Within weeks of 9/11, Japan dispatched ships to the Indian Ocean to provide fuel and other support to the Western forces waging the war in Afghanistan.

It was the first time since World War II that Japan sent forces abroad to support an overseas military conflict, although in a noncombat role. American policymakers hailed Japan as a loyal ally, willing to put "boots on the ground."

Come Nov. 1, however, the Japanese ships will be heading home.

American officials worry that, after taking steps to shed its postwar pacifism, Japan will now shirk its role as an ally in international security.

But these concerns are alarmist. The Japanese government, even its liberal opposition party, has shown a desire and commitment to contribute to global security.

A renewal of the law authorizing the mission in Afghanistan is now increasingly unlikely, since the opposition Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), which opposes the measure, won a shocking victory in last summer's elections for the upper house of parliament. While the ruling conservative Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) is still determined to reauthorize the military role, it faces significant public opposition and a tough road in the parliament.

Some American officials and experts have issued bellicose warnings that not renewing the mission would signal a dangerous retreat from Japan's responsibilities in the world and undermine the security alliance. Others accused DPJ leader Ozawa Ichiro of being irresponsible, even "anti-American."

These remarks are clumsy and unfair. The possibility of Japan's return to a lesser security role is real enough, but its mission in Afghanistan is the wrong test of the country's reliability as an ally.

In reality, the maritime mission has become largely symbolic. As for Mr. Ozawa, if Americans would listen carefully to his arguments, they would find that he seeks to expand, not contract, Japan's global security role.

What the US sees as backtracking on global responsibility is actually something else --opposition, shared by Japan's liberal and conservative parties, to the American decision to invade Iraq. Once carefully buried behind the appearance of alliance solidarity, it is now surfacing.

Ozawa and his party have been unusually open in questioning the Iraq war, characterizing it as a war without clear international justification. According to reliable accounts, Japanese Prime Minister Fukuda Kazuo privately shares that view, as do others in the LDP.

US officials critical of the DPJ for avoiding a greater security role for Japan should remember that the party supported the antiterrorism law when it was passed in 2001. But they refused to support its renewal later after the Iraq war began. Over time, senior DPJ members say, the mission's original purpose got muddied with military operations in Iraq. Japanese and American officials deny that any diversion took place, but the Pentagon admits that ships engage in multiple missions and there is no way to segregate how fuel is used.

The new version of the law proposed by the LDP explicitly narrows the role of the Navy to supporting antiterrorist interdiction operations, a backhanded acknowledgment that there was no clear separation from the Iraq war.

Ozawa has long advocated a more visible security role for Japan outside its borders, calling on the government to send forces to aid the Gulf War in 1991 and pushing through legislation allowing Japanese participation in UN peacekeeping operations.

Japanese peacekeepers, however, are restricted to noncombat missions. Despite inching toward a larger security role, the government stands by an interpretation of Japan's American-authored antiwar clause in its Constitution that bars the use of force for anything other than to respond to an attack on themselves. But Ozawa has long contended that the constitutional bar should not extend to UN activities.

This month, Ozawa proposed that instead of the maritime force, Japan should send peacekeepers to Afghanistan under the auspices of the UN-authorized international security forces, and to Sudan as well.

Ironically, the ruling conservatives reject that as unconstitutional, arguing it would be an act of collective defense rather than self-defense.

"If Japan is to really be an ally of the US ..." Ozawa wrote, "it should hold its head up high and strive to give proper advice to the US." And in order to do that," he continued, "Japan had to be willing to put itself more on the line by sharing responsibility for peacekeeping, not just sending a few boats out of harm's way."

These are ideas that should be embraced, rather than denounced, by American officials.

Reprinted by permission by the Christian Science Monitor.

Once the jewel in the crown of the formidable British Empire, India has been surrounded by myth for years. After gaining independence in 1948, this often misunderstood country found itself faced with a new sense of freedom -- and along with it, enormous burdens and challenges. While exotic, mysterious, and seductive, it has also become an economic force to be reckoned with. With the fourth largest economy in the world, the largest youth population on Earth, and a thriving middle class, India is the second-most-preferred destination for foreign investment. But very few Americans truly understand what a rich and powerful country it has become -- or its role as a global power, center of outsourcing, and potential partner with the United States.

From the country's thriving film industry to its burgeoning high-tech industry, as well as its attempts to stabilize its economy, India Arriving offers a fascinating glimpse into the real India, with all of its assets and all of its faults.

Author Rafiq Dossani goes beneath the veil surrounding India and considers the many ways it has begun to emerge onto the world stage. He explores its birth as an independent nation and forces like political shifts, social reform, and education that have helped to shape a new India. Honest and revelatory, India Arriving provides a deeper understanding of a country that promises to be the next major player in the world economy.

There is no consensus as to what outsiders can or should do in response to the dire situation inside Burma (Myanmar). At least that was the impression left by a vigorous discussion at a standing-room-only event convened by SEAF on October 18, 2007 on "Burma's Crisis: What Should Outsiders Do?"

Reviewing the protests that broke out in Burma in August 2007, swelled into mass demonstrations for democracy, and were brutally repressed by the junta in September-October, Maureen Aung-Thwin, who heads the Open Society Institute's Burma Project, argued for targeted sanctions. In her view, for example, cutting the flow of tourists to Burma would be less effective than spotlighting China's ties to the junta in the run-up to the 2008 Beijing Olympics, when Chinese leaders would be especially sensitive to embarrassment. But if positive change could be achieved through engagement, that too would be worth trying, in her estimation.

