Abstract: In fragile states, regimes must cultivate military forces strong enough to ward off external threats, but loyal enough to resist launching a coup. This requires that leader distinguish the loyal from the untrustworthy, a particularly challenging exercise in post-conflict settings with weak institutions. In this study, I explore how Congolese soldiers operating in North Kivu, the largest operational theater in the Democratic Republic of Congo and the epicenter of one of the most violent conflicts in Africa, solve this crucial task. I argue that leaders use non-payment as a form of trial and tribulation that reveals commitment by driving non-loyal soldiers to defect and loyal soldiers to weather challenging times. Non-payments creates a dual-pronged screening process because unpaid soldiers engage in unit-managed extortion and violence against civilians, which is used to both test and generate loyalty. To detail and assess this argument, I couple thick description based on 100 open-ended qualitative interviews with a fine-grained quantitative analysis of 350 members of the armed forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo. This analysis provides a novel explanation for how leaders overcome classic screening dilemmas in ways that ultimately drives violence against civilians.
About the Speaker: Grant Gordon is a PhD Candidate in international relations and comparative politics at Columbia University. His research examines the political economy of conflict, humanitarian intervention and institutions, and combines field experiments, original survey data, ethnography and unique administrative data.
His dissertation seeks to understand the logic of state violence during conflict. In a complementary set of empirical papers, he analyzes why simple strategies used to solve principal agent problems in states afflicted by war cause civilian abuse.
Abstract: How do leaders win power struggles in Leninist regimes? The political science literature emphasizes the importance of institutions in such polities: institutionalization allegedly provides a mechanism for distributing patronage, prevents the military and secret police from playing a special role, and strictly delineates the group that selects the leadership. This project instead argues that the defining feature of one-party states is the lack of institutionalization. Power struggles are therefore determined by prestige and sociological ties, politicized militaries and secret police, and the manipulation of multiple decision-making bodies. I test the relative explanatory value of these two competing sets of hypotheses by examining the power struggles fought by Nikita Khrushchev, Deng Xiaoping, and Kim Ilsung. The historic failure to institutionalize leadership selection had a tragic legacy: its absence is crucial for understanding the origins of stagnation, the tragedy at Tiananmen Square in 1989, and the Kim family multi-generational personality cult.
About the Speaker: Joseph Torigian is a Ph.D. student at MIT interested in Chinese, Russian, and North Korean elite politics and qualitative methods. His current research uses archival material to investigate how war affects political authority in authoritarian regimes. Before coming to MIT, Joseph worked at the Council on Foreign Relations and studied China's policies towards Central Asia as a Fulbright Scholar at Fudan University in Shanghai. He has conducted dissertation research at the Higher School of Economics in Moscow and as a visiting scholar at the Institute for Security and Conflict Studies at George Washington University. He received his BA in Political Science at the University of Michigan and speaks Chinese and Russian.
Growing evidence demonstrates that climatic conditions can have a profound impact on the functioning of modern human societies, but effects on economic activity appear inconsistent. Fundamental productive elements of modern economies, such as workers and crops, exhibit highly non-linear responses to local temperature even in wealthy countries. In contrast, aggregate macroeconomic productivity of entire wealthy countries is reported not to respond to temperature= while poor countries respond only linearly. Resolving this conflict between micro and macro observations is critical to understanding the role of wealth in coupled human–natural systems and to anticipating the global impact of climate change. Here we unify these seemingly contradictory results by accounting for non-linearity at the macro scale. We show that overall economic productivity is non-linear in temperature for all countries, with productivity peaking at an annual average temperature of 13 °C and declining strongly at higher temperatures. The relationship is globally generalizable, unchanged since 1960, and apparent for agricultural and non-agricultural activity in both rich and poor countries. These results provide the first evidence that economic activity in all regions is coupled to the global climate and establish a new empirical foundation for modelling economic loss in response to climate change, with important implications. If future adaptation mimics past adaptation, unmitigated warming is expected to reshape the global economy by reducing average global incomes roughly 23% by 2100 and widening global income inequality, relative to scenarios without climate change. In contrast to prior estimates, expected global losses are approximately linear in global mean temperature, with median losses many times larger than leading models indicate.
