Future historians will mark the first national election to be held in Malaysia since the retirement of Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad (1981-2003) as a watershed in the country's political history. Among key questions circulating in the run-up to the voting on 21 March 2004 were these: Would the ruling National Front gain or lose votes and seats? (Surprise: gained greatly.) Would the opposition Islamic Party, now in control of two states, improve or worsen its position? (Surprise: worsened sharply.) Would KeADILan, the political party which emerged after the sacking of Anwar Ibrahim, gain or lose? (Surprise: lost badly.) Answers to other questions were still unknown: Would the election benefit Malaysia's current Prime Minister, Abdullah Badawi, at the congress of his political party later this year? What would the ruling coalition's landslide imply for Malaysian democracy, stability, and development? For Malaysia's role in the campaign against terrorism? For the country's relations with its neighbors and with the U.S.? (Surprise: Come hear Elizabeth Wong and find out.)

This is the ninth seminar of the 2003-2004 academic year Southeast Asia Forum.

Mr. Sun will try to establish a new research framework to analyze the monetary policy transmission mechanism. In this field, previous research has usually assumed that the banking sector would completely transmit the purpose of the central bank to the real sector, thus paying attention to the channels from the banking sector to the real sector. Because the transmission of monetary policy in the banking sector is the most important part of deciding the effectiveness of monetary policy, this research focuses on the transmission mechanism of monetary policy from the central bank to the banking sector. The concept of ?cushion storage reserve? was created by Mr. Sun and was introduced to this framework to analyze the comparison of reserve supply and reserve demand. Based on this concept and a related main formula, commercial banks? behaviors were divided into three reactive approaches -- sterilize, forbear, and adjust. According to the different kinds of reactions, monetary policy has different effects. This new analyzing framework makes the analysis of monetary policy operation more concise and effective. At the end of his paper, Mr. Sun will try to use this approach to explain the present monetary situation of China and Japan. Lunch will be provided for those who RSVP by 3/29/04.

Ambassador Park joined the Republic of Korea's Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1963 and has served as deputy minister for political affairs, ambassador to Morocco and Canada, ambassador to the UN office in Geneva and GATT, chancellor of the Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security, special envoy to Iran, Jordan, Qatar and Oman, chief representative of the ROK on the UN Security Council, and president of the UN Security Council. He is currently president of the UN Association of the Republic of Korea.

Consider the paradox: Singapore's economy is well developed, yet civil society in the city-state has failed to generate significant pressure for greater openness and more democracy. Nor does Singapore appear to have been affected by the ?Third Wave? of democratization that has swept other parts of the world. Scholars have tried to account for the conundrum by noting the deterrent effect of extensive state power, including the Internal Security Act (ISA), which allows for detention without trial. The state in Singapore has been likened to a large banyan tree whose omnipresent foliage casts shadows so wide and deep that no other organisms can take root or grow.

In her talk, Prof. Kadir will challenge this explanation as overdrawn. She will question the extent to which the Sinagpore state has remained immune from societal pressures, and explore the increasingly complex dynamics of society-state interaction. Based on a review of different civil-society actors and actions, she will highlight two modes in which social groups are proactive toward the state: by engaging it through interest advocacy, and by resisting it through efforts to protect their own autonomous space. The conventional wisdom is partly correct: Civil society does suffer the stunting shadows of the banyan tree. Yet social pressures are being felt. Ironically, some of these pressures, far from undermining the state, have helped it to remain strong.

Suzaina Kadir, currently a fellow at the Asia Research Institute in Singapore, is writing a book on state power and religious authority in Indonesia.

(Abstract from paper) Sociological theorizing and research on the relationship between inequality and corruption is surprisingly rare given the discipline’s long-standing focus on the correlations of inequality with democracy and development, as well as research that demonstrates the associations between corruption, democracy and development.  We propose that greater income inequality increases corruption and find that its explanatory power is significant relative to conventionally accepted correlates of corruption such as low levels of economic development and democracy.  We argue that the rich will employ corruption as one means to preserve and advance their own status, privileges and interests while the poor will be vulnerable to extortion at higher levels of inequality.

While countries with authoritarian regimes are likely to have greater levels of corruption on average, higher levels of inequality increase the likelihood of corruption in countries with democratic regimes because the wealthy cannot employ oppression to advance their interests in these political systems.  Contrary to conventional wisdom, smaller and not larger government is associated with higher levels of corruption because higher inequality through corruption is associated with both lower tax rates as well as lower government transfers and subsidies. We also corroborate the finding that the negative effect of inequality on economic growth can be explained at least in part by its impact on corruption.