Zarni, an author, activist, and visiting research fellow at Oxford University, differed from Aung-Thwin in recommending constructive and coordinated engagement. And whereas she thought that the political situation inside Burma, if it were to change at all, could change rapidly, Zarni argued that "gradual change is the only solution." Yet just as Aung-Thwin welcomed engagement, if that could promote democracy, protect human rights, and reduce the suffering of Burmese, so was Zarni amenable to sanctions if they could effectively serve such ends.

The willingness of both speakers to entertain a range of options reflected the difficulty of inducing change in Burma from the outside, and the corresponding inclination to be eclectic about options. One speaker from the floor went so far as to suggest that only physical intervention from the outside could end the repression. But of all the proposals suggested, that one appeared to be by far the least realistic.

Several speakers urged that China, India, and/or the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) be persuaded to put pressure the regime. But there was little faith in the room that Burma's immediate neighbors would sacrifice their economic interests, including access to Burma's natural gas, for the sake of promoting political reform. The sense of pessimism prevailing in the room prompted one person in the audience to suggest later that all one could hope to do was extend humanitarian aid to the Burmese people and wait for political reforms that might never arrive.

Suharto's authoritarian "New Order" regime in Indonesia unraveled quickly in 1998. Aung-Thwin recalled a conversation she had had that year with an expert on Indonesia. He had told her he expected the New Order to last a long time. Three weeks later, Suharto resigned.

Aung-Thwin offered this anecdote by way of suggesting that events in Burma, too, could someday catch observers by surprise. Also surprising, in view of this discussion, would be the effectiveness of any external action, on the full spectrum from sanctions to engagement, to induce the democratization of Burma.

The Asia Society Northern California and the Center for Southeast Asian Studies at the University of California-Berkeley co-sponsored this event with Stanford's SEAF. Of course none of the three is responsible for the opinions expressed on the panel or during the Q and A.

Pro: Not as Tempting

by Sabrina Siddiqui, intern, BusinessWeek, and a senior at the Medill School of Journalism at Northwestern University.

There is no doubt that over the last decade, India fortified its rule over the shared services and outsourcing (SSO) sector. Access to low-wage yet skilled workers allowed local global technology services giants Infosys (INFY), Tata Consultancy Services (TACSF), and Wipro (WIT) to employ tens of thousands of Indians to do work for such multinational corporate clients as Bank of America (BAC), Microsoft (MSFT), and Ericsson (ERIC).

But a recent study by Frost & Sullivan consolidates the idea that India's outsourcing has already peaked, and there are a number of factors to blame:

The Rupee Riddle. Earlier this year, the Indian rupee appreciated 8.4% against the U.S. dollar and touched 41.14 to the dollar, its highest rate in nine years. A significant reason for concern for the outsourcing sector, the upward value of the rupee continues to put a squeeze on earnings. By April, 2007, it had cut margins by about 2.5 percentage points.

Cost (In)Efficiency. Companies looking to outsource have long seen India as their most cost-efficient vehicle. But with wage inflation running 15% to 25% per year, India can no longer use the siren song of its labor being the cheapest. Competitors like China can offer their services at a lower cost, while firms like Infosys are stuck recruiting from outside the country, because the comparable Indian staff is growing too expensive.

That Age-Old Infrastructure. As much as the economy continues to boom, how long can it sustain its position when IT operations spend considerably on backup systems to fight regular blackouts? And the 300,000 engineering students who graduate each year may be short of the level needed to support modernization of infrastructure and industry growth. (Not to mention that the peculiarly accented "Doug Smith" on the computer help desk is a little too hard for U.S. callers to comprehend.)

So if you assume you're being rerouted by tech support to a call center in Bangalore, guess again. It seems India's grasp on the SSO market is at long-term risk, and it just so happens that your call might be answered by someone in Shanghai.

Con: Plenty of Spice Left

by Rafiq Dossani, Stanford University and Martin Kenney, University of California, Davis

Notwithstanding the occasional news stories about companies returning work earlier offshored to India, the logic behind offshoring and its financial impact (both on outsourcing firms operating in India and their American clients) remains intact. First, the logic: A fresh engineer costs $8,000, including benefits, on average in Bangalore. Even a "Google-quality", presumably equivalent to the best Google can hire anywhere (in fact, Google offers its India recruits the option of working in Silicon Valley if they so desire) costs $30,000. These wages are much lower than in the U.S. and will remain that way for at least a decadeespecially if the ambitious graduation targets of Indian education policymakers are realized.

Of course, there are problems in doing work long distance: Coordinating the work of global teams is costlier than coordinating such work locally. The intellectual property issues could be important. But offshoring is now tried and tested enough, and large corporations are deeply committed to it.

By 2010, many large multinational corporations like IBM (IBM) will have their largest workforces in India. This is creating a relatively rich ecosystem in a number of Indian cities, especially Bangalore.

Already, for a number of these firms, their Indian operations are being declared global centers of excellence, whose value goes well beyond just cost savings. Undoubtedly, some smaller firms have faced high initial costs, but even they, particularly the technology firms of Silicon Valley, have committed to Indian operations. Firms such as Infinera (INFNO) and HelloSoft have substantial Indian operations that are critical to their success. For them to retreat would require a major reorientation of their business strategy.

The appreciating rupee will, like rising wages, affect offshoring decisions. However, the Indian system integrators such as TCS, Infosys, and Wipro, which are also being squeezed by costs, have experienced profits rising at about 35% a year for the past decade and enjoy margins in excess of 20%. This provides ample room to absorb rising costs.

There can be little doubt that the Indian ecosystem is maturing. However, the growth of offshoring to India has not peaked.

Reprinted by permission from BusinessWeek.