Abstract: Cybersecurity depends heavily on civilian cyber defense, which is decentralized, private, and voluntary. Although the structure of this field stands to have a profound impact on national and international security, its history is rarely subject to critical or comparative analysis. Why is civilian cyber defense organized this way? There are at least three plausible explanations for the origins and evolution of cyber defense as an organizational field: technology, bureaucracy, and ideology. I examine the influence of each factor during the formative years of the Internet in the United States. From the beginning, malware was described in terms of infectious disease (viruses and worms), so I use public health to provide comparative context for cyber defense. I find that technological determinism explains far less about the genesis of this field than often assumed. Bureaucratic politics are also insufficient. Therefore, I argue that the American ideology of anti-statism is necessary to explain civilian cyber defense, and this family of ideas has important implications for security cooperation at home and abroad.
About the Speaker: Frank Smith is a Senior Lecturer with the Centre for International Security Studies and the Department of Government and International Relations at the University of Sydney. His teaching and research examine the relationship between technology and international security. His book, American Biodefense, explains why the U.S. military struggled to defend itself and the country against biological warfare and bioterrorism. His current research examines cyber security cooperation; he is also analyzing the potential impact of quantum computing on international relations. Previously, Smith was a visiting scholar with the Institute for Security and Conflict Studies at the Elliott School of International Affairs, a research fellow with the Griffith Asia Institute, and a pre-doctoral fellow with the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University. He has a Ph.D. in political science and a B.S. in biological chemistry, both from the University of Chicago.
Frank Smith
Senior Lecturer
Speaker
Centre for International Security Studies; Department of Government and International Relations, University of Sydney
Francis Fukuyama discusses Congress's dysfunctional budgetary politics in "The American Interest", asking why the United States is one of the only advanced democracies under constant threat of government shutdown. Given America's peculiar institutions, technical and institutional reforms to the budgeting process may be limited in their impact.
New research finds that without climate change mitigation, even wealthy countries will see an economic downturn by 2100.
When thousands of scientists, economists and policymakers meet in Paris this December to negotiate an international climate treaty, one question will dominate conversations: what is the climate worth?
A new study published in the journal Nature shows that the global economy will take a harder hit from rising temperatures than previously thought, with incomes falling in most countries by the year 2100 if climate change continues unchecked. Rich countries may experience a brief economic uptick, but growth will drop off sharply after temperatures pass a critical heat threshold.
The study, co-led by Marshall Burke, a professor of Earth system science at Stanford's School of Earth, Energy & Environmental Sciences, provides a clear picture of how climate change will shape the global economy, which has been a critical missing piece for the international climate community leading up to the Paris talks. Understanding how much future climate change will cost in terms of global economic losses will help policymakers at the meetings decide how much to invest in emissions reductions today.
The work was co-authored by two researchers from the University of California, Berkeley: co-lead author Solomon Hsiang, the Chancellor's Associate Professor of Public Policy, and Edward Miguel, Oxfam Professor in Environmental and Resource Economics.
Heat threshold
"The data tell us that there are particular temperatures where we humans are really good at producing stuff," said Burke, who is also Center Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies and fellow, by courtesy, at the Stanford Woods Institute for the Environment. "In countries that are normally quite cold - mostly wealthy northern countries - higher temperatures are associated with faster economic growth, but only to a point. After that point, growth declines rapidly.
That point, it turns out, is an annual average temperature of about 55 degrees Fahrenheit.
As average temperatures move past that mark, wealthy countries will start to see a drop-off in economic output. Poorer countries, mostly in the tropics, will suffer even steeper losses because they are already past the temperature threshold. This has the potential to widen the global inequality gap, said Burke.
A new approach
Looking at existing research, the team found a puzzling mismatch between micro-level studies, which show negative impacts of hot temperatures on output in specific sectors such as agriculture, and macro-level studies, which at least in rich countries show limited impacts on economic output.
"Many very careful studies show clearly that high temperatures are bad for things like agriculture and labor productivity, even in rich countries," Burke said. "While these relationships showed up again and again in the micro data – for example when looking at agricultural fields or manufacturing plants – they were not showing up in the existing macro-level studies, and we wanted to understand why."
The researchers suspected the problem was with the analysis, not the data, so they took a new approach.
