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A lab experiment in Côte d’Ivoire finds that making applications for cash support public reduced unsuccessful claims but also deterred more than one in four eligible participants.

A government can fund a social programme and define who qualifies. But will eligible people come forward if applying exposes their financial hardship? In many settings, applications are made in person and are difficult to keep private. This visibility may create a hidden barrier to social protection.

Several factors may prevent eligible people from claiming support. Applications can be costly, time-consuming, and difficult to understand, and may require documents people do not have (Bhargava and Manoli 2015, Finkelstein and Notowidigdo 2021). In low-income settings, recipients may also face pressure to share benefits with relatives and friends (Baland et al. 2011, Platteau 2014).

A third possibility is psychological: being seen asking for help may threaten applicants’ self-worth or expose them to anticipated judgement – a concern often discussed under the broader heading of welfare stigma. Most evidence on this psychological cost comes from high-income countries (Lasky-Fink and Linos 2022).

In Fafchamps and Sadou Zouleya (2026), we ask whether making the application itself observable deters demand for income support among low-income populations. In our experiment, the public procedure screened out 28% of participants who would otherwise have received the transfer.

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VoxDev
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Marcel Fafchamps
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We examine how social stigma affects the willingness of low-income individuals to apply for financial support. After completing tasks to earn income in the lab, participants are given the opportunity to apply for a transfer from a social fund earmarked for the lowest earners. We experimentally vary whether the application is public or private and whether the funds come from the experimenters or other participants. We find that making the application public reduces take-up by 31 percentage points. Adding peer funding leads to a further 10 percentage point drop. These effects are strongest when income is earned through effort instead of a lottery, and when both public visibility and peer funding are present. The findings are not driven by altruistic or redistributive preferences, but perspective taking makes participants more sensitive to the public application treatment. Our findings suggest that ensuring privacy in the application process helps increase access to income support programs.

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Stanford King Center on Global Development
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Marcel Fafchamps
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Data is necessary to study any particular place. But, in development economics, research inquiries have historically focused more on rural areas. Nearly a decade ago King Center faculty affiliate and economics professor Marcel Fafchamps and former King Center faculty director Pascaline Dupas (now at Princeton), set out to change that by launching the King Center’s African Urbanization and Development Research Initiative (AUDRI). The initiative conducts wide-ranging, multi-year panel surveys on the changing economic, social, and political conditions in two of Africa’s largest cities, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, and Abidjan, Côte d’Ivoire.

Read the full article from the King Center on Urban Development.

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South African township
South African township. | Peter H. Maltbie
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By 2050, seven out of every 10 people worldwide will live in cities. Stanford researchers are seeking ways to make them stable and sustainable.

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We investigate the potential welfare cost of relative rank considerations using a series of vignettes and lab-in-the-field experiments with over 2,000 individuals in Abidjan, Cote d'Ivoire. We show that: (1) individuals judged to be of a lower rank are perceived as more likely to be sidelined from beneficial opportunities in many aspects of life; and (2) in response, individuals distort their appearance and consumption choices in order to appear of higher rank. These effects are strong and economically significant. As predicted by a simple signaling model, the distortion is larger for individuals with low (but not too low) socio-economic status.

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CEPR Press
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Marcel Fafchamps
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CEPR Discussion Paper No. 19092
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