctoral thesis in Computer Science at MIT. He holds Ph.D. and M.S. degrees in Computer Science from MIT, and a B.S. in Symbolic Systems from Stanford University.

This event is part of the Liberation Technology Seminar Series.