Analyzing records from 166 countries over a 50-year period from 1960 to 2010, they compared each country's economic output in years of normal temperatures to that of unusually warm or unusually cool years. The data revealed a hill-shaped relationship between economic output and temperature, with output rising until the 55 F threshold and then falling faster and faster at higher temperatures. “Our macro-level results lined up nicely with the micro-level studies,” Hsiang said.
Two possible future. Colors are 2100 temperatures under “business as usual” climate change (left) and aggressive climate policy (right). This image shows a simulation of future nightlights, as seen from space, since richer economies tend to glow brighter. A hotter world is a more unequal world, with the north benefitting and tropical economies declining. A cooler world leads to more equitable global growth, offering regions like Africa the chance to “catch up”. Courtesy of Marshall Burke.
Two possible future. Colors are 2100 temperatures under “business as usual” climate change (left) and aggressive climate policy (right). This image shows a simulation of future nightlights, as seen from space, since richer economies tend to glow brighter. A hotter world is a more unequal world, with the north benefitting and tropical economies declining. A cooler world leads to more equitable global growth, offering regions like Africa the chance to “catch up”. Source: Burke, Hsiang and Miguel.
Higher temperatures, lower growth
The team then sought to understand what this historical pattern might mean for the future global economy as temperatures continue to warm.
“Many other researchers have projected economic impacts under future climate change,” Hsiang said. “But we feel our results improve our ability to anticipate how societies in coming decades might respond to warming temperatures.”
Projecting future changes in economic output under climate change was challenging.
“Even without climate change, there are a lot of possible ways in which the future economy might evolve,” Burke said. “We start with a few different baseline scenarios and then we bring in our historical understanding of the relationship between temperature and economic output to better understand how these economic trajectories might change with warming temperatures."
The researchers’ findings were stark.
In a scenario of unmitigated climate change, the team’s model shows that by 2100 the per-capita incomes of 77 percent of countries in the world would fall relative to current levels. By the team’s main estimate, global incomes could decline 23 percent by 2100, relative to a world without climate change. Other estimates are twice as high. The likelihood of global economic losses larger than 20 percent of current income is at least 40 percent, and much higher in some scenarios.
These estimates are substantially larger than existing models indicate, a difference the research team attributes to their updated and data-driven understanding of how countries have historically responded to temperature increases.
Rich countries not immune
A common assumption among researchers has been that wealth and technology protect rich countries from the economic impacts of climate change, because they use these resources to adapt to higher temperatures.
"Under this hypothesis, the impacts of future warming should lessen over time as more countries become richer," Burke said. "But we find limited evidence that this is the case."
Burke's team found that, historically, rich countries did not appear to respond any differently to temperature change than poor countries.
“The data definitely don’t provide strong evidence that rich countries are immune from the effects of hot temperatures,” said Hsiang. “Many rich countries just happen to have cooler average temperatures to start with, meaning that future warming will overall be less harmful than in poorer, hotter countries.”
Paris climate talks
From Nov. 30 to Dec. 11, France will host the 21st Session of the Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP21/CMP11).
More than 40,000 delegates from national governments, private companies and civil society will meet in Paris to hash out an international agreement aimed at keeping global emissions low enough to prevent warming of more than two degrees Celsius.
On the table are three key issues: climate adaptation, mitigation and financing.
"We don't want to rule out that we could see unprecedented adaptation to hotter temperatures in the future, and we certainly hope we do see it," Burke said. "The historical evidence, though, suggests that this is not something we should count on."
The team says that mitigation, and how to pay for it, should be at the forefront of discussions in Paris.
"Our research is important for COP21 because it suggest that these economic damages could be much larger than current estimates indicate," said Burke. "What that means for policy is that we should be willing to spend a lot more on mitigation than we would otherwise. The benefits of action on mitigation are much greater than we thought, because the costs of inaction are much greater than we thought."
Note for reporters: The research team has created a website about their research results and methodology, including an interactive map showing country-by-country GDP projections through 2100 under a scenario of unmitigated climate change.
Two possible future. Colors are 2100 temperatures under “business as usual” climate change (left) and aggressive climate policy (right). This image shows a simulation of future nightlights, as seen from space, since richer economies tend to glow brighter. A hotter world is a more unequal world, with the north benefitting and tropical economies declining. A cooler world leads to more equitable global growth, offering regions like Africa the chance to “catch up”. Courtesy of Marshall Burke.
