Michael A. McFaul - Critics of the American-led wars in Afghanistan and Iraq cited the violation of state sovereignty as their chief concern. Invoking the United Nations Charter, opponents of these wars warned that American violation of Afghan and Iraqi sovereignty was illegal, immoral, and threatening to international order.

Michael A. McFaul - It is absolutely vital that the new regime in Afghanistan succeed. Afghanistan is our new West Germany. The new regime there must stand as a positive example to the rest of the region of how rejection of tyranny and alliance with the West can translate into democratic governance and economic growth. And the United States must demonstrate to the rest of the Muslim world that we take state construction -- democratic construction -- as seriously as we do state destruction. Beyond Afghanistan, the [Bush] administration must develop additional, non-military tools for fighting the new war. To succeed, the United States will need its full arsenal of political, diplomatic, economic and military weapons. Bush's statements suggest that he understands this imperative. Bush's budget, however, suggests a divide between rhetoric and policy.

Michael A. McFaul - First, the collapse of the old regime left a vacuum of state power. The anarchy, looting and interruption of state services that we see in Iraq are predictable consequences of regime change. Second, after the fall of the dictator, expectations about "life after the dictator" exploded. People who have been oppressed for decades want to benefit from the new order immediately. The urgent and angry questions last week from Ahmed Chalabi, the Iraqi National Congress leader now back in Iraq, about why the Americans have not provided more relief faster is typical. The first leaders after the departure of the king in France, the czar in Russia or the communists in Eastern Europe knew Chalabi's situation well. Paradoxically, society's expectations inflate at precisely the same moment when the state is least prepared to meet them. Third, the coalition that opposed the dictatorship dissolved. While the dictator was still in power, this united front embraced one ideology of opposition -- "anti-king," "anti-czar," "anti-shah" or "anti- communist." In doing so, these coalitions consisted of economic, political, ethnic and religious forces with radically different visions for their country after regime change. Unity ended after the dictator fell. In Russia, Bolsheviks and liberals in 1917 and nationalists and democrats in 1991 went their separate ways. In Iran in 1979, Islamic leftists, liberals and militant clerics celebrated their shared goal of removing the shah. Just a few years after the collapse of the old order, many of the coalition partners who brought down the shah were out of power or in jail. Soon after the Soviet puppet regime in Afghanistan fell, the anti-Soviet coalition forces were killing each other.

Michael A. McFaul - Last week was a tragic setback for those committed to promoting regime change in the greater Middle East. Terrorists slaughtered dozens of innocents in Iraq, Israel and Afghanistan. In the wake of the carnage, expressing hope for democracy in Palestine, Iraq and Afghanistan sounds naïve. Even the prospect of stable, effective government in these places seems remote.