This event is presented in conjunction with the Japan Society of Northern California.

Heidi Linton has worked with Christian Friends of Korea in a variety of capacities since its founding in 1995, and has served as Executive Director since 2002.  She holds a Master’s Degree from New York University, and a Bachelor’s Degree from the University of Washington.   Since 1995, CFK has delivered over $34 Million USD in various forms of aid (including food, medicine, medical supplies and equipment, technical upgrades, agricultural supplies and equipment and other goods) to multiple healthcare and other facilities in the DPRK.   Heidi regularly leads CFK visits to the DPRK to confirm delivery of all shipments and to engage in technical projects.  Together with Andrew Linton, a co-founder of CFK whose parents, grandparents and great-grand parents were all lifelong Presbyterian missionaries to Korea, they have three children.

Abstract:  In this era of catastrophic terrorism and heightened concerns about pandemic influenza and other emerging diseases, unprecedented resources have been allocated to improving medical and public health emergency preparedness.  Investments in such preparedness, however, can impose significant opportunity costs, particularly when the investments are focused on improving consequence management capabilities.  Enhancing preparedness and response capabilities in economically efficient, proportionate, and politically sustainable ways thus becomes a critical component of any longterm effort to address the threats we face.  Dr. Hatchett will speak about the challenges of developing medical countermeasure for CBRN threats and preparing communities for infectious disease emergencies, using these examples to raise more general issues about the relative benefits of specific v. "broad-spectrum" strategies and countermeasures, decision-making under conditions of uncertainty, and our efforts to "get ready" for nuclear terrorism and pandemic influenza.

Dr. Hatchett is Associate Director for Radiation Countermeasures Research and Emergency Preparedness at the National Institute for Allergy and Infectious Disease, overseeing a program that develops drugs and devices to prevent or mitigate the effects of radiation exposure. 

In 2005-06, he served as Director for Biodefense Policy at the White House Homeland Security Council, where he was a principal author of the Implementation Plan for the National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza and helped set policy and devise strategies to mitigate the consequences of a pandemic.  Dr. Hatchett previously served as Senior Medical Adviser in the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) Office of Public Health Emergency Preparedness, where he worked on a wide range of biodefense issues, including the delivery of mass prophylaxis to urban populations, the development of disease containment strategies, and the role of modeling in the formulation of public health policy. 

Dr. Hatchett completed his undergraduate and medical educations at Vanderbilt University, an internship and residency in Internal Medicine at New York Hospital - Cornell Medical Center, and a fellowship in Medical Oncology at the Duke University Medical Center.

Emily Meierding is a Ph.D. Candidate in the University of Chicago Department of Political Science. Her dissertation examines the role of natural resources in interstate conflict and cooperation. She is a participant in the Center for International Studies' Project on Environmental Conflict at the University of Chicago.

James Fearon is the Theodore and Frances Geballe Professor in the School of Humanities and Sciences, a professor of political science and CISAC affiliated faculty member at Stanford University. His research interests include civil and interstate war, ethnic conflict, the international spread of democracy and the evaluation of foreign aid projects promoting improved governance. He is presently working on a book manuscript (with David Laitin) on civil war since 1945. Recent publications include "Iraq's Civil War" (Foreign Affairs, March/April 2007), "Neotrusteeship and the Problem of Weak States" (International Security, Spring 2004), and "Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War," (APSR, February 2003). Fearon won the 1999 Karl Deutsch Award, which is "presented annually to a scholar under the age of forty, or within ten years of the acquisition of his or her Doctoral Degree, who is judged to have made, through a body publications, the most significant contribution to the study of International Relations and Peace Research." He was elected as a fellow of the American Academy of the Arts and Sciences in 2002.

Abstract:  Scholars and policy-makers, when seeking to predict the future of nuclear proliferation, often refer to "nuclear capable states," or "latent nuclear weapons states," or "virtual nuclear powers."  There is consensus, however, about what such terms mean or how to measure a state's "nuclear latency," a condition that leads to widespread miscommunication and misunderstanding in the field.  This talk reviews alternative methods for measuring "nuclear latency" in the political science and technical literatures. It provides historical evidence of the wide range of time-lines for different states to move from one state of nuclear weapons development to more advanced states of development and identifies a set of political factors (including organizational competency, ambivalent political leadership, different arsenal size ambitions) that can influence the time-lags that states experience in their nuclear weapons programs. 

Scott Sagan is a professor of political science and co-director of Stanford's Center for International Security and Cooperation. He is on sabbatical in 2008-09. Before joining the Stanford faculty, Sagan was a lecturer in the Department of Government at Harvard University and served as a special assistant to the director of the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the Pentagon. He has also served as a consultant to the office of the Secretary of Defense and at the Sandia National Laboratory and the Los Alamos National Laboratory.

Sagan is the author of Moving Targets: Nuclear Strategy and National Security (Princeton University Press, 1989), The Limits of Safety: Organizations, Accidents, and Nuclear Weapons(Princeton University Press, 1993), and with co-author Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed (W.W. Norton, 2002). He is the co-editor of Peter R. Lavoy, Scott D. Sagan, and James L. Wirtz, Planning the Unthinkable (Cornell University Press, 2000). Sagan was the recipient of Stanford University's 1996 Hoagland Prize for Undergraduate Teaching and the 1998 Dean's Award for Distinguished Teaching. As part of CISAC's mission of training the next generation of security specialists he and Stephen Stedman founded Stanford's Interschool Honors Program in International Security Studies in 2000.

His recent articles include "How to Keep the Bomb From Iran," in Foreign Affairs (September-October 2006); "The Madman Nuclear Alert: Secrecy, Signaling, and Safety in October 1969" co-written by Jeremi Suri and published in International Security in spring 2003; and "The Problem of Redundancy Problem: Will More Nuclear Security Forces Produce More Nuclear Security?" published in Risk Analysis in 2004. The first piece warns against "proliferation fatalism" and "deterrence optimism" to argue that the United States should work to prevent Iran's pursuit of nuclear weapons by addressing the security concerns that are likely motivators for Iran's nuclear ambitions. The International Security piece looks into the events surrounding a secret nuclear alert ordered by President Nixon to determine how effective the alert was at achieving the president's goal of forcing negotiations for the end of the Vietnam War. It also questions many of the assumptions made about nuclear signaling and discusses the dangers of new nuclear powers using this technique. Sagan's article on redundancy in Risk Analysis won Columbia University's Institute for War and Peace Studies 2003 Best Paper in Political Violence prize. In this article, Sagan looks at how we should think about nuclear security and the emerging terrorist threat, specifically whether more nuclear facility security personnel increases our safety. His article, "Realism, Ethics, and Weapons of Mass Destruction" appears in Ethics and Weapons of Mass Destruction: Religious and Secular Perspectives, edited by Sohail Hashmi and Steven Lee. In addition to these works, Sagan is also finishing a collection of essays for a book tentatively entitled Inside Nuclear South Asia.